We begin on 46b, at the very bottom, with the Gemara’s statement of Rava. Let us review the Mishnah. The Mishnah says, “Be betrothed to me with this date, this date, and this date,” and then describes her eating each date as she receives it.
We explained that when he says, “With this, this, and this,” he is referring to the dates collectively. Therefore, if she eats the first date, and the dates are not collectively worth a perutah, that first date is considered a loan. A deposit that she receives remains the owner’s property, whereas a loan is given to be spent. Since she owes the money, betrothal with a loan does not effect betrothal. That is the case presented in the Mishnah.
Rava then says: “They taught this only when he said to her, ‘With this, this, and this.’” In other words, each time he gave her a date, he said, “With this, this, and this,” meaning that he was speaking collectively.
However, if he said to her, “Be betrothed to me with these,” and then gave her the dates, the betrothal takes effect with the second date she receives. Therefore, even if she ate the first date, she is betrothed. Although the dates collectively are worth a perutah, and she ate the first one before receiving all of them, it is nevertheless hers already. When a person takes a pile of dates and says, “Be betrothed to me with these,” the betrothal takes effect immediately with the entire group. Even if she eats the dates, it does not matter, because the betrothal has already taken effect.
When she eats them, she is eating her own property. This applies even if he did not give all the dates to her at the same time. He said, “With these,” and even if he gave them to her in installments, it is sufficient. The reason is that she does not acquire the first date as a loan. As soon as he completes the statement, “Be betrothed to me with these,” the dates enter her possession as betrothal property. There is no delay. By contrast, when he says, “With this, this, and this,” the betrothal is delayed until the end, and in the meantime the earlier dates become a loan.
Thus, when he says, “With these,” she is eating her own property. Even if she eats the dates one by one, she is betrothed, provided that the dates collectively have the value of a perutah.
One might have thought that since she is receiving immediate benefit from eating each date, the dates would not need to have the value of a perutah. The Gemara’s discussion rejects that assumption. Even in this case, the dates must collectively be worth a perutah.
We now come to a baraita that supports Rava. This is a very important baraita, and it must be broken down carefully. In the first case, the man says, “Be betrothed to me with an acorn, a pomegranate, and a walnut.” An acorn is a seasonal food, and although it is primarily eaten by animals, people can eat it as well, particularly when it is roasted.
The baraita continues: “Be betrothed to me with these.” If the items collectively have the value of a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed. That is the first case.
The baraita then presents another case: “With this, this, and this.” If all of them collectively have the value of a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed.
It then describes what happens when he says, “With this,” and gives her one item at a time. She takes one and eats it, then receives another and eats it, and continues in this manner. In that case, she is not betrothed unless at least one of the individual items has the value of a perutah. Since he said, “With this,” each item is treated separately. It is not a collective case. Therefore, each item must independently have the value of a perutah for the betrothal to take effect with that item.
The Gemara analyzes the first case: What exactly is the case when the baraita says, “With an acorn, a pomegranate, and a walnut”? If it means that he said, “Be betrothed to me with an acorn, or with a pomegranate, or with a walnut,” then why does the baraita say that she is betrothed only if they collectively have the value of a perutah? That is not a collective case. It is equivalent to saying, “With this, this, and this,” meaning that each item is separate.
Perhaps, then, the baraita means that he said, “Be betrothed to me with these”—the acorn, the pomegranate, and the walnut collectively. But that is precisely the next case in the baraita. Why would the baraita state the same case twice, once by mentioning the individual items and again by saying, “with these”?
The Gemara therefore considers another possibility: The first case must also mean that he said, “Be betrothed to me with these.” But the baraita explicitly states that formulation in its later clause. This implies that the first clause, mentioning the acorn, pomegranate, and walnut, is not referring to “these.”
The Gemara answers that the baraita is explaining itself. When it says, “With an acorn, a pomegranate, and a walnut,” it means, “With these.” The later phrase explains how to understand the first phrase; it is not introducing a second, identical case.
Once we understand the first part of the baraita in this way, the Gemara returns to the final case. There, the man says, “With this,” gives her one item, and she takes it and eats it; then he gives her another, and she eats that one as well. The baraita says that if one of the items has the value of a perutah, she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed.
