The learning of Tractate Chagigah, daf 26, is dedicated anonymously for success and long life for Yaakov Yisrael ben Frida Sipora and Sarah bat Simcha, that Hashem should lengthen their days in goodness and pleasantness. Amen.
Today’s learning is also for the healing of Shimon Nissi, and for the healing of Eliyahu ben Rachel, among all the sick of the Jewish people. May Hashem heal him. Amen.
Let us begin today’s daf, on page 26, side two, at the bottom of the Mishnah. We are discussing examples in which terumah is more stringent than sacred offerings. The chapter began with the principle of greater stringency in sacred offerings, presenting the ten or eleven stringencies that sacred offerings have over terumah. The subsequent mishnayot presented the reverse: cases in which terumah has stringencies over sacred offerings. We will now continue with some of those stringencies.
“From Modi’in and inward”—Modi’in was a city outside Jerusalem—meaning toward Jerusalem, the sellers of earthenware vessels are considered trustworthy regarding the ritual purity of those vessels. One may trust them that the vessels they sell are pure and may be used for sacred offerings. However, “from Modi’in and outward,” farther away from Jerusalem, they are not considered trustworthy.
We will see why it was necessary to rely on unlearned people for these vessels. Why could pottery not simply be made in Jerusalem? The Mishnah says that it could not be made there because of the smoke. The smoke would blacken the walls of Jerusalem. At the same time, small earthenware vessels were necessary in Jerusalem, and there was a shortage of them. We will see why the Sages did not apply their decree regarding the vessels of an unlearned person in this case.
The concern regarding an unlearned person is rabbinic, not biblical. There is no reason on a biblical level to assume that the pottery of an unlearned person is impure until we know that it is impure. Nevertheless, the Sages established a decree that unlearned people generally be treated as impure. Where it was impossible to maintain that decree, however, the Sages did not enforce it. This is an instance of the principle that the Sages do not impose a decree on the community when the majority of the community cannot uphold it.
Here, pottery was especially necessary in Jerusalem, and there was a shortage because the vessels used for sacred offerings had to be broken afterward. Whatever was used for sacred offerings absorbed some of the sacred substance into its walls, and after the time during which the offering could be eaten had passed, that remainder could not simply be removed through a ritual purification process. The vessel had to be broken. Since vessels were constantly being broken in Jerusalem, there was an ongoing shortage, yet pottery could not be manufactured there because of the smoke. It therefore had to be imported.
The Sages said that, in the corridor from Modi’in toward Jerusalem, if an unlearned person brought and sold the small earthenware vessels that were needed, they would suspend the usual laws concerning ritual impurity in order to address the shortage.
The Mishnah then explains the case. How does this work? The potter who sells the vessels enters the area within Modi’in, together with the vessels he brought, and the purchasers see him entering with them. In that case, he is considered trustworthy, and one may purchase the vessels from him. If he leaves Modi’in and goes farther away, however, he is no longer considered trustworthy.
There are restrictions on this leniency. It applies only to the person who actually brought the vessels into the permitted area. If one person brings the vessels and gives them to someone else to sell, the second person is not considered trustworthy. For example, a wholesaler may bring the pottery into the proper area and then give it to a retailer who sits there and sells it. Although the retailer is selling merchandise that was brought in properly, he is not the potter who brought it in, and the leniency does not apply to him.
The potter himself cannot say, “Since I am now selling pottery, I may also sell vessels that came from outside the permitted area.” The vessels must be those that he personally brought into the area, and he must be seen bringing them in. If he later turns around and goes back in the other direction, he loses his status of trustworthiness.
This leads to a question about Modi’in itself. Until now, we have been discussing the area outside Modi’in but within the fifteen-mil corridor toward Jerusalem. What is the law if one encounters the potter in Modi’in itself? The Gemara gives its usual answer: it depends.
Sometimes Modi’in is treated as part of the area toward Jerusalem, and sometimes it is treated as being farther from Jerusalem. One case is when the potter is leaving the permitted area and entering Modi’in, while the trusted purchaser is entering Modi’in from the other side. They meet in Modi’in: the potter is coming from the permitted area, while the purchaser is approaching from outside. In that case, Modi’in is treated as part of the permitted area, and the purchaser may buy the pottery.
