The Eddie B. Sitt edition and audio series of the Talmud Bavli, fifteen lines from the top. What I am saying is that this is really a combination. The first section is the primary source of the analogy. That is truly the primary source of the analogy; it is simply that other connections are also available.
Once I see another connection between the two instances of “sin”—not through a verbal analogy, but merely through a common word, between the oath of testimony and the oath concerning a deposit—I can say that perhaps the intention was for us to learn the verbal analogy from “sin” in the oath of testimony to “sin” in the oath concerning a deposit.
Do we have any limitation on this? In the oath of testimony, the person brings a sin offering. What offering does one bring for the oath involving an utterance of the lips? A sin offering. What offering does one bring for the oath concerning a deposit? A guilt offering. Perhaps it would be more logical to connect the oath of testimony with the oath involving an utterance of the lips, since they require the same offering, a sin offering, rather than connecting it with the oath concerning a deposit, whose punishment is a guilt offering.
Look at all these matters. There are four properties that are similar. Since these four properties are similar to each of these cases, we must examine them one at a time.
First, what is the situation if a person makes an oath concerning any of these matters? The common feature is that the oaths do not all have the same subject. One person says, “You owe me my deposit,” while another says, “I swear that I will not eat bread.” The latter concerns the future, whereas the former concerns the past. The oath of testimony concerns testimony that a person knows and could provide for me; the oath concerning a deposit concerns the claim, “You owe me the deposit.”
Although, according to Rabbi Akiva, the oath involving an utterance of the lips can also apply to the past, its primary application—the principal case of an oath involving an utterance of the lips that is written in the Torah—is really about the future. Therefore, that oath is not analogous to the oath of testimony. It is more analogous to the oath concerning a deposit, because the latter requires four elements.
First, it is not an oath concerning a sin. Second, in both cases the person acts intentionally, and in both cases there is an offering. Third, there is a claim and a denial. Fourth, the matter concerns the past tense.
I will show you a similarity between the oath of testimony and the oath involving an utterance of the lips. There is a sin offering in both cases, and the offering can vary according to the person’s means. If the person cannot afford the standard offering, he brings a lower-grade offering.
Thus, the first similarity between the oath of testimony and the oath involving an utterance of the lips is that both involve a sin offering. The second is that the offering fluctuates according to the person’s means. The third is that neither the oath of testimony nor the oath involving an utterance of the lips requires the person to pay an additional fifth if he lied.
In contrast, in the oath concerning a deposit, when a person denies the deposit, he must add a fifth. Therefore, I have found three similarities between the oath involving an utterance of the lips and the oath of testimony. In addition, the oath involving an utterance of the lips applies even to nonmonetary matters. Therefore, perhaps we should say that the oath of testimony also applies to nonmonetary matters.
The answer is that there are four similarities to the oath concerning a deposit, whereas there are only three similarities to the oath involving an utterance of the lips. There are more similarities to the oath concerning a deposit than to the oath involving an utterance of the lips. Therefore, the verbal analogy will connect the oath of testimony with the oath concerning a deposit, and not with the oath involving an utterance of the lips.
Rabbi Akiva derives an additional point from the word “betrayal.” What does that word teach him? It teaches that there is a monetary element. Since there are many matters that can be considered relevant, some monetary and some nonmonetary, how do we know which way to learn the passage? If it is monetary, it is relevant; if it is not monetary, it is also relevant. The question is which direction the derivation should take.
Rabbi Akiva relied on the verbal analogy. In reality, he added the primary section of the verbal analogy and therefore compared the oath of testimony to the oath concerning a deposit. Once I see that the verbal analogy connects the oath of testimony to the oath concerning a deposit, I know how to understand the word “betrayal.” It excludes nonmonetary matters and includes monetary matters.
In other words, the verbal analogy first connects the oath of testimony with the oath concerning a deposit. Once that connection has been made, the word “betrayal” teaches that the oath of testimony applies only to monetary matters, not to nonmonetary matters.
The final question is this: At the end of the day, both positions are saying the same thing. Both derive the ruling from the letter ayin. What, then, is the difference between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva?
Suppose the case involves testimony concerning land. In such a case, according to Rabbi Eliezer, the matter is monetary. Nevertheless, even though it is monetary, the person will never be liable for the oath of testimony, because land is not included in this oath. According to Rabbi Akiva, from where is the ruling ultimately derived? He derives it from the following structure: the verbal analogy teaches that just as the oath concerning a deposit applies to monetary matters, so too the oath of testimony applies to monetary matters. Then the word “betrayal” further teaches that not every monetary matter is included. It applies to movable property, but not to land.
