We will begin with Masechet Yevamot, page 106, side one. This study is dedicated for a complete recovery for Shimon ben Semcha, among all the sick people of Israel. Amen.
We begin at the top of the page: “A defective shoe-removal ceremony is valid.” What is the case of a defective ceremony? Reish Lakish says that it is when they tell the levir, “Perform the ceremony, and by doing so you will become married.”
The man wants to perform levirate marriage and does not want to perform the shoe-removal ceremony. Therefore, they look for a way to persuade him to do it. They tell him, “Do not worry. Perform the ceremony, and it will cause you to become married.” He performs the ceremony, and afterward they tell him, “It is over; you are now free to leave.” This is clearly a false premise. Nevertheless, even though he performed the ceremony with the understanding that it would result in marriage, the ceremony is valid.
The Gemara challenges this. Rabbi Yohanan taught that when one person intends the act and the other does not, the ceremony is invalid, until both of them intend it together. Yet here we are being told that a defective shoe-removal ceremony is valid, even though the man was not intending to release the woman. He thought that the act would actually bring about the marriage.
The Gemara therefore rejects that initial explanation and says that the case is different. They told him, “Perform the ceremony on the condition that she will give you two hundred zuz.” He agrees, performs the ceremony, and afterward the woman says that she does not have to pay him. The condition is not valid, because one cannot impose a condition on the shoe-removal ceremony. Nevertheless, the ceremony itself is valid.
Why can one not impose a condition on this ceremony? We learn the laws of conditions from the agreement that Moses made with the tribes of Gad and Reuben. From that agreement we learn the requirements of a valid condition: it must be a properly formulated condition, with the condition and its alternative stated, and the other relevant requirements. We also learn that a condition applies only to something comparable to the agreement with Gad and Reuben.
The agreement with Gad and Reuben involved something that could not be carried out through an agent. They themselves were to receive the land. The Gemara understands that a condition applies to an act that can be performed through an agent, because Moses appointed Joshua to carry out the division of the land after Moses’s death. As Rashi explains, Moses made Joshua his agent to execute the arrangement.
The shoe-removal ceremony, however, cannot be performed through an agent. The man cannot say, “Go and perform the ceremony for me.” Since it is not subject to agency, it is not subject to the laws of conditions. Therefore, one may attach whatever condition one wishes to the ceremony, but the condition does not have to be fulfilled. The ceremony remains valid.
At this point, an important question arises: Why can the shoe-removal ceremony not be performed through an agent? A bill of divorce, for example, can be delivered through an agent. Why can a person not appoint an agent to perform the shoe-removal ceremony?
Some of the later authorities discuss this question. The early authorities write that since the verse says, “And she removes his shoe,” the act must be performed by her personally. It is considered a personal mitzvah, one that must be done with the person’s own body, and therefore it cannot be delegated. The Or Zarua and other authorities offer different explanations as well.
The later authorities also discuss whether this reason applies only to the levir’s part of the ceremony or to the woman’s part as well. Perhaps the woman can appoint an agent to act on her behalf, since the requirement that the levir appear personally may be a separate matter. Other authorities maintain that she too cannot appoint an agent. According to that view, neither side can impose a condition, because neither side can perform the ceremony through an agent.
Now we have to understand the initial possibility. Even before the Gemara introduced the issue of conditions, what could have led us to think that a defective shoe-removal ceremony would be valid? If the man performed the ceremony believing that it would result in marriage, and that was clearly not his intention, why should the ceremony work?
Rabbi Chaim Brisker explains that the shoe-removal ceremony is fundamentally different from an ordinary acquisition. Whenever a person performs an act of acquisition or betrothal with a particular intention, and it turns out that the act was not what he thought it was, we say that the acquisition is void if it is clear that he would not have acted had he known the truth. The act was performed under a false premise.
Here, too, it is obvious that the man would not have performed the ceremony had he known that it would separate him from the woman rather than create a marriage. Why, then, should the ceremony be valid?
The answer is that ordinary acquisitions operate through the person’s intention. The buyer or seller is creating a legal transaction, and therefore we need to know precisely what he intended to acquire or transfer. The shoe-removal ceremony is different. It is not an acquisition in the ordinary sense. The Torah established a procedure: the levir removes a shoe, the woman performs the associated act, and through this procedure the bond between them is dissolved.
It is almost like a prescribed ceremony. The Torah says to perform a series of acts, and through those acts the legal bond disappears. The man is not transferring ownership, purchasing anything, or creating a new legal transaction in the ordinary way. The Torah itself established that these actions dissolve the bond. For that reason, perhaps his personal understanding of the result does not prevent the ceremony from working.
