We begin our study with a case from the Mishnah: a person stole an animal from his father and then slaughtered it. In such a scenario, he is obligated to pay the four- or five-fold payment for stealing and slaughtering. The novel point here, as explained by Yom Kippur, is that this obligation applies because his father died after the animal was slaughtered. Had his father died in the interim—that is, after the theft but before the slaughter—the son would have inherited the animal. In that case, what he stole would have become his own property through inheritance, and thus he would not be liable for the payment. This is the specific novelty of Yom Kippur's teaching.
The discussion then turns to a case where someone stole an ox belonging to two partners and slaughtered it. Subsequently, he admitted the theft to one of the partners. The rule is that one who admits to a penalty is exempt from that penalty. However, he only admitted to one partner. The question arises: when the Torah states one must pay five times, does it mean five full animals, not five half animals? Or does it mean five, even if it's five halves? Can the payment be split if he admits to only one of the partners, thereby being liable for only half the payment?
The Gemara states, "The Merciful One requires five oxen, not five half oxen." This means the payment cannot be split; it's either the full five or nothing. This leads to a challenge from a Mishnah: a son stole from his father and slaughtered the animal, and then his father died. The Mishnah states that the son must pay the four- or five-fold payment to the inheritors—his brothers and any others who inherit. The question is, once the father dies, the son himself becomes an inheritor with a share in the animal. Therefore, he is part of the four- or five-fold payment, meaning he effectively pays himself for his share. If the payment is split among the brothers, with him being one of them, his portion is already "paid." Thus, he wouldn't have to pay a full four or five. This seems to contradict the earlier ruling that payments cannot be split. If the Mishnah says he pays, it implies a full payment, suggesting that splitting is not an option.
Yom Kippur responds by clarifying that the Mishnah's case refers to a situation where the father, while still alive, had already taken the son to court (a Beit Din). The Beit Din found the son guilty and obligated him to pay the four- or five-fold penalty. Once the son was found guilty in court while his father was alive, that obligation stands. Even if the father subsequently died, the son is not considered an inheritor regarding that specific debt. If, however, the son had been found guilty only after the father died, then he would indeed be an inheritor, and his share would be included in the calculation, meaning he wouldn't have to pay a full amount. But in the Mishnah's case, the obligation was established while the father was alive. The son was obligated to the father, and upon the father's death, that obligation transfers to the inheritors, but the son is not part of that specific payment.
The Gemara then asks: why did the Mishnah present two cases? One where payment is required, and one where it is not. The Mishnah states that no payment is required if the father died before the son slaughtered the animal, because then the son is slaughtering his own animal. The Gemara questions why the Mishnah didn't instead give a case where the father was alive, the son stole and slaughtered, but the father did not take him to Beit Din. This would be a more direct contrast to the case where the father did take him to Beit Din, rather than introducing the less common scenario of the father dying before the slaughter.
The Gemara answers that the Mishnah wanted to maintain consistency in its language. Since the first part of the Mishnah (the Reisha) discussed a case where the son stole and slaughtered, and then the father died, the second part (the Seifa) also addressed the father's death, but before the slaughter, to keep the structure congruent. It could have presented the distinction based on whether the father took the son to Beit Din or not, but it chose consistency in the narrative flow.
The discussion then shifts as Rav Nachman revises his initial stance. He now says that when the Torah states "five oxen," it can also include "half oxen." For example, in the case of partners, if one admits to one partner, he would still have to pay the other partner his share. This shift in understanding is attributed to a moment of clarity, likened to tasting meat after a period of not eating, symbolizing a deeper grasp of the law. This implies that even a partial payment or compensation for a share is valid.
This revised understanding of Rav Nachman creates a new challenge for the Mishnah. If partial payments are valid, then in the case where the son stole from his father and the father died after the slaughter, the son should still have to compensate his brothers for their share, even if he doesn't pay himself. The Mishnah, however, implies a complete exemption if the father died before the slaughter. What then is the distinction in the Mishnah between the father dying before or after the slaughter?
The Gemara answers by referencing the verse "and he slaughters it." This implies that the act of slaughter must be entirely forbidden (be'isur). In the Reisha of the Mishnah, where the father did not die yet, the animal was entirely stolen, so the slaughter was 100% forbidden. However, in the Seifa, where the father died before the slaughter, the son inherited a share of the animal. Therefore, the slaughter was not 100% forbidden, as he had a partial share in the animal. Consequently, he is exempt from the four- or five-fold payment. This is the distinction.
This leads to the question of the case of partners: if one slaughters an animal stolen from two partners and then admits to one, would he be exempt from both or only one? According to this final understanding, when he slaughtered the animal, it was entirely forbidden because he was obligated to both partners. Even if he later admits to one, he would still be liable to the other partner.