The Gemara makes a deduction. In the first case, where he says, “With these,” the baraita does not distinguish between whether she eats the items or leaves them. We may therefore conclude that whenever he says, “With these,” even if she eats the items as she receives them, she is eating her own property. This supports Rava: once he says, “With these,” the items become hers immediately. As long as they collectively have the value of a perutah, the betrothal is valid.
The Gemara then points out that this baraita is not so simple. We previously learned in the Mishnah that when she is eating the dates as she receives them, she is betrothed only if there is a date worth a perutah. The Gemara asked where that ruling applies.
One possibility was that it refers to the first part of the Mishnah, where he gives her the dates one at a time. If so, the novelty is that even if she eats them immediately, each individual date still has to be worth a perutah. One might have thought that because the benefit is immediate, even less than a perutah would suffice. The Mishnah teaches that this is not so: even when she eats the date, it must have the value of a perutah.
A second possibility was that it refers to the latter part of the Mishnah, where he says, “With these.” The Mishnah says that if one of the dates has the value of a perutah, she is betrothed. The Gemara asks: What does “one of them” mean? The first date is not yet hers, because the collective betrothal has not yet taken effect. It should be considered a loan, and betrothal with a loan does not work.
The Gemara answers that it means the last date. If the last date has the value of a perutah, the betrothal takes effect, because the final date completes the collective value. We therefore have a dispute about how to understand the Mishnah, and the Gemara now applies those interpretations to the baraita.
According to the view that the Mishnah’s ruling about eating refers to the latter clause—the case of “with these”—the phrase “until there is one among them worth a perutah” means that the last one must be worth a perutah. The same explanation can be applied to the baraita. Although it says that he gave her the items one at a time and she ate them, the baraita could mean that the last item must have the value of a perutah.
However, according to Rav and Shmuel, who explain that the Mishnah’s ruling about eating refers to the first clause, where he says, “With this, this, and this,” the novelty is that even though she eats the item immediately, it must still have the value of a perutah. How, then, can they explain the baraita?
The Gemara answers that the baraita discusses only collective cases. It discusses the case of an acorn, a pomegranate, and a walnut; the case of “with these”; and the case of “with this, this, and this.” It does not explicitly discuss the case in which he says, “With this,” and gives her each item separately. Therefore, the clause describing her eating the items cannot be referring to the first case according to Rav and Shmuel, because that case is not present in the baraita. It must refer to the latter case.
The Gemara asks how, then, can Rav and Shmuel understand the baraita? It answers that the baraita follows the opinion of Rabbi. Rabbi says that when discussing separate portions of an offering, a person’s intention is treated as separate even when he says, “A kezayit and a kezayit,” rather than, “A kezayit, a kezayit, and a kezayit.” The conjunction does not necessarily make the items collective. According to Rabbi, the wording “with this and this and this” can still refer to separate items.
Accordingly, even though the baraita says, “With this and this and this,” it can be understood as a series of individual acts of betrothal. That allows the baraita to accord with Rav and Shmuel. The novelty is that if she eats the items as she receives them, one might have thought that the immediate benefit would allow betrothal with less than a perutah. The baraita teaches that each individual item must still have the value of a perutah.
Rashi explains that the final clause of the baraita—where she takes one item, eats it, and then receives another—is taught by a different authority from the authority responsible for the first clause. The final clause follows Rabbi’s view that even “with this and this” can be understood as separate rather than collective. The term “eating” is not meant literally to exclude leaving the item untouched; the same rule applies if she does not eat it. Each item must independently have the value of a perutah.
According to this explanation, the baraita repeats the expression “with this, this, and this” in order to teach that the wording can be interpreted as individual rather than collective. Each act of betrothal is separate. If one item is worth a perutah, that individual item effects betrothal; the values of the items are not combined.