The Gemara then brings a teaching parallel to this discussion: “A defective shoe-removal ceremony is valid.” The case is that they tell the levir, “Perform the ceremony on the condition that she gives you two hundred zuz.” There was once a woman whose husband died, leaving her subject to levirate marriage with a man who was not an appropriate match. The levir wanted to perform levirate marriage, but he also wanted to perform the shoe-removal ceremony on the condition that she give him two hundred zuz.
He came before Rabbi Hiyya. Rabbi Hiyya said to the widow, “My daughter, stand up and perform levirate marriage,” because that was what the levir wanted. The woman’s mother answered, “Let her sit; that is her standing.” In other words, the mother was saying that her daughter would rather remain seated and refuse the marriage than stand and enter into a marriage with this man.
Rabbi Hiyya understood what was happening. He realized that the man was not interested in the woman as a suitable match. He knew that she had money, and he was interested only in obtaining financial benefit from the marriage. He would take her money and later divorce her. The family did not want the daughter to undergo such an experience.
Rabbi Hiyya then told the mother, “You do not need to say anything more.” He understood that the family did not want the marriage. He had to find a way to remove the levirate bond. Therefore, he allowed the levir to proceed with the ceremony under the false understanding that it would result in marriage. After the ceremony, Rabbi Hiyya told him that he was now forbidden to perform levirate marriage with her, because the ceremony had already prohibited her to him. He then had to perform another shoe-removal ceremony in order to release her and permit her to marry someone else.
The first ceremony had accomplished something: it prohibited her to this levir. But because of the way it had been performed, it did not fully release her for marriage to the outside world. Therefore, a second ceremony was required to free her completely.
The commentators explain that although the first ceremony did not fully permit the woman to marry someone else, it did have the legal effect of making her prohibited to this levir. Once the possibility of levirate marriage was removed, they could compel him to perform the proper ceremony that would release her.
This leads to a further difficulty. Earlier, when the levir removed the shoe without the required intention, we said that the act was nothing. Why, then, does the first ceremony in this story have legal force against the other brothers?
One answer is that in the earlier case the levir himself lacked the required intention, whereas in this story the woman did have the required intention. The woman was participating in the ceremony as a genuine shoe-removal ceremony. Even though the man was acting under a false premise, her intention gives the act some status as a defective ceremony. It is therefore sufficient to prohibit her to the other brothers, even though it does not fully release her to marry someone else.
In contrast, when the shoe was removed without the proper intention on the man’s side, and the woman’s role did not provide the necessary element, the act could be treated as nothing. Here, however, there was at least a recognizable act of the ceremony, and therefore it created the limited consequence of making her prohibited to the brothers.
There is another practical point in this story. The levir had demanded money in exchange for performing the ceremony. Rabbi Hiyya could not simply tell him that the condition was invalid and allow him to walk away. He needed to create a situation in which the man would perform the ceremony. Once the ceremony was completed, the levir would no longer be able to marry the woman, and he would be forced to perform the second ceremony as well.
Abaye challenges this approach. If the man cannot impose a condition on the shoe-removal ceremony, what should be done? Abaye says that the court should formulate the matter as a valid arrangement: tell him to perform the ceremony, and then pay him the money. The ceremony will be valid regardless, but the court should still honor the financial commitment.
After the ceremony, the woman is told to give the man the two hundred zuz. Even though the condition itself was not legally effective as a condition attached to the ceremony, the man was promised payment for performing the service. Therefore, he should be paid.
This raises a question. If the condition was invalid, perhaps the woman can say, “I only said that I would pay you in order to persuade you to perform the ceremony. Since the condition does not work, I do not have to pay.”
Abaye answers that this is no worse than the case of a person escaping from prison who hires a ferryman. The escapee tells the ferryman, “Take me across the river, and I will pay you a dinar.” After the ferryman takes him across, he says, “What is the ordinary fare? I will pay you that amount, but not the dinar I promised.”
The ruling in that case is that the ferryman receives the normal fare, not the extravagant amount promised under pressure. The person was in a position of duress and had to offer a large sum in order to obtain the service. Nevertheless, he must pay for the service at its ordinary value.
The same reasoning applies here. The woman needed the ceremony in order to be released. She promised two hundred zuz in order to induce the levir to perform it. Since the ceremony itself cannot be made conditional, she does not owe the two hundred zuz as the fulfillment of a condition. But the levir performed a service at her request, and he is entitled to the ordinary value of that service.
