There were five women, among them two sisters. A man took a basket of figs—produce that had grown in the women’s fields during the Sabbatical year—and said, “All of you are betrothed to me with the contents of this basket.” One of the five accepted the betrothal on behalf of all of them. The Sages said that the sisters were not betrothed. It would seem, then, that two of the five were not betrothed, because a person cannot marry two sisters, while the other three were betrothed.
The Gemara asks: How do we know that when a man betroths a woman and her relative at the same time, the betrothal does not take effect? One might have thought that the betrothal takes effect with one of them, while it does not take effect with the other, who is her sister. The innovation here is that none of the betrothals take effect—not even with the first woman.
Rashi explains that the case is one in which these women are each forbidden to the others, such as when he betrothed them simultaneously. The verse says that “the souls who perform” this act will be cut off. The Gemara asks: If the betrothal does not take effect when he betroths them simultaneously, why would he be liable for excision? If the betrothal was invalid, there is no prohibition against marrying a woman’s sister, because there is no wife.
The Gemara answers that the verse is referring to a case in which the man acted consecutively. First, he betrothed one woman, so she became his wife; afterward, he had relations with her sister. In that case he is liable for excision, because the second woman is the sister of his wife. This does not prove the case in our Mishnah, however, which concerns simultaneous betrothal.
The Gemara therefore says that the Mishnah follows the principle of Rabbah: Anything that cannot take effect consecutively cannot take effect simultaneously. The verse is discussing a case in which the first betrothal was valid and the woman became his wife, after which he betrothed or had relations with her sister. The Mishnah, however, is discussing a simultaneous act. Since betrothal with the sister cannot take effect consecutively, it cannot take effect simultaneously either.
This is the important principle: if something cannot work one after the other, it cannot work when performed at the same time. Consequently, since betrothal with a woman’s sister cannot take effect, simultaneous betrothal to both of them also does not take effect.
The Gemara then challenges this principle from the laws of tithing. Suppose a person separates twenty percent of his produce as tithe, even though he was supposed to separate only ten percent. The first ten percent is certainly properly tithed. What is the status of the additional ten percent? Since he separated too much, that additional portion should have remained untithed produce. Yet the Mishnah indicates that the produce designated as tithe is treated as properly tithed.
The question is as follows: If the first ten percent was separated properly, and the second ten percent was not validly separated consecutively, then according to the principle that whatever cannot take effect consecutively cannot take effect simultaneously, the second ten percent should not become tithe even when both portions were separated together.
The Gemara answers that tithing is different. A person can designate even half of a kernel of wheat as tithe. If he says, “Let the tithe take effect on half of this kernel,” the designation is valid. Therefore, when he separates more than the required amount, the sanctity of the tithe can take effect incrementally: part of each kernel can receive the designation. In this way, the entire additional portion can technically receive the status of tithe.
That is why tithing can take effect simultaneously. It is possible to say that half of each kernel is designated as tithe, so that every kernel has a share of that designation. By contrast, with betrothal we do not say that half of one woman is betrothed to him and half of another woman is betrothed to him. Betrothal does not work incrementally in that manner. Therefore, tithing can take effect simultaneously, while betrothal cannot.
The Gemara raises another challenge from the laws of animal tithing. If nine animals passed before the owner and he called the tenth one “the tenth,” that animal becomes the tithe. But what happens if the eleventh animal passed and he mistakenly called it “the tenth”? It becomes a peace-offering because of the error. Now suppose two animals emerged together and he called both of them “the tenth.” One of them is certainly the actual tithe, while the other is a peace-offering whose status resulted from the mistake. Why are both treated as doubtful cases? If the principle is that something that does not work consecutively cannot work simultaneously, neither should be valid.
One might have argued that each animal should receive only half the designation, but an animal cannot be offered as half a tithe and half a peace-offering. Nevertheless, the law treats one animal as a definite tithe and the other as a peace-offering whose identity is uncertain.
