The Talmud Bavli Masechet Baba Kama, specifically the Eri B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series, has been generously sponsored in our Daf Yomi program by Siyahu Ashar Hakohen and his wife Rina. May they be blessed with continued success, prosperity in all their endeavors, good health, happiness, and much joy from their children, enjoying many years of tranquility and peace of mind. Amen. We begin today's Daf on Chavdav, Amudbe, starting with the statement of Rabbah, found ten lines from the bottom.
Rabbah states: If a person threw a vessel from a roof, and while it was airborne, someone else struck and broke it with a stick, the one who broke it is exempt from payment. This is because the vessel was already destined to break upon impact with the ground. By breaking it mid-air, he merely broke an already "broken" vessel, and therefore, he is not obligated to pay.
Rabbah further states: If a person threw a vessel from a roof, but there were cushions or mats on the ground intended to break its fall, preventing it from breaking, and then someone else came and removed the cushions, or even the thrower himself removed them (for example, by having a long string attached to them), the thrower is exempt. This is because at the moment the vessel left his hand, his "arrow came to an end"; his action, at that point, would not have caused the damage. The subsequent removal of the cushions is considered an indirect cause of damage, a "geramah," for which one is not liable for direct payment.
The discussion then shifts to a different scenario: If someone threw a child from a roof, and another person below received the child with a sword, killing him. This scenario leads to a dispute among the Tannaim. A Baraita teaches: If ten people beat a man with ten sticks, whether they did so simultaneously or one after another, they are all exempt from the death penalty. The reasoning is that the Torah requires one to kill "the whole soul" to be liable for the death penalty. In this case, each person only contributed to a part of the soul's demise, not the complete act of killing. However, Rabbi Yehuda ben Beterah states that if each person delivered a blow, and the tenth person delivered the final, fatal blow, that tenth person is liable. This is because he "brought his death closer." According to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beterah, one does not need to kill the entire soul; killing any part of the soul, or accelerating its death, is enough to incur liability. Rashi explains that just as the tenth person who struck the man is liable because he brought his death closer, similarly, the person who received the child with a sword is liable because he preempted the child's death, which would have occurred upon falling to the ground.
Next, the Gemara considers a case where a person threw a baby off a roof, and instead of a man with a sword, an ox gored and killed the baby with its horns. The question arises regarding the payment of "kofer" (ransom). When an ox causes death, its owner must pay kofer. The dispute is whether kofer is based on the value of the "mazik" (the one who caused the damage, i.e., the owner of the ox) or the "nizak" (the one who was damaged, i.e., the baby). If it's based on the value of the nizak, a baby has no monetary value, and therefore no kofer would be paid. However, if it's based on the value of the mazik (the owner of the ox), then the owner would pay kofer to the baby's inheritors or family. The Gemara concludes that a baby has no value, and therefore no payment is made by the ox's owner in this specific case.
The discussion continues: A man falls from a tree and lands on a woman, causing intimate contact. He is liable for four types of payments (injury, pain, medical expenses, and loss of livelihood). This is because even though he fell, he is considered negligent, as he should have anticipated falling due to a normal wind. He is not liable for "boshet" (embarrassment) because he lacked intent for intimate contact. However, if this woman was his "yibamah" (sister-in-law, eligible for levirate marriage), this act of intimate contact does not constitute a valid levirate marriage. While an accidental or unintentional intimate act with a yibamah can establish a levirate marriage if there was at least intent for intimate contact, here, the man had no such intent; he merely fell. Therefore, no marriage is established.
If the man fell due to an uncommon wind, he is not considered negligent. In this case, he is liable for "nezek" (injury) because one is always liable for direct injury, even if accidental. However, he is exempt from the other four payments and from boshet, as he was not negligent and had no intent. If it was a common wind, and he should have anticipated falling, he is considered negligent and is liable for the four payments, but still exempt from boshet because he lacked the specific intent for intimate contact that would cause embarrassment. However, if as he was falling, he "maneuvered" or "twisted and turned" in mid-air, intending to land more comfortably, this demonstrates an intent to cause damage. In such a case, he would also be liable for boshet.
