We begin today’s study with the Mishnah on the twenty-eighth folio, side B. The Mishnah discusses three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters; or one who was married to a woman and the other to her daughter; or one to a woman and the other to her granddaughter through her daughter; or one to a woman and the other to her granddaughter through her son.
The issue is that when the two brothers die, both women become subject to levirate marriage with the surviving brother. In each of these cases, however, the surviving brother cannot marry both women, because one may not marry a woman and her sister, a woman and her daughter, or a woman and her granddaughter. The law is therefore that the women require a ritual release, because they became subject to the surviving brother through two different brothers.
Although the levirate bond is rabbinic in nature, the women do become subject to levirate marriage on a biblical level. Consequently, there is both a levirate bond and a prohibition against marrying two such relatives, and the surviving brother must perform a ritual release.
Rabbi Shimon, however, exempts them entirely. He maintains that when two women become subject to levirate marriage in this manner, there is no ritual release at all. He holds that the status of a woman bound through the levirate bond is sufficiently strong that it is treated, for this purpose, like marriage.
Consider the basic question: Are one’s wife and her daughter permitted to marry the same man? No. When these two women become subject to levirate marriage, it is as though he is already married to one of them. If he is married to the woman, then the daughter is like his wife’s daughter; and the same is true in the opposite direction. Although the technical term is a levirate bond, for lack of a better expression it functions here like marriage. Rabbi Shimon therefore maintains that the prohibition is biblical, and even a ritual release is not performed.
The Gemara then discusses the case in which one of the women is a relative forbidden by a biblical prohibition. That woman does not become subject to levirate marriage, while the other woman does become subject to it. Thus, if two sisters become subject to the surviving brother and one of them is a forbidden relative, the forbidden woman is excluded, and the surviving brother performs levirate marriage with the other sister.
There is also a case in which the woman who became subject to levirate marriage came from a marriage that is prohibited only rabbinically, such as a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative, a divorcee who married a priest, or a similar case. The Sages prohibited levirate marriage with her, but they still required a ritual release.
Let us read Rashi on the Mishnah. Rashi explains that the phrase does not mean that the two women were married to each other. It means that they became subject to levirate marriage together. One does not take either of them in levirate marriage. The Torah gives the example of a man’s wife’s sister, but the same principle applies to every prohibition that becomes relevant when the women fall together: neither woman may be taken, even individually.
That explains Rabbi Shimon’s position. When two women who are prohibited to each other become subject to levirate marriage together, neither one is permitted, and there is not even a ritual release.
The Mishnah then says that if one of the sisters is a woman prohibited by a rabbinic prohibition, the forbidden woman is not taken, but the other sister is taken through levirate marriage. The Gemara asks why this case is necessary. We already encountered the same basic scenario in the previous Mishnah. Why repeat it?
The Gemara answers that the case is necessary for Rabbi Shimon. One might have thought that when one of two sisters is a forbidden relative, Rabbi Shimon would issue a decree prohibiting levirate marriage with the other sister as well. Since Rabbi Shimon prohibits levirate marriage when two sisters become subject to it together, perhaps he would be concerned that people would make levirate marriage with the other sister in an ordinary case involving two sisters.
The Mishnah therefore teaches that Rabbi Shimon’s position applies only when the two sisters themselves become subject to levirate marriage together. When one of the women is a forbidden relative and therefore does not become subject to levirate marriage, the other sister may be taken. In that case, the problem of two sisters bound to the same brother does not arise, because the forbidden woman never entered the levirate bond.
The Gemara next examines the statement that when one of the women is a rabbinically prohibited relative, a ritual release is required. The Gemara assumes that Rabbi Shimon agrees with this law, because it appears immediately after his ruling.
If the two women are sisters, however, Rabbi Shimon says that two sisters do not become subject to levirate marriage at all. Why, then, does the Mishnah require a ritual release when one of the sisters is a rabbinically prohibited relative? According to Rabbi Shimon, if the two sisters do not become subject to levirate marriage on a biblical level, there should be no need to do anything.
The Gemara answers that the requirement of ritual release is a rabbinic decree designed to prevent an error in an ordinary case. In an ordinary case involving a woman prohibited only by a rabbinic prohibition, and not a case involving two sisters, the woman does become subject to levirate marriage and requires a ritual release. If, in the case of two sisters, people saw the surviving brother simply walk away from both women, they might conclude that a woman prohibited by a rabbinic prohibition never requires any procedure. The Sages therefore required a ritual release in this case, even though the two sisters are not truly subject to levirate marriage according to Rabbi Shimon.
The Gemara then asks why a ritual release is required from the other sister as well. If the purpose is to prevent confusion in an ordinary case involving a rabbinically prohibited woman, the ritual release should be performed only with the rabbinically prohibited woman. What does the other sister have to do with that concern?
