We begin the final chapter of Massechet Yevamot with the first Mishnah. The Mishnah discusses a woman whose husband went overseas with his other wife. The co-wife traveled with him, while this woman remained at home. At the time the husband left, he had a brother, so there was a potential obligation of levirate marriage.
As always, we first establish the original status before anything happened. The presumption was that the husband had no children, and that he had a brother. Therefore, if the husband were to die, his wife could potentially become subject to levirate marriage or to the release ceremony. The woman who remained at home must determine whether the co-wife became pregnant and gave birth. If she gave birth, there would be no obligation of levirate marriage, because the deceased would have a child.
The Mishnah therefore says that the woman may not marry someone from the general marketplace, because perhaps the co-wife did not give birth and she remains subject to levirate marriage. She also may not perform levirate marriage until the matter is clarified, because perhaps the co-wife is pregnant or gave birth, in which case there would be no obligation of levirate marriage. The Gemara will ask why she cannot simply perform the release ceremony. If there was an obligation, the ceremony would release her; and if there was no obligation, nothing significant would have happened. The Gemara will also ask how long she must wait. Must she wait three months, nine months, or indefinitely because perhaps the co-wife is pregnant?
The Mishnah then presents another case. A woman had a mother-in-law who was overseas. When the woman’s husband left, he had no brothers. Therefore, at that time, she was not presumed to be subject to levirate marriage. We do not have to be concerned that the mother-in-law may have given birth to another son overseas, thereby creating a brother-in-law who would make her subject to levirate marriage if her husband died.
However, if the mother-in-law was already pregnant when she went overseas, the first opinion in the Mishnah says that the daughter-in-law must be concerned that the mother-in-law gave birth to a viable male child. If so, the daughter-in-law would now have a brother-in-law, and she could not marry someone from the general marketplace until the matter was clarified.
Rabbi Yehoshua says that she does not have to be concerned, even if the mother-in-law was pregnant when she went overseas. The reason is that we are dealing with probabilities. It is possible that the mother-in-law gave birth, but for the daughter-in-law to become subject to levirate marriage, several conditions must be met. The child must be male, and he must be viable. There are other possibilities: she may have miscarried, or she may have given birth to a female child. In either of those cases, there would still be no obligation of levirate marriage. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua says that she does not have to be concerned.
The distinction between the two cases is clear. In the first case, the co-wife was already married to the husband. Whether she gave birth to a boy or a girl, the husband would have a child, and the woman who remained at home would no longer be subject to levirate marriage. Therefore, there is greater reason for concern that the co-wife gave birth to something that would exempt her. In the second case, however, only a viable male child would create an obligation of levirate marriage, so there are fewer possibilities that would produce that result.
The Mishnah therefore concludes that if the mother-in-law went overseas without being pregnant, the daughter-in-law does not have to be concerned at all. If the mother-in-law was pregnant, the first opinion says that she must still be concerned, while Rabbi Yehoshua says that she does not, because the possibilities of miscarriage and the birth of a female child reduce the likelihood that a viable male child was born.
The Gemara begins by examining the wording of the first case. The Mishnah says that the woman who remained at home must be concerned about the particular co-wife who went overseas. What does this wording teach us? It teaches that we are concerned about the co-wife who actually went overseas with the husband. We do not have to be concerned that the husband may have married another woman overseas, and that this other woman may have become pregnant and given birth. The concern is limited to the co-wife mentioned in the Mishnah.
Suppose witnesses come and say that they were overseas and saw that the co-wife was not pregnant. We would then know that she did not give birth, and the woman who remained at home would be subject to levirate marriage. But perhaps the husband married another woman overseas, and perhaps that woman had a child. The Gemara says that we do not have to be concerned about that possibility. The Mishnah’s concern applies only to the co-wife who traveled with the husband.
If witnesses testify that the co-wife did give birth, then the first woman is exempt from levirate marriage, because the husband had a child. We do not add another concern and say that perhaps this particular co-wife did not have a child but another woman whom the husband married overseas did. That is the meaning of the Mishnah’s emphasis on the co-wife herself.
