The discussion begins with a passage from Gemara Megilla, on page 19. This study is dedicated in honor of Mr. Nasim Norman Jamal, for the well-being of his parents, that they may be preserved in life with robust health and joy from all their children. It is also studied for the elevation of the soul of the righteous and foundational sage, Hacham Nissim Indibo, may he rest in peace, son of Shafia, may the spirit of God grant him rest in Gan Eden. Additionally, this study is for the complete healing of Rozan bat Idan and David ben Miriam, that God may quickly heal them with a healing of the soul and a healing of the body, and may their healing soon arrive. Amen.
We begin at the bottom of page 18b. The Mishna discusses a Megillah written with a type of ink called “sam.” We seek to understand what “sam” is. The Gemara explains that “sam” is “sama.” What is “sama”? It is “sakra,” another type of ink. Rabba bar bar Hana states that its name is “sakreta.” We also encounter “komos koma.” Rashi explains that “sama” is orpiment in the holy tongue. The Gemara delves into this because Tosafot will later engage with the topic. “Sakreta” is red ink. “Koma” is like tree resin, or sap, the Arabic gum taken from a tree. Then there is “kankantom.” Not Um Kulthum, but “kankantom.” Kankantom is “harta de'ushpape.” Rashi explains “harta de'ushpape” as shoepolish, the black dye used to polish shoes. Next, “diftera” is a type of parchment that is salted and treated with water, but not with gallnuts. These are all processes for making parchment. Therefore, “diftera” is not suitable because it is salted and treated with water but not with gallnuts. “Niyar” is another type of parchment, which we would call paper. This is referred to as “mahka.” Rashi says “mahka” comes from grass, similar to how our paper today comes from trees. It was a type of papyrus, assembled in a way that was used for writing in ancient times.
Now, let us examine this Tosafot. Regarding “kankantom harta de'ushpape,” the Kuntras explained in other places, such as Gemara Gittin, that it is “armenti.” A difficulty arises: if this is the case, then we should be permitted to add “arment” to ink, and we do so. However, according to Rashi, we would not be allowed to put this “arment” into the ink, yet we do. This implies that “kankantom” is not “arment.” The reason “kankantom” is forbidden for writing a bill of divorce is because the Torah states regarding the Sotah (a woman suspected of adultery), “he shall write and erase.” This means the writing must be erasable. Ink containing “kankantom” cannot be erased. If so, it implies that “kankantom” is not “arment,” for we add “arment” to our ink daily, and it is still easily erasable. Therefore, it cannot be “arment.” So what is it? It appears to be as Rashbam explained in Eruvin, that “kankantom” is vitriol. Although it is stated there that it is green, it is possible that it turns black when ground very finely. Thus, we have a dispute regarding the identity of “kankantom.”
The next Tosafot discusses “diftera demaliach vekamiach velo afitz,” a type of parchment that is unsuitable because it was not treated with gallnuts. If so, our parchments, which are not treated with gallnuts, how can we write Torah scrolls, phylacteries, and mezuzahs on them? This is a strong question. Rabbeinu Tam answers that the lime we use for our parchments has the same effect as gallnuts. You can know this because in the second chapter of Gittin, it states that without gallnuts, a document can be forged. Yet, our parchments cannot be forged. Therefore, it must be that we have found a way to make them unforgeable through our treatment, achieving the same result as gallnuts.
The next Tosafot refers to writing on a scroll with ink. We have not yet reached that part of the Gemara. The Megillah must be written in Ashurit script. The verse “according to their writing and according to their times” teaches us that it must be in Ashurit. From where do we derive that it must be on a scroll and with ink? We learn this through a gezeira shava (a verbal analogy) from the word “writing.” Here, it says, “and Queen Esther wrote,” and there it says, “and Baruch said to them, ‘From his mouth he will read all these words to me, and I am writing on the scroll and with ink.’” Since the word “wrote” appears in both contexts, we derive that the Megillah must be written on a scroll with ink, just as Baruch wrote. The writing must be in Ashurit, as indicated by “according to their writing,” referring to the Jewish writing, which was Ashurit. Rabbeinu Tam explains that our ink is proper ink, but ink made solely from gallnuts is not considered proper ink. In the second chapter of Gittin, it is taught that one may write a bill of divorce with anything, including ink and “sam,” concluding that anything permanent is acceptable. What does “anything” come to include? It comes to include what Rabbi Chiya taught: if one wrote with gallnut water, it is valid. This implies that gallnuts are not considered ink, but rather a separate item. Since it was necessary to include gallnuts through an expansion after mentioning ink, it means that primary ink is not made from gallnuts. For this reason, Rabbeinu Tam sought to invalidate a Torah scroll written with gallnut ink. However, the Ashkenazim responded to him that the passage in Gittin refers to water in which gallnuts were soaked, which is not considered ink. But ink made from the gallnuts themselves is certainly valid. Nevertheless, it appears that our ink is the primary ink. In Gemara Kol HaYad, Rabbi Ami would break off a piece of ink to check for black Niddah blood. This shows that ink can be chipped off. Our ink is breakable and chippable, unlike the watery gallnut ink mentioned in Gittin. Therefore, it is evident that they are two different types of ink.
The Mishna states: "A city-dweller who went to a walled city, or a walled city-dweller who went to a city." Let's review the rule. A city-dweller reads the Megillah on the 14th. If he went to a walled city, he would read on the 14th if he intends to return home. A walled city-dweller reads on the 15th. If he went to a city and intends to return home, he reads on the 15th. The simple rule is: if he intends to return to his place, he reads according to his place. If he is a 14th-day person and plans to return home, even if he is in a walled city, he reads on the 14th. If he is a 15th-day person and is in a city, and plans to return home, he does not read with them; he reads with his people on the 15th. If he does not intend to return home, he reads with them. Obviously, it is not as simple as this. The Gemara will clarify when this intention to return home applies and how long he must be there. The novel aspect of this Mishna is that one does not need to be a full-time resident of a walled city to be subject to its law, nor a full-time resident of a city to be subject to its law. Even a one-day resident is considered a resident. "From where does a person read the Megillah?" There is a significant dispute on this. Rabbi Meir says, "the whole Megillah." This is the established halakha. You must read from the first chapter to the tenth. Rabbi Yehuda says, "from 'Ish Yehudi' (A Jewish man)." He believes you do not need to start from the very beginning; "Ish Yehudi," which introduces Mordechai, is sufficient. Rabbi Yosi says, "from 'Achar HaDevarim HaEleh' (After these things)," which introduces Haman.