The potter is not going back toward the permitted area; he is going in the opposite direction. The purchaser may have missed the opportunity to buy from him in the permitted area, so the Sages were not overly strict. They said that if the two meet in Modi’in under these circumstances, Modi’in may be treated as part of the permitted area.
The same applies when both are entering Modi’in from outside, or when both are leaving the permitted area and entering Modi’in. In both cases, their direction of travel determines how Modi’in is treated.
When the potter is walking from outside Modi’in toward the permitted area, however, the purchaser must wait until he enters that area. If the potter is heading toward Jerusalem, there is no reason to be lenient in Modi’in; the purchaser can wait until the potter reaches the permitted zone.
Similarly, if both of them are already in the permitted area and both are leaving it toward Modi’in, we are not lenient. The purchaser should have bought the vessels while they were still in the permitted area. Since he saw the potter there and chose not to buy from him, he must now wait until the potter returns another time. The Sages did not make Modi’in into a free zone under every circumstance.
Rashi gives one additional case that the Gemara itself does not mention. The potter is entering Modi’in from outside, while the trusted purchaser is leaving Modi’in. In that situation, the purchaser should wait and follow the potter. Since the potter will eventually continue into the permitted area toward Jerusalem, the purchaser can wait and buy the vessels there. Everyone is moving in the wrong direction at that moment, but the purchaser will ultimately have an opportunity to buy from him in the permitted area.
Abaye says that we can derive this principle from the Mishnah itself. The Mishnah says that the potter who sells the vessels and enters inward from Modi’in is trustworthy. The implication is that he is trustworthy only once he is within the fifteen-mil area; Modi’in itself is not automatically included.
On the other hand, another inference seems to emerge from the Mishnah: if the potter leaves Modi’in, he is not trustworthy, implying that while he is in Modi’in itself he is trustworthy. We therefore have contradictory implications.
The Gemara resolves the contradiction by distinguishing between their directions. One statement refers to the case in which the potter is leaving the permitted area and entering Modi’in, while the trusted purchaser is entering from the other side. The two meet in the city, and Modi’in is treated as part of the permitted area. The other statement refers to a case in which both are entering or both are leaving, where the potter is not considered trustworthy. Thus, whether Modi’in itself is included depends on how the two people approach it.
The Mishnah teaches that the sellers are trustworthy regarding small earthenware vessels used for sacred offerings, but they are not trustworthy regarding large vessels. Apparently, large vessels were not as necessary for sacred offerings, and therefore the Sages did not create the same leniency for them.
Rashi explains that when the Mishnah says, “from Modi’in and inward, they are trustworthy regarding earthenware vessels,” it is referring to the small vessels that one cannot do without. Large vessels, such as large barrels for wine, are trustworthy only within Jerusalem.
Rashi then says that he did not fully accept the explanation he had heard regarding the size of the small vessels. He had heard that they must be so narrow that an unlearned person could not insert his foot or finger into them, because otherwise he could have rendered the vessel impure from the inside. Rashi does not want to accept that explanation. Rather, he understands the distinction simply: the small vessels are included wherever the Mishnah’s leniency applies, while the larger vessels are included only within Jerusalem.
The reason is the degree of need. Everyone needed small vessels for daily use, and sacred offerings were constantly being prepared. Afterward, those vessels had to be broken, so there was a continual shortage. Large storage vessels, however, were needed mainly for the Temple and for storing wine and similar substances. Because they were less necessary, the Sages limited the area in which one could rely on an unlearned person for them to Jerusalem itself.
The Gemara discusses what qualifies as a small vessel. One opinion says that it is a vessel that can be carried in one hand. Rabbi Hanan says that even if it cannot be carried in one hand, it is still considered a small vessel as long as it can be used for the preparation of offerings. The primary consideration is whether it is useful for sacred offerings.
Reish Lakish limits the ruling further. It applies only when the earthenware vessels are empty. If they are filled with liquids belonging to the unlearned person, the leniency does not apply. The liquids of an unlearned person are subject to the rabbinic concern of impurity, even if he is selling the vessels within the permitted area.
Rabbi Hanan says that even if the vessels are filled with the unlearned person’s clothing, the vessels themselves may still be trusted. The Sages decreed impurity on the clothing of an unlearned person, but Rabbi Hanan allows us to distinguish between the clothing and the vessel. We do not trust the clothing, but we may trust the vessel.
