The Evi B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud, Beverly Masechet Baba Kamma, has been generously sponsored in our Daf Yomi program by our good friend, patron, and charter member of our Daf Yomi class, Siyahu Ashar Hakohen, and his dear wife, Rina. With God’s help, may they have continued success, prosperity in all their endeavors, good health, happiness, prosperity, and much satisfaction from their children. May they enjoy many years of tranquility, peace in their home, and peace of mind. Amen.
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We begin today’s page on 76b, at the top line: “If one stole an animal and consecrated it, and afterward slaughtered or sold it.” The Mishnah says that he does not have to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. The obvious reason is that he was no longer slaughtering or selling the owner’s animal. Once he consecrated it, it left the owner’s possession.
The Gemara says: I understand why, when he slaughtered it, he is exempt. The reason is that the animal no longer belonged to the owner. After all, we must be dealing with a case in which he consecrated the animal. If he consecrated it, that means that the owners had already despaired of recovering it, because one cannot consecrate an object before the owner’s despair. Once he consecrated it, there was both the owner’s despair and a change of ownership. It was no longer in the owner’s domain; it was in a different domain. Therefore, if he slaughtered it after consecrating it, he did not slaughter the owner’s animal, and he is not liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment.
But he should nevertheless be liable simply because he consecrated it. Why? There is an ordinary case in which a thief steals an animal and sells it. What difference is there between selling it to an ordinary person and selling it to the Temple treasury? Ultimately, when he consecrates it, he removes it from one domain and places it in another domain. That should be comparable to a sale, and he should be liable for the payment on account of the sale itself.
Why, then, does the Mishnah say that if he stole an animal, consecrated it, and slaughtered or sold it, he is exempt? I understand why he is exempt for slaughtering it: it is no longer the owner’s animal. But the act of consecrating it should be considered a sale, and he should be liable for the theft-and-sale payment on account of the consecration itself.
The Gemara answers: Who is the author of our Mishnah? It is Rabbi Shimon, who says that consecrated animals for which a person bears responsibility remain, to a certain degree, in the owner’s possession.
What does it mean that he bears responsibility for them? For example, a person says, “It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering.” He then consecrates an animal that is standing before him. If something happens to that animal, since he accepted responsibility for it, he must replace it with another animal. That is what it means that he bears responsibility for it: he must replenish the offering.
There is a principle that anything that causes a person a monetary liability is considered, to a certain degree, his property. Although the animal is consecrated, it remains connected to him because, if it is lost, he will have to replace it. Therefore, the consecrated animal is still considered to be in the domain of the person who consecrated it.
The case is therefore as follows. The thief stole the animal and consecrated it, but how did he consecrate it? He said, “This animal should be an offering on my behalf.” Such a consecration does not remove it entirely from his domain. It is still considered his property because he remains responsible for it. Since he must replace it if something happens to it, anything that causes him a monetary liability is considered like his property.
Rashi explains that the thief said, “This animal should be an elevation offering,” and designated the stolen animal for his vow. Since he remains responsible for it, and anything that causes him a monetary liability is considered like his property, this was not a sale. The animal did not leave his domain in the same way that it would have if he had sold it.
The point is that there are two aspects to the case. With regard to the slaughter, the animal is not considered the owner’s animal anymore, because it has become consecrated. Therefore, the thief is exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment. But with regard to the act of consecration, this type of consecration is not considered a sale, because the thief remains responsible for the animal. Since he must replace it if it is lost, it remains connected to him financially, and the consecration is not considered a sale.
Accordingly, the Mishnah, which says that consecration is not considered a sale, follows Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara restates the point: Rabbi Shimon says that consecrated animals for which a person bears responsibility remain in the domain of the one who consecrated them. He did not sell the animal; he merely consecrated it, while remaining responsible for it.
But the Gemara challenges this explanation. In the second part of our Mishnah, Rabbi Shimon himself is mentioned. Since the second part is attributed to Rabbi Shimon, the first part cannot also be Rabbi Shimon. The Mishnah is arranged with one position in the first part and Rabbi Shimon’s position in the second part. Therefore, we cannot explain the first part as the teaching of Rabbi Shimon.
We return to the original question: Why is the act of consecration itself not considered a sale? Why should the thief not be liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment because of the consecration?