Now let's turn to the Gemara. Rava states: "They only taught this rule if he intends to return home by the night of the fourteenth. But if he does not intend to return by the night of the fourteenth, he reads with them." This means that a city-dweller who goes to a walled city will continue to read like a city-dweller on the 14th, as long as his intention is to return. The question is, when? The Gemara says that as long as his intention is not to be in the walled city by day, meaning he intends to return by the night of the 14th, he does not intend to be in the walled city during the day, which is the essence of publicizing the miracle. Therefore, he will read on the 14th at night, even though he is in the walled city. But since his intention is to leave at night, he must read according to his original hometown. This means, if he decides to stay for the morning, he no longer has the status of a city-dweller. He will not have to read the Megillah that night because he is now considered a one-day resident of the walled city, as he is there in the morning, which is the essence of the Megillah reading. Simply put, what establishes residency in the new city? Being there by day. As long as you leave before morning, you are still considered from your original place. Rashi explains this: "They only taught this regarding a walled city-dweller who went to a city." So he is a 15th-day person who went to a city and intends to return to his place. Everyone else reads the Megillah on the night of the 14th, but he is a walled city-dweller. He reads on the 15th, not the 14th, according to his place. "Only if he intends to return by the night of the 14th." If he leaves the city before dawn, Rashi learns that it is not only about intention; he must actually leave. He must actually make a move. One might have thought it only depends on his intention, for example, if he intended to leave but got stuck. But Rashi does not say that. Rashi says he must actually leave the city, and his status changes from before the night of the 14th, even if he is there. This is a great trivia question: if a person is in a city on the night of the 14th, and the whole town is reading the Megillah, he is sitting at home, breaking his fast. Since he will not be there during the day, he is not even considered a temporary resident for that day. If he does not intend to leave at night, he is considered a temporary resident for that day, meaning he intends to stay overnight and be there in the morning. Now he becomes a temporary resident. Even if he intends to return the next day after dawn, for that day he is called a temporary resident and reads with them, whether on the 14th or the 15th. Now he must be ready by night because he knows his travel plans. The same rule applies to a city-dweller who went to a walled city. If he intends to return by the night of the 15th, so that he will not be there on the day of the 15th, then he does not take on the residency of a walled city. He is not considered a walled city-dweller for that day and reads on the 14th, according to the obligation of his place, even though no one is reading on the 14th in that walled city; he must read it. Even though he is in a walled city. But if he does not intend to return by the night of the 15th, he does not need to read it on the 14th and waits and reads with the walled city people, even if he eventually intends to return to his town. But as long as he was there in the morning, that is what he does.
Now the Gemara wants to know how we know that one can establish residency for one day. Rava asks: "From where do I derive this? As it is written: 'Therefore the Jews of the open cities, who dwell in the open cities.'" This sounds redundant. The people living in the open cities, the Jews who are "parazim" (unwalled city dwellers), a person who lives in an open city is called a "paruz," who are sitting in the open cities. Obviously. "Since it is written 'the Jews of the open cities,' why do I need it to be written 'who dwell in the open cities'?" If you are a "paruz," then obviously you are sitting in open cities. Why the double language? "This comes to teach us that there are two types of parazim: a 'paruz' who is a permanent resident, and a 'paruz' who is a temporary resident." This teaches you that a "paruz" for one day is called a "paruz." That's it. Dawn? Rashi said dawn, yes, because that is the time for Megillah reading. By law, all daytime commandments begin at dawn. We only perform them at sunrise to avoid confusion. So here, by law, it is dawn. That is the time of the commandment. We have found that a "paruz" for one day is considered a "paruz" for one day. How do you know that a "mukaf" (walled city dweller) for one day is a "mukaf"? From where do we know about a "mukaf"? The Gemara says, "It is a logical inference." Since a "paruz" for one day is called a "paruz," a "mukaf" for one day is called a "mukaf." What's the difference? It's a logical inference. If you can be a one-day "paruz," then presumably you can be a one-day "mukaf"; there should be no difference. It's a logical inference.
Rava further states: Let's consider the case of a villager. A villager does not read on the 14th, nor on the 15th. They have the possibility to read even on the 11th, 12th, or 13th, as we learned. So, let's say a villager went to a city. He finds himself in the city even by night, and he intends to return. Now, what did we say? In other cases, if you're going back, you follow your original custom. But not if you're a villager. If you're a villager and you're already in the city on the night of the 14th, no matter what, he reads with them. He does not get that dispensation to read according to his original place. What is the reason? Because a villager is really supposed to read on the 14th in the first place. The only reason we told him he doesn't have to read it is because he's not there, and we don't burden him to come to the city. But if he is in the city, even if he's there by night, we will tell him he has to read. Why? What is the reason? These are considered like city dwellers in general. The villager really has to read like the city dwellers. So what? It is the Rabbis who were lenient with the villagers, so that they could supply water and food to their brethren in the walled cities. This applies only when they are in their own place, in the village. But when they are in the city, you are there. They must read like city dwellers, even if you are only there by night. Rashi explains: "A villager who read early on the day of entry." He already read the Megillah, for example, on the 12th. "And afterwards went to the city and was there on the night of the 14th." He was there on the night of the 14th. "No matter what," even if he intends to leave before daybreak, it does not matter. "He reads with them at night." Why? "He must read like city dwellers." All unwalled city dwellers' time is on the 14th. All "parazim," whether you are a villager or from a regular city. "And it is the Rabbis who were lenient with them to read early on the day of entry." The Rabbis were lenient to let them read earlier. "And this leniency, that they do not need to return and read on the 14th, applies specifically when they are not staying there on the night of the 14th, but rather come there on the day of the 14th." Very good. They come there on the 14th by day so they can give out food. So if they are there by day, no problem, because that is the leniency. But if you were there by night already, if they came the night before to set up shop, sorry, you came too early. We only let them come by day, therefore we exempt them during the day. "But when they stay there on the night of the 14th, their status is certainly like city dwellers, even if they already read." And Tosafot agrees with Rashi 100 percent. So it's the intention law: wherever you are sleeping and you are there at that exact moment, say 6 a.m., that's it, you're stuck. This is like the custom for Purim in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. We did it when we were studying in Israel. That's it. We wanted to celebrate a two-day Purim. Who doesn't want to celebrate a two-day Purim? So we went outside of Jerusalem and slept there, and we were there in the morning. We celebrated Purim there, then we came back with Hacham Ovadia, may he rest in peace, to the great synagogue in Jerusalem, which is on the 15th, and celebrated a two-day Purim. And I think we also had a post-holiday celebration, but the Gemara doesn't talk about that. That was just a... In any event, the Gemara asks: "From where does a person read the Megillah?" I find it fascinating that there were opinions that held you don't have to read the entire Megillah. You went into synagogue, "The Megillah, 'Ish Yehudi' was in Shushan the capital," hey, "And it was in the days of Achashverosh." And that will be the opinion of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. Meaning, according to all the mystical intentions of Kabbalah, according to Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, he held there is no need to read the entire Megillah from beginning to end. You could start from wherever "Ish Yehudi" is, and you are fine. Although it has to be written in its entirety. But you don't really have to read the whole story. So it says here: "It was taught, Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai says: From 'On that night.'" So Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai holds you start from "On that night," chapter six, literally. "On that night the sleep of the king was disturbed." Do you read the Megillah in 11 minutes? That's it. "On that night," chapter six. "On that night the sleep of the king was disturbed." Rabbi Yochanan says: "And all of them derive their opinion from one verse." Everyone's source is one verse in the Book of Esther, and from that verse, they all learned where the main part of the Megillah is. What does the verse say? "And Queen Esther and Mordechai the Jew wrote with all authority." They wrote the main part of the miracle, the main, the "tokef," the essence of the miracle. So the question is, the essence of what miracle? What essence were they trying to convey? "The one who says the whole Megillah" says it refers to "the authority of Achashverosh." They want to tell you about the story of Achashverosh, Achashverosh's rise to power. So that's the "tokef" they're talking about. And so, all ten chapters talk about Achashverosh. Therefore, if it's "the authority of Achashverosh," you have to start from the beginning, "And it was in the days of Achashverosh." "And the one who says from 'Ish Yehudi'" refers to "the authority of Mordechai." No, we are interested in telling you the essence of Mordechai's power. And when does that start? "A Jewish man was in Shushan the capital." "And the one who says from 'Achar HaDevarim HaEleh'" refers to "the authority of Haman." That's when Haman rose to power. We want to know about Haman, that's the enemy. "And the one who says from 'On that night'" refers to "the authority of the miracle." We don't care what happened before. We want to know when the miracle happened, get to the meat. The meat starts "On that night the sleep of the king was disturbed," and then everything turned around, and that's the miracle. So you don't have to start with "we begin with degradation and conclude with praise," like the Passover Haggadah. Just start with the praise. Start straight and go to the miracle.