This may seem strange, because it appears that we are dividing the rabbinic concern: the vessel is treated as pure while the object inside it is treated as impure. But we have seen such a distinction before. There was a case involving an earthenware vessel that blocked an opening through which impurity could rise, while food or liquid was located inside the vessel. The vessel itself was treated as impure, while the food was treated as pure.
On a biblical level, once one thing becomes impure, the other would also become impure. But when the entire issue is rabbinic, the Sages can distinguish between the vessel and its contents. That is what is happening here as well. The unlearned person’s clothing or liquids are not trusted, but the vessel itself may be used for sacred offerings.
Rashi explains that this is the way the Sages formulate their decrees. We find a case involving a vessel that protects the liquid inside it without protecting every other vessel in the same location. Similarly, a vessel can be treated one way while the liquid or object inside it is treated another way.
The next Mishnah discusses tax collectors. These were Israelites who worked for the king. They collected taxes and could enter people’s homes, sometimes with authority to seize property as collateral. The concern is that when they entered the home, they may have touched the vessels inside.
The Mishnah is discussing the home of a trusted person who is careful about ritual purity. He was not present when the collectors entered, because they could enter without asking permission. The Mishnah also discusses thieves who entered a house, stole vessels, and later returned them. When they return the vessels, they are believed if they say, “We did not touch them.” The vessels are therefore considered pure for purposes of sacred offerings, but not for purposes of terumah.
Rashi explains that these collectors were Israelites appointed by a non-Jewish king to collect various taxes, including a head tax and land taxes. When they entered a house to take collateral, they might handle earthenware vessels. Since touching the inside of an earthenware vessel renders it impure for sacred offerings, they are believed to say that they did not touch the inside. They are not believed regarding terumah, because this Mishnah continues the theme that terumah is more stringent than sacred offerings.
The Tosefta presents a similar ruling: tax collectors who entered a house are believed regarding the purity of the sin-offering, but not regarding the purity of terumah. The term “sin-offering” there refers to sacred offerings, not to the ashes of the red heifer. Thus, they are trusted regarding sacred offerings but not regarding terumah.
The Mishnah concludes that in Jerusalem, unlearned people are believed regarding sacred offerings throughout the year. During the pilgrimage festivals, they are even believed regarding terumah. We will explain this further.
A contradiction is raised from another teaching: when tax collectors enter a house, the entire house is considered impure. Here, however, we said that they are believed to say that they did not touch particular vessels. The Gemara answers that it depends on whether a non-Jewish escort was accompanying them.
If a non-Jew was with them, they are not believed to say that they entered the house but did not touch anything. The Jewish tax collector is afraid that the non-Jewish official will think he is not doing his work properly. Therefore, he will inspect everything and touch the vessels. When the tax collector enters alone, however, he has no reason to touch everything, and he is believed when he says that he did not touch the vessels.
The Mishnah therefore says that when a non-Jew is with them, they are believed only to say that they did not enter the house at all. They are not believed to say, “We entered, but we did not touch anything.” If they entered with a non-Jewish escort, we assume that they inspected and handled the vessels.
The Gemara asks what difference it makes whether the non-Jew is with them. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar explain that they are afraid of the non-Jewish official himself. They do not want him to accuse them of neglecting their duties, so they inspect everything.
Others explain that the fear is not of the non-Jewish official himself but of the king. The Jewish tax collector is afraid that the non-Jew will report to the king that he is not performing his work properly. The practical difference between the explanations concerns a non-Jew who is not influential. If the concern is fear of the non-Jew himself, then even an unimportant official could cause the tax collector to inspect everything. If the concern is fear that he will report to the king, then an unimportant person may not create that concern.
The Gemara asks what difference this distinction makes. If the non-Jewish escort is not important and has no influence with the king, then according to the opinion that the fear is of the king, the tax collector would still be believed, because he has no reason to fear that this person can report to the king. According to the opinion that the fear is of the non-Jew himself, however, he would not be believed, regardless of the escort’s influence.
The Gemara then returns to the case of thieves who return the vessels. If the vessels came from the area where the thieves rummaged through the house, how can they say that they did not touch them? We already said that the entire area they searched is presumed impure.
