The
third of the Ten Commandments is the prohibition, “Lo Tisa Et Shem Hashem
Elokecha La’shav” – “You may not bear the Name of G-d in vain” (Shemot
20:7). The Gemara understands this
command as forbidding several different kinds of false or meaningless oaths
uttered in G-d’s Name. One is swearing
about something which is obviously untrue, such as swearing that a rock is a
piece of gold. The second example is an
oath about something which is obviously true, such as swearing that a rock is a
rock. Thirdly, it is prohibited to swear
that one will not fulfil a Misva, such as swearing that one will not wear
Tefillin. Since we are all bound by the
commitment declared by our ancestors at the time the Torah was given, such an
oath is meaningless, and thus forbidden.
The fourth kind of forbidden oath is a vow to do something which is
impossible, such as if one swears he will not sleep for three days, or that he
will not eat for seven days.
Likewise,
this prohibition requires that if somebody swears in G-d’s Name to do
something, or to refrain from doing something, then he must fulfill his vow, as
otherwise it will have been uttered falsely.
The
Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that these oaths are forbidden because they constitute
a grave disparagement of G-d’s Name. We
may invoke G-d’s Name only for meaningful and important purposes, and one who
invokes His Name for a meaningless or false oath disrespects it. Moreover, when one invokes G-d’s Name when
swearing to do something, he does so in order to lend greater credence to his
words. The person in effect says that
just as G-d is permanent and everlasting, and He exists forever, his word is
likewise permanently binding. By
extension, if one violates his oath, then he shows that just as his word is not
permanent, G-d is likewise not permanent, Heaven forbid. It thus turns out that if one swears by G-d’s
Name and then violates the oath, he has spoken heresy, by indicating that G-d
is impermanent like his word.
In
discussing this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch makes a grammatical observation,
noting that the Hebrew verb for “swear” – “Nishba” – is always used in the
Nif’al construction. The usual
construction would yield “Shaba,” but the word instead is formulated “Nishba,”
in the “Nif’al” form. This form is
normally used for a passive verb, which describes something being done to a
person, as opposed to an action which a person performs. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the
“Nif’al” form is used for this verb because we are influenced by the words we
speak. When a person swears, he is
affected by the oath, and is motivated and driven to fulfill his world, and
therefore the passive “Nif’al” construction is used in reference to a person
who takes an oath.
The
Gemara in Masechet Temura establishes that one who violates this command is
liable to Malkut, despite the fact that he did not commit an action. According to one view, speech does not
qualify as a Halachic “Ma’aseh” (“action”), in which case prohibitions violated
through speech should fall under the category of “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” –
prohibitions transgressed without committing an action, for which one is not
liable to Malkut. Nevertheless, the
Gemara teaches, the prohibition of “Lo Tisa” marks an exception to this rule,
due to its unique gravity, and one who swears in G-d’s Name falsely or
meaninglessly is, indeed, liable to Malkut even though he did not commit an
action.
Rav
Yehonatan Eibshutz (1690-1764), in his work Urim Ve’tumim, addresses the
question of whether one violates this prohibition if he makes a false oath in
writing. Does this prohibition forbid
swearing falsely only verbally, or does it include even written oaths? Rav Eibshutz proves from the Gemara that a
written oath does not fall under this prohibition. The Gemara resorts to a textual inference
from a verse to establish that one is liable to Malkut for violating this
prohibition even though no action has been committed. Rav Eibshutz notes that if it is possible to
transgress this prohibition through writing, which is, quite clearly, a
“Ma’aseh,” then this prohibition would fall under the category of “Lav She’yesh
Bo Ma’aseh” – a prohibition violated through an action. Hence, there would be no need for the Gemara
to resort to a textual inference, as it would be clear that one is liable to
Malkut for violating this command.
Indeed, as the Minhat Hinuch notes, the Maggid Mishneh (commentary to
the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah by Rav Vidal of Tolosa, Spain, 14th
century) famously stated that according to the Rambam, if a prohibition can be
violated through an action, then one is liable to Malkut even if he violates it
without committing an action. Hence, the
fact that the Gemara speaks of the prohibition of “Lo Tisa” as a “Lav She’en Bo
Ma’aseh” proves that this prohibition cannot be violated by writing.
The
Poskim debate the question of whether one violates this prohibition by reciting
a Beracha She’ena Sericha – an unnecessary Beracha, such as if one recites a
Beracha over a drink during a meal after having recited “Ha’mosi.” Once one recites “Ha’mosi” over bread, this
Beracha covers most foods and drinks he enjoys during the meal, and thus
reciting a Beracha over a food or drink during the meal is an unnecessary
Beracha. As opposed to a Beracha
Le’batala – which is recited entirely in vain – this Beracha is recited
meaningfully, but it is unnecessary.
Some Poskim maintained that reciting such a Beracha does not violate “Lo
Tisa” because it does not disrespect G-d, whereas others argued that since the
Beracha is not necessary, it indeed transgresses this prohibition.
Some
people make the mistake of trying to substantiate their words by saying
something to the effect of, “I swear to G-d.”
Such a remark is inappropriate, as one invokes G-d’s Name
disrespectfully, in a context where it is not warranted.