In the merit of the study of Gemara Kiddushin, may there be a complete recovery. May we remain in a state of happiness, and may there be a complete recovery from all injuries, relief for those who have been wounded, and divine mercy for the soldiers and for everyone involved in the current war. Hashem should protect them all.
We are at the end of the last discussion in the chapter. We probably should have completed it yesterday, but we will finish it now. The discussion begins several lines from the end of the page and concerns a case of ordinary, unconsecrated animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. We have already established that one may not eat such meat. The question, however, was whether one may derive benefit from it—for example, whether one may throw it to one's dogs.
The Gemara suggests: Perhaps one may slaughter the animal, and although one may not eat the meat, one may throw it before the dogs. The verse states, “To the dog you shall throw it.” The Gemara explains that the verse is speaking about an animal that is unfit for consumption, a carcass or an animal rendered defective. That animal may be thrown to a dog. The wording “it” teaches that one may throw that animal to a dog, but not animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. Such animals are prohibited for benefit.
Rabbi Yehuda encountered Rabbi Yosef, who was with Rabbi Shmuel the son of Rabba bar bar Hanah, standing at the entrance to Rabba’s study hall. They said: It was taught in a baraita that if a man betroths a woman with the firstborn of a donkey, with meat cooked in milk, or with animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Shimon says that she is betrothed, while the Sages say that she is not betrothed.
We therefore have a dispute. According to Rabbi Shimon, if a man betroths a woman with animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, the betrothal is valid. This appears to indicate that such animals are permitted for benefit. Yet we recently derived from the Torah that they are prohibited for benefit: the Torah says that an animal rendered unfit is given to a dog, implying that only that animal may be used in this manner, while everything else in the category is prohibited for benefit.
The difficulty becomes stronger because Rabbi Shimon himself taught elsewhere that animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard must be burned. If they must be burned, what does that imply? It implies that they are prohibited by Torah law. The only reason to require burning would be that the Rabbis extended the law of animals that became disqualified offerings to ordinary animals slaughtered in the courtyard. In the case of disqualified offerings, the animal must be burned. But why should Rabbi Shimon require ordinary animals slaughtered in the courtyard to be burned if their prohibition is only rabbinic?
Rashi focuses on the word “burned.” He explains that burial would not be sufficient; the animal must specifically be burned. From this Rashi infers that the prohibition is Torah-based. If the prohibition were only rabbinic, would the Sages be so stringent as to require burning? Certainly, the Torah does not require burning in such a case. The rabbinic requirement to burn the animal must therefore be based on an underlying Torah prohibition.
Rashi explains the concern as follows. When an animal in the Temple courtyard is an actual consecrated offering that became disqualified, everyone knows that it must be burned. The Rabbis therefore understood why they would require an ordinary animal slaughtered in the courtyard to be burned as well: they wanted to prevent people from confusing that animal with disqualified consecrated offerings.
But this explanation works only for a domesticated animal. If a wild animal was slaughtered in the courtyard, there is no comparable concern. Disqualified consecrated offerings are domesticated animals; one does not bring a wild animal as an offering. Why, then, would Rabbi Shimon require even a wild animal slaughtered in the courtyard to be burned? There is no reason to create a precaution to prevent confusion with disqualified offerings.
Nor would burial be necessary. If the prohibition were only rabbinic, even burial would seem unnecessary. The only conclusion, Rashi says, is that the prohibition of ordinary animals slaughtered in the courtyard is itself Torah-based, and the requirement to burn them is a rabbinic enactment based on the law of disqualified offerings. The Rabbis extended the requirement of burning to both domesticated and wild animals so that people would not distinguish between the two cases in a place where the Sages had established a uniform rule.
This returns us to the contradiction. On the one hand, Rabbi Shimon says that animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard must be burned, which indicates that they are prohibited by Torah law. On the other hand, he says that if a man betroths a woman with such an animal, she is betrothed, which indicates that the animal may be used for benefit. How can these two statements be reconciled?
The students came before Rabba, and someone objected that this was merely an attempt to create a difficulty. The solution, they explained, is that the two statements concern different cases. When the baraita says that a woman is betrothed with an animal slaughtered in the courtyard, it is speaking about an animal that was later discovered to be defective and therefore unfit for consumption.
