We begin on daf 67a, side one. Rabbi Zeira says that a change that causes an object to acquire a new name is considered a change. Yesterday, we discussed that a change of name, together with the owner’s relinquishment of the object, can enable the thief to acquire it. We discussed a calf that becomes an ox and similar cases. Therefore, when an object acquires a new name, that is already significant.
However, we had a question. The Gemara brought a teaching regarding the famous case of a beam. A beam that was built into a house is called a roof beam. We see that its name has changed. Nevertheless, the thief is not required to return the beam itself only because of the enactment for penitents. The Sages wanted to make it easier for thieves to repent, because once the beam has been built into a house, how can the thief possibly return it? They therefore allowed him to repay its value in money.
But why do we need that explanation? We could simply say that the thief does not have to return the beam because he acquired it through the change of name. The Gemara answers that a beam remains a beam wherever it is. Even after it has been built into a house, it is still called a beam. Therefore, this is not truly a change of name.
The Gemara gives another answer: the beam is not considered to have undergone a change of name because the change is reversible. If the beam is removed from the house, it returns to its original status as a beam. By contrast, one cannot turn an ox back into a calf. But one can turn a roof beam back into a beam simply by removing it from the house. Such a change is not considered a true change of name.
Rashi, in the fourth line, explains that this is the reason the beam is not acquired through a change of name: it is a change that can return to its original state. If the structure is dismantled, the beam again becomes a beam, or a piece of wood. By contrast, in the case of the hides, once a hide has been fashioned into a tablecloth, it is no longer called a hide. That is a permanent change of name. The question, then, is whether a reversible change is nevertheless considered a change.
The Gemara challenges this from another case. Consider a piece of wood that was hollowed out and made into a channel for drawing water into a ritual bath. Originally, it was simply a piece of wood; afterward, it was a channel. That is plainly a change of name. A teaching states that if the channel was hollowed out while it was detached from the ground and was afterward attached to the ground, it disqualifies the ritual bath, because it was already a vessel before it was attached to the ground. Even though an object attached to the ground is sometimes not considered a vessel, this object retains its status as a vessel because it had already been a vessel before it was attached.
However, if the wood was first attached to the ground and only afterward hollowed out to make a channel, it does not disqualify the ritual bath. In that case, it is considered part of the ground when it is hollowed out, and not a vessel. But if a change of name is considered a change, the Gemara asks, why should the second case be different? Even if the wood was attached to the ground first, once it is hollowed out and becomes a channel, it is a new object. It should therefore be considered a vessel, just as a channel that was hollowed out while detached from the ground is a vessel. The fact that it was attached first should not matter, because the object acquired a new name afterward.
Rashi explains that originally it was merely a piece of wood, before it was hollowed out. Once it was attached to the ground, water was drawn through it into the ritual bath. At that point, it was not a vessel; it was merely an extension of the ground. The Gemara nevertheless says that since the hollowing changed the name of the piece of wood and it became a channel, it became a new object. It can no longer be regarded simply as part of the ground. It is treated like a detached object, even though the object was hollowed out after it had been attached to the ground.
The Gemara answers that the laws of drawn water are rabbinic. Since the disqualification of drawn water is rabbinic, the Sages had room to be lenient. They instituted the rule, and they also retained the authority to be lenient within that rule. The Gemara then asks: if so, why not be lenient even in the case in which the wood was hollowed out after it was attached to the ground?
The Gemara answers that the two cases are different. In the first case, the object already had the legal status of a vessel while it was detached from the ground. At that point, it would have been prohibited to draw water through it into the ritual bath. Once the disqualification takes effect on the vessel, it does not disappear merely because the vessel is later attached to the ground. In the second case, however, when the wood was detached from the ground, it did not have the status of a vessel. It was only a piece of wood. Therefore, the rabbinic decree is weaker in that case. Once it subsequently acquires the status of a vessel, the Sages did not want to extend the leniency any further. The entire decree was intended to prevent one from using a vessel, and once the object becomes a vessel, the matter is over.