The Mishnah says at the beginning that the woman may neither marry someone from the general marketplace nor perform levirate marriage. The Gemara understands the two prohibitions as addressing two opposite possibilities. She may not perform levirate marriage because perhaps the co-wife gave birth, in which case the woman is exempt from levirate marriage. And she may not marry someone from the general marketplace because perhaps the co-wife did not give birth, in which case the woman remains subject to levirate marriage.
The Gemara first asks why she may not perform levirate marriage. That is understandable: perhaps the co-wife gave birth, and the woman is exempt. If she were to perform levirate marriage, she might be entering into a relationship with a woman who is forbidden to her as a close relative, a serious biblical prohibition. But why may she not marry someone from the general marketplace? If we follow the majority, she should be permitted.
Most women who live with their husbands become pregnant and give birth. If that majority is applied here, we should assume that the co-wife gave birth and that the woman who remained at home is exempt from levirate marriage. Why, then, does the Mishnah prohibit her from marrying someone from the general marketplace?
The Gemara suggests that the Mishnah may follow the view of Rabbi Meir, who is concerned even about a minority. According to Rabbi Meir, although most women become pregnant and give birth, there is a minority who do not. Since this woman may belong to that minority, she may not marry someone from the general marketplace, because perhaps the co-wife did not give birth and the woman remains subject to levirate marriage.
The Gemara brings a source for the principle that Rabbi Meir is concerned about a minority. In the discussion of the Samaritans, a decree was made concerning all of them because some members of that group worshipped idolatry. Even though they were only a minority, the concern for the minority was sufficient to affect the entire group.
The Gemara then rejects the need to establish the Mishnah according to Rabbi Meir. Perhaps the Mishnah follows the Sages, who generally follow the majority. The Gemara explains that the Sages follow a majority only when the majority is present before us. When the majority is not present before us, they do not necessarily rely on it.
The Gemara gives several examples of a majority that is present before us. If there are ten stores, nine of which sell kosher meat and one of which sells non-kosher meat, and a piece of meat is found outside the stores, we say that it came from the majority of kosher stores. The stores are physically before us, and the question is only from which store this particular piece of meat came. Since most of the stores are kosher, we follow the majority.
Similarly, when judges are sitting before us, we count them. If four judges reach one conclusion and six judges reach another, we follow the majority of the judges who are present. This is also a majority that is before us.
In the case of the co-wife, however, we do not have two identifiable groups before us. We have one particular woman, and we do not know whether she became pregnant and gave birth. We are not asking which group she came from. We are using a general statistic about women and applying it to her. That is a majority that is not before us. Even the Sages, who follow a majority, do not necessarily follow such a majority.
The same question arises regarding minors. We learned that a minor boy may not perform the release ceremony, because perhaps he will become incapable of fathering children. A minor girl may not enter into levirate marriage, because perhaps she will prove to be incapable of bearing children. The Gemara asks: if the Sages do not follow a majority that is not before us, how can they say that most boys will not become incapable of fathering children and that most girls will not be incapable of bearing children?
The Gemara explains that the Sages do rely on a majority that is not before us in that context. This seems inconsistent with their treatment of the majority of women who become pregnant and give birth. If the majority of women who give birth is not sufficient to permit the woman to marry someone from the general marketplace, why is the majority concerning minors sufficient to permit levirate marriage?
We are therefore forced to say that the Mishnah follows Rabbi Meir, who is concerned about the minority. Most women become pregnant and give birth, but Rabbi Meir is concerned that this particular co-wife may belong to the minority who did not give birth. Consequently, the woman who remained at home may neither perform levirate marriage nor marry someone from the general marketplace.
The Gemara then asks a practical question. If we are concerned about the minority, why not allow the woman to perform the release ceremony? That would resolve the problem. If the co-wife did not give birth, the release ceremony would be required; and if the co-wife did give birth, the ceremony would not be required, but it would seemingly cause no further problem. After the ceremony, the woman could marry someone from the general marketplace.