Rav Huna offers a different source. In the Book of Esther, it tells us that they wrote the Book of Esther, and what was the motivation to write it? "And what did they see concerning this," meaning, what did they see? The Megillah was written to tell future generations what they saw at that time. "And what came upon them," and what was the result? This means they were obviously reacting to something. "What did they see concerning this?" What happened to that generation that motivated them to write the Megillah? "And what came upon them?" And as a result of what happened to them, what was the consequence? What exactly took place? So we have to find out two things now. We have to find "what did they see concerning this," what did they see to write the Megillah, for what was the motivation? "And what came upon them," and what was the result of whatever happened to them? So it says: "The one who says the whole Megillah" says we have to read it like this: "What did Achashverosh see that he used the vessels of the Holy Temple?" Oh, what did Achashverosh see to make that party in the third year of his kingdom, using the vessels of the Holy Temple? "Concerning this," which means, you know what he saw? "Because he miscalculated the seventy years and they were not redeemed." And what did that cause? "What did Achashverosh see to make the party with the vessels?" "This." What is "this"? Miscalculation. "And what came upon them?" And what happened to him as a result? "That he killed Vashti." He ended up causing Vashti to get killed at the party. Now the Maharsha immediately points out, apparently, it says "what did they see concerning this," and then you bring me Achashverosh, who was a single individual. It should say "what did he see." But the Book of Esther says "what did they see." So you have to say, says the Maharsha, that it is not only the plural form "they saw" referring to Achashverosh, but also to his advisors. Keep your finger on the Maharsha because you're going to do a few things here. Another interpretation: "What did Mordechai see that he instigated Haman?" I'll tell you why. "Concerning this," because of this: "That he made himself an idol." According to this Gemara, Haman made himself an idol, a deity. "And what came upon them?" And what happened as a result? "That a miracle occurred." So then again, the Maharsha's question is "what did they see," it's just Mordechai. So why does it say "what did they see concerning this"? "And similarly, what did Mordechai see with the other righteous people of that generation?" Oh, interesting. So what holy ones? And the one who says from "Achar HaDevarim HaEleh," from the opinion that says you start from Haman's rise to power, "What did Haman see that he became jealous of all the Jews?" "Concerning this," because Mordechai would not bow down or prostrate himself, because he was antagonized by Mordechai who didn't want to bow. "And what ended up happening to them?" "And they hanged him and his sons on the tree." Now again, "what did they see concerning this," it's Haman, Haman's an individual. The Maharsha says again, "And what did Haman see with his sons?" Okay, it's Haman and company. Very well. Okay, now we continue the Gemara. And the one who says "On that night," that's when the king had the dream—or he couldn't sleep, I'm sorry, couldn't sleep. "What did Achashverosh see to bring the book of chronicles?" What possessed Achashverosh in the middle of the night to ask for the book of chronicles, to bring his diary? "Concerning this," because Esther invited Haman with him, because he started to get suspicious. Why did Queen Esther invite Haman to the party unless they're planning a coup d'etat? And if they're planning a coup d'etat plot, why isn't anybody telling me about the plot to kill me? Was there anybody that ever saved my life and I did not reward them, and therefore there's no incentive to save my life because they know what's the difference anyway, the guy doesn't pay his debts? So that motivated him to bring the book of chronicles. "And what came upon them?" That a miracle occurred. What was the miracle? Haman walked in exactly at that time, and we know the rest is history. Now if you look at Maharsha here, I actually want to just catch up to here. Maharsha on "concerning this, that Esther invited," as in the king Achashverosh's question itself. He said, "What is this, that Esther invited Haman, perhaps" like we saw, the plot. Now look at the Maharsha that says, "And the one who says from 'Ish Yehudi.'" "What did Mordechai see that he instigated?" What's the reason why we start from "Ish Yehudi"? "What did Mordechai see" not to bow to Haman? "It is somewhat difficult," since Mordechai's instigation and Haman making himself an idol did not happen until "Achar HaDevarim HaEleh Gadol," he should only have started from there. According to that opinion, you start from "Ish Yehudi," but if the whole point is "what did Mordechai see" not to bow to Haman, that's later on, "Achar HaDevarim HaEleh," you should start from there. Why starting from "Ish Yehudi"? Again, what's that opinion? "What did Mordechai see" not to bow to Haman? When did that happen? In "Achar HaDevarim HaEleh," not by "Ish Yehudi." So why are you starting... you're starting too early, the Maharsha is asking. Maharsha answers: "And it can be answered that 'Ish Yehudi' indicates this, that because of this he did not bow, as explained in the Gemara: 'And why is he called a Jewish man? Because he denied idolatry.'" For anyone who denies idolatry is called a Jew. Because it's giving his essence, Mordechai, he's a Jew, and you only call somebody a Jew who denies idolatry. That's giving him his... his roots of who Mordechai is, he's a denier of idolatry from then because he's "Ish Yehudi."