We now return to the issue of betrothal with a loan. The Gemara asks: Why does betrothal with a loan not work? It says that a loan is given to be spent. A borrower is permitted to spend the money and is not required to keep those particular coins available. He is not obligated to maintain the money in the bank so that, if the lender suddenly demands repayment, he will be able to return those exact funds. Since a loan is given to be spent, the money is considered to belong to the borrower. The borrower does not owe the original money itself; he owes a debt.
For that reason, when a man says, “Be betrothed to me with the loan,” he is attempting to betroth her with money that is considered hers already. This is unlike a deposit. A deposit remains the property of the person who deposited it. If the owner says, “Keep the deposit,” there is no transfer of ownership unless he explicitly relinquishes his rights to it. The issue is therefore not the benefit of forgiving the loan, but the loan itself: is he betrothing her with the loan, or merely with the benefit of forgiving it?
The Gemara proposes that perhaps the dispute concerning betrothal with a loan is a dispute among Tannaim. One statement says that betrothal with a loan does not work, while another says that it does. Perhaps they disagree about whether a loan is given to be spent. According to one view, it is given to be spent; according to the other, the borrower must retain the money or otherwise keep it available. If the money remains available, the lender still has a form of ownership in it, and betrothal with that loan could take effect.
The Gemara rejects that explanation by examining the end of the relevant statement. It says that everyone agrees that a sale of land can be effected with a loan. If a buyer owes the seller money and the seller says, “Keep the money you owe me as payment for the field,” the sale is valid. This indicates that everyone agrees that the loan is considered available for use in a transaction. Otherwise, how could the money effect the acquisition of the land?
Abaye therefore asks: If a loan is given to be spent, with what does the acquisition take place? The Gemara concludes that the dispute cannot be based simply on whether the loan is given to be spent. Even if one holds that the loan is not given to be spent, there may still be a reason that betrothal with a loan does not work.
Rava explains that the dispute concerns a special case. The man says to the woman, “Be betrothed to me with one hundred zuz,” but when the money is counted, it turns out that he gave her only ninety-nine. He still owes her one zuz.
One opinion holds that a person is embarrassed to demand a single coin. She will want the missing coin, but she is embarrassed to pursue him over such a small amount. Since she is not relying on receiving it, she is not betrothed. Another opinion holds that she is not embarrassed to demand the missing amount, and she relies on receiving it. Therefore, the betrothal takes effect, subject to his paying the remaining coin.
This explains why the case of one missing coin differs from the case in which ninety-nine coins are missing. If he says that he is giving her one hundred and gives her only one, she is not embarrassed to ask where the other ninety-nine are. But if he gives her ninety-nine and only one is missing, she may be embarrassed to demand that final coin. The distinction is therefore based on whether she relies on recovering the balance and whether she is embarrassed to pursue it.
The Gemara compares this with a teaching elsewhere: If a man says, “Be betrothed to me with one hundred,” and gives her one, the ruling is that she is betrothed and he must complete the payment. Why is that case not treated like the case here, where he gives her ninety-nine and owes one?
The Gemara explains that the cases are different. When ninety-nine are missing, she is not embarrassed to demand the balance. When only one is missing, she may be embarrassed to pursue him for it. Thus, the issue is not merely whether the missing amount is greater or less than the value of a perutah. The issue is whether she relies on receiving the missing amount and whether she is willing to demand it.
This leaves an intermediate case—something between one missing coin and ninety-nine missing coins. That is a fair question, and it is the kind of question one might raise with a scholar who enjoys such discussions. The exact point at which the woman is no longer embarrassed to demand the balance is not defined here.
The Gemara then raises another challenge. What is the case of a person who says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me with a deposit that I gave you,” and she discovers that the deposit was lost or stolen? If a perutah’s worth remains, she is betrothed; if less than a perutah remains, she is not betrothed.
That ruling appears to be saying that when the item is a deposit, there must be at least a perutah’s worth remaining. But when the item is a loan, even if nothing remains, the betrothal should take effect, because the man is forgiving the debt. The benefit she receives is that she no longer has to repay what she owes.
At first glance, the baraita seems to distinguish between a deposit and a loan: with a deposit, a perutah’s worth must remain, while with a loan, even if nothing remains, the betrothal takes effect. The Gemara notes that this appears to contradict Rav, who says that betrothal with a loan does not take effect.