The explanation is that if the eleventh animal was mistakenly called the tenth, the designation does not simply disappear. The animal receives the status of a peace-offering. Thus, when two animals are called “the tenth” together, one of them is certainly the true tithe and the other has the status of a peace-offering resulting from the error. We do not say that neither designation is valid.
What is done in practice? The questionable peace-offering is allowed to graze until it develops a blemish, after which it may be eaten. The actual tithe is treated as the tithe. The law demonstrates that a mistaken designation can retain halachic effect in the laws of tithing, even though it would not ordinarily work in the laws of betrothal.
The distinction is therefore that tithing has a special rule concerning an erroneous designation. Normally, if something cannot work consecutively, it cannot work simultaneously. But tithing is different because a mistaken designation can remain effective, and because the designation can be distributed incrementally among the kernels or animals. Betrothal has no such mechanism.
The Gemara then brings a further discussion concerning the loaves of a thanksgiving offering. A thanksgiving offering requires forty loaves: thirty unleavened loaves and ten leavened loaves. Suppose a person consecrated forty loaves, but the flour turned out to be of the wrong type. The consecration was mistaken and does not take effect. He then consecrated another forty loaves. The question is whether the second set is valid, or whether it is also affected by the first set.
There is no case of consecutive designation here if he first consecrated forty loaves and then, separately, another forty. If he said explicitly, “Let all eighty loaves be consecrated,” everyone agrees that this does not work, because a thanksgiving offering requires only forty loaves. The dispute concerns a person who had eighty loaves before him, designated forty without specifying which forty, and then designated another forty.
Chizkiah says that forty out of the eighty are consecrated. Rabbi Yohanan says that the forty are not consecrated. The discussion initially considers whether their dispute reflects the principle that anything that cannot take effect consecutively cannot take effect simultaneously. According to that approach, Chizkiah would say that the additional forty serve as a reserve: if the first forty are lost, the second forty can be used. Rabbi Yohanan would say that because the person ultimately linked the two sets together, none of them becomes consecrated.
This raises a question because Chizkiah was Rabbi Yohanan’s teacher. How could Rabbi Yohanan reject Chizkiah’s position? The Gemara answers that the dispute does not necessarily concern the principle itself. Everyone agrees that if the person explicitly said, “I want all eighty loaves to be consecrated,” none of them are valid. The dispute is only about how to understand an unspecified statement when forty loaves were in front of him and another forty were also present.
According to the first view, when a person says, without further specification, “I am bringing a thanksgiving offering,” he intends to designate the forty loaves required for the offering. The second forty are merely available as a reserve in case the first set is lost, and they are not consecrated. According to the other view, when all eighty loaves are before him, his unspecified statement can be understood as referring to all of them. Since a thanksgiving offering cannot contain eighty loaves, the designation does not take effect.
Thus, the question is not whether a person may explicitly consecrate eighty loaves. That is certainly invalid. The question is how to interpret an unspecified designation when eighty loaves are present. One authority understands the statement as referring to forty, with the second forty serving as insurance; the other understands it as referring to all eighty.
The discussion then returns to the principle that betrothal which is not fit for marital relations does not take effect. Why does Rabbah need to explain the Mishnah through the principle that whatever cannot take effect consecutively cannot take effect simultaneously? There appears to be a simpler explanation: if the betrothal is not fit to lead to marital relations, it should not take effect.
In the case of two sisters, even if one were to say that the simultaneous betrothal could take effect, the man would not know which woman had become his wife. If one was his wife, he could not have relations with the other because she would be his wife’s sister. Thus, the betrothal would not be fit for marital relations.
The answer is that this simpler principle is associated with Rava, who indeed maintains that betrothal that is not fit for marital relations does not take effect. But the earlier discussion began because Rabbi Ami bar Hama cited the verse concerning a woman and her sister. That verse must be explained through a consecutive case, in which the first woman became his wife and the second was then forbidden as her sister. Once that is established, Rabbah’s principle is applied to derive the law of simultaneous betrothal.
