Two people gave two vessels to a guardian: one large and one small. They later disagreed. One said, “I gave you the large vessel,” while the other said, “You received the small vessel.” The large vessel was worth one thousand zuz.
The ruling is that the guardian gives the small vessel to one of them, breaks the large vessel, and gives the other person an amount of money equal to the value of the small vessel. The remaining money is left until Eliyahu HaNavi comes and clarifies who is the true owner.
Rabbi Yose came along and said, “In that case, what did the claimant who wanted the larger vessel lose?” He tried to obtain the larger vessel but ultimately received the value he was supposed to receive. In the end, he received the same value, so he did not lose anything.
The Gemara asks: We already have this case in the Mishnah. Why is it different from the case involving money? One person says, “I gave you one hundred,” and the other says, “I gave you two hundred.” One person claims that he deposited one hundred, while the other claims that he deposited two hundred. The ruling is that each receives one hundred, and the remaining one hundred is held until Eliyahu HaNavi comes. What difference is there between the case of vessels and the case of money?
The Gemara answers that in the case of money, nobody loses. One person receives one hundred, and the other one hundred is held until Eliyahu HaNavi comes. If he comes, the money will be given to the proper claimant. In the case of the vessels, however, the person who is supposed to own the larger vessel will lose, because the large vessel is broken and sold in order to compensate the other person. When Eliyahu HaNavi comes, the large vessel will no longer exist.
One might therefore have thought that the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yose in the case of the vessels. Perhaps nothing should be divided, and everything should remain in escrow until Eliyahu HaNavi comes. After all, perhaps the large vessel should not be broken and sold merely to pay the other claimant the value of the smaller vessel.
Conversely, if the teaching had been stated only in the case of the vessels, one might have thought that Rabbi Yose’s position applies there because dividing the property requires breaking the vessel. But in the case of money, perhaps even Rabbi Yose would agree with the Rabbis: give each person one hundred and hold the remaining one hundred until Eliyahu HaNavi comes.
The Gemara rejects that distinction. What is the entire reason for Rabbi Yose’s position? Rabbi Yose says that if each person receives one hundred, what did the wrongdoer lose? The person who falsely claimed the larger amount has not been penalized at all. Therefore, there would never have been a reason to distinguish between vessels and money. Rabbi Yose’s concern applies equally in both cases: the wrongdoer should not be allowed to benefit.
The Gemara then explains that both cases in the Mishnah follow the view of the Rabbis, and the Mishnah is written in the manner of “not only this, but even that.” Not only in the case of money do the Rabbis say that each claimant receives one hundred and the remaining money is held; even in the case of the vessels, although the large vessel must be broken and the person who should receive it will never recover that actual vessel, the Rabbis still require the division.
If the case of the vessels had been stated first, the case of money would not have been necessary, because the case of the vessels contains the greater novelty. Nevertheless, the Mishnah presents the case of money first and then teaches that the same ruling applies even to vessels. Although, when the truth is revealed, the person who was supposed to receive the large vessel will receive money rather than the vessel itself, that is still the procedure required by the Rabbis.
The Mishnah then discusses a different case. A person gave produce to his friend to guard. The produce began to spoil: perhaps mice began eating it, or it began to decay. The first tanna says that the guardian may not sell it. Instead, he must go before a court and sell it in the court’s presence, because he is returning a lost object to its owner. Since the owner may suffer a loss, the guardian should recover whatever value remains and give the money to him.
Why, according to the first tanna, may the guardian not sell produce that is beginning to spoil? The Gemara gives two explanations.
The first explanation is that a person prefers one measure of his own produce to nine measures belonging to someone else. A person would rather receive back his own produce, even if it has declined somewhat in value, than receive money from produce that he did not work to produce. He cultivated his own produce and invested his labor in it. Therefore, he prefers to receive his own partially spoiled produce rather than have it sold and be given money instead.
According to this explanation, if the produce has not yet completely spoiled, the guardian should return it rather than sell it. The owner would rather have his own produce back. People value their own possessions because of the effort and labor invested in them.
The Gemara gives a second explanation. Perhaps, before depositing the produce with the guardian, the owner had already designated it as sacred agricultural produce. If the guardian sells it, the purchaser might be an ordinary Israelite who is not permitted to eat such produce. Therefore, the guardian should not sell it, because the sale might result in someone eating produce that he is not permitted to eat.