Rabbi Yochanan says that even according to Rabbi Eliezer, testimony concerning land is excluded from the oath of testimony. What practical difference is there between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva? There is a difference in a case involving testimony concerning a fine.
According to Rabbi Akiva, a fine is monetary. Therefore, the person should be liable. Rabbi Eliezer, however, will say that it is monetary, but the word “betrayal” teaches that only certain monetary matters are included. A fine is excluded, and the person is exempt. Thus, the practical difference is whether the oath of testimony applies to a matter involving a fine.
Rabbi Yosef the Galilean says that the very fact that you are telling me that the oath of testimony concerns a monetary case indicates that monetary matters have the quality of knowledge without seeing and seeing without knowledge. A person can see something without truly knowing what he is seeing, or know something without actually seeing it. Therefore, both of these possibilities apply to monetary matters.
The Gemara says that Rabbi Yosef does not maintain this position. What does he say? We learned that Rabbi Eliezer says that the owners are liable when a camel is found dead beside another camel that is kicking it. If you see a camel kicking another camel, and the other camel is found dead beside it, you may know as a matter of fact that the first camel killed it. The owners are therefore liable, even though they did not actually see the moment of death. They saw only the camel kicking, while the other camel was found dead beside it.
What do we learn from this? Even though the witnesses did not actually see the killing, they saw the circumstances surrounding it. The text states that there is no testimony without both seeing and knowing, except in the case of monetary testimony. Normally, one must see the event and understand what one is seeing. The exception is testimony concerning money, such as the oath of testimony, where one may have one without the other.
It follows that Rabbi Yosef the Galilean does not accept Rabbi Eliezer’s position. In the camel case, the liability is based on an assessment of the circumstances. It is not a case of the oath of testimony. The person has neither direct knowledge nor direct observation, and yet the ruling is that he is liable. That is because the case is based on circumstantial assessment.
In other words, in all other cases one must know what one is seeing. Here, however, the witnesses do not even have to know exactly what they are seeing, and they do not have to see the actual act. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient. They see one camel kicking and another camel lying dead beside it, and they make an assumption from those circumstances.
The question continues. If you maintain that circumstantial evidence is sufficient in the case of the camel, I can give you a case involving capital punishment in which there is knowledge without seeing. In that case, too, you could rely on circumstances rather than direct observation.
What is the case? A man says, “May my children die and may I never be comforted,” so certain is he of what he is saying. He was seen chasing his friend into a dilapidated building. I chased after him to see what he would do. I saw a man running, holding a knife or sword, with blood dripping from it. I saw the dead man lying on the floor, already in the process of dying. Who killed him? There are only two possible people—either me or you.
What can I do to you? Your blood is not placed in my hands for me to do anything to you. Why? Two witnesses are required. God will punish you. Walk away two steps, and before anything else happens, the man is bitten by a snake.
Here is a case of circumstantial evidence in which the circumstances appear sufficient. The witnesses did not see the murder itself, but they know who killed the man. If you accept the camel case as a precedent, you should accept this case as well. Again, however, the question is whether the principle of circumstantial evidence applies only to monetary matters or also to capital cases.
If you apply the principle to monetary matters, then perhaps the Torah’s case of the oath of testimony can also involve a capital case. In other words, there can be a circumstantial case in which you know who killed the victim even though you did not see the actual killing.
But let me give you the opposite type of case. In a capital case, you can have knowledge without seeing, but you cannot have seeing without knowledge. If you saw a person kill someone but you do not know whom he killed, you cannot execute him. You must know whom he killed. Perhaps he killed a non-Jew; perhaps he killed a Jew. In addition, he may have killed someone who was already mortally ill or someone who was whole and healthy.
Therefore, the conclusion is that the principle of knowledge without seeing, or seeing without knowledge, applies only to monetary matters. How can there be such a case? Either the witnesses saw money being handed over, so they have seeing but do not know why the money was given, or they heard the defendant admit that he owes money, so they have knowledge but did not see the actual transaction.