A Baraita is brought to demonstrate that boshet depends on intent to cause damage. It describes a scenario where two men are fighting, and a woman intervenes. The Torah states that she "sent forth her hand and grabbed his private parts." The phrase "sent forth her hand" implies a deliberate act. Even if her primary intention was to stop the fight, by intentionally grabbing that specific area, she demonstrated intent to cause damage, and therefore she is liable for boshet. In contrast, the man who fell from the roof, if he didn't maneuver, had no intent to cause damage, even if he was negligent in falling. But if he did maneuver, that act of conscious redirection implies intent to cause damage, making him liable for boshet.
Next, the Gemara presents a case: If a person places a hot coal on his friend's heart, and the friend dies, the person who placed the coal is exempt. The reasoning is that the victim, being a human being, should have removed the coal himself. However, if the coal burned the friend's garment, the person who placed the coal is liable. The Gemara explains that the difference lies in the victim's ability to prevent the damage. A person can remove a coal from his body, but a garment cannot remove itself. These statements are presented as Mishnayot. The case of the coal on the heart is analogous to pushing someone into fire or water where they could have escaped but did not. If they could not escape, then the one who pushed them is liable. Similarly, if one places a coal on a person's chest, and the person could have removed it but did not, the one who placed it is exempt, as the victim contributed to his own death.
Another Mishnah states: If someone tells his friend, "Rip my garment" or "Break my jug," the friend is liable for payment, even if he followed the instruction. The understanding is that the owner meant, "Rip it, and I will take you to court to pay for it." However, if the owner explicitly says, "Rip my shirt on the condition that you will be exempt," then the friend is exempt. If no such stipulation is made, he is liable. The Gemara then asks: How do we view a slave ("eved")? Is he considered like a regular human being ("gufo") who has the intelligence to remove a coal from his heart, thus exempting the one who placed it? Or is he like property ("begadim") for which one must pay if damaged? If an eved has "da'at" (intelligence), then if he doesn't remove the coal, it's his own fault, and the one who placed it is exempt. But what about an ox? An ox does not have da'at to remove a coal from its back. The Gemara concludes that an eved is indeed like a regular person; if a coal is placed on him and he dies, the one who placed it is exempt because the eved should have removed it. However, an ox is considered property, and if a coal is placed on it and it is damaged, one must pay, as the ox has no da'at to remove it.
We begin the third chapter. If a person places his jug in a public domain, and another person trips on it and breaks it, the person who tripped is exempt. This is because the owner had no right to place his jug there. If the person walking was injured by tripping on the jug, the owner of the jug is liable, as placing it there created a hazard. The Gemara immediately notes a linguistic inconsistency: the Mishnah uses "kad" (small jug) at the beginning and "habit" (large barrel) at the end. A similar question arises from another Mishnah: Two people are walking in the public domain, both with permission. One is carrying his barrel, the other his beam. If the jug of one is broken by the beam of the other, the one with the beam is exempt because both had a right to be there. Again, the Mishnah starts with "habit" and ends with "kad." A third Mishnah describes a situation where one person has a barrel of wine and another has a small jug of honey (which is more expensive). If the barrel of honey cracks and leaks, and the wine owner empties his wine to save the honey, he is only paid for his labor, not the value of his wine. This Mishnah also uses both "habit" and "kad."
The Gemara initially suggests that "kad" and "habit" are simply synonyms and interchangeable. However, it then asks about the practical difference ("nafka mina") in their terminology, especially in business. If in a place where people consistently call a "kad" a "kad" and a "habit" a "habit," there is no question: if a buyer asks for a "habit" and receives a "kad," it's not a valid sale. The novelty of the Mishnah, the Gemara explains, is in a place where the majority of people distinguish between "kad" and "habit," but a minority interchange the terms. In such a scenario, if a buyer asks for a "habit" and is given a "kad," the sale is considered final. This is because when it comes to monetary matters, we do not rule according to the majority ("ein holchim b'mamon achar harov"). The seller can argue that some people in town consider a "kad" to be a "habit," and therefore he provided what was asked. The buyer, who is trying to reclaim money ("HaMotzi Mechavero Halava Ra'aya"), must prove that he specifically meant the larger vessel, which he cannot do if a minority uses the terms interchangeably. For example, if a person buys an ox, expecting it for field work, but receives a wild, goring ox, the seller might claim he thought the buyer wanted it for slaughter. Since the buyer cannot prove his specific intent beyond the general term "ox," the sale is final. Thus, the Gemara concludes that in a place where the terms are interchangeable, the seller can give either a large "habit" or a small "kad."