The Gemara then states: Rav Chelbo said in the name of Rav Hama bar Guria, who said in the name of Rav: "The halakha follows the opinion that says the whole Megillah must be read." Okay, the halakha states we must read the whole Megillah. "And even according to the opinion that says from 'Ish Yehudi,'" even according to the opinion that says you start from "Ish Yehudi," "it must be written in its entirety." So you just only have to read it from the beginning. Why "Ish Yehudi" and not the opinion that says "On that night"? That's a good question. We have a "chet" there by "Ish Yehudi." See that "chet" there? I don't have a "chet" in my Gemara. How do you say it's... "chet aleph"... "chet bet"... page 2... it's only in the Gemara. And even according to the opinion that starts... it's like this: the reason why it's picking the earliest is because I would have... I would have thought you're not missing too much when you write "Ish Yehudi." Meaning you're writing basically nine chapters. So therefore, even according to the opinion that starts from "Ish Yehudi" where you're writing the majority of the Megillah, but if you start "Achar HaDevarim HaEleh"... Okay, you only write four chapters. Okay, come on, get by with a story like that. But even "Ish Yehudi" where you wrote the majority of the Megillah, it's still coming to tell you that you have to write the first chapters as well, because the matter is conspicuous. Now the Gemara says: "And Rav Chelbo said in the name of Rav Hama bar Guria, who said in the name of Rav:" not "Rav Megillah," but "Rav" said: "The Megillah is called a scroll." Okay, the Megillah is called a scroll. "And it is called a letter." Ah, so here we have two different contradictory words. A scroll is a scroll like a Torah scroll, and a letter is like a letter. And they have different laws. "It is called a scroll," meaning "if one sewed it with linen thread, it is invalid." It needs to have stitching, like you sew the parchments together. And how do you sew it? You sew it with sinews, like we have the scroll of the Torah scroll. Sinews are like the sinew of the animal. But if you sewed it with linen, no good. So that's going to have the same law as a Torah scroll. "If one sewed it with linen," no good. "And it is called a letter," meaning "if one inserted three sinew threads, it is valid." It's called a letter, that if you put three stitches, it's going to be valid. Rav Nachman said: "Provided they are equidistant." As long as they are equidistant. Now Rashi explains what "equidistant" means. Rashi says: "That from the beginning of the seam to the place of the sinew stitch should be like from it to the second sinew, and from the second to the third, like from the third to the end of the seam," which is equidistant. From the top of the parchment, we're going to learn that you leave it blank. You don't want to sew it up all the way from the top of the parchment because otherwise it'll rip. So let's say we leave inches now. You leave an inch from the top to the first stitch. The second stitch is an inch. The next one is an inch, the next one is an inch, and then an inch to the bottom. So therefore every stitch is equidistant to each other. From the top to the first stitch, from the first stitch to the second stitch, from the second stitch to the third stitch, each one is one inch from each other. And from the last stitch to the bottom of the parchment, that's what "equidistant" means. It doesn't mean that you're putting them, you know, in a third, you know, from the top, middle, and bottom. It doesn't mean that. Tosafot immediately comes along and takes that out of your head. "It appears like Rashi's explanation, that from the beginning of the seam to the sinew should be like from one sinew to its fellow sinew," which means from the top of the parchment to the first sinew will be equidistant from the first sinew to the second sinew, whether you're going from top to bottom. "And similarly, it is implied in Makkot regarding cities of refuge, 'and you shall divide it into three.'" What do we learn from that? Equidistant from the south to Hebron, like Hebron to Shechem, and Shechem to Kadesh, like Kadesh to the end. That they're equidistant to each other. "It is implied that 'equidistant' means this, and not as some explain, that one should place the sinew at the top of the page, at its end, and in its middle." That's not the simple meaning of "equidistant." It's like the "equidistant" of Masechet Makkot. How do we learn "three sinew threads"? You don't have to do it like a Torah scroll. A Torah scroll, they put one sinew, one long sinew. But here you could put three because it's a letter. A letter does not have to have one long sinew. Since it's a letter, a letter allows you to put... but it has to be equidistant. Yes, that's the law. But it has to be from a sinew as opposed to linen. There's another stringency for a letter that the Gaon of Vilna, the famous Gaon of Vilna, says it should be 11 lines. A Megillat Esther, there's a stringency to have an 11-line Megillat Esther because a letter is 11. Ten sons of Haman. Just so they're equal. That's not that it has to be that way, but that's also because it's a letter. A letter is 11. I had one like that. I still have one like that, but I gave it to my son. From Hillel Heiman many years ago when I just got married. And he said I got you a Megillat Esther for the Gaon's stringency of 11-line Megillah. So I said okay, how much is it? He says 1,000 bucks. 1,000 bucks for me then was like 10,000 bucks, like a million dollars. I said I don't have it. He said I'm not asking for the money, when you have the money you pay me. That's why I saved it for you. And I paid him over, I don't know, 10 years probably, 100 dollars a year. And then when my eyes got bad, so it was hard to see, it was a little small, small letter, and I got me this big Megillah with the big letters, easy for me to read in public. So I gave it to my son. But it's a nice... you don't find that too much, a Megillah, you know, that has 11 lines to it. That's 11 lines. Mine. Is it? The big one. Yeah. Good. I didn't know that. It's 11 lines. I thought it was more than 11 lines. Oh so that's why it's written that small because you have to fit... yeah, it was just written it happened to be a small one because that's the way he wrote it, it was like a small one. Yeah, I'd like to see it. Yeah, please do. Melech, Hamelech, another stringency. Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: "One who reads from a Megillah written among the other sacred writings." Okay, next, we saw this in Tosafot already earlier. Let's say you have a Tanach. In the old days, the Tanach was written on parchment. And the law is that if you read Megillat Esther from a Tanach that was written on parchment through the Tanach, so it says over here "he has not fulfilled his obligation." Why? Because there is no publicizing of the miracle when you're reading it from a regular Tanach. I want you to read its own standalone Megillah. Rava said: "We only said this if it is not slightly shorter or longer. But if it is slightly shorter or longer, we are not concerned." But if the size of Megillat Esther is different, which means you have a regular Tanach, but it's smaller, the Megillah, or it's bigger, so therefore it stands out. So even though it's written amongst the Prophets and the Writings, it's okay. Now the Gemara says: "Levi bar Shmuel was reading before Rav Yehuda." One of the rabbis was reading Megillat Esther from a Megillah written among the other sacred writings. Rav Yehuda said to him: "They already said, 'One who reads from a Megillah written among the other sacred writings has not fulfilled his obligation.'" Chiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: "One who reads from a Megillah written among the other sacred writings has not fulfilled his obligation." He said that law, that if you read it among the sacred writings, you have not fulfilled your obligation. "And he struck it and broke it." What do you mean? He limited what he said. How? "They taught this in public." That's only in public, where there's a publicizing of the miracle issue. But if you're reading it alone, you can even read it among the sacred writings because there's no really publicizing of the miracle issue. And Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: "The remaining space of the seam," meaning leaving some space at the top of the parchment and the bottom of the parchment, so that you don't stitch it all the way up to the top. You leave a little space on top, a gap on top and at the bottom. "Is a law given to Moses at Sinai." "And he struck it and broke it." After he said that that's a law given to Moses at Sinai, he took the hammer and broke it and he said: "They only said this so that it would not tear." Not that it's a law given to Moses at Sinai; it's practical. It's just so the parchment doesn't rip, because if you tie it, if you stitch it all the way to the top, it becomes very, very tight. And when you're going to turn it, it can snap. So therefore it's nothing to do with a law given to Moses at Sinai. It's got to do with a practical reason. And that's what the top Tosafot says: "It appears that even for a Megillah and other scrolls, we require the remaining space of the seam, since the reason is so that it would not tear." So then it's not only a law for a Torah scroll, it's going to be a law for my Megillah and any book because if the reason is because you don't want it to tear, so therefore it should apply to any book. And Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: "If there had remained in the cave where Moses and Elijah stood even a pinhole-sized opening, they would not have been able to withstand the light, as it is stated: 'For no human can see Me and live.'" Remember when Moses asked God, "Please show me Your glory," and then God said, "For no human can see Me and live." And then He said, "Behold, I am coming to you in the cleft of the rock," I'll appear to you. So it says that Moses was put into a cave, and when he was put into the cave, then God came over him, and the Gemara is saying here that the cleft of the rock is the cave. And when God came over to him, the Gemara is saying that if there would have been even a slight crack in the cave the size of a pinhole where the light of God would have penetrated that pinhole into the cave where Moses was standing, he wouldn't have survived it. That means the light of God is so strong that even if there was a—and the Gemara is saying that Elijah the Prophet at a certain point was exactly in that same cave as Moses. Although the Maharsha there struggles to find out where do we see that Elijah was in the cave. That is, that he was hidden in the inner part of the cave on the side where the glory of God passed, even a tiny pinhole-sized opening. And regarding Moses, it is explicitly stated that the Holy One, Blessed be He, hid him so that he would not see the glory of God, as it is written: "And it shall be, when My glory passes, that I will put you in the cleft of the rock, and I will cover you with My hand." But regarding Elijah, it says: "Go, stand on the mountain before the Lord, and behold, the Lord is passing by." It doesn't say anywhere they put him in a cave. And it is not explicitly stated that the Holy One, Blessed be He, hid him. And it is possible that since it is explicitly stated that he was in Moses' cleft of the rock, as it is written: "And he came there to the cave," it says the word "the cave" by Elijah with the definite article. So it must be it is THE cave. Which cave? The same cave where Moses was, presumably that He hid him. Now we don't know what he was doing in that cave, but we assume that he was in Moses' cave for the same reason that Moses was in there. And what was he in there for? In order to protect himself from the Divine Presence, from the revelation. Also the Holy One, Blessed be He, was there, and furthermore, it relies on the verse "for no human can see Me and live." And anyway, he must have been saved because he cannot have been outside when the revelation came because "for no human can see Me and live" after all.