The Gemara then discusses the general rule of betrothal that is not fit for marital relations. Suppose a man gives a coin to each of two sisters and says, “One of you is betrothed to me,” without identifying which one. Neither sister can have relations with him, because if one is his wife, the other is his wife’s sister. Abaye says that the betrothal takes effect, while Rabbi Ami bar Hama says that it does not take effect at all.
Abaye understands the verse, “When a man takes a woman and becomes her husband,” as teaching that even betrothal that is not presently fit for marital relations can still take effect. Rabbi Ami bar Hama understands the verse as teaching the opposite: betrothal that is not fit for marital relations is not betrothal.
The Mishnah states that if a man betroths a woman and her daughter, or a woman and her sister, simultaneously, neither is betrothed. The Gemara analyzes the wording. It might have been possible to infer that if he betrothed only one of the pair, that woman would be betrothed. This would support Abaye, because the betrothal of one woman could take effect even though it is not clear which woman she is.
The Mishnah then speaks of five women, among whom are two sisters, and says that if he says, “All of you are betrothed to me,” none of them are betrothed. The discussion asks whether this means that he specified that the women fit for marital relations should be betrothed, in which case the sisters would be excluded, or whether the Mishnah itself is teaching that all five are excluded because the two sisters create a case of betrothal not fit for marital relations.
According to Abaye, the first part of the Mishnah supports him, while the latter part presents a difficulty. If a man betrothed only one woman from a pair, the betrothal can take effect. But if he betrothed both together, neither takes effect because two sisters cannot both become his wives. According to Rava, the latter part supports him, because the sisters are excluded along with the other women; the first part, however, presents a difficulty.
Rava explains the latter case by adding an explicit qualification: the man said, “Those among you who are fit for marital relations are betrothed to me.” Since the two sisters are not fit for marital relations, they are excluded, while the other women are betrothed. This reading requires understanding the Mishnah as including that qualification.
One might ask why the man had to specify “those who are fit for marital relations.” Why not simply say, “One of the five is betrothed to me”? The answer is that the wording of the Mishnah says, “All of you,” so the explanation preserves the wording rather than replacing it with a different case.
The discussion leads to a broader halachic question: What is the status of a woman who is in a state of ritual impurity because of menstruation? At the moment of betrothal she is not fit for marital relations, but she will become fit later. Is her betrothal considered betrothal that is fit for marital relations, or is it considered unfit at the time it is performed?
This is different from the case of sisters or other permanently forbidden relatives. A sister will always remain forbidden to the man in that relationship. A woman who is menstruating, however, will become permitted after the relevant period. The question is therefore whether we judge the betrothal according to her present status or according to the fact that she will eventually be fit for marital relations.
The Gemara then discusses a man who betroths one of a father’s daughters without specifying which daughter. The father has older daughters and younger daughters, and he accepts the betrothal on behalf of one of them. The older daughters who have reached majority are excluded, because the father can no longer accept betrothal on their behalf. The question concerns the younger daughters: which one did the father intend to accept the betrothal for?
At first glance, one might say that the younger daughter is certainly included. The Gemara asks, however, whether this is a case of betrothal not fit for marital relations, since the daughters are sisters and the man does not know which one became his wife. If one is his wife, he cannot have relations with any of the others because one of them may be his wife’s sister.
Rava explains that the case involves one older daughter and one younger daughter. The older daughter has already appointed her father as her agent to accept betrothal for her. When a man arrives and gives the father money without specifying for which daughter, there is a question: Did the father accept it for the older daughter who had appointed him as her agent, or did he accept it for the younger daughter?
The Gemara says that the older daughter is generally excluded from the case because the father does not ordinarily retain the betrothal money for her. When he accepts betrothal for the younger daughter, however, he retains the money. A person does not normally abandon an opportunity that benefits him financially. Therefore, the father is presumed to have accepted the betrothal for the younger daughter.
