The discussion centers on the halachic implications of finding various types of legal documents, specifically focusing on whether they should be returned to the intended recipient or not, due to concerns about potential fraud or misrepresentation of intent.
We begin by examining the case of a divorce document, a get, found in the marketplace. If the husband acknowledges that he divorced his wife with this get, it is given to the wife. However, if he does not acknowledge the divorce, the get is not given to either party. The concern here is that the get might have been dated in Nisan but only given in Tishrei. In the interim, the husband might have sold the produce (perot) of his wife's property. According to halacha, a husband has the right to consume the perot of his wife's property during the marriage. If the get were to be recognized as effective from Nisan, the wife could claim that the husband had no right to sell the perot during that period, as they were already divorced. This would lead to a situation where the buyers of the perot would lose their purchase, as the wife would reclaim them. The Gemara explains that this concern is not valid because we follow the principle of Shapir, which states that once a husband intends to divorce his wife, he loses his rights to the perot even before the get is physically given. Therefore, if the get was intended to be given, the wife would have a right to the perot from the date of the get, and the husband's sale would be invalid. However, an alternative view suggests that the husband sold the perot legally because the divorce was not yet finalized, and the wife would then illegally reclaim them by presenting the predated get. To prevent this, the court would require proof of when the get was actually given, not just when it was dated.
This situation is compared to a general debt document, a shtar chov. If a shtar chov is found, the ruling is not to return it to either the borrower (loveh) or the lender (malveh). The concern is that the shtar chov might be predated. For instance, it might have been written in Nisan, but the loan itself was not disbursed until Tishrei. If the malveh were to collect based on the Nisan date, they would be collecting illegally for the period before the loan was actually given. We require the malveh to prove when the loan was actually made, just as with the get. The question arises: why is the case of the get different? The Gemara explains that in the case of the get, if the wife comes to claim the perot, the buyer of the perot will have a claim against her. However, the court will justify returning the get to the wife to prevent her from becoming an agunah (a woman whose husband has disappeared or refused to grant a divorce). In contrast, returning a shtar chov to a malveh implies its validity for collection, and thus the court would not return it without proof of the actual loan date, to avoid illegal collection.
Next, we consider a document of emancipation (shtar shichrur) for a servant (eved). If such a document is found, it should not be returned, due to the concern that it might have been written but never executed. However, if the master (adon) acknowledges that he gave it, it is returned. The concern is that the master might have written the shtar shichrur, dated it in Nisan, but only given it in Tishrei. In the interim, the master might have sold properties that the eved acquired in Nisan. According to the principle of Yad Eved Ki Yad Rabo (the hand of a servant is like the hand of his master), any property acquired by an eved belongs to his master. If the eved were to be considered free from Nisan, he could claim the properties acquired during that period. The Gemara explains that this is not a concern according to the opinion that views emancipation as a benefit (zechut). When witnesses sign a shtar shichrur, the emancipation is effective from the time of signing, regardless of when the shtar is physically delivered. Therefore, if the shtar was signed in Nisan, the eved was free from Nisan, and the properties he acquired then truly belong to him. The master would have had no right to sell them. However, according to the opinion that views emancipation as a detriment (chof) because an eved is permitted to eat terumah and marry a Canaanite woman, which he loses upon freedom, then the shtar shichrur is not a zechut. In this case, the emancipation is only effective upon delivery of the shtar. If the shtar was signed in Nisan but delivered in Tishrei, the eved was not free in Nisan. If he then attempts to claim properties acquired in Nisan, it would be problematic. As with the get and shtar chov, proof of actual delivery would be required.
The discussion then moves to a matanah (gift document). A specific type of gift, called a Daytik, is discussed. This refers to a gift made by a person who is mortally ill (shchiv mera), where the property is automatically transferred upon his death, without a formal act of acquisition (kinyan). This is a rabbinic enactment (takanat Rabanan). A regular shtar matanah, however, usually means that the property is given "from today and after death" (mehayom ule'achar mita). This means the giver cannot sell the property from now, but retains the rights to its perot until death. If a shtar matanah is found without this specific stipulation, it is generally understood to transfer both the property and its perot immediately. The Gemara clarifies that if a shtar matanah is written with the stipulation "from today and after death," it is valid, allowing the giver to retain perot. If it is written without this, implying an immediate, full transfer, it is also valid. The concern of the Gemara is that if a shtar matanah is found, it should not be returned due to the worry that the giver might have changed his mind (hazar bo) after writing it but before delivery. However, if the giver acknowledges that he gave it, it is returned.
The Gemara then considers the case of a document found for an Apotiki, which is a designated field for payment of a debt. If such a document is found, it is not returned to either the malveh (lender) or the loveh (borrower). The concern is that the loveh might have written the shtar but never delivered it to the malveh. In the interim, the loveh might have written another shtar for the same field to a different person (Shimon). If the first shtar (to Reuven) is returned, and it is predated to Shimon's shtar, Reuven could use it to claim the field from Shimon, even though the original owner might have retracted the gift to Reuven or given it to Shimon later. This would lead to an illegal taking of property. The Gemara clarifies that this concern applies to a shtar matanah of a healthy person (matanat bari). In such a case, if two shtarot exist, the court follows the later-dated shtar, assuming the giver retracted the earlier one. Therefore, if Reuven has an earlier-dated shtar and Shimon has a later-dated shtar, Shimon's claim will prevail, and Reuven will not be able to illegally take the property. Thus, there is no concern in returning the shtar to Reuven in this scenario.
However, if the discussion is about a matanat shchiv mera (a gift from a mortally ill person), the situation is different. A shchiv mera has the right to retract his gift at any time before his death. Therefore, if he gave a shtar to Reuven and then another to Shimon, he could retract from Shimon and affirm the gift to Reuven. In this case, even if Shimon has a later shtar, Reuven's claim could be valid because the shchiv mera had the right to change his mind. The Gemara concludes that in the case of a matanat shchiv mera, the date of the shtar is less significant than the actual intent and final decision of the giver before death. Therefore, if the shchiv mera said to give it, it should be given to the recipient, as he has the power to change his mind anyway, and his current declaration overrides previous concerns about retraction or predating. The concern about one recipient taking property from another illegally is mitigated because in a matanat bari, the later shtar prevails, and in a matanat shchiv mera, the giver's right to retract means that the final intention is paramount, making the earlier shtar valid if he ultimately desires it to be so.