The Gemara answers that the case involves ordinary consecrated offerings, which are of a lesser degree of sanctity. This follows Rabbi Yosef HaGelili, who says that such offerings remain the property of their owners and remain in their domain. They are not a complete transfer of ownership. Therefore, consecrating this animal is not considered a sale.
Rashi explains that, according to Rabbi Yosef HaGelili, this is not considered a sale. The animal did not pass into a completely separate ownership. Nevertheless, with regard to the slaughter, it is still considered consecrated, and the thief is exempt because he did not slaughter the owner’s animal. With regard to the sale, however, it remains connected to the thief because he consecrated it only as an offering of lesser sanctity. Therefore, it is not considered that he sold it.
The Gemara asks: If that is the explanation, why does the first part of the Mishnah distinguish between slaughtering before consecration and slaughtering after consecration? The same distinction could have been taught in a single case involving slaughter after consecration. The Mishnah could have said that if he consecrated the animal as an offering of lesser sanctity, the consecration is not a sale, whereas if he consecrated it as an offering of the highest sanctity, it is a sale. Why was it necessary to distinguish between slaughter before consecration and slaughter after consecration?
The Gemara answers that this proposal is not correct. Regardless of what type of offering he consecrated it for, the act of consecration does not constitute a sale. The animal never left the ownership of the person who consecrated it in the same way that it would have if he had sold it to another person.
If a person sells an animal, it begins as Reuven’s animal and becomes Shimon’s animal. But when a person consecrates an animal, it begins as Reuven’s animal, and then it becomes Reuven’s consecrated animal. It remains associated with the person who consecrated it. Therefore, consecration is not a sale.
That is why the act of consecration does not generate the fourfold or fivefold payment. The animal does leave the person’s ordinary possession in one sense, but it remains identified with him. It is still considered his consecration, and therefore it is not comparable to an ordinary sale, in which the animal changes from one owner’s possession to another’s.
We can now return to the Mishnah. When a thief steals an animal and consecrates it, the animal has indeed left his ordinary possession. Nevertheless, the act is still identified as the consecration of the thief. It is not a regular sale in which an animal changes from one person’s ownership to another person’s ownership. Therefore, he is not liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment.
Rabbi Shimon then teaches an additional qualification. It depends on what the thief consecrated the animal for. If he consecrated the animal for an offering for which he bears responsibility, he is liable; if he consecrated it for an offering for which he does not bear responsibility, he is not liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment.
At first glance, this seems to be the opposite of what we would expect. If he bears responsibility for the offering, that means that he must replace the animal if it is lost. If it remains financially connected to him, why should that make him more liable? It would seem that this should make him less liable, because the animal is still more closely associated with him and has not completely left his domain.
Let us review the question. Rabbi Shimon must hold that there is no difference between selling the animal to an ordinary person and transferring it to the Temple treasury: in either case, he should be liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment if the act constitutes a sale. But in which case should he have stated his distinction? It should have been the opposite. When the thief bears responsibility, the animal is still more closely connected to him because he must replace it. In that case, why should he be liable? When he does not bear responsibility, the animal has entirely left his financial domain. That would seem to be the case in which he should be liable.
The Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon was not responding to the Mishnah’s first issue. He was responding to a different law. In truth, Rabbi Shimon agrees with the first position that, whenever a person consecrates an animal, the animal is still identified at the moment of consecration with the person who consecrated it. Whether the consecration was for a vow or a freewill offering, and whether or not the person bears responsibility for it, it is not considered a sale.
When a person sells an animal to an ordinary individual, it changes from Reuven’s animal to Shimon’s animal. But with consecration, it remains the animal of the person who consecrated it, now in its consecrated status. Rabbi Shimon agrees with that principle. His distinction between offerings for which the person bears responsibility and offerings for which he does not bear responsibility concerns a different case.
The Gemara therefore presents the Mishnah as follows: A thief who steals from another thief and slaughters the animal does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. Similarly, a person who steals consecrated property from the house of its owner is exempt. But one who steals from the owner’s house may be liable.
Why does Rabbi Shimon distinguish between these cases? If a person steals an offering for which the owner bears responsibility, it is considered as though he stole from the owner’s house. Although the animal is consecrated, the owner must replace it if it is lost. Since the animal causes the owner a monetary liability, it remains, in this respect, the owner’s property. Therefore, if the thief steals it from the owner’s house, he is liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment.