The Gemara then proceeds to another proof. The Mishnah states that a robber, a thief, an extortionist, and one who consecrated or separated priestly gifts or tithes from produce that did not belong to him—these acts take effect. We know that a person cannot consecrate, designate priestly gifts, or separate tithes from an object that does not belong to him. What case, then, is the Mishnah discussing? It must be a case in which the original owner had relinquished the object. This appears to prove that relinquishment enables the thief to acquire it, contrary to the position of Rabbi Yosef, who held in the previous discussion that relinquishment does not enable the thief to acquire the object.
The Gemara answers that this case is different because there is also a change of name. Originally, the produce was ordinary untithed produce; afterward, it was designated as a priestly gift. Similarly, originally it was ordinary produce, and afterward it became consecrated. Thus, there was both the owner’s relinquishment and a change of name. Rabbi Yosef can therefore agree that the act takes effect in this case. Obviously, the case assumes that the owner first relinquished the object. Without that, the thief could not consecrate it while it remained in his possession. Both elements are necessary: the owner’s relinquishment and the change of name.
Rabbi Chisda said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: From where do we know that a change enables the thief to acquire the object? The verse says, “He shall return the stolen item.” The wording implies that he must return the object only when it remains in the state in which it was stolen. If it has changed, he does not return the object itself; he repays its value in money. The implication is that once there is a change of name, it is considered a different object.
The Gemara rejects this proof. The phrase “the stolen item” is needed for another teaching: it excludes an inherited theft. If a father stole, falsely swore regarding the theft, and then died, the son must repay the principal, but he does not add the additional payment that the father would have owed. The verse says “the stolen item,” teaching that the obligation applies to the item stolen by the person who swore, not to an item stolen by his father.
If that is the only purpose of the verse, the Torah could have written simply, “He shall return his theft.” Why does it say, “the stolen item”? The Gemara answers that both teachings are derived from the wording. We learn that an inherited theft does not carry the additional payment, and we also learn that the obligation to return the object applies even after a change.
According to this view, even a change brought about by an action—a major change—is not sufficient to enable the thief to acquire the object. The verse teaches that “he shall return the stolen item” in every state. Even if the object has changed, it must be returned. The wording “the stolen item” sounds as though it refers to the object as it was stolen, but the phrase “that he stole” is used for the law of the additional payment on an inherited theft. The remaining wording teaches that the stolen object must be returned regardless of what change occurred.
We will later learn, in the next chapter, that if someone steals a piece of wood and fashions it into vessels, he pays the value of the wood. The Gemara there will explain that once the object has been changed, the thief is allowed to repay money because it is difficult for him to return the original object. Nevertheless, according to Torah law, he would still be required to return the object itself based on this interpretation of the verse. The same distinction would apply in the case of a unique object that cannot be replaced. If someone stole something entirely unique, such as a painting comparable to the Mona Lisa, he could not simply pay money in place of returning it. If he changed or damaged it, the question would be different, but the underlying object would remain unique.
The Gemara then asks how we know that the owner’s relinquishment does not enable the thief to acquire the object. One source is a verse in Malachi, in which the prophet rebukes his generation for bringing defective offerings. The verse says that they brought stolen animals, lame animals, and sick animals. Just as a lame animal cannot be repaired and made suitable, so too a stolen animal cannot be repaired and made suitable—whether it was stolen before the owner relinquished it or after the owner relinquished it. If relinquishment enabled the thief to acquire the animal, then after relinquishment the thief should be able to offer it. Since the verse still calls it a stolen animal and says that it is unacceptable, we see that relinquishment does not enable acquisition.
Rabbah gives another source. The Torah says regarding an offering, “his offering,” teaching that an offering must be his and not stolen. What is the case? It must be that the thief consecrated the animal before the owner relinquished it. That is obvious, because before relinquishment the thief certainly cannot consecrate someone else’s animal. Why, then, does the verse need to teach this? It must be teaching that even after the owner relinquishes the animal, the offering is still invalid. This would prove that relinquishment does not enable the thief to acquire it.
