We begin our exploration from the fourth section of the text. The Torah states that if someone is watching an item for a friend, denies possession, swears falsely, and then later admits to having it, they must bring a sin offering and repay the principal with an additional one-fifth. The verse explicitly mentions a "sin offering." From this, we learn that even if one is watching a peace offering (a type of sacrifice), it is considered the property of the owner. This is the view of Abaye Yosef ben Dostai, who cites Ben Azai as saying that the verse comes to include "light holy offerings" (קדשים קלים). He interprets Ben Azai to mean that if one is watching a peace offering, it is considered the owner's property.
However, Abaye Yosef ben Dostai then clarifies that Ben Azai did not mean all peace offerings, but specifically a firstborn animal (בכור). This distinction leads to a deeper analysis: If Ben Azai meant to include peace offerings as the owner's property, what was he trying to exclude? If the intention was to exclude a firstborn animal, this seems illogical. A peace offering has many laws associated with it: the owners must lean their hands on it, libations must be brought with it, and the breast and thigh must be waved. If such an animal is considered the owner's property, then a firstborn animal, which lacks these specific rituals, would certainly be considered the owner's property. Therefore, Ben Azai could not have meant to include peace offerings to the exclusion of a firstborn animal.
So, what was Ben Azai trying to exclude? The text suggests he was excluding a tithed animal (מעשר בהמה). Regarding a firstborn animal, the Torah states, "You shall not redeem it." However, it is permissible to sell a firstborn animal while it is still alive. This means that while its sanctity cannot be transferred to money, it can be sold, and the buyer would then be obligated to slaughter and eat it. Thus, a firstborn animal is considered the owner's property because it can be sold. In contrast, for a tithed animal, the Torah uses a stronger term, "it shall not be redeemed," implying that it cannot even be sold. This makes a tithed animal truly "property of the Most High" (ממון גבוה), not the owner's. Therefore, when Ben Azai said that a peace offering is considered the owner's property, he was excluding a tithed animal, not a firstborn animal.
Ravina then discusses the statement of Abaye Yosef ben Dostai, who said that Ben Azai only referred to a firstborn animal. According to this interpretation, Ben Azai meant that if one is watching a peace offering that is a firstborn animal, it is considered the owner's property. But again, what would this exclude? It cannot be other peace offerings, because if a firstborn animal, which is holy from birth, is considered the owner's property, then a regular peace offering, which is not holy from birth, would certainly be considered the owner's property. Thus, Abaye Yosef ben Dostai's interpretation of Ben Azai would also lead to the conclusion that the exclusion is a tithed animal.
However, the Gemara notes a problem: Abaye Yosef ben Dostai explicitly stated that Ben Azai said "only a firstborn animal" (אלא בכור בלבד). If this is the case, then the logic that a firstborn animal being holy from birth would imply other peace offerings are also the owner's property, and thus the exclusion is a tithed animal, is still valid. The Gemara concludes that if one learns the entire discussion based on Abaye Yosef ben Dostai's specific wording, it becomes difficult to explain the exclusion. The difficulty arises from the strong emphasis on "only a firstborn animal," which seems to limit Ben Azai's statement in a way that the subsequent logical deductions struggle to accommodate.
The Gemara then returns to a fundamental principle: "Any property that is not subject to the law of trespass (מעילה)." Previously, we understood this to mean that if a peace offering is damaged, one must pay, because peace offerings are not subject to the law of trespass. However, the Gemara asks why the Mishnah uses this complex phrasing. Why not simply say "private property" (הדיוט)? The implication is that the Mishnah could have simply stated that one is liable for damages to private, non-consecrated property. The phrase "not subject to the law of trespass" might be interpreted as including property that, while consecrated, does not incur the specific trespass penalty. This leads to the question of why the Mishnah did not use a simpler term like "private property."
Rava explains that the Mishnah's phrasing means that one is only liable to pay for damages to property that is not consecrated. So why not simply say "not consecrated"? The Gemara suggests that the phrasing "not subject to the law of trespass" is meant to be precise. Even if a consecrated item, like a peace offering, is not subject to the specific trespass penalty, it is still considered "consecrated" and thus might be thought to be exempt from damage payments. The Mishnah clarifies that liability applies only to property that is entirely private, not even potentially consecrated.
The discussion shifts to a case where a peace offering causes damage. If a peace offering damages something, the payment is collected from its meat, but not from the parts (אמורים) designated for the altar. For example, if the damage is 100, and the animal is worth 200, with 150 being meat and 50 being altar parts, the owner only pays from the meat. The rule is that liability for damages is limited to the value of the damaging item itself (מגופו). So, if the animal's meat is worth 150, and the damage is 100, the owner pays 75 (half of the meat's value, as it's a "tam" or innocent animal, paying half damages). The altar parts, being consecrated, are exempt. The question arises: why is this even a novel ruling? It's obvious that one cannot take payment from consecrated parts.