The Gemara answers that the ritual release from the sister is also a decree on account of the rabbinically prohibited woman. The Sages required a ritual release from the sister so that people would not see one woman receive a ritual release and the other simply leave without any procedure. The ritual release from the sister is therefore connected to the same concern.
The Gemara asks a further question. When a biblically forbidden relative becomes subject to levirate marriage together with another woman, we do not require a ritual release from the forbidden relative. We say that the forbidden woman does not become subject to levirate marriage, and the other woman receives the ritual release. Why, then, did the Sages not institute a similar decree with respect to the forbidden woman, out of concern for the other woman?
The answer is that everyone knows that a biblically forbidden relative does not become subject to levirate marriage. If people see that no ritual release was performed for her, they will understand that the reason is her biblical prohibition. They will not mistakenly conclude that the other woman is also exempt.
By contrast, the law of a secondary rabbinic prohibition is not as well known. People may see that the rabbinically prohibited woman was exempted and mistakenly assume that an ordinary woman with that same rabbinic prohibition is also entirely exempt, without either levirate marriage or ritual release. That is why the Sages required a ritual release in the case of the two sisters.
The Gemara explains the distinction as follows. When one of two sisters is a biblical forbidden relative, everyone understands that she is not part of the levirate bond. The other sister is therefore not exempted because she is another sister; she is exempted because the first woman was a forbidden relative and never became subject to levirate marriage. In the case of two sisters, one of whom is only rabbinically prohibited, people may not understand the underlying reason. They may think that the other sister is exempt merely because she is a sister of a woman who became subject to the bond. The decree requiring a ritual release prevents that misunderstanding.
This is also why the Mishnah does not require a ritual release from the biblical forbidden relative. People recognize that she is an excluded relative and will not draw a conclusion about ordinary cases from her exemption. The concern exists specifically with the less familiar law of the rabbinically prohibited woman.
The Gemara then turns to another Mishnah. There were three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, while the third brother, Levi, was unmarried. Levi performed a formal betrothal-like act with one of the sisters. This act is called a formal levirate betrothal.
The Sages instituted this formal act because levirate marriage appears to involve a man taking a woman without the usual preliminary procedure. Although the Torah permits the levirate marriage in that manner, the Sages required the brother first to perform this formal betrothal. Levi therefore became partially connected to one of the sisters through that act.
Afterward, one of the other brothers died, and his wife—the second sister—became subject to Levi through levirate marriage. The question is whether Levi may now marry her. Can a man marry the sister of the woman to whom he is already connected through the formal levirate betrothal? The answer depends on how strong that formal act is. Is it treated like full marriage, or does it create only a limited connection?
Beit Shammai says that his formal levirate betrothal is treated as marriage. The woman to whom he performed it is regarded as his wife, and the second sister therefore leaves because she is the sister of his wife. Levi must give the first woman a bill of divorce because of the formal levirate betrothal, and he must perform a ritual release with the second sister. He cannot perform levirate marriage with her.
This is the case described by the Mishnah as one in which he loses on both sides: he loses his first wife because he must give her a bill of divorce, and he loses the second sister because he cannot marry her and must perform a ritual release.
Rashi explains that Beit Shammai treats the formal levirate betrothal as a form of acquisition. The Gemara will later discuss whether this status resembles betrothal or full marriage.
The Gemara asks what case the Mishnah is minimizing when it says, “This is the case in which he loses on both sides.” The classic case is the case of Rabbi Yehoshua.
In that case, two brothers were married to two sisters. One of the sisters was an adult, and her marriage was biblical. The other was a minor whose brother or mother had married her off, so her marriage was valid only rabbinically. The husband of the adult sister died without children, and the adult sister became subject to levirate marriage with the husband of the minor sister.
Since the minor’s marriage was only rabbinic, one might think that the surviving brother is not considered married to the sister of the woman who became subject to him. On a biblical level, the minor is not fully his wife, and the adult sister should therefore be able to enter into levirate marriage with him. At most, the minor would be considered the sister of a woman connected to him through a levirate bond, which is a rabbinic prohibition.
Nevertheless, Rabbi Yehoshua says that he loses on both sides. He must give his wife—the minor sister—a bill of divorce, and he must perform a ritual release with the adult sister. He cannot perform levirate marriage with the woman who became subject to him, because on a rabbinic level his minor wife is treated as his wife, making the other woman her sister.
The other Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehoshua. They maintain that the marriage to the minor can be undone through a refusal procedure, which retroactively dissolves the rabbinic marriage. Once that marriage is dissolved, the surviving brother may perform levirate marriage with the adult sister. Rabbi Yehoshua, however, does not allow that solution in this case.