For example, they saw a person give money to another person, but they do not know whether it was a repayment, a loan, or a gift. They can testify that the money was handed over even though they do not know the purpose of the transfer. Alternatively, they heard the person admit that he owes money, and they can testify to the admission even though they did not see the original transaction. That is how Rabbi Eliezer understands the matter: the cases of knowledge without seeing or seeing without knowledge apply to monetary matters.
Rabbi Yosef adds another point. When the oath of testimony concerns a fine, and the witnesses know that the person owes a fine but he denies everything, and they later testify that they saw the act, do we say that the fine has the status of money and that the witnesses are liable for the oath of testimony? Or do we say that it does not have that status?
The Gemara says that it can prove the answer. Now that Rabbi Yosef must maintain that there is no oath of testimony in a case involving a fine, why is that? If you want to say that the oath of testimony can apply to a fine, then we could have a case of knowledge without seeing. For example, a person could enter a room and possess knowledge of what happened there, even though he did not see the act itself.
But in a case involving a fine, there is only one side of the matter. There can be knowledge without seeing, but not seeing without knowledge. If you did not see the act and have no idea whom the person harmed, you cannot serve as a witness. Therefore, according to this position, a fine cannot be the subject of the oath of testimony.
There is also a personal point here. I once heard this from a student: “You are wiser than your rabbi; therefore, your words bring wisdom to your rabbi.”
Consider another case. A person says to his friend, “I lent you money beside that pole.” He gives the location where the money was allegedly given. The friend responds, “I never walked by that pole.” Two witnesses then appear and say, “That is not true. We once saw him urinating beside that pole.” Since he is denying that he was ever there, the witnesses establish that he is lying. He was at the pole when he went to urinate, and therefore he is considered untrustworthy. He must repay the loan in the presence of two witnesses, and we will not believe him even if he says that he repaid it.
But what kind of law is that? It sounds like a Persian law—something that makes no sense. The answer is that when he said, “I never walked by that pole,” he meant, “I was never beside that pole in connection with this transaction.” The witnesses who say that they saw him urinating there have not shown that he was there when the loan was given. Therefore, their testimony does not establish that he was lying.
A person does not remember every insignificant act. If he urinated beside the pole, that may not remain in his mind. If there was a loan, however, that is a significant matter, and he would remember it. The fact that he does not remember urinating beside the pole does not make him a liar. The witnesses’ testimony shows only that he was once there, not that he was there during the loan transaction.
Now let us return to Rabbi Shimon’s position. The entire discussion concerns Rabbi Shimon’s view. The question of the Gemara was how we know that the oath of testimony applies specifically to monetary matters.
Rabbi Shimon gave a straightforward answer. In the oath concerning a deposit, we have both an oath and a monetary item. The oath concerning a deposit is the case in which a person denies that he owes the deposit. It is clearly an oath, and it is clearly monetary, because a deposit is a monetary item. Therefore, the same should be true of the oath of testimony: it is an oath and it applies specifically to monetary matters.
He then proposed a logical inference. Consider the oath concerning a deposit, which has many stringencies: women are included like men, relatives are included like nonrelatives, and disqualified witnesses are included like qualified witnesses. Nevertheless, the person is liable only in a monetary case and only in court.
The oath of testimony, by contrast, has leniencies. It applies only to qualified witnesses, not to relatives or disqualified witnesses, and only in court. If, in the case of the oath concerning a deposit, which has all those stringencies, liability applies only to money, then in the case of the oath of testimony, which has all those leniencies, certainly liability should apply only to money.
That was Rabbi Shimon’s logical inference. He then said that the inference could be challenged. The oath concerning a deposit has two leniencies. First, it applies only when the person himself takes the oath, not when others impose the oath upon him. Second, if he acts intentionally, he is not liable. The oath of testimony, however, applies whether the oath is taken voluntarily or imposed by others, and even when the person acts intentionally.
Perhaps because the oath of testimony has those additional stringencies, it does not apply only to monetary matters. Perhaps it applies to other matters as well. This was Rabbi Shimon’s challenge to the logical inference.
He therefore brought a verbal analogy between the two occurrences of “sin”: “the sin of the oath concerning a deposit” and “the sin of the oath of testimony.” Just as the oath of testimony applies only to money, so too the oath concerning a deposit applies only to money. That was the verbal analogy together with the initial proof.
He then brought the logical inference and challenged it. The people in Israel laughed when they heard Rabbi Shimon’s position. Why did they laugh? One of the points he used to challenge the inference was that the oath concerning a deposit does not apply when the oath is imposed by others, whereas the oath of testimony does. But how did Rabbi Shimon know that the oath of testimony applies only when the person takes the oath himself?
