In Parashat Shoftim (17:1), after commanding that we must obey the rulings of the Sanhedrin, the Torah introduces a prohibition against disobeying their rulings: “Lo Tasur Min Ha’dabar Asher Yagidu Lecha Yamin U’smol” – “Do not turn away from what they tell you, right or left.”
The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that if everybody follows his own understanding of Torah, rather than accepting the rulings of the central body of Torah authority, there would be countless disagreements and ongoing divisiveness. It would appear as though we have many different Torahs followed by many different people, rather than a single Torah to which we are all devoted. The Torah therefore commanded that we abide by the rulings of the Sages of the Sanhedrin, who invested a great deal of time and effort, applying themselves assiduously day and night to arrive at the truth of Torah law.
The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that the Torah requires abiding by the Sanhedrin’s rulings even if one is certain that the ruling is incorrect. The reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is “Tob Li’sbol Ta’ut Ahat Ve’yiheyu Ha’kol Mesurim Tahat Da’atam” – “It is better to tolerate one mistake and have everyone subject to their authority.” Although the Sanhedrin might, on rare occasions, issue a mistaken ruling, it is preferable for everyone to accept all their rulings, even their mistaken decisions, rather than allow people to disregard their opinion and thus disrespect their authority. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if people do not obey the court’s ruling, this would lead to “Hurban Ha’dat” – “the destruction of the religion.” Thus, accepting the rare incorrect decision is a small price to pay to maintain the stability of the Jewish religion by respecting the Sanhedrin’s authority.
The Sefer Ha’hinuch in this context discusses the famous story told in Masechet Baba Mesia (59) about the question regarding “Tanur Shel Achnai” – a certain type of oven, whose Halachic status came under dispute. Rabbi Eliezer maintained that this oven is not susceptible to Tum’a (impurity), whereas all the other Rabbis disagreed, and ruled that this oven can become Halachically impure. In an effort to prove his position, Rabbi Eliezer said that if he was correct, certain supernatural phenomena should occur, and they did. He then said that if he was correct, a Heavenly voice should make an announcement to this effect, and, sure enough, a voice came forth proclaiming that his view was correct. The Rabbis nevertheless refused to accept his opinion, as the Torah commanded following the majority view. Another Heavenly voice then came forth, announcing, “Nisehuni Banai, Nisehuni” – “My children have defeated Me!” It seems that Rabbi Eliezer’s view indeed reflected the true Halacha, but G-d was “defeated” by the Sages. The Sefer Ha’hinuch clarifies that G-d was, quite obviously, not “defeated.” It goes without saying that G-d can never be defeated by anybody. Rather, G-d was expressing that although Rabbi Eliezer was correct, the other Sages were nevertheless correct in dismissing his view, following the principle of “Ahareh Rabim Le’hatot.” G-d commanded in the Torah that we must follow the majority view, and so He granted His approval to the majority decision, even though it was incorrect. For the sake of maintaining the authority of the majority of the Sages, their view is to be accepted even in the rare situation where it can be determined to be incorrect.
The Rambam maintained that this prohibition of “Lo Tasur” includes disobeying any law established by the Sages. Whether the law was determined through logical deduction, or by applying the thirteen “Middot She’ha’Torah Nidreshet Bahen” (methods by which Halachot are extracted from the text of the Humash), violating the law transgresses the command of “Lo Tasur.” The Rambam adds that this applies also if one transgressed a law enacted by the Sages as a safeguard against violations of Torah law.
The Ramban strongly disputes the Rambam’s opinion, noting that the Rambam in essence transforms every violation of Rabbinic law into a violation of Torah law. If so, the Ramban asks, then how did the Sages draw Halachic distinctions between these two categories of laws? As we know, Halacha establishes that “Safek De’Orayta Le’humra” – we must act stringently in situations of doubt where a Torah law is at stake, whereas “Safek De’Rabbanan Le’kula” – we may act leniently in situations of doubt where a Rabbinic law is at stake. According to the Rambam, however, this rule seems meaningless, for every Rabbinic law is, essentially, a Torah law, as violating a Rabbinic law constitutes a violation of the Torah command of “Lo Tasur.” The Ramban therefore maintains that the prohibition of “Lo Tasur” applies only to the Sages’ interpretation of Torah law, and not to the laws which they enacted.
Later writers explained that in the Rambam’s view, the Sages enacted their laws with certain “built-in” leniencies. Meaning, from the outset, the Sages intended their enactments to apply only in situations of certainty, and not in situations of doubt. The rule of “Safek De’Rabbanan Le’kula” stems from the fact that the Sages did not require us to observe their enactments when there is some uncertainty. This rule, then, does not disprove the Rambam’s theory that violating a Rabbinic enactment constitutes a violation of the Torah command of “Lo Tasur.”
Some Aharonim added that the command of “Lo Tasur” applies only to knowingly disregarding the Sages’ authority. If a person violates a Rabbinic law due to temptation, or out of simple laziness, but without any intention to undermine the Rabbis’ authority, then he is not in violation of “Lo Tasur.” The Rambam, according to this understanding, refers only to one who violates a Rabbinic law out of disregard for the authority of the Sages.
The prohibition of “Lo Tasur” falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’azharat Bet Din” – a prohibition that, in certain circumstances, is punishable by court execution. There is a situation of “Zekan Mamreh,” where a Torah scholar refuses to accept a ruling of the Sanhedrin regarding certain categories of Torah law, and is thus liable to capital punishment. One who violates a “Lav Ha’nitan Le’azharat Bet Din” under circumstances that do not warrant capital punishment is not liable to Malkut. Therefore, one who violates the command of “Lo Tasur” by disobeying the ruling of the Sanhedrin, despite committing a grievous transgression, is not liable to Malkut.