The Yom Ha'Avod presents the view of Rabbi Yehuda, who states that a blind person is exempt from capital punishment administered by a court. This exemption is derived from the term "rotze'a" (murderer), which appears in the context of both exile for unintentional killing and capital punishment for intentional murder. Since a blind person is exempt from exile, they are similarly exempt from capital punishment. The exemption from capital punishment is further extended to other court-administered penalties, such as lashes, through a gezeirah shavah (a halachic derivation based on identical words in different verses) connecting the term "rasha" (wicked person) found in both contexts.
Another teaching attributes to Rabbi Yehuda the ruling that a blind person is exempt from all monetary laws. This is supported by a verse stating that judges "will judge between the slayer and the avenger of blood." The juxtaposition of the avenger and the slayer with the laws of judgment implies that those who fall under the category of an unintentional slayer or an intentional murderer are subject to monetary laws. However, a blind person, being exempt from the laws of exile and intentional murder, is consequently exempt from monetary laws.
A further teaching by Rabbi Yehuda extends this exemption: a blind person is free from all the commandments of the Torah, not only monetary laws. This is based on a verse that links commandments, statutes, and judgments. The principle derived is that whoever is subject to judgments is subject to commandments and statutes, and conversely, whoever is not subject to judgments is not subject to commandments and statutes. Since a blind person is exempt from judgments, they are therefore exempt from all Torah commandments.
Rabbi Yosef, who was blind, initially stated that if someone had informed him he was exempt from the commandments, he would have celebrated, believing he would receive immense reward for fulfilling them voluntarily. However, upon hearing Rabbi Hanina's teaching that one receives greater reward for fulfilling a commandment when obligated than when not obligated, Rabbi Yosef's perspective shifted. He then declared that he would celebrate if he were told that he is, in fact, obligated in commandments, because this would ensure him greater reward. The reason for this distinction, known as the "bread in the basket" theory, is that an obligated person faces internal resistance and the evil inclination's opposition, making their fulfillment more challenging and thus more meritorious than a voluntary act.
The Mishnah then shifts to comparing the stringencies that apply when a person causes damage versus when an ox causes damage. A person causing damage is liable for five types of payments: damage, pain, medical expenses, loss of livelihood, and shame. Additionally, a person is liable for the loss of a fetus if they cause a pregnant woman to miscarry. An ox, however, is only liable for damage and does not pay for the other four types of payments, nor for the loss of a fetus. If a person damages their parent, they are exempt from all payments because they are subject to capital punishment. Similarly, one who damages their own Canaanite slave is exempt from the payment for loss of livelihood, as the slave's labor belongs to the master, but is liable for the other payments, including shame. This is a novel ruling, as one might think a slave has no shame. If one damages another person's Canaanite slave, they are liable for all five payments, including shame. This is because a Canaanite slave who has immersed in a ritual bath is considered sufficiently Jewish to be subject to these laws, even if generally exempt from other commandments. Rabbi Yehuda, however, maintains that a slave has no shame and is therefore exempt from that payment.
The Mishnah also discusses individuals with limited legal capacity: a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor. Dealing with these individuals is considered a "bad deal" because if they damage someone, they are exempt from payment, but if someone damages them, the perpetrator must pay. The same applies to a woman: if she damages someone, she is exempt because she does not own property independently (her property is controlled by her husband), but if she is damaged, the perpetrator must pay. However, these payments are suspended until they acquire independent means, such as a divorced woman regaining control of her dowry.
One who strikes their parents or causes injury on the Sabbath is exempt from monetary payment because they are liable for capital punishment. If a person damages their own Canaanite slave, they are exempt from payment because the master would be paying himself, as the slave's earnings belong to the master. The Gemara then considers the case of one who injures a minor girl (a ketana, under 12 years old). Who receives the compensation? The Rabbanana (the Sages) assert that since the Torah states that all benefits and profits of a minor girl go to her father, this includes compensation for depreciation in her value, such as if she were to be sold as a maidservant. The father can sell her, and her damaged state would reduce her price. Alternatively, the father receives the marriage money (kesef kiddushin) because he has control over her marriage, even to an undesirable suitor. Therefore, any compensation related to her marriage value would go to him. However, the father does not have ownership over her physical well-being to the extent of causing her injury, so compensation for injury might not go to him.
