A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Eli Mansour

Daf Yomi

Bava Kamma 106A - 106B (12th Cycle Daf Yomi Shiur)

Lectured by Rabbi Eli Mansour

Published
December 7, 2006
Duration
61:04

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The Eddie B. Sitt Edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, Masechet Bava Kamma, has been generously sponsored in our Daf Yomi program by our good friend and patron, Siyahu Ashar HaKohen, and his dear wife, Rina. May they, with God's help, continue to have success, prosperity in all their endeavors, health, happiness, and much joy from their children. May they enjoy many years of peace and tranquility. Amen.

Today's Daf is being studied in memory of Marat Zekenati, Yaffa Bat Sara, and in memory of my father, Avraham Ben Esther. May their souls be at peace in Gan Eden. Amen. Today's Daf is also dedicated to the complete recovery of Moshe Ben Dina. May he be healed in body and spirit, along with all the sick of Israel. Amen.

We begin today's Daf on Kuf Heh Amud Bet, towards the middle, starting with the words "Tanya Amar Ben Azzai." The last two words on the line are "Tanya." We have a Beraita. Ben Azzai taught that there are three types of oaths, specifically referring to a type of oath called Shevuat Ha'edut. This is the oath a person must take when they know testimony that could help a friend recover money. If a person lies and claims they do not know anything, when in fact they do, they are obligated to bring a Korban Chatat, a sin offering. For example, if someone swears, "I don't know anything," and later admits that they do, the Torah mandates that they must bring a Korban Chatat. This is known as Shevuat Ha'edut.

The Gemara explains, in the name of Ben Azzai, that there are three scenarios where this applies. The first scenario is "Hikkir Bah V'lo Bemotza'ah." This refers to a case involving an Aveidah, a lost object. In this case, the witness recognized the lost object belonged to someone, for example, Reuven, but did not recognize or know the person who found it. The witness should have come to Beit Din to testify, saying, "Yes, I saw the lost object at such and such a place," even if they did not know exactly who found it. This information would have been beneficial for the person who lost the object, allowing them to investigate and locate it. If the witness withheld this information and swore they did not know anything, they would be Chayav, obligated.

The second scenario is "Or Bemotza'ah V'lo Bah." Here, the witness knows who found the animal, but does not know that the animal belongs to Reuven. It would have been helpful for the witness to provide this testimony, as it would allow Reuven to investigate and potentially recover his animal. If the witness withholds this information and swears they do not know anything, they are also Chayav Chatat.

The last scenario is "Lo Bah V'lo Bemotza'ah." In this case, the witness does not know the animal belongs to Reuven and does not know who found it. The Gemara questions this scenario immediately, asking, "If he does not know anything, how can he swear?" The response is that if he truly has no information, then his oath is valid and he is not at fault. However, the Gemara suggests a more obvious case: "Bah U'motza'ah." In this case, the witness knows both who the animal belongs to and who found it. If they had provided this information at Beit Din, it could have helped locate the lost object for Reuven. If they did not come forward and instead swore they did not know, they are obligated to bring a Korban Chatat.

The Gemara then asks, "What is the purpose of Ben Azzai teaching these situations? What halacha comes from it? Is he teaching me a Chiyuv or a P'tur?" Rav Ami, in the name of Rabbi Chanina, states that he is coming to teach cases where the witness is Patur from the Korban Shevuat Ha'edut. However, Shmuel argues that he is indeed Chayav. This presents a Machlokes, a dispute, on what Ben Azzai intended to teach—whether these are cases of obligation or exemption. This dispute is based on the opinions of Tana'im, as we have a Beraita stating that if a person is forced to testify, and they swear they do not know anything, but then admit they do, one Rabbi says they are Patur from the Korban, as their testimony would not have changed the outcome since one witness cannot obligate payment. Another Rabbi states they are Chayav, as their testimony could potentially lead to a monetary obligation.

The Gemara explains that this Machlokes hinges on whether a statement that leads to potential financial consequences is considered as significant as direct financial obligations. One Rabbi argues that it is not, while the other maintains that it is. This distinction is crucial in understanding the implications of withholding testimony and the associated obligations.

The discussion continues with Rav Sheshet introducing a new point: "Ha-kofer Be-pikadon." If someone is watching an item and denies having it, even without swearing, they become a Gazlan, a thief. Once a person denies having the item, they are liable for all damages, regardless of circumstances, because they are no longer considered a Shomer, a guardian with certain responsibilities. Rav Sheshet's insight emphasizes the seriousness of denial and its consequences.

The Gemara supports this with a verse, "Ve-chichash Bah," which refers to a guardian who denies having an item entrusted to them. The verse teaches that if they deny it, they have an obligation to return it under all circumstances, which includes being liable for any damage, even if it was beyond their control. The Gemara then asks about the warning associated with this punishment, clarifying that a warning must accompany any punishment. The verse "Lo techachashu" serves as this warning, indicating the prohibition against denial.

Rav Sheshet's teaching is further clarified through examples and scenarios, demonstrating the implications of denial and the responsibilities of guardianship. The discussion emphasizes the importance of honesty and the consequences of failing to fulfill one's obligations.

As the Gemara continues, it delves deeper into the nuances of testimony, denial, and the obligations of witnesses in various scenarios. The intricate details of halacha are explored, highlighting the importance of understanding the distinctions between different cases and their implications.

In conclusion, the Gemara presents various perspectives on the obligations of witnesses and guardians, emphasizing the seriousness of testimony and the consequences of denial. The discussions are rooted in a deep understanding of halacha and the moral responsibilities that accompany it. Each ruling and interpretation serves to guide individuals in their actions and decisions, ensuring that justice and truth are upheld in all matters.