The passage concerning the oath of testimony describes a case in which others cause the person to swear. How, then, did Rabbi Shimon know that the oath of testimony also applies when the person swears on his own? He derived that point from the oath concerning a deposit. Just as he learned the requirement that the person swear himself from the oath concerning a deposit, perhaps he should also learn from the oath concerning a deposit that an oath imposed by others is excluded.
In other words, if Rabbi Shimon learned the voluntary oath of testimony from the oath concerning a deposit, then he should also learn that an oath imposed by others is excluded. The people in Israel therefore laughed at the way he challenged the logical inference. They said that he had already used the oath concerning a deposit as a source for one side of the issue, and he could not simply disregard it when dealing with the other side.
There was also the question of intentional action. Rabbi Shimon said that the oath concerning a deposit has the leniency that an intentional false oath does not create liability, whereas the oath of testimony does create liability even when the person acted intentionally. But how do we know that the oath of testimony creates liability in an intentional case?
The answer is that the verse concerning the oath of testimony does not contain the word “was hidden” or “unrecognized,” the expression that indicates an inadvertent lapse. Since that word is absent, the person is liable even when he knew what he was doing. The oath concerning a deposit also does not contain that word, so perhaps it too should create liability in an intentional case.
That is why the people in Israel laughed. They said that if the absence of the word “was hidden” teaches liability in an intentional case for the oath of testimony, then the same should apply to the oath concerning a deposit. Why did Rabbi Shimon use the absence of the word to create liability in one case but not the other?
Rabbi Shimon answered that perhaps an intentional case is treated like an inadvertent case by means of a derivation from the law of misuse of sacred property. The word “betrayal” appears in the oath concerning a deposit and in the ordinary law of misuse of sacred property. We know that misuse of sacred property applies only when the person acts inadvertently. Therefore, perhaps the oath concerning a deposit also applies only when the person acts inadvertently.
What is the difficulty? Rabbi Shimon could have learned from the law of misuse of sacred property that an intentional case is exempt, and he could have learned from the oath of testimony that an intentional case is liable, because the word “was hidden” is absent in both passages. Both possibilities are available.
There are therefore two places from which to derive the law. One can derive from misuse of sacred property that an intentional act is exempt, or one can derive from the oath of testimony that an intentional act is liable. The same verbal analogy between “sin” and “sin” could connect these cases.
Rabbi Shimon answers that there are more similarities between the oath concerning a deposit and misuse of sacred property. Count them: there are five similarities as opposed to four.
First, misuse of sacred property applies to all types of sacred property, just as the oath concerning a deposit involves benefiting from an item by retaining it. In both cases, the person benefits from the item. Second, both require a standard offering. Third, both involve a guilt offering rather than a sin offering. Fourth, in both cases the person must pay an additional fifth. These matters create a stronger analogy between misuse of sacred property and the oath concerning a deposit.
On the other side, there are similarities between the oath of testimony and misuse of sacred property. Both involve an offering, and both include a guilt offering. Both also involve a fifth. But the oath of testimony and the oath concerning a deposit apply to ordinary, non-sacred property, whereas misuse of sacred property concerns sacred property. Therefore, the analogy between the oath concerning a deposit and the oath of testimony is stronger in relation to ordinary property.
In the oath concerning a deposit and the oath of testimony, there is a claim and a denial. In one case, the claim is, “Where is my deposit?” and the person denies it. In the other, the claim is, “Testify for me that you know testimony,” and the person denies it. Thus, the dynamics of a claim and a denial are the same.
In addition, both passages contain the word “or.” Therefore, if you say that the oath of testimony is more analogous to the oath concerning a deposit than to misuse of sacred property, then perhaps the intentional case should be exempt in the oath of testimony just as it is in the oath concerning a deposit.
The answer is that there are still more similarities to misuse of sacred property. Therefore, it is more appropriate to learn from misuse of sacred property that an intentional act is exempt. There was consequently no reason to laugh at Rabbi Shimon when he said that the oath concerning a deposit is exempt in an intentional case. He was learning that law from misuse of sacred property: just as misuse of sacred property is exempt when done intentionally, so too the oath concerning a deposit is exempt when done intentionally.
