We begin today’s page with a quotation from the Mishnah. The Mishnah lists the four forms of execution administered by a court and then gives their order of severity: stoning is the most severe, followed by burning, execution by the sword, and strangulation. At the end of the Mishnah, it concludes: “These are the laws of those who are stoned.”
The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the Mishnah concludes by saying, “These are the laws of those who are stoned”? In the previous chapter, we learned all the procedures involved in stoning a person: the verdict is finalized, and the place of execution is two stories high. Now we are going to discuss how a person is burned. Therefore, the Mishnah stated that until this point we had been learning how stoning is performed, and from here the Gemara will discuss how the process of burning is performed.
The Mishnah teaches that when someone is liable for burning, they place him in sand up to his knees so that he cannot move and remains stable. They then take two scarves, one coarse and one soft. The coarse scarf is placed on the inside, and the soft one is wrapped around it on the outside. They place them around his neck in order to force his mouth open, but they do not want to injure or bruise his neck with the coarse scarf. At the same time, the inner scarf must be strong enough to help open his mouth, which is why a coarse scarf is used.
They then take the coarse scarf, place it inside the soft one, and wrap them around his neck. One person pulls from one side and another person pulls from the other side until his mouth opens. Once his mouth is open, they ignite the wick. The Gemara explains that the substance used was actually molten lead. They would heat the lead and pour it into his mouth, where it would travel down to his intestines and burn his insides.
The first opinion maintains that the scarves are indeed placed around his neck. Another opinion objects that this might kill him before the lead is poured into his mouth, in which case the court would not have fulfilled the execution of burning. According to that opinion, when the Mishnah says that they open his mouth, it means that they use some kind of device to hold his mouth open against his will. They then heat the lead and pour it into his mouth.
Thus, the disagreement between the first opinion and Rabbi Yehuda is whether the scarves must actually be wrapped around his neck. The first opinion says that they must be used, while Rabbi Yehuda says that they should not be used.
The Mishnah continues with the statement of Rabbi Tzadok: “There was an incident involving one daughter of a priest who committed adultery.” The Torah states that the daughter of a priest who commits adultery is to be burned. In this case, the court surrounded her with branches and wood and burned her in a fire. They did not know the halacha and acted incorrectly. When Rabbi Elazar related this incident, the Sages told him that the court had not been expert in the law. They had thought that burning meant placing the woman in a bonfire, but that is not the halacha. The person must be burned with molten lead.
The Gemara now begins its analysis. The Mishnah said that they ignite something, but what exactly do they ignite? The answer is that they ignite molten lead. From where do we know that this is the meaning of burning? This form of execution burns the inside while leaving the outside intact. Perhaps, however, burning means what the other Sages understood it to mean: burning the entire body.
The Gemara answers that we derive it through a comparison of the expression “burning” in this context with another instance of burning in the Torah, concerning the congregation of Korah and those who joined him when they opposed Moshe Rabbeinu. The following morning, they brought their fire pans with the incense inside. Moshe Rabbeinu said that the fire would consume the incense of the person who was the true priest, while the others would be consumed by the fire. Fire descended and consumed them.
Just as the burning mentioned in connection with Korah refers to the burning of the soul while the body remained intact, so too, the burning administered by the court refers to the burning of the soul while the body remains intact.
Rabbi Elazar offers a different proof. There is another instance of burning in the Torah, involving the sons of Aaron, Nadav and Avihu, who were burned in the Sanctuary. Just as Nadav and Avihu were burned while their bodies remained intact and their insides were burned, so too, the burning administered by the court means that the soul is burned while the body remains intact.
The Gemara now presents the disagreement regarding the source of this law. Is the procedure derived from the congregation of Korah or from the sons of Aaron?
The one who derives it from the congregation of Korah must explain how he knows that their bodies remained intact. The verse says that the people brought their fire pans “with their souls.” This teaches that their souls were burned while their bodies remained intact.
The other opinion responds that the burning in the story of Korah was actual burning of the entire body. What, then, does the verse mean by saying that they brought the fire pans “with their souls”? It means that the reason they were punished was that they pursued the pleasures of their souls.