Rabbi Shimon follows his own reasoning. It was taught that when a person slaughters an animal that is defective, or when he slaughters an animal and it is subsequently discovered to be defective, both cases are considered ordinary animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. Rabbi Shimon permits deriving benefit from them, while the Sages prohibit it.
Rabbi Shimon maintains that ordinary animals slaughtered in the courtyard are prohibited only when the slaughter is a valid act of slaughter. In the case of an animal that is defective, the slaughter is not considered a valid slaughter. Therefore, the animal is not considered an ordinary animal slaughtered in the courtyard, and it is not prohibited for benefit. That is the case in the baraita: the animal was defective, and the woman may therefore be betrothed with it.
By contrast, when Rabbi Shimon says that such animals must be burned, he is speaking about a valid slaughter of an ordinary animal in the courtyard. That is considered an animal slaughtered in the courtyard, and it is prohibited by Torah law. Since the animal in the baraita was defective, the slaughter does not create that prohibition, and the betrothal is valid.
Someone asked: But the person did perform slaughter. The answer is that slaughter of a defective animal is not halachically considered slaughter for this purpose. It is merely as though he performed an act that resembles slaughter. Since the animal could never have been a valid offering, the act does not establish the status of an animal slaughtered in the courtyard. Consequently, it is not prohibited for benefit, and the woman can be betrothed with it.
The Gemara then asks about the money received in exchange for items prohibited for benefit. If someone sells one of these items and now possesses the money, may he use that money? Why should the money not acquire the same prohibited status as the original item?
The Gemara answers that we find such a rule explicitly in the case of idolatry. The Torah says, “It shall be a חרם like it,” teaching that whatever is exchanged for idolatry becomes like the idolatry itself. Anything from which one derives benefit becomes subject to the same prohibition. From this the Gemara infers that it is specifically in the case of idolatry that the transferred object acquires the status of the original. In the case of other prohibitions, when the forbidden item is exchanged for money, the money remains permitted.
Thus, if a person sells meat cooked in milk and receives money, the money does not become prohibited for benefit. He may use it, and he may betroth a woman with it. If he sells idolatry, however, the money also becomes prohibited. The rule that the transferred object acquires the status of the original applies specifically to idolatry.
The Gemara challenges this distinction. Why not derive the law for all other prohibitions from idolatry? The Gemara responds that idolatry and the produce of the Sabbatical year are two written sources. According to the principle that two verses teaching the same law do not establish a general rule for the entire Torah, the law remains limited to those two cases.
We have already identified the source for idolatry. Where do we know that produce of the Sabbatical year has the same rule? The verse states that the produce of the Sabbatical year is holy. Just as holiness transfers to the money exchanged for a consecrated item, so too does the sanctity of the Sabbatical year transfer to the money received in exchange for its produce.
The Gemara asks whether the comparison is complete. With an ordinary consecrated item, when it is exchanged for an unconsecrated item, the original item becomes ordinary and the new item becomes consecrated. Perhaps the same should apply to produce of the Sabbatical year: the original produce should lose its sanctity and the money should acquire it.
The verse therefore states that the produce of the Sabbatical year remains in its status. The sanctity does not leave the original produce. Instead, the money acquires sanctity as well. Both the original produce and the object received in exchange are subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical year, similar to the law of an exchange offering, where both items retain a sacred status.
For example, if someone exchanges produce of the Sabbatical year for meat, both the produce and the meat are subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical year. The produce must be treated according to the laws of that sanctity, and the meat must also be treated accordingly. If he then exchanges the meat for fish, the meat leaves the system of sanctity, while the fish acquires the sanctity. If he exchanges the fish for wine, the fish leaves the system and the wine becomes subject to the sanctity. If he exchanges the wine for oil, the wine leaves and the oil becomes subject to the sanctity.
In other words, the original produce remains subject to its laws, and the last item received in the chain of exchanges also becomes subject to those laws. This principle applies to the Sabbatical year.
The Gemara now says that this reasoning works only according to the opinion that two written sources do not teach a general rule. According to the opinion that two written sources do teach a general rule, we should derive from idolatry and the Sabbatical year that money received for any prohibited item also becomes prohibited.
The Gemara answers that the verses themselves contain limiting expressions. In the case of idolatry, the wording teaches that the transferred object becomes like it—specifically, like idolatry and not other matters. In the case of the Sabbatical year, the wording likewise limits the teaching to that subject. Although one might ordinarily derive a general principle from two sources, these exclusionary expressions prevent that derivation. Therefore, the law remains limited to idolatry and the Sabbatical year.
