A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Eli Mansour

Daf Yomi

Shevuot 22A - 22B (12th Cycle Daf Yomi Shiur)

Lectured by Rabbi Eli Mansour

Published
June 19, 2007
Duration
61:30

This transcript was auto-generated and polished for readability. While we aim for accuracy, errors may occur. If you notice a mistake, please click to submit corrections.

The Eddie B. Sitt edition presents an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, specifically focusing on Masechet Shavuot Daf Kaf-Beit. This series is sponsored for the elevation of the souls of Mordechai ben Esther, Eliyahu ben Harry, and Adele bat Mazal. May Hashem grant them peace in the Garden of Eden, amen.

We begin our study three lines from the bottom of the page. The discussion opens with a challenge directed at Rabbi Akiva: “Where do we find in the Torah that a person can make a shevua not to eat even a small amount, referred to as kol shehu?” Rabbi Akiva posits that a man can indeed take a shevua stating, “I will not eat even a kol shehu.” The Rabbis counter this assertion, questioning Rabbi Akiva’s position, as typically, the measure for eating is a kezayit (olive's worth). The Gemara then seeks to clarify this point.

The Gemara begins by referencing a case involving an ant: “But the case of the ant is different.” The Gemara explains that an ant is considered a complete being, a briya, which is significant in halachic terms, thereby disallowing it as a valid proof against Rabbi Akiva's claim. The discussion then turns to hekdesh (consecrated items): it is taught that one can be liable for me'ilah (misappropriation) even if they consume less than a kezayit of hekdesh, as long as the value is equivalent to a peruta (the smallest currency). The Gemara specifies that the measure here is indeed a shaveh peruta, which is less than a kezayit but still significant.

Next, the Gemara discusses the case of someone who explicitly states, “I take a shevua not to eat mashu (something).” In this instance, the Gemara concludes that this declaration elevates the mashu to a status of importance, rendering the shevua valid. However, it clarifies that in a general case, without explicit mention, the measure remains a kezayit.

Rabbi Akiva’s position is further defended through the example of afar (dirt). If a person swears not to eat dirt, the Gemara questions how much dirt must be consumed to be liable. The Gemara explores whether dirt, being inedible, can be considered under the same measure as other foods. It concludes that since dirt is not classified as an edible item, the measure could very well be a kol shehu, as it is not bound by the same rules as food.

As the discussion unfolds, the Gemara presents a scenario involving a neder (vow). A person states, “I will not eat this loaf of bread,” which is a konam (vow) and is binding on all parts of the loaf. The Gemara notes that in this case, the person is prohibited from consuming any part of the loaf, and if they do, they must bring a korban (sacrifice) for transgressing their vow.

Rabbi Akiva’s argument is further supported by the assertion that a shevua is stricter than a neder. The Gemara articulates that the sin of a shevua arises from speech, which carries its own weight and consequences. Thus, Rabbi Akiva maintains that even a stam shevua (a general oath) implies a mashu, whereas the Rabbis argue that the default measure is a kezayit.

The Gemara continues to explore various examples, including the case of a neder where the individual does not specify an amount. It concludes that if the person swears not to eat something that is already forbidden, such as a kezayit of nevela (carrion), the shevua does not take effect as the item is already prohibited.

Through these discussions, the Gemara elucidates the intricate halachic distinctions between different types of oaths and vows, emphasizing the importance of language and intent in halachic rulings. The dialogue between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis illustrates the dynamic nature of halachic discourse, where each case is analyzed within its specific context, leading to a deeper understanding of the principles underlying Jewish law.

In conclusion, the exploration of these cases in the Gemara not only highlights the complexity of halachic reasoning but also reinforces the significance of intention and specificity in the realm of oaths and vows. As we continue our study, we remain mindful of the profound implications of our words and commitments in the spiritual and legal dimensions of our lives.