There is an important distinction between the two cases. In the case of the ferryman, there is an established fare for crossing the river. The person must pay the normal price, even though he does not have to pay the amount promised under pressure. In the case of the shoe-removal ceremony, there is no ordinary market price for the ceremony. Therefore, the discussion concerns what amount should be paid, if anything, for the service that the man performed.
This principle also appears in the discussion of a patient who promises a doctor an excessive amount of money in exchange for providing medical treatment. Some authorities say that because the patient is under duress, and because the doctor is obligated to help him, the doctor receives only the ordinary fee charged by doctors. Even if the patient promised ten times the usual amount and the treatment was successful, he does not necessarily have to pay the excessive sum.
Other authorities disagree. They say that a physician’s fee may reflect knowledge and expertise, and expertise has no fixed limit. There may be no ordinary price for the particular doctor’s skill. According to that view, the amount that was promised may be the amount that must be paid. The authorities debate whether the principle of duress limits the payment to the usual fee or whether the doctor’s unique expertise justifies the larger amount.
Returning to our subject, the conclusion is that one cannot trick the levir by telling him, “Perform the shoe-removal ceremony and it will make you married.” The valid method is to create a financial condition or arrangement. The condition itself does not affect the validity of the ceremony, because the ceremony is not subject to conditions. The man must know that he is performing the ceremony; he simply believes that he will receive something in return. Afterward, it turns out that the payment does not function as a condition attached to the ceremony.
The Gemara brings another teaching: “A defective shoe-removal ceremony is valid; a defective bill of divorce is invalid. A forced shoe-removal ceremony is invalid; a forced bill of divorce is valid.” At first glance, this is confusing. We are told that a forced bill of divorce is valid, even though we know that a forced divorce is generally invalid unless the proper legal framework is present.
The Gemara asks what case is meant by a forced bill of divorce. If the husband eventually says, “I want to give it,” then even the shoe-removal ceremony should be valid. Once he says that he wants to perform the act, the coercion has apparently been removed. If he never says that he wants to give the bill of divorce, then the bill of divorce should also be invalid. What, then, is the distinction?
The Gemara answers that the teaching should be understood as follows: A defective shoe-removal ceremony is always valid, whereas a defective bill of divorce is always invalid. A forced shoe-removal ceremony and a forced bill of divorce may sometimes be valid and sometimes invalid, depending on whether the man ultimately says, “I want to do it.”
When a husband initially refuses to give a bill of divorce, the court may pressure him until he says, “I want to give it.” Once he says that, we accept his words, and the bill of divorce is valid. The same principle applies to the levir. If the court pressures him until he says that he wants to perform the shoe-removal ceremony, the ceremony is valid.
The source for this principle is the verse concerning a burnt offering: “He shall bring it according to his will.” One verse appears to indicate that the person may be compelled to bring the offering, while another phrase indicates that it must be brought willingly. How can both be true?
The answer is that the court compels him until he says, “I want to do it.” They compel him to reveal his true will. The same principle applies to other matters. The court may pressure a person until he says that he wants to fulfill the obligation. Once he says so, the act is considered voluntary in the relevant sense.
This raises a question regarding the woman. The discussion here concerns compelling the levir. What happens if the woman does not want to perform the shoe-removal ceremony? Can the court compel her as well?
The distinction is that the ceremony is primarily required in order to affect the levir. If the levir does not want to perform levirate marriage, and the woman refuses to perform the shoe-removal ceremony, the refusal does not create the same problem for him. She may remain bound to him, but he can marry someone else only after the legal issues are resolved. The discussion of coercion therefore focuses on the levir’s will.
In the case of a bill of divorce, there is a principle that a woman can be divorced against her will, but the bill itself must still be given according to the husband’s will. Therefore, if the husband refuses, the court pressures him until he says, “I want to give it.” The same logic applies to the levir’s role in the shoe-removal ceremony. It cannot be performed through outright coercion without his consent; he must ultimately express his willingness.
Some explain that a person’s deepest will is to do what is right, but that his inclination obstructs him. When the court removes that obstruction through pressure, the person’s statement, “I want to do it,” expresses his genuine underlying will. The pressure does not create a new desire; it removes the force that was preventing him from expressing the desire he already had.
The Gemara then brings another teaching in the name of Rav Huna, who said in the name of Rav Sechora in the name of Rav: The court may perform the shoe-removal ceremony even when the judges do not recognize the people standing before them.
This is an unusual case. A man and a woman come before the court, and the man says, “This is my sister-in-law. Her husband died, and I want to perform the shoe-removal ceremony.” The court does not know these people, does not know whether they were married, and does not know whether the man is truly the woman’s levir. Nevertheless, the court performs the ceremony based on their statements.