If the consecrated animal is not one for which the owner bears responsibility, however, the owner does not have to replace it. It is not considered the owner’s property in the relevant sense, and the thief is not liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment.
According to the conclusion, everyone agrees that the act of consecrating an animal is not itself a sale. When a thief steals an animal and consecrates it, he is not liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment because consecration is not a sale. The case discussed by Rabbi Shimon is different: the thief stole an animal that was already consecrated from the owner’s house. If it was an offering for which the owner bore responsibility, the theft is considered a theft from the owner’s house, because the owner will have to replace the animal. If the owner did not bear responsibility, the thief is exempt.
The Gemara then raises another difficulty. Earlier in the chapter, Rabbi Shimon held that if a thief steals an animal, slaughters it, and it turns out to be a tereifah, he is exempt because the slaughter must be fit to make the animal edible. The slaughter must be a viable slaughter. Here, however, we are discussing an animal that was already consecrated. If the thief slaughtered it outside the Temple courtyard, the slaughter was not permitted, and the animal was not edible. How, then, can Rabbi Shimon say that the thief is liable?
The Gemara answers through several possibilities. Rav Dimi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan that the case is one in which the thief took an unblemished animal into the Temple courtyard and slaughtered it there for the sake of the original owners. In that case, the slaughter was a viable slaughter. The animal was slaughtered in the proper place and for the sake of the owners.
The Gemara challenges this answer. If he slaughtered it in the Temple courtyard for the sake of the owners, then he effectively returned the animal to them. Why should he have to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment? By slaughtering the offering on their behalf, it is as though he returned the animal to the owners.
The Gemara answers that the case is one in which the blood spilled before it could be sprinkled on the altar. Therefore, the thief did not effectively return the offering to the owners. Nevertheless, at the time of slaughter, the slaughter was viable: the animal was in the proper place and had been slaughtered for the sake of the owners. Since the blood later spilled, the owners did not receive the completed offering, and the thief remains liable.
Rabbi Yohanan offered another answer. The thief brought the unblemished animal into the Temple courtyard and slaughtered it there, but not for the sake of the owners. The slaughter was still valid, because an offering slaughtered without the proper intention remains valid, although it does not fulfill the obligation of the owners. Therefore, it was a viable slaughter for purposes of liability, even though it did not count for the owners.
The Gemara offers a third possibility: the animal that the thief stole had a permanent blemish. A blemished consecrated animal does not need to be slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. It may be slaughtered outside the courtyard after the appropriate redemption. Therefore, the slaughter in this case was viable.
These are the three answers. The question was: Rabbi Shimon requires a slaughter that is fit to make the animal edible. In this case, the thief stole consecrated property, so where was the viable slaughter? The first answer is that he brought the animal into the courtyard and slaughtered it there for the sake of the owners; afterward, the blood spilled. The second answer is that he brought it into the courtyard but did not slaughter it for the sake of the owners. The third answer is that it was a blemished animal, which may be slaughtered outside the courtyard.
The Gemara now examines these answers. Rabbi Elazar asks: How do they resolve the issue of what makes the animal edible? The slaughter itself does not make the consecrated animal edible. The sprinkling of the blood is what permits the offering to be eaten. Therefore, if the blood spilled, the animal was never permitted to be eaten. The first answer does not seem to resolve the problem.
Rabbi Elazar raises a similar objection to the third answer. In the case of a blemished animal, slaughtering it does not make it permitted. It requires redemption. The redemption, not the slaughter, makes the animal permitted. Therefore, even though the thief slaughtered it, the slaughter did not itself make the animal edible. How can this be considered a viable slaughter?
The Gemara responds that when Rabbi Elazar raised this question, he did not yet know an important principle held by Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Shimon maintains that blood that stands ready to be sprinkled is considered as though it has already been sprinkled. Even if, in reality, it was not sprinkled, if the conditions were present for the sprinkling to take place, we treat it as though it had been performed for this matter.
Therefore, according to Rabbi Yohanan’s first answer, even though the blood ultimately spilled, at the time of slaughter it stood ready to be sprinkled. That is considered like blood that was sprinkled. The slaughter was consequently regarded as a slaughter that could permit the animal.
Rabbi Shimon also maintains that an animal standing ready to be redeemed is considered as though it had already been redeemed. In the case of the blemished animal, although the redemption had not yet actually taken place, the animal stood ready for redemption, and the redemption would ultimately take place. Therefore, the slaughter is treated as one that can permit the animal.