The Gemara then raises a question. The owner gave the produce to the guardian, and the guardian may not touch it. Since he may not sell it, the owner can designate it as sacred agricultural produce even while it is in the guardian’s possession. The owner may have a pile of wheat in his field and say that the produce in the guardian’s possession should be designated for that purpose. Why is this possible? Because we have already established that the guardian cannot sell the produce. Therefore, the owner knows that it is still in existence and can designate it.
The language of the Gemara seems to indicate that because the guardian cannot sell the produce, the owner can designate it. But Rav Nachman said the opposite: because the owner might already have designated it as sacred agricultural produce, the guardian may not sell it. Which is the correct explanation?
The answer is that both points are involved. The guardian may not sell the produce because the owner may already have designated it. Once we know that it has not been sold, the owner can now designate it if he had not done so previously. If it had been sold, it would no longer be in the owner’s possession for this purpose, and the owner could end up causing someone to eat produce that had not been properly designated. Since we know that the guardian did not sell it, the owner can make the designation while the produce remains in the guardian’s possession.
Rav Abba bar Rav Ḥana, in the name of Rabbi Ḥana, explains that the ruling that the guardian may not sell the produce applies only when it is spoiling at its normal rate. Produce naturally deteriorates over time. As long as it is decaying in the ordinary manner, it may not be sold. But if it begins to spoil rapidly, beyond what is normal, and its remaining value is being lost, everyone agrees that it should be taken to court and sold in order to recover something for the owner.
The Gemara asks which of the two reasons Rav Abba bar Rav Ḥana accepts. Is the reason that a person prefers his own produce, even when it is worth less than someone else’s produce? Or is the reason that the owner might already have designated it as sacred agricultural produce?
The Gemara says that Rav Abba bar Rav Ḥana is certainly arguing with the second explanation. If the concern is that the owner may have designated the produce, what difference does it make whether it has spoiled a little or a great deal? In either case, one should be concerned that it may already have been designated.
But is Rav Abba bar Rav Ḥana also arguing with the first explanation? Perhaps the first explanation applies only when the produce is slightly spoiled. A person might prefer his own produce when it still has value, even if it has deteriorated somewhat. But perhaps when the produce is completely spoiled, he would prefer to receive money, and it could be sold.
The Gemara rejects this possibility. The original statement that a person prefers one measure of his own produce to nine measures of someone else’s was an exaggeration intended to express the general principle. It did not mean that the person would always prefer his own produce regardless of its condition. Rather, up to a certain point, he prefers his own produce. If it begins to decay beyond the normal rate, he would prefer that it be sold and that he receive the remaining value.
Therefore, when Rav Abba bar Rav Ḥana says that produce which is spoiling beyond the normal rate may be sold, he is consistent with the first explanation. That explanation applies only to a certain degree of deterioration. The case is different when the produce is being completely lost.
The Gemara then returns to the possibility that the owner had designated the produce. If the produce is spoiling beyond the normal rate and may be sold, how can the owner now designate it? Perhaps the guardian sold it, and if the owner designates other produce in his field on the basis of the deposited produce, he will cause someone to eat produce that has not been properly designated.
The Gemara answers that when the produce has deteriorated beyond the normal rate, it is sold to priests for the value of sacred produce. Sacred produce is sold to those permitted to eat it. Therefore, even if the owner had already designated it, there is no problem: it is sold to the appropriate purchasers. The guardian is not selling it to someone who may not eat it.
At this point, the Gemara asks about the second explanation, that the guardian may not sell the produce because the owner may already have designated it. If the produce has spoiled significantly, why should it not be sold to priests? Even if it had been designated, the sale would be permissible.
The answer is that it is uncommon for produce to spoil completely and rapidly. When produce begins to deteriorate in the ordinary manner, the owner will designate it as sacred agricultural produce at an earlier stage. A person does not leave a pile of produce in an uncorrected state for a long period. He wants to remedy the situation promptly.
According to this reasoning, Rabbi Abba’s position is as follows: when the produce is fresh, there is a concern that it may already have been designated, so it may not be sold. When it has deteriorated completely, however, a long period has passed, and we do not assume that the owner waited until that late stage to designate it. If he had wanted to designate it, he would have done so earlier. Therefore, it may be sold to priests.
Rav Nachman understands the matter differently. He maintains that produce can spoil very quickly. It may deteriorate before the owner has had the opportunity to designate it, and the guardian may sell it almost immediately. If the owner had not designated it before the sale, he might designate it afterward, when it is no longer in his possession. He would then end up causing someone to eat ordinary produce under the assumption that it had been properly designated.
Therefore, according to Rav Nachman, the guardian should not sell the produce when it is fresh, when it is beginning to spoil, or even when it has deteriorated substantially. The process can happen quickly enough that the owner might either have designated it already or still be planning to designate it. That is why the guardian may not sell it.