The Gemara explains that Korah was very clever. He needed the 250 men to support him, so he first persuaded them to join him by feeding them a beautiful meal. Once they had eaten his food, they were already beholden to him. Since they had satisfied their souls, Korah was able to draw them to his side.
The Gemara explains this with the expression that excessive flattery is connected to the idea of bringing the minister of Gehinnom upon a person. Because these 250 men falsely flattered Korah after eating the food he gave them, they brought the minister of Gehinnom upon themselves. In other words, the teeth of the minister of Gehinnom came upon them. According to this opinion, the story of Korah involved actual burning. The sin for which they were punished was that they pursued the gratification of their souls by accepting Korah’s food, and as a result they were compelled to flatter him and agree with his position.
The opinion that derives the law from the sons of Aaron explains how we know that their bodies were not burned. The verse says that they “died before God,” which sounds like an ordinary death. When a person dies an ordinary death, the body remains intact. The other opinion responds that they were in fact burned. The verse sounds as though they died naturally because the fire began inside them and only later spread outward and consumed them.
The Tanna taught in the name of Rabbi Yosef ben Dostai that two strands of fire emerged from the Holy of Holies. Each strand divided into two, producing four strands of fire. Two entered the nostrils of Nadav, and two entered the nostrils of Avihu, and the fire burned them.
The Gemara asks: The verse says that the fire “consumed them,” which sounds as though it consumed them completely. According to the first opinion, we understand that their entire bodies were consumed internally while the outside remained intact. But according to the opinion that their bodies were entirely consumed, what does the wording imply remained intact? The answer is that their bodies were destroyed, but their clothing remained intact.
The Gemara now asks: Why do we need to derive the procedure from either the congregation of Korah or the sons of Aaron? There is another case involving an animal that was slaughtered but may not be brought on the altar for whatever reason. The law is that it must be taken outside the camp and burned there, as we mention in the prayers. Why not derive the procedure of burning from that case? There, the entire animal is burned to ashes.
The Gemara answers that it is more logical to learn the law concerning a human being from another human being rather than from an animal. First, we do not derive a law concerning a human being from an animal. Second, the human being committed a sin, whereas the animal did not commit a sin, so it is not a fair comparison. Third, we are discussing a person who possesses a soul, whereas an animal does not possess a soul in the same sense. Finally, the laws of improper intention apply to an animal sacrifice. If a priest has a different or improper intention while performing the sacrifice, it becomes invalid. Those laws apply only to animals, not to human beings. For these reasons, the Gemara says that it does not make sense to compare an animal with a human being.
The Gemara then reverses the argument and says that perhaps the procedure should indeed be derived from the animals that are burned. Those animals are a law that applies throughout the generations, whereas the incident involving Korah was an isolated event, and the incident involving Nadav and Avihu was also an isolated event. Perhaps we should derive the law from the practice that is more prevalent and applies throughout the generations.
The Gemara answers that although the cases involving animals have that advantage, the differences between them and human beings are greater than the similarities. Therefore, it is preferable to derive the law from one human case or the other, either from Korah or from the sons of Aaron.
The Gemara returns to the opinion that derives the law from Korah. Why does that opinion not derive it from the sons of Aaron? He understands that the sons of Aaron were actually burned. The Gemara answers that he could indeed derive the law from them. If so, the Gemara asks, why should he not derive the procedure of burning from the sons of Aaron and understand burning as actual burning?
Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the Torah teaches the principle, “You shall love your fellow as yourself.” Even when a person is being executed by the court, the execution must be performed in the most compassionate and humane manner possible. The verse requires the court to show him consideration and respect. Burning the entire body is not the most humane method. The more compassionate method is to burn the inside while leaving the body intact.
The Gemara asks: If this principle already teaches us to give him the most humane death, why do we need the comparison between the expressions for burning in the stories of Korah and the sons of Aaron? Why do we need that derivation at all? The answer is that without it, we might have thought that leaving the body intact is not considered burning. We might have said that burning requires making a large fire and burning the person entirely. Therefore, the derivation is necessary to teach that the procedure is considered burning even when the body remains intact.
Once we know that the body remains intact, another question arises. Perhaps the court should do even more and find an even more humane form of execution. The Gemara answers that the requirement to preserve the body and the requirement to provide a humane death together establish the procedure described here.