The Gemara challenges this proof. Perhaps the case is one in which the thief stole an animal that had already been consecrated by its owner. The novelty would then be that although the animal had already been consecrated, the thief’s offering does not provide atonement for the original owner. If so, there is no proof that relinquishment does not enable the thief to acquire an ordinary animal.
The Gemara responds that perhaps the case is one in which the thief stole the animal before relinquishment. But if so, it remains obvious that he cannot consecrate it. The Gemara therefore considers whether Rabbah later retracted that answer, or whether the answer was not actually given by Rabbah in the first place. One of the answers previously stated in Rabbah’s name may have been given by Rav Pappa. Accordingly, there is no contradiction with Rabbah: either Rabbah gave the answer and later retracted it, or it was never Rabbah’s answer at all.
In truth, even if relinquishment does not enable the thief to acquire an animal, one might ask why the discussion needs to derive this from offerings. The case would be that a person stole an offering and consecrated it. If he consecrated it before relinquishment, it is obviously ineffective. It must therefore be that he consecrated it after relinquishment, and yet the offering remains unacceptable. The earlier teaching that the consecration itself takes effect is explained by the change of status: the object changed from ordinary property to consecrated property. But that does not mean that the offering is accepted.
This is an important distinction. The consecration of the thief can take effect, while the animal still cannot be brought as an acceptable offering. These are two separate issues. The fact that the consecration is valid does not mean that the offering is accepted before God. The animal may have become consecrated because of the change in status, but it remains invalid as an offering because it is stolen. Even if relinquishment did enable acquisition, there would still be a separate problem of an offering brought through wrongdoing.
Ulla explains the matter differently. If relinquishment enabled the thief to acquire the animal, then the offering would be acceptable. The reason it is not acceptable is that the owner’s relinquishment does not acquire the animal for the thief. The animal therefore remains stolen, and the thief cannot bring it as an offering. This explanation differs from the teaching of Rabbi Yochanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, who derives the problem from the verse stating that the offering must be accepted from the owner. Rabbi Yochanan’s explanation focuses on the absence of the original owner’s acceptance, whereas Ulla’s explanation focuses on the fact that the thief never acquired the animal.
According to Rabbi Yochanan, even if relinquishment did enable the thief to acquire the animal, there would still be a problem because of an offering brought through a transgression. According to Ulla, the problem is specifically that the thief did not acquire the animal. These are two different explanations and two different consequences.
Tosafot, citing Rabbi, explains that the different passages can be reconciled as follows. If relinquishment enables acquisition and the thief acquired the animal before consecrating it, there would be no problem with bringing it as an offering. But if relinquishment does not enable acquisition, then even if the thief consecrated it after the owner relinquished it, the animal would still not have left the original owner’s possession. Its consecration would not make it an acceptable offering. This interpretation explains the passages according to the view that relinquishment acquires the object, while distinguishing that view from the view that it does not.
The Gemara then returns to the payments of four and five. The payment of four or five applies only to an ox or a sheep, because the verse says that if a person steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters or sells it, he pays five cattle in place of the ox and four sheep in place of the sheep. The additional payment applies to every case of theft, but the payment of four or five applies only to these particular animals.
The Gemara asks why the rule should be limited to an ox and a sheep. Perhaps we should derive the law from the laws of Shabbat. There, the Torah says that one may not perform work involving one’s ox or donkey, and the Sages explain that the prohibition includes other animals as well. Just as the mention of an ox and a donkey there extends to all animals, perhaps the mention of an ox and a sheep here should also include all animals.
Rava answers that the verse mentions “ox and sheep” twice. The repetition teaches that the law applies only to an ox and a sheep and not to other animals. The Gemara asks which mention is extra. Perhaps the second mention is extra. The Torah could have said that if someone steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters or sells it, he pays five cattle for the ox and four sheep for the sheep. Why does it repeat the words “ox” and “sheep” at the end?