The answer is that these thieves have repented. The fact that they return the vessels indicates that they have become penitents. They are not returning the vessels in order to continue their criminal behavior and lie about them. Although they were formerly thieves, once they repent they are believed to say that they did not touch the vessels. The Mishnah’s language indicates that they are people who have repented, and from this we learn that penitents are believed when they make such a statement.
In Jerusalem, an unlearned person is trusted regarding sacred offerings. This is an exceptionally broad leniency. The Mishnah teaches that large earthenware vessels may also be purchased from an unlearned person in Jerusalem for use with sacred offerings. Even if the vessel is filled, we may distinguish between the contents and the vessel: the contents may not be trusted, but the vessel itself may be used.
The reason for the leniency in Jerusalem is again that pottery could not be manufactured there because of the smoke. The city therefore had a shortage of vessels, and the Sages had to rely on unlearned people to supply them. They suspended the decree in Jerusalem for large vessels and extended the leniency beyond Jerusalem for small vessels, which were needed more frequently.
During the pilgrimage festivals, everyone was considered trustworthy regarding terumah. At that time, the entire Jewish people were treated as trusted associates. A person who was generally not trusted regarding terumah was trusted during the festivals, because the festival created a heightened level of communal observance and purity.
Rashi explains that the reason for trusting people regarding large vessels in Jerusalem, and small vessels even in the surrounding area, is the degree of need. Small vessels were needed every day, while large vessels were primarily needed for the Temple. Therefore, the Sages extended the leniency farther for the small vessels and limited the leniency for large vessels to Jerusalem.
The next Mishnah discusses a person who opens his barrel to sell wine during a pilgrimage festival, or who begins selling his dough and bread in Jerusalem during the festival. During the festival, he is treated as a trusted associate, and his food is considered reliable regarding terumah. The question is what happens to the leftovers after the festival.
Perhaps the impurity concern should now apply retroactively. During the festival, the impurity of an unlearned person was suspended, but it was not removed entirely. Once the festival ends, perhaps we should say that the unlearned person touched the contents of the barrel or the dough, and the impurity now becomes effective. What is the status of the leftover food?
Rabbi Yehudah says that they tell him to finish selling it. The reasoning is that if we tell a person that any goods left over after the festival will become unusable, he will not open his barrel or begin selling in the first place. Since we need people to provide food for the pilgrims, the Sages permitted the conclusion because of the beginning. The leniency at the end is granted so that the person will begin selling at the outset.
The Sages, however, say that he may not finish selling the leftovers. According to them, once the festival ends, the unlearned person’s touch takes effect retroactively, and the remaining food is treated as impure.
Rabbi Ami asked Rabbi Yitzchak Nappaha about this matter. What would be the law if one left the goods until the next pilgrimage festival? Perhaps the impurity is suspended again when the next festival arrives.
He answered that the unlearned person had already touched the goods. The Sages did not remove the impurity; they merely suspended its practical effect during the festival. Once the festival ends, where would that impurity go? It does not simply disappear.
The questioner responded: Were the unlearned people not touching the goods during the festival as well? Why should the touch during the festival be different?
The answer is that during the festival the Sages suspended the effect of the touch. The fact that the person touched the goods during the festival does not mean that he was considered permanently pure. The suspension applied to the festival itself; once the festival ended, the underlying concern returned.
Rashi explains that this discussion follows the opinion of the Sages, because according to Rabbi Yehudah he may simply continue selling the goods. The question is specifically according to the Sages, who prohibit him from continuing to sell after the festival: may he leave the goods until the next festival, or not?
There are two additional teachings that seem to contradict one another. One says that he may leave the goods until the next festival, while the other says that he may not. The Gemara explains that the dispute is not necessarily within the Sages. Rather, one teaching reflects Rabbi Yehudah’s position, who allows him to continue selling immediately, while the other reflects the position of the Sages. According to the Sages, one may leave the goods until the next festival, but he may not sell them during the intervening period.
The next Mishnah discusses what happens after the festival. The vessels in the Temple courtyard were removed and immersed in a ritual bath. The vessels that unlearned people had touched during the festival were considered pure during the festival because the concern was suspended, but after the festival they had to be purified.
If the festival ended on Friday, the priests did not immediately immerse all the vessels, because they were occupied with preparing for Shabbat. If the festival ended on another day, they also did not necessarily immerse them immediately. The priests had to remove the ashes from the altar and prepare for the additional offerings after the festival. Therefore, even on Thursday, they might not have been available to purify the vessels, and the purification was postponed until Sunday.