Returning to the first Mishnah: "If another person tripped on it and broke it, he is exempt." The Gemara questions this: "Why is he exempt? He should have looked where he was walking!" The principle "Adam mu'adde olam" (a person is always on guard) dictates that one must be attentive. So why is the person who tripped exempt? Three answers are provided: 1) The entire public domain was filled with barrels, leaving him no choice but to trip. 2) It was dark, and he could not see the barrel. 3) The barrel was placed at a blind corner, making it impossible to anticipate. Rava Papa states that the Mishnah only makes sense according to the second or third answers (darkness or blind corner). If the first answer (entire public domain filled with barrels) were true, the Mishnah should have stated that he is permitted to break it even intentionally, not just by tripping. The Mishnah uses "nitkal" (tripped) because later, when discussing the owner's liability if the walker is injured, it only applies if the walker tripped, not if he intentionally broke it and got hurt. The Gemara concludes that the Mishnah's use of "nitkal" in the first clause is consistent with the second clause. However, Hacham David offers a different explanation: It is not the way of people to pay close attention to every stumbling block in the road. Therefore, even in daylight, and even if the public domain is not entirely filled, the person who tripped is exempt because he is not expected to have such heightened awareness.
The Gemara then relates a story from Bnei Har De'a: A man was walking in the public domain and broke another's barrel. Shmuel ruled that he had to pay, stating that he should have paid attention. In Pumbedita, Rava also made him pay. Shmuel's ruling is consistent with his view that one is only exempt if it happened at night; during the day, one must pay attention. But why did Rava rule this way? Rava Papa explains that this case involved a corner, which would normally lead to an exemption. However, it was during the "pressing season" ("atzra"), a time when it was common for people to line up their barrels near the pressing house. Therefore, even at a corner, one should have anticipated barrels and paid attention. Thus, Rava agrees that normally one is exempt at a corner, but in this specific context, the expectation of barrels made the tripper liable.
The discussion shifts to payments for embarrassment ("boshet"). The rabbis teach that the amount of payment varies based on the severity and manner of the embarrassment. For kicking someone in the knees or thighs ("l'rkuba"), the payment is three coins, as kicking is more embarrassing than merely pushing with hands. For kicking with the foot ("b'eita"), it's five coins. For hitting someone with a donkey saddle ("sanukeret"), it's thirteen coins, as this is a greater embarrassment. Rabbi Hasda then asks Rabbi Nachman about the payment for hitting someone with the handle of a hoe or the hoe's metal head. Rabbi Nachman replies, "Are you charging 'knas' (punitive fines) in Babylon?" This implies that the rabbis in Babylon were not considered sufficiently authorized to levy such fines. He then asks Rabbi Hasda to describe the exact circumstances. Rabbi Hasda recounts a story: Two partners shared a water system, alternating days for drawing water. One partner began drawing water on the other's day. The other partner protested, saying, "This is my day!" The first ignored him. So the second took a stick (or axe handle) and hit him. Rabbi Nachman responded, "He should have hit him a hundred times!" This implies that the aggrieved party was entirely justified. The Gemara explains that while there is a dispute among scholars regarding whether one is generally allowed to take the law into one's own hands, everyone agrees that it is permissible when there is an immediate loss ("hefsed"). In this case, if the first partner continued to draw water, there might be no water left for the second, constituting a loss. Going to court would be too late. Even those who generally oppose taking the law into one's hands agree that in a situation of imminent loss, it is permitted.
The Gemara then cites Ben Bagbag, who says, "Do not enter your friend's courtyard to take your item without his permission, lest you appear as a thief." This suggests that even if you are entitled to an item, you should not retrieve it surreptitiously. The Gemara asks: Does Ben Bagbag mean you should go in broad daylight and "break his teeth" (i.e., confront him forcefully) to take your item? This would imply that even without an immediate loss, one can take the law into one's own hands. The Gemara answers that this is a question based on a single opinion, that of Ben Bagbag, who is a "Yahid" (an individual opinion) with whom the other rabbis disagree. Rabbi Yanai, however, interprets Ben Bagbag's statement differently: "Break his teeth" means to take him to court and let the judges break his teeth (i.e., compel him to return the item). The Gemara challenges this interpretation, arguing that if that were the meaning, it should have said, "And they (the judges) will tell him." The Gemara concedes that the question remains difficult. Baruch Adonai.