The Eri B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli, Massechet Kiddushin, has been sponsored by our good friend Vestachai Midanah in honor of his wife, Dina bat Rivka. May they have many years of peace in the home, success in Massechet Kiddushin, success and prosperity, and all good things—health, happiness, joy from their children, and all the blessings. Amen.
Today’s learning is dedicated for the elevation of the soul of Muzikini Yosef ben Sarav, Marat Zakenati Yefah bat Sara, Ben Shemat Avram ben Ester, and Daph ben Stadler. May God comfort and protect them, and may there be complete salvation and peace for Moshe ben Dina and Sarabat Rahad.
We begin today’s page on 79b. We are five, six, seven lines from the bottom.
A man comes along and says, “I married a woman overseas.” Once he brings proof regarding the woman, that is sufficient. Since he has already established the woman’s identity, as we learned on the previous page, the children are considered attached to her. Once you prove that the woman is of established lineage, the children automatically fall into place. You have to bring proof regarding the older children, but you do not have to bring proof regarding the younger children.
What is the case? When there is only one woman, regarding the younger children you do not have to bring proof, because the younger children are attached to their mother. The older children, however, are independent and are not necessarily attached to her. The younger children are attached to their mother, and that is sufficient.
Now look at Rashi. He writes, “He married a woman,” and asks: What should we do regarding the younger children and not the older ones? The answer is that the older children are not attached to their mother. If you can bring proof regarding the older children, then you do not even have to bring proof regarding the younger children. Why is that so? We have to examine the Gemara, because in truth the younger children are always acceptable. They are attached to their mother, and therefore there is never a question regarding them. The older children are not attached to her. Yet here the Gemara is telling us that if I bring proof regarding the older children, I do not need proof regarding the younger children. You never needed proof regarding the younger children in the first place.
We have to read the case again and understand it more precisely. Perhaps this is referring to a man who had one wife. But if he comes back with two wives, and one of the wives died, the case is different. He brings proof regarding the woman, the children, the older children, and the younger children.
Look at the way Rashi writes on the page: “One woman.” He says that the case is where the man says, “I married one woman.” But if he says, “There were two women, and one of them died,” and he claims that these are the children of the woman who is still alive, then there is no proof merely because the younger children are attached to her. Perhaps these children really belonged to the woman who died, and you do not know which woman was their mother.
Therefore, even if you bring proof regarding the identity and lineage of the woman who is alive, and even if you see that the children are attached to her, that is not proof. Perhaps they are attached to her because she is their stepmother. In truth, they may belong to the woman who died. Consequently, you have to bring proof regarding both the older and the younger children.
The Gemara responds that the woman raised them, and that is why they are attached to her. We therefore have an interesting situation here. Let us clarify the case once again, because this leads to a major question raised by the commentaries.
The man comes along and says, “I had two wives,” but he returns with only one of them. He then says, “These are the children of the wife who is alive.” We do not know who the living wife is, and certainly he must prove her identity. That is what the Gemara said. Even after he proves who she is, however, and even though the children are attached to her, that is still not proof. Perhaps they are attached to her only because she is their stepmother. In truth, the children belong to the other woman, the one who died. Therefore, he must bring proof for both the younger and older children.
The commentaries ask a very strong question: What is the problem? The man should be believed through a logical presumption known as a miggo. He could have returned from overseas and simply said, “This is my wife, and these are our children.” Instead, he volunteered additional information and said, “I had another wife, but these children are from the wife who is alive.” Since he could have remained silent and made the simpler claim, why should we not believe him regarding the children as well?
This is the question that the commentaries all ask: There is a miggo that he could have remained silent. As a result, the Rambam disagrees with the interpretation presented here and understands the case entirely differently.
The Rambam understands the case as follows. The man married one woman whose lineage was established. He then went overseas and returned with two wives, both of whom were alive. Even though the children are attached to the woman whose lineage was established, that is not considered proof that they are her children. Perhaps they were raised by the other woman, with whom they were living, and that is why they became closer to her.