The question was raised: Why should the vessels need to be purified at all? The concern was that unlearned people had entered the Temple courtyard during the festival and touched things. This did not refer to ordinary people wandering everywhere in the Temple; the priests and workers themselves could also have been unlearned people. During the festival, all the priestly divisions came to serve, and it was more difficult to control and scrutinize everyone. After the festival, the concern was addressed by immersing the vessels.
During the rest of the year, the priestly divisions were more limited, and it was easier to scrutinize the people serving. During the festival, however, all the divisions came, and there was a greater need for this temporary suspension of the laws of impurity.
All the vessels in the Temple were immersed after the festival, except for the golden altar, the copper altar, and the table. The golden altar was the incense altar, and the copper altar was the altar used for the offerings.
These objects were not immersed because they were treated like the ground. The copper altar is described as an earthen altar, and something considered part of the ground is not susceptible to ritual impurity in the same way as an ordinary vessel.
The Mishnah says that all the vessels in the Temple required immersion. It does not mention the table because the table was not handled by the unlearned people. The priests were warned not to touch the table, since the showbread had to remain on it continually. If the table became impure, it would have to be moved and immersed, compromising the requirement that the bread remain upon it.
The Gemara also warns the priests not to touch the menorah. The question is why the menorah was not mentioned in the Mishnah along with the table. The table had to remain in its place continually, whereas the menorah had to be lit continually in the sense that its light had to be maintained, but the menorah itself did not necessarily have to remain in its place at every moment.
One opinion maintains that the menorah could be moved temporarily for immersion. The verse concerning the menorah indicates that it stood opposite the table, but this teaches its placement rather than requiring that it remain there continually. The other opinion derives a continual requirement for the menorah from the word “continually” written regarding the table and its placement opposite the menorah. According to that view, the priests had to be warned not to touch the menorah as well.
There was a discussion about why the priests needed to be warned at all. Perhaps priests are generally careful and would not cause impurity. The answer suggested was that during the festival, many priestly divisions came together, and not everyone could be assumed to have the same level of vigilance. During the rest of the year, the people serving could be more carefully supervised, but during the festivals there was a larger and more difficult group to control.
The table itself was made of wood. A wooden vessel that is made to remain in one place is not susceptible to ritual impurity. The general rule is that a wooden vessel is susceptible to impurity only when it can be moved, whether empty or full. A wooden object that is permanently fixed in place is not treated as an ordinary vessel.
The Gemara derives this principle from the comparison between a wooden vessel and a sack. Just as a sack can be moved whether it is empty or contains something, a wooden vessel must be movable in order to be susceptible to impurity. An object that remains fixed in place, like the Temple table, would therefore not ordinarily be susceptible to impurity.
But the verse says that the showbread must be placed on a pure table, implying that the table could become impure. How can that be, if it is a wooden vessel fixed in place?
The answer is that the table was lifted and shown to the pilgrims during the festivals. The priests would lift the table with the showbread upon it and show it to the people, saying, “See how beloved you are before the Omnipresent.” The bread remained miraculously fresh and warm. Since the table was occasionally lifted, it was considered movable and therefore susceptible to ritual impurity.
This is why the priests had to be warned not to touch it. It was not enough to say that the table was a fixed wooden vessel. Although it remained in its place throughout the year, the fact that it was lifted for the pilgrims meant that it could receive impurity.
There is a discussion about whether lifting the table while leaving it in its place is considered moving it. The point is that the table was not carried elsewhere; it was raised where it stood so that the pilgrims could see it. Nevertheless, that occasional lifting was enough to give it the status of a movable wooden vessel.
The Gemara then discusses vessels that had been diminished or covered with marble. If a wooden table is damaged but still has enough exposed wood to hold a cup, it remains a wooden vessel. Rabbi Yehudah says that this is not sufficient; there must be enough exposed wood to hold pieces of meat, since that is also one of the functions of a table.
Similarly, if a wooden table is covered with marble, it loses its status as a wooden vessel and follows the covering. Since stone is not susceptible to ritual impurity, the table is pure, unless some wood remains exposed in a way that allows it to continue functioning as a wooden vessel.
