The
Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:10), “Ve’shem Elohim Aherim Lo
Tazkiru, Lo Yishama Al Picha” – “and you shall not mention the name of other
deities; it shall not be heard upon your mouth.”
The
Sefer Ha’hinuch brings three interpretations of this command.
The
first is that this verse forbids swearing in the name of a foreign deity, and
even causing a pagan to swear in the name of his god by demanding that he take
an oath during a civil dispute. If a Jew
claims that a pagan owes him money, and the pagan refuses, the Jew may not sue
him, because he will then be causing the gentile to swear in the name of a
pagan god.
Secondly,
this command forbids conducting business with a pagan on or shortly before his
religious holiday. If a gentile closes a
lucrative deal before or on his holiday, he will express praise and
thanksgiving to his deity, and the Jew will thus have caused him to speak in
praise of his god. Therefore, it is
forbidden by force of this command to engage in commercial dealings with pagans
before or during their holiday.
Thirdly,
this command forbids using an idol as a landmark. For example, one cannot tell his fellow,
“Meet me at the corner, next to the idol.”
The
Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that all this is forbidden because of the importance
of distancing ourselves from anything associated with pagan worship. Idol worship is so detestable that the Torah
does not want us even mentioning a pagan god’s name or even indirectly
facilitating its worship. The Sefer
Ha’hinuch adds that the Torah mentions the prohibition against idolatry
forty-four times, in order to emphasize its singular severity and the need to
firmly reject it and distance ourselves from it.
The
Sefer Ha’hinuch, and the Rambam, maintain that this prohibition marks an
exception to the standard rule that violators of prohibitions which are
transgressed without performing an action are not liable to Malkut. One who takes an oath in the name of a
foreign deity, according to the Rambam and Sefer Ha’hinuch, is liable to
Malkut, even though this violation is committed verbally, and not by performing
an action, due to the unique severity of idolatry.
This
command, of course, applies to both men and women, both in Eretz Yisrael and
outside the land, and at all times.
Already
the Rishonim, approximately a thousand years ago, took note of the common
practice among Ashkenazic Jews to permit conducting business with gentiles
before and during their holidays. The
Rishonim justified this practice by stating that this was allowed due to the
concern of “Eba” – enmity that would be aroused by refusing to engage in
commercial activities with the gentiles.
If the Jews would suddenly discontinue trade and commerce with the
gentiles during their holiday season, causing the gentiles financial losses,
they will naturally resent the Jews, leading to hostility. Out of this concern, the Rabbis permitted
doing business with the gentiles before and during their holidays.
Likewise,
the custom developed to permit Jews to sue gentiles who owed them money, even
though the gentiles would then swear in the name of their god. This was permitted due to the severe
financial losses Jews would incur if there unable to bring gentiles to court.
These
leniencies led Rav Moshe Feinstein (Russia-New York, 1895-1986) to the
conclusion that these two prohibitions – conducting business with pagans during
their holiday season, and demanding an oath from a pagan in court – were
enacted by the Sages. In his Iggerot
Moshe (Yoreh De’a, 1:71), Rav Moshe noted that if these were forbidden on the
level of Torah law, they could not be allowed due to the concern of enmity or
to avoid financial losses. Evidently,
Torah law allows business with pagans during their holiday season, and
demanding an oath from a gentile, and these prohibitions were enacted by the
Rabbis.
Rav
Feinstein explains this theory based on the principle of “Dabar She’eno
Mitkaven,” which means that Torah law does not forbid an action which could
result in an unintended violation. As
long as the act is not committed with the intention to transgress a Torah law,
and it is not certain that the act will have such a result, the act is allowed. When a Jew engages in commerce with a gentile
during the gentile’s holiday season, he does not intend at all that the gentile
will give thanks to his god, and this is clearly not certain to occur. Therefore, as far as Torah law is concerned,
this is permissible, but the Sages enacted that this should be avoided in the
interest of distancing ourselves from pagan worship. Likewise, when a Jew brings a gentile to
court, he has no intention that the gentile would swear in the name of his
pagan god, nor is this certain to happen.
To the contrary, the Jew hopes that the gentile will simply admit to
owing the money he claims in order to avoid falsely swearing. Therefore, Torah law does not forbid suing a
pagan who will likely swear in the name of his god, but this was prohibited by
the Rabbis.
Hence,
as these prohibitions apply not on the level of Torah law, but rather by force
of Rabbinic enactment, they are suspended when this will likely invite hostility,
or when a substantial financial loss is at stake.
It
should be noted, however, that the Sefer Ha’hinuch presents these three
prohibitions – suing a pagan, conducting business with a pagan during a holiday
season, and mentioning the name of an idol – as three interpretations of the
verse “Ve’shem Elohim Aherim Lo Tazkiru.”
This would certainly imply that in the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s view, all three
are forbidden by the Torah. Rav Moshe,
apparently, felt that common practice does not follow this view, and instead
regards the first two as applying only by force of Rabbinic enactment, such
that leniencies can be introduced when the need arises.