The Gemara then considers a Mishnah dealing with a blemished animal (tereifa), which is not edible. The question is whether one who steals and slaughters such an animal is still obligated to pay the four- or five-fold penalty. The Mishnah states that a tereifa is not edible, and therefore no payment is required. This is the view of Rabbi Shimon, contrasting with the first sage (Tanna Kamma) who would say payment is still required.
Rabbi Habibi of Mechuza, in the name of Rav Ashi, derives a principle from another case in the Mishnah: one who slaughters non-sacred animals (chullin) in the Temple courtyard (Azara). When one brings chullin into the Azara, the animal becomes forbidden for benefit (asur be'hana'ah). The Tanna Kamma holds that even in this case, one must pay the four- or five-fold penalty. From this, Rabbi Habibi infers that the act of slaughter (shechita) is considered complete only at its very end, not continuously from the beginning. If shechita were a continuous action, then as soon as the knife touches the animal in the Azara, it would become asur be'hana'ah, and thus no longer the owner's animal in a way that would incur the penalty for slaughtering a stolen animal. Since the Tanna Kamma obligates payment, it must be that the shechita is only effective at the final moment, meaning the animal remains the owner's until the very end of the slaughter, at which point the penalty applies.
The Gemara challenges this: perhaps shechita does begin from the initial cut, and the four- or five-fold payment is for that initial cut, even if the animal subsequently becomes forbidden. However, the Gemara rejects this, stating, "Do not reject Rabbi Habibi's proof." The Torah's phrase "and he slaughters it" implies a complete act of slaughter. One is not liable for merely an initial cut; the entire animal must be slaughtered. Therefore, Rabbi Habibi's proof stands: shechita is considered complete only at the end.
The Gemara then asks how those who hold that shechita begins from the first cut (yesh le'shechita mi'techila) would interpret the Mishnah's case of slaughtering chullin in the Azara. They would explain it as follows: the person began slaughtering the animal outside the Azara, where it was still permissible and fully the owner's. Then, with only a small part left to cut, he brought it into the Azara and completed the slaughter. At that final moment, it became asur be'hana'ah, but it was still considered the owner's animal at the time of the effective shechita, thus incurring the four- or five-fold penalty. This provides two ways to understand the Mishnah's case of chullin in the Azara, depending on one's view of when shechita takes effect.
The Gemara notes that this difference of opinion regarding when shechita takes effect has practical implications (nafka minot) in other areas of Jewish law, such as the laws of sacrifices in the Temple. For example, if a person has an improper intention (machshava) during shechita, such as intending to eat the sacrifice outside its designated time or place, this intention can render the sacrifice invalid (pigul). If shechita is only effective at the end, then the intention must be present at that final moment. But if shechita is effective from the beginning, then an intention at the start could already invalidate it. This demonstrates the broader significance of this halachic debate.
The Gemara then links this discussion to a teaching by Rabbi Yochanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Levi, that shechita is called shechita only on the final cut. This aligns with Rabbi Habibi's view that shechita is effective only at the end. However, Rabbi Yochanan also said that shechita is considered from beginning to end. The Gemara asks how Rabbi Yochanan, holding this latter view, could explain the Mishnah regarding chullin in the Azara. If shechita begins from the first cut, then as soon as the knife touches the animal in the Azara, it becomes asur be'hana'ah, and thus one is not slaughtering the owner's animal. Why then would the Mishnah obligate payment?
The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yochanan would explain the Mishnah in the same way as the previous explanation for those who hold shechita begins from the first cut: the person slaughtered part of the animal outside the Azara and then completed the final cut inside. This way, the initial part of the slaughter was on the owner's animal, and the final cut, though making it asur be'hana'ah, was still considered a completion of the slaughter of the owner's animal, thus incurring the four- or five-fold penalty. This confirms that the requirement is for a complete act of slaughter, "and he slaughters it," not merely an initial cut.
To summarize, we have discussed two main halachic points. First, the interpretation of "five oxen." Initially, Rav Nachman suggested it meant five full oxen, not half. But he later revised this to include even half payments. This led to a distinction in the Mishnah regarding a son stealing from his father: if the father died before the slaughter, the son is exempt because the slaughter was not "totally forbidden" (kulo be'isur), as he had inherited a share. If the father died after the slaughter, the obligation stood because the animal was entirely stolen at the time of the forbidden act.
Second, we explored the debate on when shechita takes effect: either from the very beginning of the cut (mi'techila ve'ad sof) or only at the very end (ela le'besof). If shechita is only at the end, then the Mishnah's case of slaughtering chullin in the Azara is straightforward: the animal remains the owner's until the final cut, at which point the shechita is complete and the penalty applies. If shechita is from the beginning, then the Mishnah's case must be understood as a partial slaughter outside the Azara, with the completion of the final cut inside, to ensure the animal was still considered the owner's for the full act of slaughter.