The Gemara answers that without the repetition, one might have understood that the thief must pay nine animals for either animal: five cattle and four sheep. The verse therefore specifies five for an ox and four for a sheep. If so, however, the repetition is not available to exclude other animals. It is needed simply to teach that the payments are separate and that one does not pay nine animals in either case.
The Gemara then asks whether that distinction could not be derived from the repeated expression “in place of.” Since the verse says “five cattle in place of the ox” and “four sheep in place of the sheep,” it already appears that the payments are separate. The Gemara answers that the second occurrence of “in place of the ox” is needed for another teaching. One might think that if a person stole an ox worth one hundred, he could repay with five inferior animals that were weak and close to dying. The repeated wording teaches that he must pay animals of comparable quality to the animal he stole.
Since the repeated expression is needed for that teaching, we cannot use it to establish that the payment is not nine. We therefore return to the repeated mention of “ox and sheep.” Perhaps that repetition teaches that the law is limited to an ox and a sheep. The Gemara asks, however, why those words are needed. The Torah could have said simply, “If a person steals, slaughters, or sells, he shall pay five cattle in place of it and four sheep in place of it.”
The Gemara answers that if the verse were written that way, one might think that the thief must have stolen both an ox and a sheep, and then slaughtered or sold both. The opening mention of “ox or sheep” teaches that even if he stole only one of them, he is liable for the appropriate payment. The singular wording of “he slaughtered it” and “he sold it” indicates that the act of slaughtering or selling may involve only one animal. Nevertheless, one might still think that he had to steal both animals and then slaughter one and sell the other, or slaughter or sell only one of the two. The opening words are therefore needed to teach that the theft of a single ox or a single sheep is sufficient.
Thus, the words at the beginning and end of the verse are all needed for these various teachings. We cannot use them freely to derive that other animals are included. The Gemara therefore concludes that the payment of four or five is limited to an ox and a sheep. The general payment of double, however, applies to all forms of theft.
There was a question about what the rule would be for another large animal, such as a horse. If the law applied to all animals, would one pay four, five, or some other amount? The discussion does not resolve that question because the repeated words in the verse exclude other species altogether. The only reason we might have included them would have been an analogy to the laws of Shabbat, but the repeated wording here prevents that analogy.
Rashi presents the discussion in the same order. The Gemara begins with the statement that the payment of four and five applies only to an ox and a sheep. One might argue that just as the mention of an ox in the laws of Shabbat includes other animals, the mention of an ox and a sheep here should include other animals. The answer is that “ox and sheep” are mentioned twice, excluding other species.
The Gemara then asks which mention is extra. If the extra words are the ones at the end of the verse, one might think that the thief pays nine animals for each theft. The Gemara initially responds that the repeated wording “in place of” teaches that the payments are separate. But that wording is needed for the teaching that the replacement animals must be of comparable quality. The Gemara therefore returns to the words “ox and sheep” at the beginning of the verse. Perhaps those words are extra and teach that the thief is liable even when he stole only one animal, rather than both an ox and a sheep.
The Gemara considers several possible misunderstandings. Without the opening words, one might think that the thief must steal both animals and slaughter both. The singular expression “he slaughtered it” rejects that possibility. One might then think that he must steal both, slaughter one, and sell the other. The wording “or he sold it” also rejects that possibility. Nevertheless, one might still think that he must steal both animals and then perform one of the acts with only one of them. The opening phrase “ox or sheep” is therefore necessary to teach that stealing one animal is sufficient.
Ultimately, the Gemara explains that the extra ox in one part of the verse and the extra sheep in the other part are what limit the payment of four and five to those two species. If the Torah intended to include all animals, it could have used a more general expression. The fact that it repeats the specific terms teaches that only an ox and a sheep are included.
That concludes this section of the discussion, and we can now review the material once more before moving on.