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The Mishnah discusses a person who steals an animal and then slaughters it. In such a case, the Mishnah states that he must pay four or five times its value. The question arises: why is this payment required? We have a general rule that if he had performed this act on Shabbat, since the slaughtering would have incurred a death penalty, he would not be liable for monetary payment. This is based on the principle that one cannot receive both a death penalty and monetary payment for the same offense; the greater of the two punishments is administered. However, on Yom Kippur, there is no death penalty for slaughtering; there is a prohibition punishable by spiritual excision (karet), which is not a physical death penalty. Therefore, on Yom Kippur, if a person slaughters an animal he stole, he would still be obligated to pay the monetary four or five payments.
The Gemara asks: why is this ruling correct? Granted, the person will not receive the death penalty, but he does receive lashes (malkut). Lashes are also a form of punishment. We have a rule that just as one does not pay when liable for the death penalty, so too one should not pay when liable for lashes. Therefore, the Mishnah's ruling, which states that one is liable for payment on Yom Kippur, seems problematic. If the Mishnah is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that one is liable for both lashes and payment, then why does the Mishnah state that if one slaughters on Shabbat, one is exempt from payment? According to Rabbi Meir, there should be no distinction between a death penalty and lashes in this regard. Perhaps, one might argue, there is a distinction: one can be liable for both lashes and payment, but not for both the death penalty and payment. Is there truly such a difference?
We find a Baraita that states: "If a person stole and slaughtered on Shabbat, or stole and slaughtered for idolatry, or stole an ox that was destined to be stoned (e.g., an ox that gored a person and killed them), in all these cases, he must pay four or five times its value." The novelty here is that Rabbi Meir holds that if one steals and slaughters, even on Shabbat, one is liable for payment. This indicates that Rabbi Meir believes there is no distinction between a death penalty and monetary payment; one is liable for both. The Sages, however, exempt him in these cases. But at least according to Rabbi Meir, if the Mishnah follows his view, why does it distinguish between Shabbat (where one is exempt) and Yom Kippur (where one is liable for payment)? If Rabbi Meir holds that one is liable for both lashes and payment, then he should also hold one is liable for both the death penalty and payment, as the Baraita suggests for Shabbat.
The Gemara responds: "Leave that Baraita out." You cannot bring a proof from this Baraita to our subject. Why not? Because we learned about this Baraita that it was not referring to a case where the thief himself slaughtered the animal on Shabbat. If he himself had slaughtered it on Shabbat, he would be exempt from payment due to the death penalty. Rather, the Baraita refers to a case where the thief stole the animal and then had someone else slaughter it on Shabbat. The novelty here is that even though he appointed someone else to slaughter it, he himself must pay, because he is not receiving a death penalty. The question arises: how can this be? We have a general rule that there is no agency for a transgression; one cannot be liable for a sin committed by an agent. So how can the thief be liable for payment if his agent committed the act?
Abaye answers that this case is different. While generally, if one person sins, another does not have to pay, by slaughtering and selling, it is different. The Torah compares slaughtering to selling. Just as selling necessarily involves a third party (one sells to someone else), similarly, one can be liable for slaughtering through another person. This is a special decree from the Torah. Generally, if an agent commits a sin, I do not pay, but by slaughtering, I do, because it is likened to selling, which can be done through another. Thus, if I stole an animal, and on Shabbat, I told my agent to slaughter it, and he did, I must pay four or five times its value. This is derived either from the comparison of "slaughtering" to "selling" or from the extra word "or" or "under" in the verse, all of which indicate that an agent can make the thief liable for the four or five payments. Therefore, we have no proof from that Baraita to our case.
This means that our Mishnah, which states that one is liable for slaughtering on Yom Kippur, indeed follows Rabbi Meir, who holds that one is liable for both lashes and payment. The question of the Baraita, which seemed to contradict Rabbi Meir's view by making him liable for payment on Shabbat (where he would incur the death penalty), is resolved because that Baraita is discussing a case where an agent performed the slaughter. Thus, the Sages do distinguish between being liable for both lashes and payment (yes) and being liable for both the death penalty and payment (no).
The Gemara then asks: how can this be? "If the person himself would have done it, he would not have to pay, but if his agent does it, he has to pay?" This makes no sense. How can an agent incriminate me more than if I had done the act myself? If I slaughter it myself, I don't pay. It cannot be that an agent can make me pay when I myself would be exempt. The Gemara clarifies: it's not that when he does it himself, he is not liable. He is liable, but for a technical reason, we cannot give him two punishments. But he is fundamentally liable. Therefore, the question is invalid. When the agent does it, there is no rule of "the greater of the two punishments" (kim leih b'dira beih), so he pays. Very good.