The Mishnah then teaches that if a man betroths a woman with terumah, tithes, gifts given to a priest, the water used for the purification of the red heifer, or the ashes of the red heifer, she is betrothed. This is true even if the man performing the betrothal is an Israelite rather than a priest.
This is difficult. Terumah does not belong to an Israelite, and the priestly gifts do not belong to an Israelite. How can an Israelite betroth a woman with something that is not his?
The answer is that he possesses a benefit called the right of designation. The owner of the produce can choose which priest will receive the terumah or the priestly gifts. That choice has monetary value. He might choose one priest because that priest will later return the favor, and he might choose another priest for a different reason. Since he has the right to decide to whom the item will be given, that right itself may be considered an asset.
Accordingly, if the right of designation is considered property, an Israelite can betroth a woman with it. He is giving her the value of the right to choose which priest receives the terumah. The Mishnah would therefore be following the opinion that the right of designation is considered property.
Ulla, however, begins by suggesting the opposite: the right of designation is not considered property.
The Gemara challenges Ulla from the Mishnah. The Mishnah says that if an Israelite betroths a woman with terumah, tithes, priestly gifts, the purification water, or the ashes of the red heifer, she is betrothed. This appears to indicate that the right of designation has monetary value. Otherwise, what is the Israelite giving her? The terumah does not belong to him, and if the right to choose a priest is not property, he is giving her nothing of value.
The Gemara answers by presenting a special case. The Mishnah may be speaking about an Israelite whose maternal grandfather was a priest. The grandfather possessed untithed produce, and then he died. The produce was inherited by his grandson, who was an Israelite.
The Gemara follows the opinion that gifts that have not yet been separated are considered as though they have already been separated. Although the terumah was still physically mixed into the produce, it is treated as though it had already been removed. Since the grandfather was a priest, the priestly portion was considered his property. When he died, that property passed to his Israelite grandson.
The grandson cannot eat the terumah, because he is an Israelite. Nevertheless, he owns it and can sell it to a priest. Since it is his property, it has monetary value. That is the case in which the Mishnah says that an Israelite can betroth a woman with terumah. The betrothal is not based on the right of designation; it is based on the fact that the Israelite inherited actual terumah as property.
Rashi explains that this is treated as though the priestly gifts had already been separated. The terumah was already present in the produce, even though it had not yet been physically removed. Since it was destined to be terumah, the priest was considered to have acquired it during his lifetime. When the priest died, the terumah passed to his heir.
If the terumah had been physically separated, the Israelite heir could sell it to priests. He would not have to give it away without compensation. That is why the terumah has monetary value and can be used for betrothal.
Rashi then asks: Why does the Mishnah need to teach this? If the grandfather had already inherited actual terumah and then passed it to his grandson, the grandson obviously owns an asset. Why would the Mishnah need to tell us that he can betroth a woman with it?
Rashi answers that the novelty is greater. The Mishnah is not speaking about ordinary terumah that was already separated. It is speaking about untithed produce in which the terumah was still mixed. Even so, because the terumah is treated as though it had already been separated, it is considered property that the priest inherited and then transmitted to his grandson. The Mishnah teaches that even this inherited interest can be used for betrothal.
Someone asked whether this was simply a case of ownership rather than a case of the right of designation. Exactly so. A regular Israelite who separates terumah cannot sell it for money to a priest; he must give it to a priest. His only benefit is that he can choose which priest will receive it. That is the right of designation.
In this case, however, the heir owns the terumah itself. He can say, “I have terumah, and I am selling it for fifty dollars.” That is not merely the right to choose which priest will receive it. It is ownership of an asset with a market value. He is not receiving a favor because of his choice; he possesses property that he can sell.
The Gemara returns to the original issue: Is the right of designation considered property or not? The Mishnah appears to say that it is property, because it says that an Israelite can betroth a woman with terumah. But perhaps, as we already explained, the Mishnah is speaking about the inherited untithed produce of a priest. In that case, the Mishnah has nothing to do with the right of designation.
The question was posed to Rav Huna through Rabbi Hiyya bar Abin and Rabbi Bun: Is the right of designation considered property?