According to the Sages, who follow the majority, she could perhaps marry someone from the general marketplace without a release ceremony. Just as we eat meat found near the kosher stores because of the majority, and just as we follow the majority of judges who are present, we should follow the majority of women who give birth. According to Rabbi Meir, however, we understand why she cannot immediately marry someone from the general marketplace: he is concerned about the minority.
The Gemara now returns to the second case of the Mishnah, the case of the mother-in-law who went overseas. The daughter-in-law is immediately permitted to marry someone from the general marketplace, even though perhaps the mother-in-law gave birth to a male child. Why is she permitted? The Gemara answers that we follow the majority of women who become pregnant and give birth, but a specific type of birth is required here. The child must be male and viable.
There is a minority of women who miscarry, and among those who give birth, some give birth to males and some to females. When the possibilities of miscarriage and the birth of a female child are combined, the viable male child becomes a minority. Rabbi Meir is concerned about a minority, but here the relevant possibility is a minority within a minority. Therefore, even Rabbi Meir permits the woman to marry someone from the general marketplace.
The Gemara challenges this explanation. If the Mishnah follows Rabbi Meir and is concerned about a minority, then why does the first case prohibit the woman from performing levirate marriage? There is a presumption that she was subject to levirate marriage when the husband left, because there were no children. We should combine that presumption with the minority possibility that the co-wife miscarried or did not give birth. Perhaps the presumption and the minority together should outweigh the majority, and the woman should be permitted to perform levirate marriage.
The Gemara first suggests that a presumption does not override a majority. In the first case, the original presumption was that the woman was subject to levirate marriage, but the majority says that most women become pregnant and give birth, which would exempt her. The majority therefore has greater force than the presumption, and she should be permitted to marry someone from the general marketplace. Nevertheless, because Rabbi Meir is concerned about the minority, that minority is added to the original presumption, bringing the matter back to an unresolved fifty-fifty situation. Therefore, she may neither marry someone from the general marketplace nor perform levirate marriage.
In the second case, however, the original presumption is that the woman was permitted to marry someone from the general marketplace, because the mother-in-law had no known son. The majority also supports permitting her to marry someone from the general marketplace, because most women give birth to either males or females, and many miscarry. The possibility of a viable male child is therefore only a minority within a minority. The presumption and the majority together are sufficient to permit her to marry someone from the general marketplace.
The Gemara offers another way to formulate the distinction. In the first case, the original presumption was that the woman was subject to levirate marriage, while the majority suggests that she is permitted to marry someone from the general marketplace. Since the majority is stronger than the presumption, she would normally be permitted. But Rabbi Meir is concerned about the minority that the co-wife miscarried, and that minority is added to the presumption of an obligation of levirate marriage. The two sides are therefore balanced, and she remains in limbo.
In the second case, the original presumption was that the woman was permitted to marry someone from the general marketplace, and the majority also supports that conclusion. The possibility of a viable male birth is not merely a minority; it is a minority that must overcome both the presumption and the majority. That is why Rabbi Meir does not require concern for it in this case.
This explanation does not mean that the two sides literally weigh fifty percent each in a mathematical sense. The expression means that there is now an unresolved doubt. The minority does not necessarily tip a physical scale; it prevents us from reaching a definite conclusion.
The Gemara then returns to the practical issue of the release ceremony. The first opinion says that the woman should wait nine months. After nine months, the situation will be clear: either the co-wife gave birth, in which case no release ceremony is needed, or she did not give birth, in which case the woman must perform the ceremony. Before nine months, even if the ceremony were performed, it might not be the proper ceremony, because the co-wife might still give birth.
The Gemara asks why she must wait nine months. In an ordinary case in which a woman herself becomes subject to levirate marriage, she waits three months so that we can determine whether she is pregnant. Here, however, the woman is waiting to determine what happened to the co-wife overseas. Since the co-wife is not before us, we have no information during those months. Only after nine months will we know whether she gave birth.