The same applies to the ceremony of refusal by a minor wife. A girl comes before the court and says that she wants to perform the refusal ceremony. The court may perform it even though the judges do not know whether the original marriage occurred or whether the people before them are the people they claim to be.
Because the procedure is performed without investigating their identities and history, the court does not write a formal document confirming the shoe-removal ceremony or the refusal ceremony. The concern is that another court might see the document, assume that the first court had carefully verified everything, and rely on it to permit the woman to marry.
For example, a woman could obtain a document stating that she had performed the shoe-removal ceremony and then take it to another court. The second court might not realize that the first court performs these ceremonies without verifying the parties. It might permit her to marry based solely on the document, even though she may not be the actual widow or may not have performed the ceremony at all.
There is also the possibility that she could give the document to a different woman. A woman whose levir refuses to perform the ceremony could obtain someone else’s document and use it to claim that she had been released. The concern is therefore not only that the original court may have been mistaken, but also that the document may be misused by someone else.
Rashi explains that the courts are approached by a levir and a widow who claim to be related in the required way. Even though the court does not recognize them, it performs the ceremony. Since the court does not know them, it does not write a document and give it to the woman as proof that she is permitted.
Normally, when a woman comes to court claiming to have performed the ceremony, she must establish her identity. She may need to show her marriage document or provide witnesses who can demonstrate that she is the woman whose husband died and whose levir performed the ceremony. The document by itself cannot serve as proof when the original court did not verify the facts.
Rabbah takes the opposite position. He says that if the court recognizes the parties, then it may perform the ceremony, and the court may also write a document. The concern is only when the court does not recognize them. If the court has verified that this is the widow and that this is her levir, there is no reason to fear that another court will be misled by the document.
The witnesses who observed the ceremony can then write that they saw the woman perform the ceremony before the court. We do not suspect that the court itself failed to carry out its responsibility when the court had already verified the parties. The problem exists only when the original court did not investigate and a later court might incorrectly assume that it had.
We now reach the final Mishnah of the chapter. In some ways, this Mishnah would have been expected at the beginning, because it presents the entire procedure of the shoe-removal ceremony from beginning to end.
The first step is that the court gives the parties proper advice. The judges try to determine whether the marriage would be appropriate. For example, if the widow is young and the levir is very old, the court may tell them that this may not be a suitable match. The judges advise them to marry someone appropriate for them and not to enter a marriage outside their age or circumstances.
If they nevertheless decide to proceed with the ceremony, the woman makes the required declaration. She says that the levir does not want to establish his brother’s name and continue his brother’s family line through her. The levir then confirms that he does not want to take her as a wife.
The order is then as follows. The woman removes the shoe from the levir’s foot, spits before him so that the judges can see the saliva, and makes the required declaration. She says that this is what is done to a man who does not build his brother’s house.
The Mishnah presents only the essential verse. The continuation of the biblical passage says that his name is called in Israel, and it became customary to read the entire passage. At the end of the ceremony, the judges turn to the man and proclaim that his name should be called in Israel, “the one whose shoe was removed.”
The people standing nearby do not necessarily have to make the proclamation. The judges make it, and the people may repeat it. The essential requirement is that the court identify him in this manner at the conclusion of the ceremony.
The procedure can be remembered in this sequence: the court gives advice; the woman says something; the man says something; she removes the shoe; she spits; and she makes her final declaration. This is the order described by the Mishnah.
Nevertheless, if the acts were performed out of order, the ceremony is not necessarily invalid. The Gemara discusses the requirement that the court recite the verses to the levir and the woman so that they can repeat them. The court must ensure that the words are repeated correctly and that the meaning is not distorted.
There is a particular issue with the woman’s declaration. She says, in effect, “My levir does not want to establish his brother’s name.” The crucial words must be spoken in a way that cannot be misunderstood. If the court tells her to repeat the words one at a time and she says, “No,” followed by “he wants to establish my levirate marriage,” the pause after the word “no” could make it sound as though she is saying, “No, he wants to establish my levirate marriage.”
Therefore, the court must present the words to her in their proper context and ensure that she says them as one continuous statement: “He does not want to establish his brother’s name.” The same care is required when the words are recited to the levir.
The first opinion requires the words to be recited without a pause after the word “not,” whether the court is instructing the woman or the levir. Rava disagrees and says that a pause does not create a problem in every case. Everyone understands what is taking place, and the context makes clear that the person is saying that the levir does not want to perform levirate marriage.
Rav Ashi once saw someone reciting the words in a single breath and asked why he was being so stringent. Rava had ruled that the words did not have to be recited in a single breath. The man answered that Rava’s leniency applied to the levir’s declaration, but not to the woman’s declaration.