The Gemara clarifies that the Torah only granted the father her profits, such as kesef kiddushin and her earnings, but not compensation for physical damages. Rav teaches that the compensation for physical injury (chabalah) goes to the girl herself, not the father. The Gemara then raises a question based on the comparison between a slave and a girl. If one damages their own slave, they are exempt from the payment for loss of livelihood because the slave's earnings belong to the master. Similarly, since a girl's earnings belong to her father, if someone damages her, at least the compensation for loss of livelihood should go to the father. Abaye clarifies that Rav agrees that compensation for loss of livelihood (shevet) goes to the father, as the father is entitled to her earnings. However, Rav's statement that the father does not receive compensation for damages referred to the other payments (pain, medical expenses, shame), not loss of livelihood.
A challenge is posed: if a person injures their adult son, they must pay him immediately. If they injure their minor daughter, they are exempt. However, if someone else injures the minor daughter, they must pay the father. This contradicts Rav's statement that chabalah does not go to the father. The Gemara reconciles this by explaining that Rav's ruling applies only to the direct damages (nezek, tza'ar, rippui, boshet), not to loss of livelihood (shevet). The father receives compensation for the daughter's lost work because he is entitled to her earnings.
Another challenge arises from a baraita. If a person injures their adult son, they must pay him immediately. If they injure their minor son, the compensation is placed in a trust until he matures. If they injure their minor daughter, they are exempt. However, if someone else injures the daughter, the payment goes to the father. This seems to contradict the idea that the father is not entitled to chabalah payments. The Gemara answers that the baraita referring to payment to the father for the minor daughter's injury is specifically about the "surplus" (hadafa) of her earnings, meaning any amount she earns beyond what she needs for her own sustenance. The portion needed for her sustenance (mezonot) goes to her, but the surplus goes to the father.
The Gemara then discusses a different baraita: if a person injures their own children, whether minor or adult, they are exempt from payment. If they injure other people's children, they must pay, and for minors, the payment is held in trust. This contradicts the previous baraita which stated that one must pay their adult son immediately. The Gemara resolves this by distinguishing between children who are supported by their father (simukhim al shulchano) and those who are self-supporting. If the father supports them, he is exempt from paying for damages he causes, as he is already providing for them. If they are self-supporting, he must pay them immediately, as they need the money for their livelihood. This distinction primarily applies to the payment for loss of livelihood (shevet), not the other four payments, which are always due.
A further question is raised: if a minor daughter is self-supporting, why does the baraita say that if someone else damages her, the money goes to the father? If she is self-supporting, she needs the money for her own sustenance. Furthermore, a father cannot compel his daughter to work for him without providing for her, unlike a Canaanite slave. The Gemara answers that in this case, the father receives only the surplus earnings (hadafa) beyond what the daughter needs for her sustenance. The portion for her sustenance goes to her directly.
The Gemara then asks about the case where the father damages his adult son and must pay him immediately. If the son is supported by the father, why should the payment go to the son at all, rather than the father? The Gemara explains that the father is only particular about not losing money from his own pocket. If he damages his son, he doesn't want to pay for loss of livelihood because he is already supporting him. However, if someone else damages the son, the father is not losing anything, so he is not particular about the payment going to the son. This is true for payments that do not come out of the father's pocket.
A counter-argument is presented: if a child finds a lost object, the father is entitled to it, even though it did not come out of the father's pocket. This shows the father is particular about windfalls. The Gemara distinguishes: the father is particular about "profits that came to the child easily, without any suffering," such as a lost object. These are seen as free money that the father, as the supporter, is entitled to. However, for "damages that involved the child's suffering," even if the money comes from an outside source and does not cost the father anything, he is not particular and allows the child to receive it.
This leads to a final question: in the first baraita, if someone else damages a minor daughter, the money goes to the father. But the daughter suffered, and the money comes from outside the father's pocket, so according to the latest distinction, it should go to the daughter. The Gemara answers that the first baraita refers to a case where the father is a "kabdan" (a miser) who does not even support his own daughter. In such a case, his miserly nature means he is particular even about compensation for suffering that comes from an outside source.
Finally, regarding the "trust" (segula) for a minor, Al-Fazda suggests buying a Torah scroll for the child to learn from when he grows up. Rabbah bar Huna suggests buying a date palm tree, so the child can immediately benefit from its fruit.