One opinion therefore says that the woman should wait nine months and then perform the release ceremony if necessary. If the co-wife gave birth, the woman will already be permitted to marry someone from the general marketplace. If the co-wife did not give birth, the release ceremony will be required. At that point, the situation is no longer uncertain.
Another opinion says that she should perform the release ceremony immediately. The concern is that if she waits nine months, unnecessary complications may arise. The release ceremony would resolve the matter now: if there was an obligation, it would release her; and if there was no obligation, the ceremony would not be needed, but the Gemara must consider what consequences that unnecessary ceremony would create.
If witnesses later come and testify that the co-wife gave birth, then the release ceremony performed by the woman was not necessary. A woman who performed a valid release ceremony is ordinarily prohibited from marrying a priest. The question is whether we can announce publicly that this particular release ceremony was unnecessary, so that people will know that she is not prohibited from marrying a priest.
The Gemara suggests making an announcement. The court could publicize that although the woman performed the release ceremony, it was not required, because the co-wife had given birth. The Gemara rejects this solution because not everyone is present in the same place at all times. Some people may have witnessed the release ceremony but may not have heard the later announcement. They could then see the woman marrying a priest and conclude that the court had permitted a woman who performed the release ceremony to marry a priest.
This would create confusion concerning the law. The prohibition against a woman who performed the release ceremony marrying a priest is rabbinic, but the Sages nevertheless did not want to create a situation in which people would forget or misunderstand that prohibition. Therefore, one opinion says that the woman should not perform the release ceremony until the status of the co-wife is known.
Tosafot discusses the apparent inconsistency between this case and another case in which a release ceremony was performed while the woman was pregnant, and she later gave birth. In that other case, an announcement was made that the ceremony had not been necessary, and the woman was permitted to marry a priest. Why can we not rely on an announcement here as well?
Tosafot explains that the cases are different. In the other case, the child was present before everyone. People saw that the woman had given birth, and they understood that the release ceremony had not been necessary. Here, however, the only information that the co-wife gave birth comes from witnesses who reported it to the court. The child is not present before the public. Someone who saw the release ceremony may never hear the testimony or the court’s announcement. Therefore, the possibility of confusion is greater.
Tosafot also explains that where an unnecessary release ceremony has already been performed, the court can make an announcement. But as a matter of proper procedure, the court should not cause the woman to perform the ceremony before knowing whether it is required, because of the concern that people will hear only about the ceremony and not about the later clarification.
The Gemara then brings another Mishnah that seems to raise the same difficulty. A man who had no children went overseas with his wife, and he had a brother. The wife later returned and said that she had given birth to a son overseas. She then said that the son died first and that her husband died afterward. If that testimony is accepted, she remains subject to levirate marriage. If she says that her husband died first and that the son died afterward, she is attempting to remove herself from the original presumption that she was subject to levirate marriage. In that case, she is not believed sufficiently to permit herself to marry someone from the general marketplace without a release ceremony.
The Mishnah says that she performs the release ceremony but does not enter into levirate marriage. The Gemara asks: perhaps witnesses will later come and confirm that she was correct, that her husband did die first and that the son died afterward. If so, the release ceremony was unnecessary, and the same problem of public confusion would arise. Why do we not prohibit the ceremony in this case as well?
The Gemara gives two answers. Rav Pappa says that the woman in that case was already divorced. Since she was already prohibited from marrying a priest for another reason, the unnecessary release ceremony would not create a new practical prohibition. There would be no concern that people would see her prohibited from marrying a priest because of the release ceremony, since she was already prohibited because she was divorced.
The Gemara gives another answer: the woman and her husband were in a cave together, and no witnesses were present. Since there were no witnesses who could later establish that the husband died before the child, there was no concern that the release ceremony would subsequently be shown to have been unnecessary. The court could therefore require the ceremony in that case.