The Gemara now presents one more exposition before the Mishna. Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: "What is the meaning of the verse, 'And upon them, according to all the words which the Lord spoke with you on the mountain'?" It is a verse that says that on the tablets that Moses brought them, "and upon them, according to all the words," everything "which the Lord spoke with you on the mountain." "This teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, showed Moses everything." The Creator of the world showed Moses everything. "The intricacies of the Torah." What intricacies of the Torah? Rashi says every "et" and every "gam," you know, "ach" and "rak," all these extra words in the Torah, some coming to minimize, some coming to include. "And the intricacies of the Scribes," that's all the novel interpretations of the later rabbis, of the Mishnayot. "And what the Scribes are destined to innovate," the Gemara says, every novel interpretation that's going to come out. "And what is that?" Including what? "The reading of the Megillah." Even the reading of the Megillah was given to Moses at Mount Sinai. Now where do you see in this verse over here anything about the reading of the Megillah? You just see "and upon them, according to all the words." So the Maharsha comes along and says: "From the superfluity of 'mikkol' or 'kechol.'" What is the implication? "That it could have written 'and upon them the words.'" It should just say, on the tablets were the words. What is "kechol"? That extra word "kechol." "And therefore they expounded it as an inclusion of all the intricacies of the Torah and the Scribes from the superfluity of the comparative kaf." "Kechol." It should say "and upon them all the words." What's "kechol"? The item that is like Torah. "Kechol." Which item is like Torah? The Megillah. Because we're going to learn, you have to write the Megillah like a Torah. So therefore it's "kechol." They expounded it to also include what is destined to be innovated, namely the reading of the Megillah, which is likened to the body of the Torah. Like we're going to say later on, "peace and truth like the truth of the Torah." Okay. So that's the, that's that exposition.
Now we get to the next Mishna. Are we okay on time? 42. Beautiful. 67. Let's just check the Megillah here for a second here, my friends. See if it's a, it'll be, I'll be happy. Okay, I'll be happy with the output. It's not a white anymore. Okay. I'm happy again. Something wrong with that? Yeah. Beautifully done. Yeah, this stays to the S's, boys, got me this in Israel. The same lady that made the Torah scroll for Hacham Ovadia. Hacham Ovadia. Yeah. Okay, Mishna. Off we go on Thursday. "All are qualified to read the Megillah." Okay, everybody is kosher to read the Megillah. "Except for." Oh, there's always got to be an "except for." "A deaf person." Now normally whenever the Mishna writes "deaf," it means deaf-mute, meaning that not only can't he hear, but he can't speak. Now obviously that cannot be talking about this case, because he's speaking, he's reading the Megillah. This is an exceptional deaf person where he speaks but cannot hear. Tosafot immediately says: "Except for a deaf person." "Typically, a deaf person is one who cannot hear and cannot speak," which is deaf-mute. "But the deaf person here speaks." Obviously, because he's reading the Megillah. "And he reads the Megillah and is intelligent in all his matters." He's considered an intelligent person, "except for this matter, that he cannot make it audible to his ear." That's why he's not fulfilling his obligation, because you have to hear it. If he doesn't hear it, he cannot fulfill the obligation for others. "All are qualified to read the Megillah except for a deaf person, an imbecile, and a minor." An imbecile is obviously somebody that doesn't have his mental faculties. A minor is a minor. Rabbi Yehuda qualifies a minor. Rabbi Yehuda says a minor is okay. Now let's see the Gemara. Gemara. "Who is the Tanna who holds that a deaf person is not even valid post-facto?" Okay, it is implied from this Mishna here, "All are qualified except for a deaf person, an imbecile, and a minor." It sounds like that even post-facto he has not fulfilled his obligation. So who is that opinion that says that the deaf person has not fulfilled his obligation even post-facto? Rav Matana said: "Rabbi Yosi." In Masechet Berachot, it is taught: "One who recites Shema and did not make it audible to his ear, has fulfilled his obligation." The first Tanna says if you read the Shema and you didn't hear it, it wasn't audible to the ears, you have fulfilled your obligation. Rabbi Yosi says: "He has not fulfilled his obligation." So what do you see here? That according to Rabbi Yosi, hearing it is integral. And therefore, just as he has not fulfilled his obligation even post-facto by the recitation of Shema, so presumably he is the author of our Mishna, that when it says a deaf person has not fulfilled his obligation, it must be it's like that opinion that says even post-facto no. "And from where do we know that it is Rabbi Yosi and even post-facto no?" Who told you the author of our Mishna is Rabbi Yosi and our Mishna is saying that even post-facto he has not fulfilled his obligation? "Perhaps it is Rabbi Yehuda," which maybe... Now by the way, what do you mean "he has not fulfilled his obligation"? It means you heard it from a deaf person. The deaf person himself will read it for himself. Then it just forces he's intelligent in all his matters. So doesn't he fulfill his obligation himself because he can't hear it? Oh, so therefore it doesn't even count like the recitation of Shema of the deaf person. If he can't hear it himself. So since he can't hear it, he cannot read it for himself even, you hold. Is that all we're talking about reading it for other people? It's like the minor. The minor we sometimes also do not fulfill the obligation. An imbecile also, we see sometimes does not fulfill the obligation. So a deaf person is equal to that. Good. So it means not even for himself he cannot read it, which is basically saying he's not obligated. Why won't he fulfill his obligation then? Why won't he fulfill his obligation? So the question is: is hearing it integral or not? So if you say you're going like Rabbi Yosi, it's integral. So therefore it's not even post-facto. It's "he has not fulfilled, he has not fulfilled." What is different if you hold like the other opinions, maybe not. So we want to say our Mishna, who told you it's Rabbi Yosi? Maybe our Mishna is what? "Perhaps it is Rabbi Yehuda," which is the first opinion by recitation of Shema that says that if you don't hear the Megillah it's okay, or the recitation of Shema it's okay. Initially no, but post-facto it's fine. But even Rabbi Yehuda that says one must make it audible to his ear initially will agree that post-facto it's okay. Everybody will hold one must make it audible to his ear initially. Rabbi Yosi will say even post-facto he has not fulfilled his obligation. And Rabbi Yehuda will hold post-facto yes. And maybe our Mishna that says a deaf person, maybe it's only an initial law, but post-facto. Now when I hear this phrasing "initially, post-facto," what is it saying? To fulfill the obligation for somebody. Not for himself. What is initially fulfilled, post-facto not, from himself? What are they telling me, initially what? Initially not fulfilled, post-facto you are fulfilled. Self, yes? He has to be... he's no way to be fulfilled initially, is that what it's saying? Right, it's no way to be fulfilled initially, as he's reading it, so you tell him to read it, so it's initially to read it, you tell him, "Read it initially and you're only fulfilled post-facto." Sounds like he's reading it for others. And therefore the question is you heard it from someone that does not have an equal obligation like you because he can't hear, so the question is is that going to be good or not? And the Gemara wants to say that our Mishna could be saying that maybe initially no, but post-facto it's okay. So Gemara says no: "Do not think so." We would not even think to learn the Mishna like that. "For it teaches a deaf person similar to an imbecile and a minor." It groups a