We begin our study on Lamed Zayin Amud Bet, starting with a Mishnah that discusses cases of an ox goring. The Mishnah presents a rule: if an ox belonging to an Israelite gores an ox consecrated to the Temple (an ox of Hekdesh), or vice versa, no payment is made. The Torah states, "when you goad the ox of your friend," implying that payment is only required when damage occurs between two private individuals. Since an ox of Hekdesh is considered God's property and not a "friend's," no payment is due in either direction.
The Mishnah then introduces an interesting case involving a non-Jew (a goy). If an Israelite's ox gores a goy's ox, no payment is required. However, if a goy's ox gores an Israelite's ox, the goy must pay full damages, even if it's the first time the ox has gored (a Tam, which normally only pays half damages). This distinction is significant.
The Gemara begins by explaining the first law of the Mishnah, concerning the ox of Hekdesh. Our Mishnah, which rules that no payment is made for damage involving Hekdesh, does not align with the view of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasiah. A Baraita teaches that if a common ox gores an ox of Hekdesh, or vice versa, no payment is made, based on the principle of "your friend's ox." However, Rabbi Shimon ben Menasiah states that if a common ox belonging to an Israelite damages an ox of Hekdesh, the Israelite must pay full damages, even for the first occurrence. This clearly contradicts our Mishnah, which states no payment is made. Therefore, our Mishnah cannot follow Rabbi Shimon ben Menasiah's opinion.
The Gemara seeks to understand Rabbi Shimon ben Menasiah's interpretation. If he learns the word "friend's" literally, then any damage involving Hekdesh should result in no payment, as Hekdesh is not a "friend." Yet, Rabbi Shimon ben Menasiah distinguishes: if an Israelite damages Hekdesh, payment is required, but if Hekdesh damages an Israelite, no payment is made. How does he arrive at this? The Gemara asks, if the term "friend's" is taken literally, then both scenarios should result in no payment. If it's not literal, then both should result in payment. Why the split?
The Gemara suggests that perhaps Rabbi Shimon ben Menasiah interprets "friend's" as referring specifically to the case of a Tam (an ox that has gored fewer than three times), where only half damages are paid. He might derive a rule through a "Kal V'Homer" (an a fortiori argument): if a common ox damaging another common ox requires payment, then damaging Hekdesh should also require payment. However, the Gemara counters that a Kal V'Homer cannot be stronger than its source. Just as a Tam normally pays half damages, a Kal V'Homer would only establish half damages for Hekdesh, not full damages as Rabbi Shimon ben Menasiah asserts.
The Gemara then offers Rabbi Shimon ben Menasiah's actual reasoning. He learns that the Torah's discussion of full damages for a Mu'ad (an ox that has gored three times or more) does not use the word "friend's." This implies that the law of full damages for a Mu'ad applies universally, even to damage involving Hekdesh. Conversely, the word "friend's" is explicitly mentioned in the context of a Tam, where only half damages are paid. This teaches that the distinction between Tam (half damages) and Mu'ad (full damages) only applies to damage between two common individuals. When an ox damages Hekdesh, it is always considered a case of full damages, even the first time, because the verse for Mu'ad does not limit it to "friend's." The Gemara concludes that the absence of "friend's" in the Mu'ad verse, and its presence in the Tam verse, teaches that only in the Tam case is there a distinction between half and full damages; for Hekdesh, it is always full damages from the outset.
We now turn to the Mishnah's ruling regarding a non-Jew. If an Israelite's ox damages a goy's ox, no payment is made. But if a goy's ox damages an Israelite's ox, the goy must pay full damages, regardless of whether it's a Tam or a Mu'ad. The Gemara questions this split: if the term "friend's" is literal, then both parties should be exempt from payment. If it's not literal, then both should be liable. Why the asymmetry?