According to this interpretation, there is no miggo that he could have remained silent. We already knew that he had one wife. When he returns, we see that he has two wives. He could not simply have claimed that he had only one wife, because we know that there are two. Therefore, according to the Rambam, both women are alive. Even though he returns with two wives, the fact that the children are attached to one of them is not proof that they are her children. Perhaps they became attached to that woman rather than to the woman whose established lineage is known.
Apparently, Rashi did not want to explain the case this way. It is difficult to say that children would be attached to a woman who is not their mother. Usually, children are attached to their mother. To say that the mother is estranged from the children and that they have instead become attached to another woman is a far-reaching assumption. Nevertheless, that was the position of the Rambam. Otherwise, the strong question of the miggo remains.
The Gemara continues. Rabbi Shimon says that this applies only with regard to the status of the children for purposes of lineage. Let us proceed carefully. We are discussing priests, who need to marry women of established lineage. The question is: To what extent can we rely on the presumption that the children are attached to their mother? Are these children considered fit to marry into the priesthood? Is this attachment sufficient proof?
The Gemara answers that we rely on this presumption only to allow them to eat terumah. Terumah is sacred food that may be eaten outside Jerusalem. In other words, with regard to sacred property of the border, we are lenient. We allow the girls to marry priests without investigating their lineage, and we allow them to eat terumah. We do not know exactly who these children are. Perhaps they are not the daughters of the woman whose lineage was established; perhaps they are of questionable status. Nevertheless, because they are attached to her, they may eat terumah.
For purposes of lineage, however, this is not sufficient. We do not allow them to marry into the priesthood merely because they are attached to the woman. The attachment is sufficient to allow them to eat terumah, but not sufficient to establish their lineage for marriage.
Rabbi Yochanan says that we rely on the presumption even for purposes of lineage. He permits them to marry into the priesthood as well. Rabbi Yochanan follows his general reasoning, because Rabbi Yochanan says that punishments can be administered on the basis of presumptions. A presumption is so strong that a person can even receive lashes on its basis. People can be stoned or burned on the basis of a presumption, but terumah is not burned on the basis of a presumption.
What is an example of lashes being administered on the basis of a presumption? Rav Yehuda says that in earlier times, when a woman was menstruating, she would wear special clothing. Everyone would see that she was wearing those clothes and would know that she was presumed to be in that state, even though there was no other evidence.
If people knew that her husband had relations with her during that time, they would give him lashes. Why? He had relations with a woman who was presumed to be in a forbidden state. How did they know that she was in that state? They saw that she was wearing the special clothing. Thus, we see that lashes can be administered on the basis of a presumption.
There are cases in which people are even stoned or burned on the basis of a presumption. Suppose a husband and wife are living together as husband and wife, and they have a boy and a girl living with them. Everyone knows that this is the family: the husband, the wife, and the two children. You do not have independent proof that the children are theirs, but you see them living together for years, and there is a presumption that this is the family.
If the son has relations with that woman, he is stoned, because he has had relations with his mother. On what proof do we know that she is his mother? We saw them living together in the city for years, and we know that this is the family. Therefore, if the son has relations with the woman, the law is stoning. If the father has relations with the daughter, the law is burning. A presumption is sufficient even for these severe punishments.
Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, in the name of Rabbah bar Kappara, that there was an incident involving a woman who came to Jerusalem with a baby on her shoulders. She raised the child as her son. When the child grew older, he had relations with her, and they were sentenced to stoning.
They did not sentence them to stoning because they had independently verified that the child was her son. Since he was attached to her, and she had raised him, that was considered a sufficiently strong presumption. The attachment itself established the presumption, and they were sentenced to stoning on that basis.
We see, however, that terumah is not burned on the basis of a presumption. Although a presumption is strong enough for punishments, it is not strong enough to burn terumah. What is the case in which terumah is not burned on the basis of a presumption?
Rabbi Yochanan says that it involves a child standing next to dough in the house, holding a piece of dough in his hand. According to Rabbi Meir, the dough itself is considered pure, because a child does not have a presumption of impurity. You know that the child took a piece of dough from the pile and is holding it in his hand, but the dough that remains in the pile is considered pure.