deaf person with an imbecile and a minor. It sounds like they're equal. In what sense? "Just as an imbecile and a minor are not even valid post-facto," right? If you heard the Megillah from an imbecile and a minor, for sure even post-facto you have not fulfilled your obligation. "So too, a deaf person is not even valid post-facto." Very good. So therefore our Mishna is not talking about post-facto being valid. Our Mishna must be concluding that post-facto he has not fulfilled his obligation. And whose opinion is that? Rabbi Yosi. Why? From the fact that it grouped it with an imbecile and a minor. So the Gemara says: "But perhaps this is one way, and this is another way?" I don't know, maybe you grouped them together but each one has its own laws. Maybe an imbecile and a minor are post-facto no, and maybe a deaf person is post-facto yes. "And since the latter part teaches that Rabbi Yehuda qualifies a minor," the fact that the end of the Mishna clearly says that Rabbi Yehuda qualifies a minor, "it implies that the first part is not Rabbi Yehuda." Must be the first part is not Rabbi Yehuda. And if it's not Rabbi Yehuda, who is it? Rabbi Yosi. And therefore it must be the beginning of our Mishna is Rabbi Yosi that says a deaf person has not fulfilled his obligation even post-facto. "But perhaps it is all Rabbi Yehuda?" Maybe it's all Rabbi Yehuda? "Is it comparable for the first part to be invalid and the latter part to be valid?" What do you think? You think that the first part is coming to say that a minor is invalid and then at the end Rabbi Yehuda is saying that the... Rashi takes this version out by the way, but I'm just reading it, but you don't need this version. What do you think, the beginning he's saying invalid and the end he's saying valid? No. "But perhaps it is all Rabbi Yehuda," this is the version we have, "and it teaches two types of minors." There's two types of minors. "And the Mishna is missing some words," is missing some words, "and this is what it teaches: 'All are qualified to read the Megillah, except for a deaf person, an imbecile, and a minor.'" And what type of minor are we saying is not good? "To what do these words apply? To a minor who has not reached the age of training." He's a kid, five years old, four years old. "But concerning a minor who has reached the age of training," once he's eight, he's nine or ten years old, "even initially." You know why, even initially? "Because Rabbi Yehuda qualifies a minor." Beautiful. So therefore I can say our Mishna is who? Rabbi Yehuda. And what? "This is as it is." "This is as it is and this is as it is." The law of a deaf person and an imbecile is one law and the law of, sorry, the law of an imbecile and a minor is one law and the law of a deaf person is one law. I, how could you tell me the first part is Rabbi Yehuda, the latter part says Rabbi Yehuda qualifies? No, it's two types of minors. The first part of the Mishna that said a minor is no good is a minor who has not reached the age of training and Rabbi Yehuda qualifies a minor who has reached the age of training. But when it comes to a deaf person, initially no, but post-facto it's okay. Now why, why are we struggling to make the Mishna like Rabbi Yehuda and put missing words in there? So Tosafot says in the name of Rabbi Yehuda: "Because he ruled regarding a minor like Rabbi Yehuda." Since he rules like Rabbi Yehuda by recitation of Shema that if he did not make it audible to his ear he has fulfilled his obligation, "he struggled to establish it, since it teaches according to him." So we want to make the Mishna like... okay, my friends, so we've established the page. At this point here we're saying that the Mishna can be Rabbi Yehuda, which holds that a deaf person will be okay post-facto. I, but it says Rabbi Yehuda at the end of the Mishna, so how could Rabbi Yehuda be in the beginning of the Mishna? There's a missing words and we're talking about two types of minors. A minor who has not reached the age of training is not even valid post-facto like an imbecile, and then you have a minor who has reached the age of training, so that's what Rabbi Yehuda meant at the end of the Mishna when it said Rabbi Yehuda qualifies a minor. He qualifies a minor who has reached the age of training. So that's all good. So the Gemara says wait, "By what did you establish it as Rabbi Yehuda?" You're establishing the Mishna as Rabbi Yehuda and post-facto, and you're making the Mishna's law post-facto, meaning a deaf person can fulfill the obligation post-facto. "Rather, as it was taught by Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi." Now we have another statement, unrelated, meaning it's not Rabbi Yehuda, it's not Rabbi Yosi, it's the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi. And what does he say? "A deaf person who speaks but cannot hear," our case of a deaf person that can speak but he cannot hear, "may separate terumah initially." He's allowed to take terumah initially. Now wait a minute, why shouldn't he be able to take terumah initially? So Rashi reminds us: "And even though he needs to recite a blessing and his ears do not hear the blessing that he utters from his mouth." But it doesn't matter, even though he can't hear the blessing, he's allowed to do terumah initially. So what do you see from here? That there's an opinion that says initially it's okay. Now who's that going like? We only have two opinions amongst the Tannaim regarding making it audible to one's ear. We have either Rabbi Yosi that says post-facto no, and we have... the point here is, the point here is and Rabbi Yehuda holds post-facto it's okay, but we don't have an opinion that says initially it's okay. So who is this opinion going like? Who is it? "If Rabbi Yehuda," if you're going to say it's following Rabbi Yehuda, "post-facto yes, initially no." Rabbi Yehuda's only post-facto okay, but not initially. "If Rabbi Yosi," "not even post-facto." So therefore we have a problem if you frame the dispute like this, that Rabbi Yehuda holds post-facto okay and Rabbi Yosi says not even post-facto okay, but nobody holds initially you could do it, apparently you have no author to this statement of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi. The Gemara says, "Ah, so what else?" "Rabbi Yehuda?" So what do you want to say? You want to say that really Rabbi Yehuda holds initially, and he's the author of that statement by terumah that says what? "May separate terumah initially," and even initially. And our Mishna is what? Telling me the novelty, not according to Rabbi Yehuda, but it's telling me how strict Rabbi Yosi is, that holds Rabbi Yosi holds not even post-facto, such an extreme dispute. You have one rabbi that says initially, and then you have Rabbi Yosi at the other end of the spectrum that's saying not even post-facto, and that's the author of our Mishna. Well, you have a problem, because now you have this extreme dispute, you don't have any middle ground. What are you going to do with the following braita? "Rather, as it was taught: A person should not recite the Grace After Meals silently, but if he did, he has fulfilled his obligation." Silently means you shouldn't say it lowly, but if you said it lowly, meaning inaudible, you have fulfilled your obligation. That's a middle zone. The way you're framing it now there's no middle. The dispute of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi is extreme. Rabbi Yehuda says initially it's okay, and Rabbi Yosi says not even post-facto. Who's this opinion? Who is it? Not Rabbi Yehuda and not Rabbi Yosi. Now the Gemara explains. "If Rabbi Yehuda," "even initially." "If Rabbi Yosi," "not even post-facto." So how are you going to explain that? "Actually, Rabbi Yehuda, and even initially." And therefore, learn Rabbi Yehuda, even initially. And who's the author of our Mishna? Rabbi Yosi. And our Mishna is holding when it says a deaf person, an imbecile, and a minor that the deaf person is like the imbecile and the minor. That what, not even post-facto. "And it is not difficult." And what, the case of terumah that says may separate terumah initially could be going exactly like Rabbi Yehuda because Rabbi Yehuda says initially is okay. Ah, but we have a problem because what are