The Gemara challenges this explanation: What if the older daughter explicitly told her father that he could retain the betrothal money? In that case, the financial distinction disappears. The Gemara answers that even then, the father would prefer to fulfill the mitzvah of marrying off the younger daughter rather than leave that opportunity unused. The mitzvah is associated specifically with marrying off a younger daughter, and he would not abandon it when it is available to him.
The discussion then presents a case involving two wives and daughters from each wife. There are four daughters, with an older and younger daughter from each household. The older daughter from the second household may be younger than the younger daughter from the first household. Consequently, the terms “older” and “younger” can be relative rather than absolute: one girl may be called the older daughter of her household while still being younger than a girl from the other household.
If the father says, “I am betrothing my older daughter,” the phrase could refer to the older daughter of the older household, or to the older daughter within the second household. Similarly, the phrase “my younger daughter” can have different meanings depending on which household is being considered. The Gemara analyzes these expressions and the resulting uncertainties.
The apparent difficulty is that all the daughters are sisters, so the case should seem to involve betrothal that is not fit for marital relations. Why, then, are some of them treated as doubtful rather than as entirely excluded? The answer is that the betrothal was originally performed with a known daughter. At the time of the betrothal, the man knew which daughter he was betrothing; only afterward did the identities become confused. This is not a case in which the betrothal was initially made uncertain.
The wording supports this distinction. The Mishnah says that he does not know now, rather than that the identity was never known. This indicates that the betrothal originally took effect with a specific daughter, and the uncertainty arose only later when the identities became confused.
The Gemara considers whether the language “my older daughter” must mean the oldest of all the daughters. One possibility is that a person does not place himself into a state of uncertainty, so the phrase must refer to the clearly older daughter. Another possibility is that “older” can refer to the older daughter within one particular household. The Gemara discusses these competing interpretations.
The same issue arises in a case where a man betrothed one of two sisters but no longer knows which one he betrothed. He must give a bill of divorce to each sister, because one of them is certainly his wife and the other may be his wife. The wording again says that he does not know, indicating that the identity was once known and was subsequently forgotten or confused.
The main novelty of that Mishnah appears in its second part. If the man dies without children and has one brother, the brother cannot perform levirate marriage with either sister. Each sister may be the deceased man’s wife, but each may also be the sister of the woman bound to him through the levirate bond. Therefore, each sister requires the release of the levirate bond through the appropriate ceremony.
If there are two brothers, however, one brother performs the release ceremony with one sister and the other brother performs levirate marriage with the other. This works because, whichever sister was the deceased man’s wife, one brother is performing the required levirate act with her, while the other brother is not marrying the sister of a woman to whom he is bound.
If the brothers acted in the reverse order—one performing levirate marriage and the other performing the release ceremony—the Gemara discusses whether the order creates a problem. The concern is the rabbinic prohibition against marrying the sister of a woman to whom one is bound through the levirate relationship. The discussion explains that this prohibition applies to the brother who performs the release ceremony, but not necessarily to the other brother.
Furthermore, if both brothers already performed the relevant acts, they are not forced to divorce. If the first brother’s levirate marriage was valid, the second brother’s marriage was also valid with the other sister. If the first brother’s act was not valid, then the second brother’s levirate marriage was the valid one, and the first brother’s marriage involved only a rabbinic prohibition. Since the prohibition is rabbinic, the Sages did not require him to divorce her.
The Gemara also discusses the proper order: first perform the release ceremony and afterward perform levirate marriage. One should not perform levirate marriage first and the release ceremony afterward, because of the concern that the second act may involve marrying the sister of the woman to whom the brother remains bound.
That is why the second part of the Mishnah is necessary. The first part, concerning a man who betrothed one of two sisters and forgot which one, is straightforward. The additional case teaches what happens when the man dies and there is a levirate relationship: with one brother, both sisters require release; with two brothers, one performs the release ceremony and the other performs levirate marriage. We will continue from here.