The underlying principle is that once a court has acted on testimony and permitted a woman to marry, we do not necessarily reopen the original uncertainty merely because circumstances later change. In the case of the two brothers, the women were permitted to perform levirate marriage with another brother. Once they had acted on that permission, the original testimony was not revisited when that brother later died.
The final Mishnah discusses two women who were married to two brothers. Neither brother had children. Each woman said, “My husband died.” Each woman is believed concerning her own husband, but neither woman is believed concerning the death of the other husband. Each woman therefore remains unable to marry someone from the general marketplace, because she may still be subject to levirate marriage with the other woman’s husband.
To state the case precisely, Reuven and Shimon were brothers, and each was married to one of the two women. One woman testifies that Reuven died, and the other testifies that Shimon died. Each woman is believed to say that her own husband died. But each woman’s knowledge that the other husband died comes only from the testimony of the other woman, and a woman subject to levirate marriage is not believed to testify in a way that permits her fellow levirate wife to marry someone from the general marketplace.
Thus, each woman’s testimony helps her regarding her own husband but does not help her fellow wife. Each one is caught by the other’s inability to testify on her behalf. They both remain unable to marry someone from the general marketplace until the matter can be independently verified.
The Mishnah then presents a case in which one woman has witnesses that her husband died, while the other woman has no witnesses. The woman who has witnesses is still prohibited from marrying someone from the general marketplace, because the other woman’s husband may still be alive and she may be subject to levirate marriage with him. The woman without witnesses, however, may marry someone from the general marketplace, because she can rely on the independent witnesses who established that the other woman’s husband died. She herself is believed concerning the death of her own husband, and there is no surviving brother to whom she would be subject.
The next case is one in which one woman has children and the other does not. The woman who has children is permitted to marry someone from the general marketplace, because the existence of her children exempts her from levirate marriage. The woman without children remains subject to levirate marriage. She cannot rely on the other woman’s statement that her husband died, because that statement does not establish the death of the brother in a way that permits her to marry someone from the general marketplace.
Finally, the Mishnah discusses a situation involving additional brothers. Suppose the husbands of the two women died, and the women performed levirate marriage with another brother. After that brother also died, the question is whether the women return to their original uncertain status. Perhaps the first two husbands were still alive, because the testimony concerning them had not been sufficient to permit the women to marry someone from the general marketplace.
One opinion says that the women return to the original uncertainty and are prohibited from marrying someone from the general marketplace. Since the testimony regarding the first husbands was not fully reliable for that purpose, perhaps those husbands are still alive, and the women remain subject to the original relationships.
Another opinion says that once the women were permitted to perform levirate marriage with the additional brother, we do not revive the original uncertainty. The court already acted on the testimony and permitted them to enter into levirate marriage. Once that permission was implemented, the original concern is not reopened merely because the additional brother later died.
The Gemara then analyzes a case in which one woman has witnesses that her husband died and also has children, while the other woman has neither witnesses nor children. Both women are permitted to marry someone from the general marketplace. The first woman is permitted because she has both independent witnesses and children. The second woman is permitted because she can rely on the witnesses who established the death of the first woman’s husband, while she herself is believed concerning the death of her own husband. Since there are no remaining brothers to whom she would be subject, she too is permitted.
The point of the case is that the testimony of the witnesses does not need to serve the first woman alone. Once the witnesses establish that one brother died, the other woman can rely on that fact as well. The first woman is independently protected by her children and the witnesses, while the second woman relies on the witnesses concerning the other brother and on her own testimony concerning her husband.
The sequence of the Mishnah is therefore carefully constructed. In the first case, both women testify, but neither can testify for the other, so both remain prohibited. In the second case, one woman has independent witnesses, allowing the other woman to rely on that testimony. In the third case, one woman has children, which exempts her entirely, while the other remains subject to levirate marriage. In the final case, the question is whether a permission that was already acted upon is later revoked when the brother with whom they performed levirate marriage dies.