you going to do with this braita here that says a person should not recite the Grace After Meals silently, but if he did, he has fulfilled his obligation? How is that going to work? "And it is not difficult." "This is his own opinion, this is his rabbi's opinion." Oh, there's an opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and then there's an opinion of his rabbi, two different opinions now introducing. "For it was taught: Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah," which is his rabbi, "one who recites Shema and did not make it audible to his ear." That what? When you read Shema, "it is necessary." "It is necessary" sounds like initially. "It is necessary to make it audible to his ear." You have to listen, it has to be audible when you say the Shema, "as it is stated: 'Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one.'" What do we learn from the word "Shema"? "Make audible to your ears what you utter from your mouth." Rabbi Meir says: "Which I command you this day upon your heart." "Upon your heart," as long as it's in your heart, "according to the intention of the heart, these are the words." Now, Rashi comes along and says: "His rabbi, in the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah, it is necessary to make it audible." Now, "it is necessary" sounds like you should, meaning initially you should, but post-facto it's okay. So therefore, we have Rabbi Yehuda per se, and then we have Rabbi Yehuda in the name of his rabbi. Therefore, what it said may separate terumah initially, that's Rabbi Yehuda. If the Grace After Meals that said post-facto, that's Rabbi Yehuda in the name of his rabbi which is Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah, and everything is squared away. The Gemara says wait, now that you're introducing me that you have this post-facto opinion, "Now that you have come to this," "you can even say that Rabbi Yehuda holds like his rabbi." Now I can say don't make two opinions. I can make Rabbi Yehuda that actually holds like his rabbi. And he holds what? It is post-facto. Rashi: "You can even say that Rabbi Yehuda, who said regarding the recitation of Shema that he has fulfilled his obligation post-facto, but not initially." "And our Mishna too," we can make him the author of the Mishna. "It is initially that it invalidates a deaf person, and it is Rabbi Yehuda." Oh, you have a problem, Grace After Meals you don't, because post-facto also. "And even the Grace After Meals is Rabbi Yehuda." Which is we have a triple header here. The Mishna could be Rabbi Yehuda post-facto. And Grace After Meals is a Rabbi Yehuda post-facto. Recitation of Shema Rabbi Yehuda post-facto. According to his own opinion, according to his rabbi's opinion. Why don't you make a dispute with Rabbi Yehuda and his rabbi? If you have a statement that says even initially one may separate terumah, he doesn't have to hear it initially. Blessed be God. Once we introduce Rabbi Meir into the picture because Rabbi Meir by recitation of Shema says you don't have to hear it initially, it's a Rabbi Meir. "And that which was taught by Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, is Rabbi Meir." Rashi explains that "and regarding our difficulty with Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, who is it? Not Rabbi Yehuda and not Rabbi Yosi." Ah, but you had the question from this rabbi called Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi from Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, which was the case of terumah which says initially. Who's that going like now? Rabbi Meir. Ah, bringing Rabbi Meir into the picture. Why? "Because he qualifies initially." Because he said in the recitation of Shema braita, "which I command you this day," initially you could say it low. So once you show me that you have a Rabbi Meir that holds initially, I can say like this. Everything is squared. Our Mishna Rabbi Yehuda post-facto. Grace After Meals post-facto Rabbi Yehuda. Recitation of Shema Rabbi Yehuda post-facto. According to him, according to his rabbi. Why don't you make a dispute with Rabbi Yehuda and his rabbi? If you have a statement that says even initially one may separate terumah, he doesn't have to hear it initially. Blessed be God. Once we introduce Rabbi Meir into the picture because Rabbi Meir by recitation of Shema says you don't have to hear it initially, it's a Rabbi Meir. "And that which was taught by Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, is Rabbi Meir," and everything is squared off, blessed be God.
Now let's read the Tosafot here. We have a big Tosafot. "And Rabbi Yehuda qualifies." Okay, so Rabbi Yehuda qualifies a minor. "It is difficult, what type of minor are we talking about?" "If a minor who has not reached the age of training," it cannot be. "What is Rabbi Yehuda's reason for qualifying?" Here, he qualifies, and we say at the end of the last chapter of Rosh Hashanah. So obviously we're talking about him fulfilling the obligation for others. If he's not obligated, how can he fulfill the obligation for others? So a minor who has not reached the age of training clearly is not obligated. "And if he has reached the age of training, what is the Rabbis' reason for invalidating?" Why would the Rabbis invalidate? "But are not all who eat also only obligated by rabbinic decree?" The whole obligation of Megillah is anyway by rabbinic decree. And a minor who has reached the age of training is by rabbinic decree anyway. So apparently even a minor who has reached the age of training has an obligation, it's by rabbinic decree. So Tosafot asks, everybody should say that a minor who has reached the age of training could fulfill the obligation of Megillah, which is by rabbinic decree. What's the problem? Which means apparently there should be no dispute. If he has not reached the age of training, everybody should say he does not fulfill the obligation. And if he has reached the age of training, rabbinic for rabbinic. What's the problem? They're on equal footing. Rabbinic for rabbinic, no? Rabbinic for rabbinic is perfect. No, but the minor is a rabbinic of a rabbinic. Oh, so you want to answer Tosafot's question. "And if so, it is difficult, why do we not say that one rabbinic obligation can fulfill another rabbinic obligation?" Let one rabbinic obligation fulfill another. "And similarly, we say in the chapter 'Mi Shemeto' that a son can recite the Grace After Meals for his father." A son can make the Grace After Meals for his father, "even though he is a minor, and he fulfills his obligation with his blessing." Now what do you mean Grace After Meals is by Torah law? No, "and we establish it there as, for example, if he ate not to satiety or a measure of an egg." The father ate a measure not of satiety. So therefore the father's Grace After Meals is by rabbinic decree, "for it is a rabbinic measure, and a minor comes," meaning he is obligated by rabbinic decree, "and fulfills the obligation for the father who did not eat a rabbinic measure." "And why do we not say so regarding the Megillah?" Why don't you say the same thing by a Megillah? That what? That the minor who has reached the age of training can, even according to the Rabbis, why only Rabbi Yehuda qualifies? It should be according to everyone. "And similarly in the chapter 'Lulav ha-Gazul,' where we say that a minor does not fulfill the obligation for the recitation of Hallel." We don't let a minor fulfill the obligation for the congregation in the Hallel. "And they answer after him what they say." "What is the difference here from there?" Same question. What's the problem? Hallel is by rabbinic decree, so let the minor who is by rabbinic decree fulfill the obligation for the congregation by rabbinic decree. It shouldn't be worse than Grace After Meals. "And it can be said that it always refers to a minor who has reached the age of training." So what's the problem? "And even so, the Rabbis invalidated him because for Megillah, there is no obligation even for adults except by rabbinic decree." Here's the answer. That even adults are only obligated by rabbinic decree. "And a minor is only obligated by rabbinic decree even for other commandments." Their obligation on everything is by rabbinic decree. "And for