Rava responds that the text of the baraita must be emended before it can be used as a challenge. The wording is not reliable as it stands. We must first determine precisely what kind of deposit is involved.
The Gemara asks: What is the case of the deposit? When the man says, “Be betrothed to me with the deposit I gave you,” and she discovers that it was lost or stolen, what level of responsibility did she accept for the deposit?
Not every deposit has the same legal status. A person who accepts an item for safekeeping may accept responsibility for it, or may accept a lesser level of responsibility. If she accepted responsibility for the deposit, then she owes its value. In that respect, it is like a loan: she owes him money, and he can attempt to betroth her with that obligation.
If she did not accept responsibility, however, she does not owe him the value of the deposit. Once the deposit was lost or stolen, there may be nothing left with which to effect betrothal. In that case, the baraita could say that a perutah’s worth must remain.
The Gemara therefore asks why the baraita had to move to the case of a loan. It could have presented the entire distinction within the laws of a deposit. It could have said that when she did not accept responsibility, a perutah’s worth must remain, whereas if she did accept responsibility, even if nothing remains, the debt itself can effect betrothal.
In other words, if she did not accept responsibility, the deposit is not a loan, and she needs a perutah’s worth of property for the betrothal. If she accepted responsibility, however, she owes him the value of the deposit. That obligation is treated as a loan, and even if nothing physically remains, he could be forgiving the debt.
The Gemara accepts that this is the proper way to understand the baraita and emends it accordingly. The baraita should not be read as saying that a loan effects betrothal merely because some portion of the loan remains. Rather, in the case of the loan, even if a perutah’s worth remains, the betrothal does not take effect according to Rav.
This creates a new difficulty. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Elazar appear to say that a loan can effect betrothal, whereas Rav says that it cannot. If the woman owes money and a perutah’s worth of the obligation remains, why should the betrothal not take effect?
Rava reports that he found the students sitting in the study hall and discussing this question. They explained that the dispute concerns a loan that remains in the lender’s domain for purposes of retraction and responsibility. The question is whether, before the borrower has spent the money, the lender can retract it and whether the borrower is responsible if the money is lost through circumstances beyond his control.
One opinion holds that until the borrower spends the money, it remains in the lender’s domain. The lender can retract it, and the borrower is not responsible for accidents involving the money. According to that view, the money is still considered the lender’s property and could effect betrothal.
The other opinion holds that once the borrower receives the money, it is already in the borrower’s domain. The borrower is responsible for it even before spending it, and the lender cannot retract it. According to that view, the borrower owns the money and merely owes an obligation to repay it. Betrothal with that loan would not take effect.
Rava tells the students that they are correct regarding the right to retract the loan, but he rejects their analysis regarding responsibility for accidents. Everyone should agree that the borrower is responsible once he receives the money. A borrower is not in a better position than a person who borrows an object. If someone borrows a shovel, he becomes responsible for accidents immediately, even before using it. Therefore, a borrower of money should also be responsible for accidents from the moment he receives it.
The dispute, then, concerns only whether the lender can retract the money before the borrower spends it. It does not concern responsibility for accidents. The borrower is responsible in either case.
The students respond that even with a borrowed object there is a distinction. If someone borrows an axe for ten days and has already used it to chop wood, he has acquired the right to keep it for the agreed period, and the lender cannot retract it. If he has not yet used it, perhaps the lender can retract it. That would indicate that the question of retraction can depend on whether the borrower has begun using the item.
The Gemara points out, however, that there is a significant difference between an object and money. An object must ultimately be returned as the same object. Money does not have to be returned in the same form. Therefore, even if everyone agrees that an owner can retract an axe before it is used, the question of money may remain disputed. With money, the central issue is whether the borrower owns the funds immediately or whether they remain in the lender’s domain until spent.
The Gemara then considers whether the statement of Rav corresponds to one side of a Tannaitic dispute. According to Rav, betrothal with a loan does not take effect. Perhaps Rav follows the view that until the borrower spends the money, the loan remains in the lender’s domain in some respect, or perhaps he follows the view that once the borrower receives it, it becomes the borrower’s property and therefore cannot be used for betrothal.