The Gemara then returns to the Baraita, which states that Rabbi Meir holds one is liable when an agent slaughters on Shabbat, while the Sages exempt him. The question is, why do the Sages exempt him? If there is a special decree that makes one liable for an agent's slaughter, why do they exempt him? The Sages, representing the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, hold that a slaughter that is not viable for eating is not considered a valid slaughter. In the Baraita, there were three cases: slaughtering for idolatry, slaughtering an ox destined to be stoned, and slaughtering on Shabbat. In the case of idolatry, the animal is forbidden for benefit, so the slaughter is not viable for eating. In the case of an ox destined to be stoned, the animal is forbidden for benefit, so the slaughter is not viable for eating. The Sages would argue that in these cases, since the slaughter is not valid for eating, one is exempt from payment. But how does this apply to Shabbat? Slaughtering on Shabbat, even if done by an agent, results in a kosher animal. Why would the Sages exempt him here?
The Gemara explains that the Sages' exemption applies to two of the three cases: idolatry and an ox destined to be stoned. In these, the animal is forbidden for benefit from the outset, so the slaughter does not make it permissible for eating. However, regarding Shabbat, the slaughter is valid and the animal is kosher. Therefore, the Sages would agree that one must pay four or five times its value. So, the Sages only exempt in the two cases where the animal is not edible.
The Gemara then revisits the case of slaughtering for idolatry. Once the knife touches the animal's neck, the animal becomes forbidden for benefit. By the time the slaughter is completed, one is no longer slaughtering the owner's animal, as it is already forbidden. So how can one be liable for payment? The Gemara answers that one is not worshipping idolatry until the last cut. Thus, until the very last moment, it is still the owner's animal. Therefore, one is liable.
Next, the Gemara addresses the case of an ox destined to be stoned. An animal that has killed a person and been judged to be stoned is forbidden for benefit. How can one be liable for payment if one steals and slaughters such an animal? It is already forbidden for benefit, so it is not the owner's animal in a way that would incur payment. The Gemara explains that this refers to a specific case: an animal given to a guardian (shomer) to watch. The animal gored and killed someone while in the guardian's possession, and the judgment for stoning was issued. Now, the guardian has an animal that is destined to be stoned. Can he return it to the owner? Rabbi Yaakov holds that even if the judgment is final, the guardian can return the animal to the owner. The animal, though worthless in itself, is considered "causing monetary payment" (gorev l'mamon). If the guardian does not return it, or if something happens to it, he will have to pay for it. So, while the animal itself might not be valuable, it represents a potential monetary liability for the guardian. Therefore, if someone steals and slaughters it, they are affecting this monetary liability, and thus must pay four or five times its value.
This concept of "causing monetary payment" is known from a Mishnah regarding consecrated animals (kodashim). If a thief steals consecrated animals that were under the owner's responsibility, the thief must pay double. The argument is that even though he stole consecrated items, he stole something that represents a monetary liability for the owner. Similarly, in the case of the ox destined to be stoned, when the thief slaughters it, even though it is forbidden for benefit, he is affecting the guardian's monetary liability, and therefore must pay four or five times its value.
The Gemara then questions the premise that our Mishnah follows Rabbi Meir. The Mishnah states that one who slaughters on Yom Kippur is liable, which aligns with Rabbi Meir's view that one is liable for both lashes and payment. We also explained the case of the ox destined to be stoned according to Rabbi Meir, based on Rabbi Yaakov and Rabbi Shimon. So, the Mishnah appears to follow Rabbi Meir. However, at the end of the Mishnah, Rabbi Shimon states that he exempts in two cases. This implies that in the rest of the Mishnah, Rabbi Shimon agrees, suggesting that the Mishnah generally follows Rabbi Shimon. But if the Mishnah follows Rabbi Shimon, how can it state that one is liable for slaughtering on Yom Kippur, as Rabbi Shimon would typically exempt when lashes are involved?
The Gemara clarifies that Rabbi Shimon was not discussing all the cases of the Mishnah. Rabbi Shimon only interjected regarding the last four cases of the Mishnah, which describe slaughtering for dogs, for healing, an animal that became a terefah (non-kosher due to an injury), and consecrated animals in the Temple courtyard. The Mishnah states that in all four cases, one is liable. Rabbi Shimon disagreed in two of these four: the terefah and the consecrated animals in the Temple courtyard, because in these two cases, the animal is not edible. He agrees with the Mishnah in the cases of slaughtering for dogs and for healing, because even though they are not for human consumption, the animals are edible. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon's statement does not apply to the earlier parts of the Mishnah, including the case of Yom Kippur. In conclusion, the author of the Mishnah is indeed Rabbi Meir, who holds that one is liable for payment even when also liable for lashes.