Why? Children play in garbage. Garbage may contain rodents and other things that are impure. Therefore, when the child touched the dough, you might assume that he was impure and that he rendered the dough impure. Nevertheless, according to Rabbi Meir, the dough remains pure because a child does not have an established presumption of impurity.
The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Meir not agree that children play in garbage? Why does Rabbi Meir not take into account the possibility that the child became impure? The majority of children do play in garbage, although there is a minority who do not. The dough, however, has an established presumption of purity.
We have a minority of children who are pure, and we combine that minority with the presumption that the dough is pure. This weakens the majority. Ordinarily, when there is a majority and a presumption, the majority prevails. In this case, however, the minority of pure children is combined with the presumption that the dough is pure, and the minority becomes significant enough to weaken the majority.
Normally, we say that the majority is stronger than the presumption. There is a majority of children who play in garbage, and the presumption is that the dough is pure. Ordinarily, we would follow the majority and declare the dough impure. Rabbi Meir, however, has an unusual position. Whenever there is a majority, there is obviously also a minority. The minority does not become nonexistent merely because it is outnumbered. Therefore, we take the minority of pure children and combine it with the presumption that the dough is pure. That weakens the majority.
If you say that the minority is nonexistent because it is nullified by the majority, then the case is simply a majority against a presumption, and the majority will prevail. But if you say that the minority remains significant and can be placed together with the presumption, then the presumption will prevail. Rabbi Meir holds that the minority can be combined with the presumption.
The Sages disagree. According to them, the minority is treated as nonexistent. The majority prevails over the presumption, and the dough should be considered impure.
This is the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages. You see a child in the house holding a piece of dough. This is the case in which terumah is not burned on the basis of a presumption. That is what Rabbi Shimon is saying: This is not the case of burning terumah on the basis of a presumption. He holds that the dough is only questionably impure, and when there is a doubt regarding the impurity of terumah, we do not burn it.
What do you do with the dough? You set it aside because of the doubt. You do not eat it, but you also do not burn it. Why? Because terumah is not burned when its impurity is uncertain.
Rabbi Yochanan responds: No, that is not the case of burning terumah on the basis of a presumption. In that case, the dough remains questionable, and therefore you leave it aside. You do not burn terumah because of a doubt. Give me a case in which a presumption is strong enough that we would burn terumah.
Suppose there is dough in a house, and there are frogs in the house. The frogs are jumping around, and pieces of their limbs are scattered everywhere. You find a piece in the dough, but you do not know whether it is a rodent or a frog.
If the majority of the animals in the house are rodents, then we follow the majority. If the majority are frogs, Rabbi Yochanan will agree that we rely on the presumption. If there are more rodents than frogs, and you find a piece of one of them in the dough, you know what it is based on the majority. The presumption is strong enough in that case, and you burn the terumah.
What makes this case different? The commentaries explain that this is a majority that is before us. When there is a majority that is physically present before us—in this case, the rodents or frogs in the house—you can see the majority itself. A presumption based on a majority that is before us is much stronger than the other case, involving the majority of children who play in garbage.
The majority of children who play in garbage is not physically before us. It is a general majority based on what children usually do. Although it may be a majority, it is not a majority that is present before us. Therefore, it is not as strong, and you cannot burn terumah on that basis.
When, however, the majority is physically present before us, it is much stronger. If most of the animals in the house are rodents, and you find a piece in the dough, you can rely on that majority and burn the terumah.
We have a baraita that supports Rabbi Yochanan. There are two cases in which, even though the item itself cannot be questioned, the Rabbis treated its status in a particular way. We have a general rule: If it is impossible to ask the object whether it became impure, then a doubt regarding it is considered pure. If the item cannot answer a question about what happened to it, its doubtful status is treated leniently.
The rule is that a doubt regarding impurity in a private domain is impure when the person involved has the awareness to be questioned. If there is no awareness to be questioned, the doubt is pure. Nevertheless, the Rabbis instituted two exceptions and treated these cases as though the item had awareness to be questioned.