an adult, there is only one rabbinic obligation for Megillah." But regarding adults, an adult has one rabbinic obligation, meaning it's a rabbinic law. "For in other commandments, he is obligated by Torah law." In all other laws he is obligated by Torah law. In this law he is obligated by rabbinic decree. So he's considered rabbinic once. What is different for a minor, all his obligation is by rabbinic decree on everything. And therefore now Megillah becomes rabbinic once removed. Because it's a rabbinical on a rabbinical. Understand? His whole obligation on life is by rabbinic decree. Now take that obligation on life and add the Megillah which in principle is by rabbinic decree. "And two rabbinic obligations do not come and fulfill one rabbinic obligation." Amazing novelty. Now exactly, now Tosafot is grading the rabbinic obligations. Not all rabbinic obligations are created equal. You have a once removed rabbinic obligation cannot fulfill a pure rabbinic obligation. Then he comes along and says: "But there, regarding Grace After Meals, it refers to a minor who ate to satiety, which is an obligation by Torah law." There over there in the Grace After Meals case the minor ate to satiety, which means in principle that's an obligation by Torah law to satiety. It's just that the minor, his obligation is by rabbinic decree. So now it's rabbinic for rabbinic. "And there is only one rabbinic obligation, and he fulfills the obligation for the father who ate a rabbinic measure." Very good. But also if the minor would have eaten a rabbinic measure, now you're back to the same question. It's two rabbinic obligations to one rabbinic obligation. And therefore Tosafot gets around that. And that explains the Hallel. The Hallel is by rabbinic decree, so it's two rabbinic obligations against one rabbinic obligation, so why can't he fulfill the obligation for them in the Hallel? For all purposes, "And nevertheless, it is difficult, for we say that Rav Sheshet and Rav Yosef recited the Haggadah in the house of Passover and fulfilled the obligation for others because they held that matzah in our time is by rabbinic decree." Rav Sheshet and Rav Yosef were blind and they were fulfilling the obligation for the other people around the table for the Passover Haggadah. Why? Because they held that matzah in our time is by rabbinic decree. And since the obligation of a blind person, let's say, is only by rabbinic decree and today anyway everybody's obligated by rabbinic decree, so they said we're on equal footing. Rabbinic for rabbinic, therefore they were fulfilling the obligation for them. Right? Oh, but he says, "And according to what I explained, it is difficult." But we have a question. "How do they come, who are two rabbinic obligations?" Why? Because their whole starting point is by rabbinic decree because a blind person is exempt from commandments by Torah law. "For a blind person is exempt from the Haggadah, and sighted people are obligated by rabbinic decree." "And let it be like two rabbinic obligations." How is it possible for Rav Yosef, who was blind, and Rav Sheshet, where their obligation in life starts off as by rabbinic decree and anything they never have a Torah law obligation, and therefore apparently they are now doing a commandment of a rabbinic decree which is once removed and they're fulfilling the obligation for the people that are only obligated one rabbinic decree? "And it can be said that a blind person is superior to a minor who has already become obligated by Torah law, which is not the case for a minor." Amazing logical inference of Tosafot. A blind person is better because he once had an obligation by Torah law on him. Once already he had the obligation by Torah law, it's a high level. You consider a person obligated once in your life. What is different for the minor who was never obligated? It's interesting. I have to massage that logical inference, but it's an interesting logical inference. "That a blind person is superior to a minor who has already become obligated by Torah law," which means at a point in his life, this person here was on equal footing. He had an obligation by Torah law, so which means the simple meaning is he's there already. He's there already, it just got a technical point that he went blind, so he loses his status. What is different for the minor who never got there? So if he never got there yet, that's worse. You know, an adult cannot become a minor again, but an adult can become a blind person. So therefore, since he already entered adulthood and there was an obligation on him, that already makes him better. Therefore, the logical inference of two rabbinic obligations and one rabbinic obligation is only on someone that never had an obligation at all. But someone that once already entered obligation land, like this person, is okay. Okay, nice Tosafot. Bottom Tosafot, my friends. Let's just see if we have any Maharsha on this Tosafot. No, we have on the bottom Tosafot. Okay, we're good. Okay, bottom Tosafot, my friends. "And that which was taught: A person should not recite the Grace After Meals silently." "It is difficult." "How do we compare Grace After Meals to the recitation of Shema?" "It is understandable for Megillah to say, according to the one who says that for the recitation of Shema, audibility to the ear is required, and he holds that the Rabbis instituted Megillah similar to a Torah law." Why? Which means, we understand when you're bringing me recitation of Shema and you're telling me it is necessary to make it audible to his ear, then I understand the connection to Megillah because when the Rabbis established Megillah, they modeled it after a Torah law. Since recitation of Shema you tell me it is necessary to make it audible to his ear, so therefore I'll say the same thing by Megillah. "But Grace After Meals, which is by Torah law, and it does not say 'Shema' in it." Right? It doesn't say "Shema" by Grace After Meals. "From where do we derive to institute that it is necessary to make it audible to his ear?" Where in Grace After Meals do we see that it is necessary to make it audible to his ear? Recitation of Shema I understand, you have the word "Shema," but what's the Grace After Meals? "And it can be said that it is established for him that we derive Grace After Meals from the recitation of Shema." Okay, Tosafot says they must have had a tradition that we learn it from recitation of Shema. Recitation of Shema and Grace After Meals all of a sudden have some sort of relationship. Comes the Maharsha. "And that which we compare this act of separating terumah to the recitation of Shema." Now, we're comparing separating terumah to recitation of Shema because what did we say by separating terumah? May separate terumah initially. Right. May separate terumah initially to recitation of Shema. "And even though separating terumah is by Torah law, the blessing of separating terumah is not by Torah law." Ah, which is obviously the blessing that we're talking about is not by Torah law. "And it is well said that they instituted it similar to a Torah law." Which means I have no problem that we could say that they instituted the blessing which is by rabbinic decree and they instituted it similar to a Torah law. What is different for Grace After Meals, which is the body of the Torah law itself, according to the new logical inference of Tosafot. Right. Which means basically he's asking, he's saying that regarding Grace After Meals, what's your source? If you... by rabbinic decree I have no problem. By rabbinic decree you could always model it against some some other Torah law. So wait, wait, wait, apparently you should have the same question by terumah. Is terumah by Torah law? No. We were discussing the blessing of terumah. So the blessing of terumah we're modeling it after recitation of Shema. That what? We're modeling it after you know a Torah law that says you have to be hearing. I have no problem. What is different regarding Tosafot's question was regarding Grace After Meals which is a Torah law itself. So therefore what's your source? What do you model it after? There's no such thing in Shema that says anything else. Oh, because we make an analogy to Shema. Blessed be the Lord forever, amen and amen.