The question remains: Why did the rabbis laugh at Rabbi Shimon? At the end of the day, Rabbi Shimon used a verbal analogy. Once he had a verbal analogy, why did he first challenge his own logical inference? He initially reasoned as follows: if the oath concerning a deposit has all these stringencies and still applies only to money, then the oath of testimony, which has so many leniencies, should certainly apply only to money.
He then challenged that inference by pointing out that the oath concerning a deposit has two leniencies: it applies only when the person swears himself, not when others make him swear, and an intentional false oath does not create liability. The oath of testimony has those stringencies. That was his challenge to the logical inference.
The Gemara asks: Once Rabbi Shimon possessed the verbal analogy, why did he challenge the logical inference? On the contrary, he should have derived from the verbal analogy that both cases apply whether the person swears himself or others make him swear, and that both apply even in an intentional case.
Rabbi Shimon should have said that the verbal analogy connects all these matters. Just as an oath imposed by others creates liability in the oath of testimony, so too it should create liability in the oath concerning a deposit. Just as an intentional oath creates liability in the oath of testimony, so too it should create liability in the oath concerning a deposit. Once the verbal analogy is established, why challenge the logical inference based on the supposed leniencies?
This is the question the rabbis in Israel had against Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara answers that perhaps the leniency concerning an intentional act is learned from misuse of sacred property, not from the verbal analogy. Since misuse of sacred property applies only when done inadvertently, Rabbi Shimon could learn that an intentional oath concerning a deposit is exempt.
But with regard to an oath imposed by others, the objection remains. Once there is a verbal analogy between “sin” and “sin,” just as an oath imposed by others creates liability in the oath of testimony, it should create liability in the oath concerning a deposit as well. Rabbi Shimon’s verbal analogy should connect those cases.
The answer is that Rabbi Shimon’s position can still be maintained. The law of an intentional act is learned from misuse of sacred property, because the analogy between those cases is stronger. The law of an oath imposed by others, however, is learned through the verbal analogy between the oath of testimony and the oath concerning a deposit.
There is another question. How did Rabbi Shimon know that an intentional oath of testimony creates liability? The answer is that the Torah deliberately placed the passage concerning the oath of testimony next to the passages concerning the ordinary oath involving an utterance of the lips and the impurity of the Temple and its sacred objects. In those two neighboring cases, the Torah explicitly uses the expression “was hidden,” teaching that liability applies when the act was inadvertent.
In the passage concerning the oath of testimony, that expression is conspicuously absent. The contrast teaches that the person is liable even when he acted intentionally. Therefore, the intentional liability in the oath of testimony is not learned from misuse of sacred property. It is learned from the absence of the expression “was hidden.”
That is why the oath of testimony is liable even in an intentional case, while the oath concerning a deposit is exempt in an intentional case. The oath concerning a deposit can be derived from misuse of sacred property, where an intentional act is exempt. The oath of testimony, by contrast, is adjacent to cases in which the Torah mentions an inadvertent lapse, yet omits that expression from the oath of testimony. The omission teaches intentional liability.
Rabbi Shimon’s position therefore works out well. Ultimately, he maintains that the oath of testimony applies to monetary matters through the verbal analogy between the two occurrences of “sin.” The Gemara’s discussion of the laughter of the rabbis in Israel was an attempt to determine why they laughed at his argument.
In the end, everything Rabbi Shimon said can be understood. He first made a logical inference: if the oath concerning a deposit, with all its stringencies, applies only to money, then the oath of testimony, with its many leniencies, should certainly apply only to money. He then challenged that inference by identifying two leniencies in the oath concerning a deposit: it applies only when the person swears himself, not when others impose the oath, and an intentional act does not create liability.
The rabbis in Israel laughed because they thought that the challenge was unnecessary or inconsistent. Once Rabbi Shimon had a verbal analogy, they argued, he should have used it to connect all the cases. The Gemara, however, resolves the matter. Rabbi Shimon can learn the intentional case from misuse of sacred property, while the case of an oath imposed by others can be learned through the verbal analogy.
Thus, the final position is that the oath of testimony applies specifically to monetary matters through the verbal analogy. The oath of testimony creates liability even in an intentional case because the Torah does not use the expression “was hidden” in that passage. The oath concerning a deposit, however, is exempt in an intentional case because that law is derived from misuse of sacred property. The various distinctions are therefore accounted for, and Rabbi Shimon’s position is complete.