One case is a child. As we said, the child is standing next to the dough and holding a piece of it in his hand. Does a child have the awareness to be questioned? No. You can ask him, “Are you impure? Were you playing in the garbage?” but he is a child and does not have the required awareness. Normally, because there is no awareness to be questioned, his doubtful status would be considered pure. Nevertheless, the Rabbis treated this case as though there were awareness to be questioned.
What is the other case? There is dough in the house, and chickens are present. You see peck marks in the dough, indicating that the chickens pecked at it. We treat the dough as doubtful terumah. You set it aside, but you do not eat it and you do not burn it.
There is no concern that a chicken itself is impure. The concern is that perhaps the chickens drank from impure liquids, and some of that liquid remained on their beaks. They then pecked at the dough and transferred the impure liquid to it. Therefore, you set the dough aside because of the doubt, but you do not burn it, because perhaps it never became impure.
Even though a chicken does not have awareness to be questioned—you cannot ask a chicken whether it drank impure water—the Rabbis treated this case as though it did have such awareness. These are the two cases: the child and the chicken.
Let us slow down for a moment and finish this point. What happens when the liquid is clear and you cannot tell what happened? Suppose it was impure red wine. If you say that the chicken drank the liquid and then pecked at the dough, you might think that if there are no red marks in the dough, we should certainly say that the dough is pure. You have an indication that no red liquid was transferred.
The Gemara responds that perhaps the dough absorbed the liquid. Just because you do not see red marks does not mean that the liquid is not present. It may have been absorbed into the dough.
Rabbi Yochanan said, “I heard this matter from my teacher.” The expression “my teacher” refers to a great scholar; in this case, it refers to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. Rabbi Yochanan heard the law from his teacher, but he did not hear its explanation. He heard that the matter involved red liquids, but he did not hear what the law meant.
Rabbi Yochanan therefore explains that the matter applies only to clear liquids. When we say that the dough is considered impure even when the liquid was red, we are referring to a red liquid that is clear enough for a person to see a reflection in it. Such a liquid can be absorbed into the dough, and you will not be able to recognize that it was absorbed. Therefore, even red liquid presents a problem if it is sufficiently clear.
If the liquid is murky, however, it will not be absorbed in the same way. If it entered the dough, you would be able to see it. Therefore, in that case, if you do not see anything, the dough is considered pure. That is the distinction: a clear red liquid can be absorbed without leaving a visible sign, whereas a thick or murky liquid would remain detectable.
As Rashi explains, the liquid is considered clear when you can see a child’s face reflected in it. Since such a liquid can be absorbed into the dough without being noticed, even red liquid remains a problem. Thick red liquid is not a problem, because if it entered the dough, you would know it. The reference to a child has nothing to do with the size of the child’s face; it refers to the size of the cup. The liquid was in a small cup, and therefore the face of a child could be reflected in it. If it had been in a barrel, you could see the reflection even of an adult. The point is the clarity of the liquid, not the identity of the person whose face is reflected.
The last matter we have to understand is the concept of awareness to be questioned. Where did the Sages derive this idea? They derived it from the laws of a suspected adulteress, as we discussed previously. Where do we learn that a doubtful impurity in a private domain is treated as impurity? It is derived from the case of a woman who was secluded in a room. We do not know whether she had relations with another man, so we treat her as impure.
Although that is not a case of physical contamination, it is a doubt regarding the woman’s status in relation to her husband. From there, the Rabbis derived the rule that a doubt regarding impurity in a private domain is considered impure.
What kind of case is this? It is a case in which the person has awareness to be questioned. You can ask the woman whether anything happened. Therefore, only when there is awareness to be questioned do we treat a doubtful case of impurity in a private domain as impure. In contrast, with a child, a chicken, or another object that cannot be questioned, the doubt would ordinarily be considered pure. Rabbi Yochanan teaches that there are two exceptions to this principle.
We now continue in Massechet Kiddushin, beginning with the Mishnah.