The Gemara explains this by citing two different interpretations of a verse. One interpretation states that God observed the non-Jews not fulfilling the Seven Noahide Laws, and as a punishment, He "permitted" their money (meaning, made it permissible for Israelites to take without payment if damaged). Another interpretation links this to the giving of the Torah at Mount Sinai. When God offered the Torah to the nations of the world and they refused it, He declared their money to be "ownerless" relative to Israel. Thus, if an Israelite damages a goy's ox, there's no payment, but if a goy damages an Israelite's ox, the goy must pay full damages, even if it's a Tam.
The Gemara asks why two verses are needed if one suffices. It suggests that the first verse might have a different interpretation. Rabbi Matna explains that "God saw" refers to God seeing that the non-Jews were not fulfilling the Seven Noahide Laws, and as a result, He "exiled" them from their lands. The word "V'yater" (and He removed) is interpreted as "exiled" or "caused to jump," similar to how the Torah describes locusts jumping from place to place. This interpretation means God punished them by exiling them, not by permitting their money.
Rabbi Yosef offers a different understanding of the verse. He interprets it to mean that God saw their neglect of the commandments and declared that even if they were to fulfill the Seven Noahide Laws, they would not receive reward for it. The Gemara challenges this, noting that a non-Jew who studies Torah (referring to the Noahide Laws) does receive reward. The Gemara clarifies that non-Jews receive reward, but not like someone who is commanded and performs a mitzvah. Rather, they receive reward like someone who is not commanded but performs a mitzvah. Rabbi Hanina taught that the reward for someone commanded to do a mitzvah is greater than for someone not commanded, because it is harder to perform a commanded act due to human nature's resistance to being told what to do.
The Gemara recounts a story: the Roman Kingdom once sent two officers to the Sages of Israel, asking to be taught Torah. After learning it, the officers told the Sages that while they accepted most of the Torah, they could not accept the law that an Israelite is exempt from paying for damage to a goy's ox, while a goy must pay for damage to an Israelite's ox. They reasoned that if "friend's" was literal, both should be exempt; if not, both should be liable. They did not understand the derivation but promised not to reveal this to the Roman authorities, to protect the Sages.
Another story is told about Rabbi Shmuel bar Yehuda. When his daughter died, other Sages wanted to console him. He refused to go with them, saying their form of consolation was blasphemous. Babylonians would tell mourners, "What could you do? If you could do something, would you fight God?" Rabbi Shmuel bar Yehuda considered this blasphemy. He went alone to console the mourner. He told the mourner that God commanded Moses not to wage war against Moab, even though Moab had conspired against Israel. Moses had thought to attack Moab because they instigated the curse of Balaam. However, God revealed that He had a purpose for Moab: two great women, Ruth the Moabite and Na'ama the Amonite, would descend from them. Ruth became the grandmother of King David, and Na'ama was the wife of King Solomon's son. God preserved these nations for the sake of these future righteous individuals. Rabbi Shmuel bar Yehuda then applied this to the mourner's daughter: if she had died young, it must mean that she had already fulfilled her purpose and there was nothing more for her to accomplish in this world. Had there been more, God would have preserved her life, just as He preserved Amon and Moab for the sake of future righteous descendants. This was his consolation, suggesting that the daughter had achieved her full potential in her short life.
The Gemara then states that God does not diminish the reward of any creature, even for good speech. This is illustrated by the story of Lot's daughters. After the destruction of Sodom, they believed they were the last people on earth. The elder daughter slept with her father and named her son Moab, which means "from my father," publicly announcing her act. As a result, God held her accountable. Many years later, God commanded Moses not to wage war against Moab, but to enslave them and make them bring water and provisions. This partial subjugation was a consequence of the elder daughter's immodest naming. The younger daughter also slept with her father but named her son Amon, which means "son of my people," a more modest name. For this good speech, God rewarded her: He commanded Moses not to fight or even enslave Amon. The Gemara also notes that the elder daughter, who acted first to have children, was rewarded with the quicker emergence of Ruth, from whom came Oved, Yishai, David, and King Solomon. The younger daughter's descendants, however, did not fully enter the Jewish people until King Solomon's time, through Na'ama the Amonite, illustrating that delaying the mitzvah, even for a night, resulted in a later reward.