The Mishnah then presents a case of witnesses. If two witnesses testify that someone stole an animal and then slaughtered or sold it, and then these same witnesses are found to be false witnesses (edim zomemim), they must pay the entire four- or five-fold penalty. This means other witnesses came and testified that the first two were with them elsewhere at the time of the alleged theft and slaughter/sale. The Torah's law of edim zomemim dictates that what they sought to do to the defendant is done to them.
Case two: two witnesses testify to the theft, and two *other* witnesses testify to the slaughter or sale. If both sets of witnesses are found to be edim zomemim, each set pays according to what they tried to obligate the defendant. The first set, testifying to theft, tried to obligate the defendant to pay a double payment (kefel). So, when found false, they pay the kefel. The second set, testifying to slaughter/sale, tried to obligate the additional three-fold payment (making it four or five total). So, when found false, they pay the three-fold difference. Each pays for their specific attempted obligation.
If only the second group of witnesses (those testifying to slaughter/sale) are found to be edim zomemim, the first group's testimony to theft stands. The defendant is therefore a thief and must pay kefel. The second set of false witnesses then pays the three-fold difference.
If only one of the second group of witnesses is found to be zomem, the entire testimony of that group is nullified. Therefore, there is no three-fold payment. The defendant still pays kefel based on the first group's testimony, but no one pays the three-fold. The individual false witness does not pay because the rule of edim zomemim requires both witnesses in a pair to be found false.
If one of the first group of witnesses (those testifying to theft) is found to be zomem, then the entire testimony of all four witnesses is nullified. This is because once the testimony of theft is nullified, there is no proof that the animal was stolen. Consequently, the slaughter or sale might have been of his own animal, and no one pays anything. Rashi clarifies that for the edim zomemim to pay, the nullification (hazama) must occur in a specific order: first, the witnesses to the slaughter must be found false, and then the witnesses to the theft. If the theft witnesses are nullified first, the entire case collapses, as there's no proof of a stolen animal.
The Gemara then introduces a famous dispute between Abaye and Rabbah concerning the disqualification (pesul) of edim zomemim. When witnesses are found to be edim zomemim, they become disqualified from testifying further. The question is: does this disqualification begin from the moment they are found to be zomemim (mi'kan ve'eilach), or does it retroactively apply from the day they originally gave their false testimony (maflei hunifsal)?
Abaye holds that they are disqualified retroactively (maflei hunifsal). He argues that from the moment they testified on Sunday, they were wicked (resha'im), and the Torah states, "Do not accept a wicked person as a witness." Therefore, any testimony they gave from that point onward should be invalid. Rabbah, however, holds that their disqualification begins only from the day they are found to be zomemim (mi'kan ve'eilach). One explanation for Rabbah's view is that the entire concept of edim zomemim, where two witnesses are believed over another two, is a great novelty (chiddush). Therefore, we should limit its application to the minimum, meaning the disqualification should not be retroactive.
A second way of understanding Rabbah's position is that he agrees in principle with Abaye that edim zomemim should be retroactively disqualified. However, the Sages intervened and ruled that the disqualification is only from the present forward, out of concern for potential financial loss (hefsed) to those who transacted with these witnesses in the interim. For instance, if these witnesses had signed documents or testified in other cases between their original false testimony and being found zomemim, retroactively invalidating their actions would unfairly harm those who relied on their testimony.
The Gemara then explores practical differences (nafka minot) between these two interpretations of Rabbah. For example, if the nullification of the witnesses is not a "chiddush" (e.g., if two witnesses nullify one, and two others nullify another, rather than two against two), then according to the first explanation of Rabbah, the disqualification would be retroactive. But according to the second explanation, which prioritizes preventing financial loss, it would still only be from the present forward. Another difference arises if the witnesses are disqualified not as edim zomemim but as thieves (gazlanim). Since a thief is inherently wicked, there's no "chiddush" involved in their disqualification. According to the first explanation of Rabbah, their disqualification would be retroactive. But according to the second, it would still be prospective due to the concern for financial loss.
The Gemara concludes by stating that Rav Ashi follows Abaye in this matter. This is one of six exceptions where the halacha follows Abaye, contrary to the usual rule of following Rabbah. These six cases are often remembered by the acronym "Ya'al Ka'gam" (Yud for Ye'ush Shelo Mi'da'at, Ayin for Eid Zomem Mi'mafra, Lamed for Lechi, Kof for Kedushin Shelo Nimtza Bi'ah, Gimel for Get She'nitbatel Shalichuto, and Mem for Me'akev). Our case, Eid Zomem Mi'mafra, is the "Ayin" in this list, meaning that edim zomemim are indeed disqualified retroactively from the time of their original testimony.