The Gemara introduces another baraita. A man says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me with a promissory note,” or, “Be betrothed to me with a debt owed to me by another person,” and he transfers the right to collect that debt to her. Rabbi Meir says that she is betrothed, while the Sages say that she is not betrothed.
The Gemara first asks what kind of promissory note is being discussed. If it is a promissory note recording a debt owed by other people, then the second clause, which discusses a loan owed by others and transferred to her, appears to be the same case. Why would the baraita repeat it?
The Gemara therefore considers that the first clause may refer to the woman’s own debt. Perhaps he says, “Be betrothed to me with the promissory note documenting the money you owe me,” and he tells her to retain the debt. The second clause would then refer to a debt owed to him by other people, which he transfers to her.
The Gemara rejects that reading and explains that both clauses may concern debts owed to him by other people. The difference is that in the first case the debt is documented in a promissory note, while in the second case the debt was originally a verbal loan, and he now transfers the right to collect it to her in writing.
Accordingly, the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages concerns whether a debt documented in a promissory note can be transferred for the purpose of betrothal, and whether the same is true of a verbal debt that is transferred.
The Gemara relates this to a separate dispute concerning the transfer of a promissory note. One opinion says that the rights represented by the note are acquired through delivery of the note. If the lender gives the note to another person, that person acquires the rights recorded in it. Another opinion says that delivery alone is insufficient. One must write a document transferring the note, and then deliver both the transfer document and the original note.
According to the first explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages, Rabbi Meir follows the opinion that the rights represented by a promissory note are acquired through delivery. Therefore, giving the note to the woman is sufficient to transfer the debt to her. The Sages follow the view that delivery alone is insufficient; a separate transfer document is required. Since she did not receive that additional document, she is not betrothed.
The Gemara then presents another way to understand the dispute. Perhaps everyone agrees that a separate document must be written to transfer the promissory note. The dispute concerns what that document must say. Is it sufficient to write that the promissory note is being sold, or must it explicitly state that all the liens and obligations associated with the note are being transferred as well?
One opinion holds that the transfer of the note automatically includes the debt and its associated obligations. The other opinion holds that unless the document explicitly says that all the liens and obligations are being transferred, the buyer may have acquired only a piece of paper. Even if he paid a great deal of money, it would not be clear that he acquired the debt itself. Therefore, the document must state that the note and all the rights connected with it are being transferred.
Thus, even after narrowing the issue, the dispute can still be understood in two ways. Everyone may agree that a document is required to transfer a promissory note, but they may disagree about whether the document must explicitly transfer the underlying debt and its liens.
The Gemara then brings a statement of Shmuel. If a person sells a promissory note to another person, and afterward the debtor approaches the original lender and the original lender forgives the debt, the question is whether the forgiveness is effective.
For example, Reuven owes money to the lender. The lender sells the promissory note to another person, who now expects to collect from Reuven. Reuven then returns to the original lender, and the original lender says, “I forgive you; you no longer owe the money.” Can the original lender still forgive the debt after selling the note?
This question applies even to an heir. If the lender dies and his heir inherits the debt, the heir may also be able to forgive it. The issue is whether the original lender, or his heir, remains sufficiently connected to the debt to cancel it after the promissory note has been transferred.
According to one view, the lender can still forgive the debt. According to the other, once the note has been sold, he can no longer do so. This dispute affects the woman’s intention in accepting the promissory note as betrothal. If she knows that the original lender can later forgive the debt, she may not rely on receiving anything of value. The note could become worthless, and she would not be betrothed. If, however, the original lender cannot cancel the debt, the note has reliable value, and the betrothal can take effect.
One might ask why it should be permitted for a person to sell a promissory note and then forgive the underlying debt. Does that not amount to cheating the purchaser? The answer offered is that the original lender remains, in one sense, the essential creditor. Even after selling the note, he is still the person who originally lent the money and who controls the debt. The purchaser is being given the right to collect, but the original lender remains connected to the debt itself. Therefore, according to the view that allows forgiveness, he can still forgive it even after transferring the note.