The Gemara then offers several teachings concerning the death of Nadav and Avihu. One day, Moshe and Aaron were walking along the road, with Nadav and Avihu following behind them. The entire Jewish people were following Nadav and Avihu. The people said, “When will these two old men die, so that we can become the leaders of the generation?”
God said to them, “We will see who will bury whom.” They thought they would bury Moshe and Aaron, but God showed them otherwise. The people used a proverb: There are many old camels carrying the skins of their young. In other words, there are many cases in which the elders outlive the younger people.
On a simple level, it is impossible to understand Nadav and Avihu as actually wishing for Moshe and Aaron to die. The Stipler Rebbe explained that we must give them the benefit of the doubt. Leading the Jewish people is a great merit, honor, privilege, and mitzvah. Nadav and Avihu had great aspirations, goals, and desires to become great people. They were not wishing Moshe Rabbeinu any harm. Rather, they were saying that they could not wait until they reached the level at which they would be capable of assuming this position of leadership and responsibility.
Nevertheless, the Stipler Rebbe felt that they should not have said this. Even though their intention was not malicious, it was still improper.
Rabbi Elazar then states an important principle: How does an ignorant person perceive a Torah scholar? At first, when he sees him, the Torah scholar is like a golden vessel. After he speaks with him, the Torah scholar becomes like a silver vessel. If the Torah scholar gives him something and accepts something from him, he becomes like an earthen vessel in his eyes. Once an earthen vessel breaks, it cannot be repaired.
This is why the Gemara previously explained how Korah was able to draw the 250 men to his side. He gave them food, and once they accepted something from him, they diminished themselves in his eyes. Korah thought, “These people accepted what I gave them; they are nothing.” Once he had given them the food, he was able to control them, and they began asking how they could please him.
The Gemara says that when he gave them something, they became insignificant in his eyes. This is how he was able to win them over. Once he gave them the food, they themselves began following Korah.
There is a famous story about the Brisker Rav. A government representative came to him and said that the government wanted to give money to his yeshiva. The representative assured him that the government would not dictate anything and that he would retain complete freedom to do whatever he wanted.
The Brisker Rav responded, “You are right. You will not have to dictate anything. Once I accept the money, I will come running to you and ask what I should do.” He learned this from the story of Korah. Once Korah gave the men money or food, they themselves began pursuing him and asking how they could please him. The Brisker Rav said that he was not refusing the money because he was afraid that the government would dictate to him. He was afraid that he himself would be the one to fall under their influence.
The Gemara returns to the incident involving the daughter of a priest. A woman named Batali, the daughter of a priest, committed adultery. Rabbi Hamama bar Toviah took branches, logs, and wood and burned her. Rabbi Yosef said that Rabbi Hamama bar Toviah made two mistakes.
First, he made a mistake concerning the substance used for burning: it was not a fire of wood, but molten lead. Second, he carried out a judgment after the time of the Temple. The court’s authority to administer these forms of execution applied when the Temple and the appropriate court were in existence.
The Mishnah then records that Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok told the Sages, “I remember an incident involving a daughter of a priest who committed adultery.” They placed her in a bonfire made of logs and burned her. The Sages told Rabbi Elazar that the court had made a mistake. Burning her in a bonfire was not the correct procedure.
The Gemara observes that the court in that story was associated with the Sadducees. They did not study the Oral Law and followed the literal meaning of the Torah’s wording. Since the Torah says that she must be burned, they understood it to mean that she should be placed in a regular fire.
The Gemara then points out that the wording of the story does not appear to fit the exchange between Rabbi Elazar and the Sages. According to one version, Rabbi Elazar said that he remembered a woman whom they burned in a fire, and the Sages responded that the court had made a major mistake. Why would Rabbi Elazar relate that story if the Sages were simply going to reject it?
Another version states that Rabbi Elazar said, “When I was a child, I remember that they brought before my father the branches and wood, and they burned her.” The Sages responded, “What proof is that? You were only a child.” According to this version, Rabbi Elazar was giving testimony about something he had seen as a child, and the Sages rejected it because he was not yet an adult.