A man is not permitted to seclude himself with two women. Why is he not allowed to be alone with them? The Gemara explains that women are considered lightheaded in this context and can be easily seduced. They will not necessarily be afraid to commit a transgression with the man, because the first woman may reason that the second woman will also do it.
Normally, a person is afraid to commit a transgression because someone else may discover what he did, and he will be embarrassed. In the case of two women, however, the first woman may say, “I am not embarrassed to commit this sin with the man, because the other woman is going to do it as well.” Therefore, a man may not seclude himself with two women.
One woman, however, is permitted to seclude herself with two men, because the men are embarrassed of one another and will protect each other. One man will not commit a transgression with the woman because he is embarrassed of his fellow. The Mishnah says that he is embarrassed before his fellow.
Rabbi Shimon says that even one man may seclude himself with two women, provided that his wife is with him. His wife protects him. Furthermore, he may even sleep in the same lodging with the women. We will examine this point in the Tosafot.
We therefore have a fundamental dispute between the first view in the Mishnah and Rabbi Shimon. The first view seems to hold that one man may not be alone with two women under any circumstances, apparently even when his wife is with him. Rabbi Shimon, however, seems to say that one man may be with two women when his wife is present, because his wife protects him. Rabbi Shimon even permits him to sleep in the same lodging with them.
According to the first way of understanding the Mishnah, Rabbi Shimon was lenient only in the case of one man with two women and his wife. In that situation, there are two factors protecting him: the presence of the two women, who are embarrassed of one another, and the presence of his wife, who protects him. One man and one woman, however, would not necessarily be permitted, because there would not be the same combination of protections.
Tosafot raises a question from Massechet Avodah Zarah, because the discussion there does not seem to follow this understanding. Tosafot therefore writes, “It appears to me” that Rabbi Shimon is actually saying that the man is permitted to be alone with two women specifically when his wife is not present. When his wife is present, however, everything is permitted according to everyone, even with one woman, because his wife protects him.
According to this second reading of Tosafot, Rabbi Shimon is being especially lenient. He permits one man to be alone with two women when his wife is with him, and the presence of his wife protects him. The dispute between the first view and Rabbi Shimon is therefore only whether one man may be alone with two women. The first view says that he may not, while Rabbi Shimon says that he may.
According to Tosafot’s second version, the phrase “when his wife is with him” applies according to everyone in the case of one man and one woman. Tosafot’s version of the Mishnah is that Rabbi Shimon is arguing about the case of one man with two women, while the case of a man with one woman when his wife is present is permitted according to all opinions.
Thus, Tosafot presents two ways of understanding the Mishnah. According to the first approach, the first view is saying that a man may not seclude himself with two women even when his wife is with him, whereas Rabbi Shimon permits it when his wife is present. According to the second approach, the first view says that one man may not be alone with two women, while Rabbi Shimon permits it when his wife is present; the presence of the wife protects him even in the case of one man and one woman.
The Mishnah continues. Although it is obviously forbidden for a man to be alone with his mother, and it is forbidden for him to be alone with his daughter in the ordinary sense of the prohibition, seclusion with his mother or daughter is permitted. Not only that, but a son may sleep next to his mother even when their flesh touches, and a father may sleep next to his daughter even when their flesh touches.
Once the child becomes an adult, however—we will have to examine what age that means—they may still sleep in the same bed, but they must be dressed. The son may be with his mother, and the daughter may sleep with her father in the same bed, but once the child becomes older, they may not sleep together while undressed. That is the law stated by the Mishnah.
The Gemara again asks: What is the reason it is forbidden for a man to be alone with two women? The reason is that women are lightheaded, meaning that they can be easily seduced. They may not be embarrassed to commit a transgression with the man, because each one will assume that the other is going to do the same thing. That is why it is forbidden for a person to seclude himself with them: it can lead to a transgression.
Even if one woman might be less likely to do this, the novelty of the Mishnah is that the presence of two women creates a greater concern. How do we know that seclusion itself is prohibited? Where is there an allusion to the prohibition of seclusion?