Rav Huna again cited the Mishnah, which says that an Israelite can betroth a woman with terumah. This appears to prove that the right of designation is property. The others responded that the Mishnah had already been explained as referring to an Israelite who inherited untithed produce from his priestly grandfather. Therefore, it cannot serve as evidence concerning the right of designation.
Rav Huna replied to Rabbi Hiyya with an expression that sounded derogatory, as though he were calling him an ignoramus. Rabbi Hiyya was embarrassed. Rav Huna immediately clarified that he had not intended the expression as an insult. He meant that Rabbi Hiyya had support for his interpretation: Rav Asi of Hutzal had also explained the Mishnah in that manner. In other words, Rav Huna was saying, “You are correct; Rav Asi of Hutzal understood the Mishnah this way as well.”
The Gemara then suggests that the status of the right of designation may be a dispute among the Tannaim. A baraita discusses a person who steals untithed produce from another person. The produce contains terumah and tithes that have not yet been separated. What must the thief return?
If he stole an entire basket or bushel, perhaps he must return the entire amount. Alternatively, perhaps he must return only the ordinary unconsecrated portion, excluding the terumah and tithes, because those portions do not belong to the owner. The owner can say that he did not steal the priestly portion from him; it belongs to the priest. Since the owner merely had the right to choose which priest would receive it, perhaps the thief does not have to compensate him for that portion.
If the right of designation is considered property, then the thief did steal something of value from the owner, and he must return the entire bushel. If the right of designation is not property, then the thief did not steal anything belonging to the owner with respect to the terumah and tithes. He must return only the ordinary produce.
The Gemara initially proposes that this is the dispute between Rabbi and Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehudah. Rabbi would require the thief to return the entire bushel, reflecting the opinion that the right of designation is property. Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehudah would require him to return only the ordinary produce, reflecting the opinion that the right of designation is not property.
The Gemara rejects this explanation and offers another possibility. Perhaps everyone agrees that the right of designation is not property. The case may again involve untithed produce that fell to an Israelite as an inheritance from his priestly grandfather. The dispute would then concern whether gifts destined to be separated are considered as though they had already been separated.
Rabbi would hold that they are considered separated. Therefore, the Israelite inherited actual terumah from his grandfather, and when the thief stole the bushel, he stole the owner’s property. He must return the entire bushel.
Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehudah would hold that the grandfather had not separated the terumah, and it is not considered separated. The grandson inherited only untithed produce, not terumah. The thief therefore needs to return only the ordinary produce and does not need to return the portion that would eventually be separated as terumah.
Thus, according to this explanation, the dispute has nothing to do with whether the right of designation is property. It concerns whether gifts that are destined to be separated are treated as already separated.
The Gemara offers another possibility. Perhaps everyone agrees that gifts destined to be separated are treated as though they had been separated, and perhaps everyone agrees that the right of designation is not property. The dispute would then concern the amount of terumah that must be returned.
One opinion follows Shmuel, who says that even a single grain can exempt the entire produce from the obligation of terumah. According to that view, the thief must return almost the entire bushel, less the value of one grain. The other opinion says that the thief returns only the ordinary portion, deducting the regular amount of terumah and tithes. The dispute would therefore concern the measure of terumah, not ownership and not the right of designation.
The Gemara offers yet another explanation. Perhaps everyone agrees with the view that one must separate the terumah in the ordinary proportion, and everyone agrees that the right of designation is not property. Why, then, would one opinion require the thief to return the entire bushel?
The answer is that the Rabbis imposed a penalty on the thief. Technically, the terumah did not belong to the owner, and the right of designation was not property. Nevertheless, the Rabbis did not want a thief to benefit from the fact that he had stolen untithed produce. They required him to return the entire item so that the thief would not profit from his theft.
The other opinion does not impose that penalty. According to that view, the thief returns only what belonged to the owner—the ordinary produce—and does not return the terumah portion. The discussion is therefore whether the Rabbis penalized the thief.
There is also a question of who ultimately receives the terumah. No individual priest can necessarily claim it, because the owner could have chosen any priest. If the thief retained that portion, he would be benefiting from something that he stole and that does not belong to him. The opinion requiring the thief to return the entire bushel may therefore be understood as saying that the thief must not profit from the theft.
The Gemara gives one more approach. Shmuel teaches that a single grain of terumah exempts the entire produce. If so, there is a difficulty with Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehudah. Why does he say that the thief deducts the ordinary amount of terumah and tithes? If he follows Shmuel, he should deduct only the value of one grain.