We now discuss the law of the Kutim (Samaritans). The Kutim were converts brought to Israel by the Assyrian king. There is a debate whether their conversion was sincere or merely out of fear of lions that attacked them. The law states that if an Israelite damages a Kuti's ox, the Israelite is exempt from payment. If a Kuti's ox damages an Israelite's ox, the Kuti pays half damages for a Tam and full damages for a Mu'ad. Rabbi Meir, however, states that if a Kuti's ox damages an Israelite's ox, the Kuti must pay full damages even for a Tam. Rabbi Meir views the Kutim like non-Jews, who, as previously learned, pay full damages from the first instance.
The Gemara questions Rabbi Meir's stance. Does he truly consider Kutim to be non-Jews, because their conversion was motivated by fear of lions? This seems to contradict another law: if one finds a stain (a Ketem, indicating ritual impurity) on a garment from a place where the majority are non-Jews, it is considered pure. If it's from a place where the majority are Jews, it's impure. Rabbi Yehuda states that if a Ketem is found from the Kutim of Rekim, it is impure, because the Kutim there are considered true converts. If a Ketem is found in the street of Israelite cities, it is pure, because Israelites are careful not to discard impure items in public. But if found in the street of Kuti cities, it is impure, because Kutim are suspected of discarding impure items. The point is that Rabbi Yehuda considers Kutim to be legitimate converts regarding ritual impurity. This contradicts Rabbi Meir's view that Kutim are like non-Jews regarding damages.
The Gemara reconciles this by explaining that while Kutim are indeed considered legitimate converts, the Sages instituted a penalty (a K'nas) against their money. This was done to discourage Israelites from associating too closely with Kutim, who still practiced some idolatry and did not fully observe the mitzvot. The penalty is that if an Israelite damages a Kuti's ox, the Israelite is exempt. If a Kuti's ox damages an Israelite's ox, the Kuti must pay. The debate between the Sages and Rabbi Meir is about the extent of this penalty: the Sages say the Kuti pays half damages for a Tam and full for a Mu'ad, like a regular Israelite, while Rabbi Meir says they pay full damages even for a Tam, to further distance Israelites from them.
The Gemara raises a further challenge from the law of rape. If a man rapes a Betulah (virgin), he must pay a K'nas of fifty Shekalim to her father. This applies even if the girl is a Mamzeret (a Jew born of a forbidden union), a Netina (a descendant of the Gibeonites who converted but were forbidden to marry into the community), or even a Kutit. If Rabbi Meir holds that Kutim are subject to a K'nas that penalizes them by making them pay full damages for their animals and exempting Israelites from paying them, why is there no similar K'nas regarding rape? Why should a man who rapes a Kutit still have to pay the fifty Shekalim to her father? Why not penalize the Kutim here too, by exempting the rapist from payment, to discourage association?
The Gemara answers that the Sages distinguish between different types of interactions. In cases of damage by an ox, where the interaction is indirect, the Sages can institute a K'nas to distance Israelites from Kutim. However, in cases of sin, such as rape, the Sages cannot institute a K'nas that would effectively reward the sinner. Exempting a rapist from payment would be seen as rewarding a person for committing a sin. Therefore, even though the goal is to distance Israelites from Kutim, in a case of rape, the fifty Shekalim must still be paid to the Kutit's father, as the Sages cannot condone or reward sinful behavior. The money cannot simply be given to the poor because it has a specific claimant, the father. Thus, while Rabbi Meir indeed applies a K'nas to Kutim in animal damage cases (requiring full payment even for a Tam), this does not extend to exempting a rapist, due to the principle of not rewarding a sinner. Blessed be God.