The Gemara derives it from the verse concerning a person who incites another to idolatry. An inciter is someone who attempts to draw a person away from the faith and lead him toward idolatry. The Torah says not to listen to such a person. The verse gives the example of a brother from one’s mother who attempts to incite his brother.
The Gemara asks: Is it only a maternal brother who can incite a person? Why does the Torah use that example? Why not a paternal brother? The Gemara answers that the Torah presents a normal scenario. The two brothers were presumably living together in the same house with their mother, and that is how the brother was able to incite him. From this the Gemara derives that a son may be secluded with his mother.
The verse therefore teaches that a son may be alone with his mother, but it implies that he may not be alone with other women who are forbidden to him. Rashi explains that a son is naturally close to his mother, and the verse presents a situation in which they are together. If seclusion between a son and his mother were forbidden, the two brothers would not have been living together in that way. The fact that the Torah establishes such a scenario indicates that seclusion with one’s mother is permitted, whereas seclusion with other prohibited women is not.
The Gemara then discusses a major dispute regarding which prohibitions apply by Torah law and which were instituted by the Sages. Seclusion with one’s mother is permitted. What about a relationship that is punishable by excision? What about a relationship punishable by execution by a court? What about a prohibition that is punishable by lashes? There is a distinction regarding which forbidden relationships are included in the Torah prohibition and which forms of seclusion were prohibited by rabbinic decree.
Seclusion with an unmarried girl, for example, is permitted by Torah law. The prohibition in that case was instituted by the court of King David, when seclusion with an unmarried woman was still permitted by Torah law because she could eventually become permitted through marriage. Since she could ultimately become permissible, the Sages did not prohibit the seclusion immediately. They waited until there was a more serious concern requiring a prohibition.
Although the Gemara uses the expression “an allusion,” the commentaries explain that this is a formal derivation. The Gemara is indeed treating the prohibition of seclusion as derived from the Torah.
The Gemara returns to the verse. What is its precise meaning? The verse is speaking about a brother who incites his brother. Why does it specifically choose a maternal brother? The Gemara answers that it is obvious that one should not listen to a paternal brother who gives such advice, because paternal brothers may have animosity toward one another. They have to divide an inheritance, and there may be friction between them. Consequently, if a paternal brother gives bad advice, it is obvious that one should not listen to him.
The Torah therefore teaches that even a maternal brother, between whom there is generally no such animosity, must not be followed when he attempts to incite a person. One might think that if a maternal brother gives such advice, he has no reason to harm his brother, and perhaps the advice should be trusted. The Torah teaches that even in that case, one must not listen to him.
The Gemara asks whether the Mishnah does not follow the opinion of Abba Shaul. We will see that Abba Shaul permits a man to be alone with two women, whereas the first view in the Mishnah prohibits it. It would therefore seem that the Mishnah does not follow Abba Shaul.
The Gemara brings a baraita. If a baby dies within thirty days of birth, the mother does not have to place the baby in a coffin. She may carry the baby in her arms to the cemetery and bury it that way. There is also no need for a large funeral procession. Three people are sufficient: the mother and two men.
Why does the baraita specify the mother and two men, rather than one man and two women? The cemeteries in those days were outside the city. If the mother were to leave the city with two women, there would be a concern of seclusion. Abba Shaul says that there is no problem: even the mother may go with the baby and the two men.
It sounds as though Abba Shaul holds that there is no problem of seclusion with one woman and two men. But the discussion in our Mishnah concerns one man with two women. Therefore, this is not necessarily a proof that our Mishnah disagrees with Abba Shaul. Abba Shaul may only have said that there is no problem of seclusion in a situation of mourning.
In this case, one of the women is the mother holding the dead baby. Under such circumstances, we are not concerned that they will commit a forbidden act. The entire situation is one of mourning, and therefore Abba Shaul waived the prohibition of seclusion. Under ordinary circumstances, however, he may agree that one man with two women is prohibited.