The Gemara then returns to Beit Shammai’s ruling. Beit Shammai says that the woman with whom Levi performed the formal levirate betrothal remains with him, while the other sister leaves because she is the sister of his wife. The Gemara asks how far Beit Shammai takes this formal act. One might think that Beit Shammai considers it a complete acquisition, so that the first woman is fully his wife and the second sister leaves entirely without requiring any further procedure.
The Gemara rejects that possibility. The formal levirate betrothal is sufficient to remove the second sister from the levirate bond, because the first woman is treated as his wife for that purpose. It is not, however, a complete marriage. The first woman still requires both a bill of divorce and a ritual release if Levi wishes to end the relationship.
In other words, the formal act pushes the second sister away, but it does not fully establish the first woman as his wife. The woman with whom he performed the formal act is still connected to him through the levirate bond and therefore requires a ritual release. The term “co-wife” in this context does not mean that the two women are literally co-wives. They became subject to Levi from two different brothers. The second woman is called a co-wife only in the technical sense that she is another woman connected to the same levirate situation.
The Gemara brings an earlier Mishnah as support. Two sisters became subject to two brothers, and each brother performed levirate marriage with one of them. Beit Shammai says that if they already performed the marriages, they may remain married. The Gemara asks: If the formal levirate betrothal were a complete acquisition, why did Beit Shammai say that the marriages are valid only after the fact? Beit Shammai should have instructed each brother to perform the formal act first and then proceed with levirate marriage from the outset.
The Gemara answers that the earlier case involved two sisters who became subject to the two brothers simultaneously. At that moment, each woman was the sister of a woman bound to the same brother through a levirate bond. The situation was therefore prohibited from the outset, and the Sages did not instruct the brothers to perform a formal levirate betrothal in a prohibited situation.
In the Mishnah under discussion, however, one sister became subject to Levi first. Levi could have performed levirate marriage with her at that point, so his formal levirate betrothal was performed in a permitted situation. Only afterward did the second sister become subject to him. A formal act performed in a permitted situation has the power to remove the second sister from the bond.
The Gemara then proposes another possibility: perhaps the formal act is indeed a complete acquisition, but only when performed in a permitted situation. When performed in a prohibited situation, it does not have that power. Thus, even if the formal act normally creates a complete marriage-like status, it cannot do so when the two sisters become subject to the brothers simultaneously.
Rav Ashi presents the matter in a different version. One should not say that according to Beit Shammai the formal act entirely removes the second woman from the situation so that she requires no ritual release. Rather, the act pushes the second woman away from the man with whom the formal act was performed, but it leaves a residual levirate bond. Therefore, the second woman still requires a ritual release.
According to this version, the formal act is not a complete removal. It prevents the second sister from becoming prohibited to Levi as the sister of a woman bound to him, but it does not eliminate every aspect of the levirate bond. The first woman remains with Levi, but the second woman requires a ritual release.
The Gemara challenges this understanding from the earlier Mishnah. Beit Shammai said that if the two brothers had already performed levirate marriage with the two sisters, they may remain married. If the formal act does not entirely remove the second woman, why would Beit Shammai allow the brothers to remain married?
The Gemara answers that complete levirate marriage is different from the formal levirate betrothal. Once full levirate marriage has been performed, the relationship is complete. A formal act, by contrast, is only a partial levirate marriage and therefore may leave a residual bond.
This distinction explains why a formal act performed in a permitted situation can remove the other sister, while a formal act performed when two sisters become subject to the brothers simultaneously does not. In the permitted case, Levi could have completed the levirate marriage when the first sister became subject to him. Since complete marriage was possible, the partial act can also operate fully enough to remove the second sister. In the prohibited case, complete levirate marriage was never possible, because each woman was already the sister of a woman bound to the same brother. The formal act therefore cannot fully remove the other sister.
The Gemara then asks whether, according to Beit Shammai, the formal levirate betrothal creates a status resembling betrothal or a status resembling full marriage. This has several practical consequences. Only a full marriage gives the husband inheritance rights, allows a priestly husband to become impure for his wife, and gives the husband the sole authority to annul his wife’s vows. A woman who is merely betrothed does not have these laws in the same way.
The Gemara says that even an ordinary betrothed woman does not receive these advantages. The husband does not inherit her, a priest does not become impure for her, and he cannot annul her vows by himself. If that is true of ordinary betrothal, can the formal levirate betrothal be stronger than ordinary betrothal and create the status of full marriage?
The Gemara initially finds that difficult. A formal levirate betrothal is not even ordinary betrothal; it is a rabbinic institution that precedes levirate marriage. Why should it create a status stronger than ordinary betrothal?