The novelty is that one might have thought that if the altar parts are exempt, the meat portion should compensate for the full damage. For instance, if the total damage is 100, and the meat is worth 150, one might argue that the meat should cover the full 100, even if it means exceeding its proportional share of the animal's value. The Gemara clarifies that this is not the case. We view the animal as having two distinct parts—the meat and the altar parts—each responsible for its proportional share of the damage. If the altar parts are exempt, the meat does not compensate for their share. Thus, if the meat is worth 150 and is liable for half damages (75), and the altar parts are exempt, the injured party only receives 75. This means the injured party suffers a loss, as the altar parts are "exempt" from payment.
This ruling is then examined in light of different rabbinic opinions. According to the Rabbis, if one of two co-damagers cannot pay, the other does not compensate for the shortfall. For example, if an ox gores another ox into a pit, and the ox owner (liable for half damages) cannot pay, the pit owner (liable for full damages) does not have to pay the full amount. He only pays his own share. So, according to the Rabbis, it is obvious that the meat of the peace offering would not compensate for the exempt altar parts. However, Rabbi Natan holds that if one co-damager cannot pay, the other must compensate for the balance. Therefore, according to Rabbi Natan, one might expect the meat of the peace offering to compensate for the exempt altar parts.
The Gemara reconciles this by explaining that even Rabbi Natan would agree in the case of the peace offering. In the scenario of the ox and the pit, the pit owner is fully liable for the damage caused by his pit. He cannot claim that the ox caused the damage, because the ox was in his pit. But in the case of the peace offering, both the meat and the altar parts are equally responsible for the damage. The altar parts are simply exempt by Torah law. One cannot argue that only the meat caused the damage. Since the altar parts are a distinct part of the animal that caused damage but is exempt from payment, the meat part is not obligated to compensate for the altar parts' exemption. Therefore, even Rabbi Natan would agree that the injured party only receives payment from the meat, proportionate to its value, and suffers a loss from the exempt altar parts.
The discussion moves to a thanksgiving offering (קרבן תודה). A thanksgiving offering is unique because it requires 40 loaves of bread to be brought with it. If a thanksgiving offering causes damage, the payment is collected from its meat, but not from the bread. The Gemara asks if this is also a novel ruling. One might think that since the meat only becomes permissible to eat after the bread is brought, the injured party (who receives the meat as payment) might be obligated to bring the bread. The Gemara clarifies that this is not the case. The injured party eats the meat as compensation for the damage, but the person who brought the thanksgiving offering is still obligated to bring the bread, as it is part of his offering. The injured party does not incur this obligation.
The Mishnah states that one is liable only if the damaged property belongs to a "human being" (בן ברית). The Gemara asks what this comes to exclude. It cannot be a non-Jew, as that is discussed later. Rather, it is a general rule that will be explained in a subsequent Mishnah. The Mishnah also states that one is liable only if the property is "designated" (מיוחדין). This means that if it is unclear whose ox caused damage (e.g., two oxen chasing one, and one damages it), one cannot collect payment because the specific damaging ox is not designated. This rule is stated here and explained later.
A second explanation for "designated" refers to ownerless property (הפקר). If one damages ownerless property, one is exempt because there is no owner to claim payment. If an ownerless animal causes damage, one can simply take the animal as payment. The novelty of the Mishnah, then, is a case where an ox that was ownerless (הפקר) at the time of goring, but then acquired an owner, caused damage to your ox. You might think you could claim payment, but since it was not designated as belonging to an owner at the time of the damage, you have no claim against the subsequent owner.
Ravina offers a third explanation for "designated": it comes to exclude a case where an animal caused damage, and then its owner consecrated it (הקדש) or declared it ownerless (הפקר) before payment. The Torah states regarding an ox that kills a person that the ox "shall be stoned" and "its owner also shall be put to death." The word "owner" (בעליו) appears twice, implying that the animal must have an owner at the time of the goring and at the time of payment. If the owner consecrates or declares the animal ownerless before the court's final judgment, they are exempt from payment. Once the court declares liability, it is too late.
Finally, the Mishnah states that liability applies in "the domain designated for the damager" (רשות המזיק) and "the domain of the injured party and the damager" (רשות הניזק והמזיק). Regarding the first, if one's ox enters another's property and causes damage, the owner of the damaging ox is exempt, because the owner of the damaged property can say, "Who asked you to come into my domain?" Regarding the second, "the domain of the injured party and the damager" refers to shared property. Rav Hisda, citing Rav Ami, states that in a shared courtyard, if an animal causes damage by eating (שן) or kicking (רגל), the owner is liable. This is because shared property is considered "another's field" (שדה אחר), making the owner liable for these types of damages, unlike in a public domain where such damages are typically exempt.
The Gemara then clarifies how to read the Mishnah's statement about "the domain of the injured party and the damager." It should be read as: "If it damages in the domain of the damager, he is exempt. But if it damages in the domain of the injured party and the damager (i.e., shared property), he is liable." This aligns with the ruling that in shared property, damages from eating or kicking are liable. The Mishnah concludes by stating that payment is made from "the best of the field," a detail mentioned in the first Mishnah. This repetition is understood as referring to damages caused by goring (קרן), which our Mishnah had not explicitly discussed until this point. It clarifies that even for goring, payment is made from the best quality property. This also extends to a watcher (שומר) of an animal, who is liable for damages caused by goring, even if the animal escaped at night or was released by robbers, because the watcher takes the place of the owner.