The Rabbis, however, say that even at a time of mourning there remains a concern. Rabbi Yitzchak says that a person must overcome his inclination as long as he is alive. What does this verse mean? Rashi explains that mourning does not necessarily protect a person from his inclination. As long as a person is alive, he must struggle to overcome his sins.
In other words, even during a time of mourning, the evil inclination remains present. If there is a concern about seclusion, mourning does not automatically remove that concern.
Abba Shaul understands the verse differently. He reads it as referring to a person who complains. The verse is saying: Why are you complaining about the difficult things that have happened to you? You should be grateful that you are alive.
What is a person complaining about? He should be thankful for the life that God has given him. Does he not recognize that he has sins? Does he think that he does not deserve some troubles? The verse is not necessarily discussing the evil inclination during mourning. It is addressing someone who complains about what God has done to him and reminding him to be grateful for the life he has been given.
This is a different interpretation of the verse. According to this reading, the verse speaks about someone complaining about what is happening to him. It says, in effect, “What are you complaining about? Have you overcome all your sins? Be thankful for the life that I gave you.”
The commentators discuss three ways to understand this passage. Let us first read Rashi. Rashi says that even if one concedes to Abba Shaul and interprets the verse as referring to a person who complains, one can still explain why seclusion is prohibited even during mourning.
Although one might say that during genuine mourning the evil inclination is broken and there is no concern that the people will commit a transgression, there is a danger that people will fabricate a case of mourning. They may pretend that somebody died and say that they are going to the cemetery. In reality, the baby is alive, and the man and woman are using the supposed mourning as a pretext to go somewhere together.
Therefore, the Rabbis said that even in a genuine period of mourning, seclusion remains prohibited because of the possibility that someone will stage a situation of mourning. This is like the incident in which a woman took out her living baby while pretending that he was dead in order to commit a transgression with the man who accompanied her.
According to this first interpretation, even where there is actual mourning and one might otherwise say that the evil inclination is not present, seclusion is still prohibited because of the possibility that people will devise a scheme and falsely present themselves as mourners.
Rashi then brings another interpretation. According to this version, the entire discussion is part of Abba Shaul’s position. Abba Shaul says that one should not complain about what God does to him; a person should be happy that he has been given life. The incident brought in the Gemara supports Abba Shaul’s teaching.
The story concerns a woman who lost one child and mourned excessively. The Rabbis warned her not to mourn beyond the proper time. Her excessive mourning continued until seven of her children died. The story illustrates Abba Shaul’s idea: a person should not complain about the ways of Heaven. The woman complained excessively, and the force of judgment was consequently intensified.
That is the second way of understanding the Gemara: the verse means that a person should not complain about what God does to him. He should be grateful for the life he has received. The story of the woman who mourned excessively demonstrates the danger of complaining and excessive mourning.
There is a third interpretation. A woman went to the cemetery and cried beside her husband’s grave. At that time, there was a man who had been appointed to guard someone whom the king had executed by hanging. The king had assigned him the task of watching the hanged man.
The guard saw the woman at the cemetery. He approached her and seduced her, and she was seduced and committed the transgression with him. He then returned to the place where the hanged man was supposed to be. The body was gone. What was he going to do? He had to return to the king.
He took the dead husband from the grave, brought him back, and hung him in the other place so that he could report to the king. They dug him up and put him back on the gallows.
According to this version, the story follows the opinion of the Rabbis. The Rabbis hold that even in a situation of mourning, the evil inclination remains present. The guard was able to seduce the woman even while she was at the grave. Therefore, the story demonstrates that mourning does not remove the concern of seclusion.
Let us review the three approaches. The first interpretation is that the verse means a person should not complain, as illustrated by the woman who complained excessively and whose children died. The second interpretation is that the Rabbis would concede that during genuine mourning there is no ordinary concern of the evil inclination, but they were still concerned about a case in which people would fabricate mourning, as in the incident of the woman who brought her living baby out while pretending that he was dead. The third interpretation is that the Rabbis actually follow the story of the woman at the grave, and they maintain that even in a situation of mourning, a man can still seduce a woman.