The Gemara clarifies that the issue is not necessarily whether the formal act makes her fully married in every respect. The question is whether, for the purpose of completing the levirate marriage, Levi must bring her under a marriage canopy or perform the final procedure with her consent, as an ordinary betrothed woman would require. If she remains a woman subject to levirate marriage, the surviving brother may complete the marriage even without her consent. If the formal act changes her status into that of a betrothed woman, then the final step must be performed with her consent.
Thus, the question is whether the formal act leaves her in the category of a woman subject to levirate marriage or transfers her into the category of a betrothed woman. If she remains a levirate wife, the brother may complete the marriage without her consent. If she becomes like an ordinary betrothed woman, the final step requires her consent.
One might ask: if no formal act had been performed, the surviving brother could certainly complete levirate marriage without her consent. How could a rabbinic act make his position weaker? The answer is that the formal act may change the nature of the connection. It may not merely bring him closer to levirate marriage; it may terminate the original levirate bond and create a new relationship resembling betrothal.
The question is therefore whether the formal act is simply a halfway point toward levirate marriage, or whether it breaks the original levirate connection and creates a new form of betrothal. If it is only a partial levirate marriage, the original rules of levirate marriage remain. If it creates a new betrothal-like relationship, the rules of ordinary betrothal apply.
The Gemara then discusses a related Mishnah concerning vows. Rabbi Eliezer says that when a woman becomes subject to two brothers, one of them can annul her vows. Rabbi Yehoshua says that one brother can do so when she becomes subject to one brother, but not when she becomes subject to two brothers. Rabbi Akiva says that neither one nor two brothers can annul her vows, because there is no effective levirate bond.
Rabbi Yehoshua understands that when only one brother is involved, the levirate bond is sufficiently definite for him to have authority. When two brothers are involved, however, it is unclear which brother is the effective husband, and neither can annul the vows alone.
The Gemara asks how Rabbi Eliezer can allow one of two brothers to annul the vows. If both brothers are connected to her through the levirate bond, should they not both be required to participate?
The Gemara answers that the case is one in which one of the brothers performed the formal levirate betrothal. If that formal act creates a complete or marriage-like status, the brother who performed it is considered her husband and can annul her vows.
At first, the Gemara suggests that this proves the formal act creates full marriage. If it created only betrothal, the father would still have authority over the vows of a young woman who is betrothed, and the brother could not annul them alone. Since the Mishnah says that the brother may annul them, perhaps the formal act creates full marriage.
The Gemara responds that the Mishnah may be discussing a young woman whose livelihood is already being provided by the brother. Normally, an ordinary betrothed woman remains under her father’s authority with respect to vows. But in this special situation, the court has ordered the brother to provide her support. Once he is supporting her as a husband would, he receives the relevant authority over her vows.
This principle is based on a case in which a man was obligated by the court to provide support to a woman but then fled. The court collects support from his property on her behalf. Once the court has established that he must provide her livelihood, the woman is treated in certain respects as a married woman, even though the marriage has not been completed.
The same applies here. Whether or not a formal levirate betrothal was performed, once the court has ordered the brother to support the woman, he receives authority over her vows. The formal act itself is not necessarily full marriage. Rather, the obligation of support creates the relevant husband-like status.
This also explains why the formal levirate betrothal cannot simply be stronger than ordinary betrothal in every respect. The brother has a levirate obligation and a levirate bond, but the formal act remains a limited rabbinic institution. Where the brother is already providing support, however, the Sages grant him the authority associated with a husband for this particular purpose.
The Gemara ultimately presents several ways to understand Rabbi Eliezer’s statement that one of the brothers may annul the vows.
One possibility is that a formal levirate betrothal was performed and that the formal act creates a status like full marriage. The brother who performed it is therefore the husband, and the other brother is excluded.
A second possibility is that the formal act creates a status like ordinary betrothal. In that case, the father would normally retain authority, but the brother joins with the father in annulling the vows. The brother does not have sole authority; he acts in partnership with the father.
A third possibility follows Rabbi Eliezer’s view that the formal act does not create a complete acquisition. It is nevertheless strong enough to treat the woman like a wife for some purposes and to remove the other woman from the levirate situation. For vows, the brother therefore has a role together with the father, even though a ritual release is still required to end the levirate relationship.
A fourth possibility is that the case does not involve a formal levirate betrothal at all. Instead, the court has already ordered the brother to provide her support. Once he is paying her support, he receives the authority to annul her vows, even though no formal act was performed and he does not otherwise hold that the woman has become his wife.
These are the four approaches to Rabbi Eliezer’s statement: the formal act may create full marriage; it may create ordinary betrothal and require partnership with the father; it may create a limited marriage-like status while leaving a ritual release necessary; or the brother’s authority may derive entirely from the court’s order that he support her.