The reason for the distinction is that the woman’s statement contains an introductory phrase. She says that the refusal to establish the deceased brother’s name is not being carried out. Since there are words before the phrase “he does not want,” a pause could make the statement ambiguous. It might sound as though she is saying that he did not refuse and that he does want to perform levirate marriage. In the levir’s statement, however, the preceding words do not create the same ambiguity.
Abaye then discusses the document recording the shoe-removal ceremony. The document does not write out the entire biblical passage. Instead, it records that the court recited the passage to the woman from one specified phrase through another, that she repeated it, and that the court similarly recited the passage to the levir and he repeated it.
The Gemara asks why the document does not simply write the entire passage. The answer is that there is a rule concerning the writing of biblical verses. If one writes several consecutive words from Scripture, the parchment requires ruled lines, known as sirtut. A document recording the shoe-removal ceremony normally does not have those lines. Therefore, the document records only the beginning and end of the passage, indicating that everything in between was recited.
Mar Zutra resolves the problem by ruling the parchment and writing the entire passage. Once the proper lines have been made, the biblical verses can be written in full.
Another challenge is raised. Even with lines, there is a restriction against writing a biblical passage merely as an ordinary piece of writing. The verses may be written when the purpose is to study them, such as writing for a child who is learning how to read. But one may not simply write sections of the Torah as an ordinary narrative.
There is a distinction here. When verses are written for a child to learn, the intention is to teach the child the passage. Because the purpose is study, there are rules concerning how the passage must be written. If one is writing the entire Torah for study, it must be written as a complete Torah and not as disconnected sections.
The document recording the shoe-removal ceremony, however, is not being written in order to teach the passage. It is being written to document what happened in court. The verses are not being presented as a lesson, but as a record of the words that were recited. Therefore, the ruling of Mar Zutra can apply: the document may be ruled, and the entire passage may be recorded.
The final discussion concerns the woman’s spitting. The saliva must be visible to the judges. What happens if she spits, but the wind blows the saliva away before it reaches the levir? The ceremony is not valid in that form, because the saliva did not reach the required place.
If the wind carries the saliva in front of the levir, however, the ceremony may be valid. It does not necessarily have to land on him. It must first pass in front of him at the appropriate level. If the levir is tall and the woman is short, she must spit in a way that brings the saliva before him. If the levir is short and the woman is tall, the saliva must not simply pass over his head; it must pass in front of him before the wind carries it away.
Once the saliva has left her mouth and has reached the area in front of the levir, the requirement may be fulfilled even if the wind subsequently moves it. The key point is that the saliva must pass before him. The court therefore has to pay attention not merely to whether saliva can be seen on the ground, but to whether it actually emerged from her mouth and reached the required place.
The woman should also avoid eating foods that could create a problem. If she eats garlic before the ceremony and then spits because of the unpleasant taste, it may appear that she is merely expelling the food or saliva rather than performing the required act. The spitting must be a natural act of the ceremony, not something caused by an unrelated reason.
For this reason, the woman is told not to eat before the ceremony. The judges need to see the saliva emerge from her mouth. This is one of the most difficult parts of the ceremony to observe properly, because it is not enough to see saliva on the ground afterward; the judges must see it leaving her mouth.
Finally, the Mishnah says that the man is proclaimed to be “the one whose shoe was removed.” The question is whether this proclamation is made only by the judges or also by the students and others present. The basic requirement is fulfilled by the judges.
Rabbi Tarfon once sat before Rabbi Judah ben Beteira when a widow came to perform the ceremony. Rabbi Tarfon taught the students to say the proclamation as well. This indicates that even the students may participate in making the declaration, although the essential obligation rests with the judges.
One explanation for repeating the proclamation three times is that the levir failed to fulfill the mitzvah of levirate marriage. Instead of establishing his brother’s name, he refused to do so and required the widow to undergo the shoe-removal ceremony. He is therefore treated as a person subject to a form of public rebuke. The proclamation is repeated to emphasize the consequence of his refusal to fulfill the mitzvah that was given at Sinai.
There are authorities who say that the widow also repeats the proclamation three times. In that way, the court and the participants make it clear that this man is the one whose shoe was removed because he refused to build his brother’s house.
There is a further discussion about how the saliva must be observed. Some wording suggests that it is sufficient for the judges to see the saliva on the ground. The more precise understanding, however, is that they must see it actually propelled from her mouth. It is not enough to find saliva afterward and assume that it came from the ceremony. The judges need to see the act itself.
That completes the procedure of the shoe-removal ceremony and the discussion of the chapter.