Rashi explains that we follow the outer covering. When wood is covered with marble, the marble nullifies the wooden component, and the object is treated as a stone vessel. This supports the principle that the covering can determine the halachic status of the object.
The Gemara asks why it is necessary to say that the table was lifted. If it was covered with gold, perhaps the gold itself causes it to be treated as a metal vessel, which is susceptible to impurity. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the covering determines the status even when the wood beneath it is important. According to Reish Lakish, however, valuable acacia wood retains its independent significance, and the covering does not necessarily nullify it.
According to the view that the covering is decisive, the table would be considered a golden vessel and would be susceptible to impurity regardless of whether it was lifted. The Gemara answers that the table was a special exception. The Torah itself calls the table “wood,” despite its covering.
The same is true of the altar. The verse begins by referring to the altar as wood and then refers to the table before Hashem. The Torah places them together, teaching that the table retains the status of wood. Since it is a wooden vessel made to remain in place, the question returns: why is it susceptible to impurity? The answer is that it was lifted and shown to the pilgrims.
This teaching also contains a broader message. As long as the Temple stood, the altar brought atonement for a person. After the destruction of the Temple, a person’s table serves as an instrument of atonement. The table replaces the altar through the hospitality and food that a person provides to others.
This idea is reflected in the verse, “This is my God, and I will glorify Him.” The expression can be understood as referring to building a dwelling place for Hashem. When there is no Temple, the table of a person can serve as a small sanctuary. The table before Hashem becomes a place through which a person can bring merit and atonement.
The Gemara continues: all the vessels in the Temple had duplicates and even additional replacements. If one vessel became impure, another could be used. The copper altar, however, did not require immersion because it was treated like the ground. The golden altar and other vessels were discussed in light of whether their coverings nullified the wood beneath them.
The Sages say that the altars are not susceptible to impurity because they are covered. The Gemara questions this: if the covering is the reason, that should make them more susceptible to impurity, not less. A metal covering is itself susceptible to impurity.
The answer is that the covering is considered secondary to the wood. If the altars were not covered, they could be treated as wooden vessels that remain fixed in place and therefore do not receive impurity. Since the Torah calls them wood, the covering does not necessarily change their essential status.
Another explanation is that the Torah explicitly refers to the altars as wood, thereby nullifying the importance of the covering. The term “wood” is applied to them even though they are plated, so they retain the status of wooden vessels that are made to remain in place.
The Gemara concludes this section with a teaching of Rabbi Abahu in the name of Rabbi Elazar. The fire of Gehinnom does not rule over Torah scholars. The analogy is to a salamander, a creature created through fire. Its blood protects a person from fire. If something that is merely produced by fire cannot be harmed by fire, then Torah scholars, whose very bodies are described as fire, are certainly not overcome by the fire of Gehinnom.
The verse says, “Is not My word like fire?” The word of Hashem is compared to fire. Something that is itself fire cannot be overcome by another fire in the same way that an ordinary object can.
Rashi explains that the salamander is a creature formed when a fire burns continuously in one place for seven years. A salamander emerges from that fire, and its blood can protect a person from fire. The Aramaic translation of a certain creature mentioned among the non-kosher animals also uses a term related to the salamander.
Reish Lakish goes further and says that the fire of Gehinnom does not rule even over the sinners of Israel. This does not mean that no punishment exists; it means that the fire does not completely destroy them. Even a sinner in Israel possesses commandments and merits.
He brings an analogy from the golden altar. The gold plating of the golden altar was extremely thin, yet it lasted for many years and was not consumed by the fire of the incense that was offered upon it every day. If a small amount of gold can withstand fire, then certainly the many commandments possessed even by the sinners of Israel can protect them from the fire of Gehinnom.
Rashi explains that the analogy is to a small amount of gold that miraculously remains intact. Tosafot clarifies that the discussion concerns sinners who still possess merits and are not entirely without hope. It is not referring to someone whose entire body and conduct are defined by wickedness, but to people who have committed sins while still possessing commandments.
The general teaching is that the fire of Gehinnom does not rule over a person who has the protection of Torah and mitzvot. Just as the fire of the altar could be a constructive fire that did not destroy the altar, the fire associated with Torah and mitzvot has a different character from destructive fire. The commandments are compared to a lamp, and the Torah to light. That light protects a person from the fires of Gehinnom.
May the Torah learning and all these merits bring healing, success, and blessing. Amen.