The answer is that the Rabbis penalized the owner of the untithed produce. He should not have left the produce in that condition. Since he left untithed produce in his house, the Rabbis required that he receive only the ordinary amount after the terumah and tithes had been deducted, rather than the full amount to which he would otherwise be entitled.
Someone suggested that the same logic should apply to the priest: Why not say that the priest should have separated the terumah? The response is that a priest may eat terumah, so the presence of untithed produce does not create the same problem for him. If a priest eats the produce, he is not eating prohibited untithed produce in the same way that an Israelite would. The penalty is therefore directed at the Israelite who left produce in a prohibited, untithed state.
Rashi presents another possible way to explain the dispute between Rabbi and Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehudah. Perhaps the case involves an Israelite who inherited untithed produce from his priestly grandfather. Everyone agrees that the inheritance did not include actual monetary value arising from the right of designation, and everyone agrees that the terumah had not been separated. The dispute would then be how much of the produce the heir must return after it was stolen.
According to one opinion, he must return almost the entire bushel, less the value of a single grain. According to the other, he returns only the ordinary produce after deducting the regular terumah and tithes. This would be a dispute regarding the measure of terumah.
Rashi rejects this interpretation because it creates a difficulty in the Mishnah. The Mishnah says that when a person betroths a woman with terumah, she is betrothed, even if the man is an Israelite. There are two ways to understand that statement. Either the right of designation is considered property, or the Israelite inherited actual terumah from his priestly grandfather because the terumah is treated as already separated.
If we say that the Tannaim in the baraita agree that the right of designation is not property and also agree that the terumah had not yet been separated, then the Mishnah would not follow either opinion. It would have no basis for saying that the Israelite could betroth a woman with terumah. For that reason, the Gemara prefers the other explanations.
We now return to the Mishnah concerning terumah, tithes, priestly gifts, the purification water of the red heifer, and its ashes. The Mishnah says that a woman is betrothed with these items even when the man is an Israelite.
This appears to contradict another teaching: a person may not accept payment for performing certain mitzvot. One who accepts payment to judge a case invalidates the judgment. A judge must not be paid for the act of judging. Likewise, one who accepts payment to give testimony invalidates his testimony. The same applies to the person who performs the purification process of the red heifer. If he was paid to sprinkle the water or to place the ashes into the water, the purification water is invalid, and the ashes are considered ordinary ashes rather than the ashes of the red heifer.
The reason is that one may not accept payment for the performance of a mitzvah. The Torah was given freely, and therefore the teaching of Torah must be provided freely. The same principle applies to other mitzvot that must be performed without payment.
This creates a difficulty for the Mishnah. If one may not receive payment for preparing the purification water or for performing the purification procedure, what value does the water or the ash have? How can a person use it to betroth a woman? If he is giving her something that he cannot sell or use as payment, it seems that he is giving her nothing of monetary value.
The Gemara answers that one may not charge for the actual performance of the ceremony, but one may charge for the preparation that precedes it. A person can be paid to draw the water, to transport it, or to perform the other preparatory tasks. He cannot be paid for the actual act of sanctifying the water, but the water before that stage can have value because it requires labor to obtain and prepare.
Therefore, when a man betroths a woman with the water or ashes, he is not giving her the completed purification process for which payment is forbidden. He is giving her an item that can be used in the preparation of that process. She can take the water to the priest, and someone can compensate her for the work of bringing it. The value lies in the preparation and the labor, not in payment for the mitzvah itself.
The same distinction applies to the ashes. Once the ashes have been placed into the water and the purification water has been prepared, one may not charge for the completed mitzvah. But before that stage, the water and ashes can have monetary value. The Mishnah is therefore speaking about a stage at which the items have not yet become the completed purification water.
There is still room to question whether this distinction is obvious. Perhaps anything connected to the mitzvah, including its preparation, should be considered part of the mitzvah, and perhaps one should not be allowed to charge for any of it. The Gemara’s answer is that the actual ritual cannot be sold, but the work of obtaining and transporting the materials can be compensated. That preparatory work is what creates the value used for the betrothal.
Thus, the conclusion is that one may not charge for performing the purification ceremony itself. However, one may charge for the water, the ashes, or the labor involved in obtaining and bringing them before the ceremony has been performed. That is why the Mishnah can say that a woman is betrothed with these items, while the other teaching can say that payment for the actual mitzvah invalidates it.