The Gemara adds a qualification concerning the blemished animal. The case must involve an animal that was already blemished before it was consecrated, and the thief consecrated it in that condition. If the animal was first consecrated while unblemished and only afterward developed a blemish, there is no redemption after the slaughter in the same way. Rashi is clarifying a point in the laws of redemption: after slaughter, redemption is possible only when the animal began as a blemished animal and was consecrated in that state.
We now have the principle needed to understand the Gemara. Rabbi Shimon teaches that anything standing ready to have its blood sprinkled is considered as though the blood had been sprinkled, and anything standing ready for redemption is considered as though it had been redeemed. That is why the cases presented by Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish can qualify as viable slaughter.
The Gemara brings a source for this principle. Rabbi Shimon teaches a law concerning meat that became leftover meat after the permitted time. Certain offerings become prohibited after the day on which they were sacrificed and the following night. By the next morning, they must be burned and may no longer be eaten.
There is a distinction concerning whether such meat is capable of receiving the ritual impurity associated with food. If the night passed before the blood was sprinkled, the meat does not receive the impurity of food. If the blood had already been in a position to be sprinkled, however, and the night passed afterward, the meat does receive the impurity of food.
How do we understand this distinction? If the animal was slaughtered so close to sunset that there was not enough time to sprinkle the blood before the day ended, the offering never had a moment when it was fit to be eaten. It was never in a state of permitted food. Therefore, it cannot receive the impurity associated with food.
But if the animal was slaughtered early enough that there was time to sprinkle the blood, even though the blood was not actually sprinkled, it was fit to have the sprinkling performed. In that case, Rabbi Shimon treats it as though the blood had been sprinkled. The meat is considered to have had a moment of permitted status and can therefore receive the impurity associated with food.
Rashi explains that impurity associated with food applies only to something that is considered food and is permitted for benefit. The source is derived from the expression “any food that may be eaten.” This includes food that may be fed to others, such as a non-Jew, but excludes something that is entirely forbidden for benefit. The item must have been fit to be eaten for at least one moment.
For example, offerings of the thanksgiving type and offerings of the most sacred category ordinarily require the sprinkling of the blood before their meat may be eaten. If they were slaughtered so close to sunset that there was no time for the blood to be sprinkled, the meat never had a moment of permitted status. Since there was never a possible time at which it could be eaten, it cannot receive the impurity associated with food.
By contrast, if the offering was slaughtered ten minutes before sunset, there was technically enough time to sprinkle the blood, even if the sprinkling was not carried out. According to Rabbi Shimon, anything standing ready to have its blood sprinkled is considered as though the blood had been sprinkled. Therefore, it had potential permitted status and is subject to the laws of impurity associated with food.
This brings us back to the original question concerning Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Shimon says that the slaughter must be viable in order for the thief to be liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment. We asked how the slaughter of consecrated property could be viable when the blood was not sprinkled or when a blemished animal had not yet been redeemed.
The answer is that Rabbi Shimon considers potential viability to be sufficient. If the blood stood ready to be sprinkled, it is treated as though it had been sprinkled. If the animal stood ready to be redeemed, it is treated as though it had been redeemed. Therefore, the slaughter can be considered a viable slaughter even though the final act that would make the animal permitted did not actually occur.
We have, therefore, several principles. First, there is the law of leftover offerings: sacrificial meat that remains beyond the permitted time must be burned. Second, for food impurity to apply, the item must have been fit to be eaten at least momentarily. Third, if the animal was never fit for the sprinkling of the blood, it never had a moment of permitted status. But if it was fit for the sprinkling, even though the sprinkling was not performed, Rabbi Shimon treats it as though the sprinkling occurred. The same applies to an animal standing ready for redemption.
Accordingly, when the thief slaughtered an animal that was fit for the blood to be sprinkled, the slaughter is considered viable even if the blood subsequently spilled. And when he slaughtered a blemished animal that stood ready for redemption, the slaughter is considered viable even though the redemption had not yet occurred.
That is how the Gemara resolves the question on Rabbi Shimon. The animal does not need to have actually become permitted through the sprinkling or redemption. It is enough that, at the time of slaughter, it was in a condition in which that act could have taken place. In such a case, Rabbi Shimon considers it as though the act had been performed.