The EB Sit Edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, Masechet Bava Kamma, has been generously sponsored in our Daf Yomi program by our good friend and patron, Siyahu Asher HaKohen, and his dear wife, Rena. May they, with the help of Hashem, continue to have success, prosperity in all their endeavors, health, happiness, and much nachat from their children. May they enjoy many years of shalom bayit, tranquility, and peace of mind. Amen.
Today’s Daf is being said for the elevation of the souls of Mor Zekeni Yosef ben Sara and Hazkena Tova bat Sara, as well as for the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Ester. May Hashem have mercy on them in Gan Eden. Amen.
This Daf is also being said for a complete healing for Moshe ben Dina. May he have healing of both body and soul, and may it be soon. Amen.
We begin today’s Daf on Mem-Bet, and we are starting from five lines down. The Gemara presents a baraita that discusses the verse "Ba'al HaShor Naki." The Torah is addressing a case involving a shor tam, an ox that has gored a person and killed them. What is to be done with the animal? The animal is to be killed. This is clear. Is there a kofer? No. Is there a chatzi kofer? No. However, the Gemara will derive additional meanings from the words "Ba'al HaShor Naki." So far, we have established two interpretations. One interpretation is that the owner of the ox is considered "clean," meaning he cannot benefit from this animal, not even from its hide. The second interpretation is that the owner is "off the hook," meaning he does not have to pay chatzi kofer.
Now we will explore another interpretation of what "Ba'al HaShor Naki" is teaching us. We have another baraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGlili states that the owner of the ox is exempt from paying for the miscarried offspring if the ox gored a pregnant woman and she miscarried. In contrast, if a human being causes a miscarriage, the Torah states that the person who caused the injury must pay for the children. The novelty here is that when an ox causes a miscarriage, the owner does not have to pay for the offspring. This is the chiddush of Rabbi Yosei regarding "Ba'al HaShor Naki."
Rabbi Akiva responds to Rabbi Yosei, questioning the necessity of this interpretation. He points out that the Torah explicitly states, "Ki Yinatzu Anashim," when two men are fighting and one strikes a woman, he must pay. This implies that the obligation to pay applies only to men and not to oxen. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva argues, the verse "Ba'al HaShor Naki" is superfluous. The Gemara acknowledges Rabbi Akiva’s claim as valid.
However, Rav Ulla argues that both verses are necessary. If we only had the verse "Ki Yinatzu Anashim," we would not know that if an animal gores, the owner does not have to pay for the children. One might think that since humans are liable, animals that are similar to humans would also be liable. The Torah clarifies that even a mu'ad, an ox that is known to be dangerous, does not have to pay for the children when it is a shor tam. Therefore, the verse "Ba'al HaShor Naki" is essential to teach us this point.
The Gemara continues to analyze the implications of these verses. Rabbi Akiva’s position is that the obligation to pay for damages caused by a mu'ad is different from that of a tam. The Gemara discusses the distinctions between various cases, emphasizing that the owner of a shor tam is exempt from paying for the offspring, while the owner of a mu'ad is liable.
As the discussion unfolds, the Gemara raises further questions regarding the implications of these rulings. Abaye and Rava contribute to the dialogue, exploring the nuances of the laws surrounding damages caused by oxen and the responsibilities of their owners. The discussion highlights the complexity of interpreting the Torah’s laws and the importance of precise language in understanding halachic obligations.
Ultimately, the Gemara concludes with Rabbi Akiva’s assertion that the owner of a shor tam that kills an eved does not have to pay the thirty shekels typically required for killing a servant. This conclusion reinforces the distinction between the obligations associated with different types of damages and the unique status of the eved in halachic terms.
In summary, the exploration of "Ba'al HaShor Naki" reveals deep insights into the responsibilities of individuals when their property causes harm. The dialogue among the sages illustrates the careful consideration necessary in halachic discourse, as they navigate the complexities of justice and liability in the context of the Torah’s teachings.