The Gemara resolves the difficulty by saying that there were actually two incidents. In the first, Rabbi Elazar was a child, and he told the Sages that he remembered seeing his father involved in the case. They answered that his testimony was not accepted because he was a child. Later, when he was an adult, he told them about another incident, as recorded in the Mishnah. The court in that case was not merely mistaken; it was a court that had been corrupted by the Sadducees and therefore carried out the burning in the wrong manner.
The Gemara now moves to the next form of execution administered by the court: execution by the sword. What is the procedure for those executed by the sword? It is performed in the manner used by the government. The condemned person stands, and they take a sword and decapitate him while he is standing.
Rabbi Yehuda objects that this is a degrading death. Instead, they should place his head on a block while he is sitting or lying down, and then cut his head off with a hatchet. The Sages respond that Rabbi Yehuda’s method is also degrading. Placing him on the block and chopping off his head is not less humiliating than decapitating him while he is standing.
Rabbi Yehuda responds to the Sages: “I know that my method is also degrading to some degree. But what can I do? The Torah says, ‘You shall not follow their practices.’” In other words, although placing the person’s head on a block may be more humane, it resembles the method used by the surrounding nations. Therefore, the Jewish court must not follow that practice.
The Gemara discusses the resulting difficulty. Since the Torah commands the court to execute by the sword, we are not learning this method from the non-Jewish nations. We had the practice from the Torah first, and it happens to be that the other nations also use it. The Gemara answers that the prohibition applies when a practice is not written in the Torah and a person chooses to imitate the nations on his own. If the Torah itself requires the practice, there is no problem even if the nations happen to do the same thing.
The Gemara brings another example. When a Jewish king died, it was customary to burn all his possessions so that no one else could benefit from them. The Gemara asks how this could be permitted when the surrounding nations also followed that practice. It answers that the Torah itself says that the possessions of a king are to be burned, as it says, “They shall burn your possessions just as they burned the possessions of your fathers.” We are not learning from the nations; we are following the Torah. Therefore, the prohibition applies only to a practice that is not commanded in the Torah and that one adopts merely because the nations follow it.
We learned in another chapter that the following are executed by the sword: a murderer and the inhabitants of a city that worships idols. The case of the inhabitants of such a city is clear, because the Torah explicitly says that they are to be killed by the sword. But how do we know that an ordinary murderer is also liable for execution by the sword? The Gemara derives it through a comparison of verses. The Torah says that the murderer is to be put to death, and another verse uses the expression “by the edge of the sword.” The edge of the sword refers to execution by the sword.
A teaching is brought concerning someone who kills a Canaanite servant. The Torah says that the master is to take vengeance. What is this vengeance? It means execution by the sword. Similarly, concerning a person who kills his wife, the Torah uses the expression “he shall surely be avenged,” and this also refers to execution by the sword.
The Gemara asks: Even if we know that execution is performed with a sword, who says that the sword must be used to cut off the head? Perhaps one could use the point of the sword and stab the person in the stomach. The Gemara answers that the verse refers to the edge of the sword, not the point. The edge requires the length of the sword, rather than merely its tip.
The Gemara asks whether one might use the length of the sword to cut the person in half. The answer is that this cannot be the meaning, because the Torah requires that the court choose a humane form of death. The person cannot be cut into pieces. The execution must be performed in a way that is as compassionate as possible.
The Gemara then asks: We have established that killing a servant is punished by execution with the sword. From where do we know that killing a free person is also punished by the sword? The Gemara first considers a logical argument. If killing a servant is punished by the sword, perhaps killing a free person should be punished by strangulation, which some might regard as a lesser punishment. But this depends on which execution is considered more severe. If strangulation is considered less severe than execution by the sword, the argument works. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that strangulation is more severe, the argument does not work. Perhaps killing a servant is punished by the sword, while killing a free person is punished by strangulation because that is more severe.
The Gemara therefore brings another proof from the law of the calf whose neck is broken when a murdered person is found and the murderer is unknown. If the murderer is later discovered, he is executed in the same manner as the calf whose neck was broken. Just as the calf is killed with a sword, so too, the murderer is killed with a sword.
The Gemara asks whether this means that the murderer should be killed exactly like the calf, with a hatchet struck from the back of the neck. It answers that we derive from the calf only that the method is execution by the sword, but not that every detail must be identical. The human being is not executed in precisely the same manner as the calf; rather, the execution must be performed by the sword.