Thus, Rabbi Abba and Rav Nachman disagree about the speed at which produce spoils. Rabbi Abba is not concerned about a future designation once the produce has completely deteriorated, because he assumes that enough time has passed that the owner would have designated it earlier. Rav Nachman says that the deterioration may happen quickly, so the concern remains that the owner either designated it already or will designate it now.
The Gemara brings another teaching. A person gave his friend produce to guard, and it spoiled. Wine became vinegar, oil became rancid, and honey deteriorated. Rabbi Meir says that the guardian should not touch these items. The Sages say that he should make arrangements for them and sell them in court. When he sells them, he should sell them to other people rather than to himself, because there is a concern that he might give himself an unfairly low price.
The same principle applies to old coins. In earlier times, coins could deteriorate or lose their usefulness, and they had to be exchanged. The guardian may not exchange them for himself, because he might give himself an advantage. Instead, he should exchange them through another money changer.
Similarly, a charity collector who distributes food to the poor may find himself with food when there are no poor people present. He should sell the food to others and use the proceeds appropriately, but he should not sell it to himself or give himself a discount. In all these cases, the concern is that the guardian or collector might benefit improperly from property that belongs to someone else.
The Gemara asks about the partial quotation from the teaching. It sounded as though even items that had deteriorated beyond the normal rate could not be sold, whereas the earlier discussion established that once produce has spoiled beyond the normal rate, everyone agrees that it may be sold.
Rava answers that the teaching can be understood as referring either to produce that spoiled at the normal rate or to produce that spoiled beyond the normal rate. The matter depends on the item and the circumstances.
The Gemara rejects this answer. The teaching mentioned wine that became vinegar, oil that became rancid, and honey that deteriorated. Once these items have reached that condition, their deterioration is complete; they cannot become significantly worse. Nevertheless, Rabbi Meir says that they should not be sold. Why?
The answer is that when there is no further deterioration, the guardian gains nothing by selling them. He might as well return them to the owner. Produce that is deteriorating rapidly is different, because selling it can still recover some value. But vinegar is vinegar, and rancid oil is already in its final condition. The guardian should return it rather than sell it.
The Gemara then asks: What are rancid oil and deteriorated honey worth? According to the Sages, the guardian should go to court and sell them. Who would purchase them?
The Gemara answers that rancid oil can still be used on leather, and deteriorated honey can be used as a salve for wounds on the back of a camel. Thus, even though these items are no longer fit for their original purpose, they retain some value.
The Sages say that one should make an arrangement for these items and sell them in court. The Gemara asks what this expression means. What arrangement is being made?
Rav Ashi explains that perhaps the oil or honey itself has little value, but the containers still have value. If the deteriorated material remains in the containers, it may ruin them as well. By selling the contents, the guardian saves the owner’s containers. The question is whether the sale is being made to preserve the value of the oil and honey or to preserve the containers.
The Gemara concludes that the case involves items that have completely deteriorated but have not caused the containers to be lost. Rabbi Meir says that such a small potential loss—the loss of the containers—does not justify selling the contents. The Sages say that even a small loss must be prevented, so the items should be sold in court.
When the produce itself is deteriorating rapidly and will otherwise be completely lost, everyone agrees that it should be sold. The dispute concerns a smaller loss, such as the possible damage to the containers. Rabbi Meir is not concerned about that limited loss, while the Sages maintain that even a small loss must be addressed.
The Mishnah then returns to the case of produce that was given to a guardian and began to spoil. The guardian must take it to court and sell it in court in order to preserve whatever value remains for the owner.
It is taught that Rabbi Abba and Rabbi Yaakov, in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, said that the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Rabbi Abba also said, in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, that the halakha follows the Sages.
What is the significance of this dispute? Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the produce should be sold, while the Sages say that it should not be sold. If Rabbi Yohanan had already said that the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, why did Rabbi Abba need to repeat that ruling?
There is a dispute among the authorities about how to understand Rabbi Yohanan. One view is that Rabbi Yohanan follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel as a general rule, except in three cases. Those three cases are disputes involving the craftsmen of a city, the residents of Sidon, and the final matter of evidence.
According to that view, there was no need for Rabbi Abba to make a separate statement here. Since Rabbi Yohanan had already established that the halakha generally follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, with only those three exceptions, this case would automatically follow Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
Another view is that Rabbi Yohanan does not have a general rule that the halakha always follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Each case must be examined individually to determine whether Rabbi Yohanan follows him. According to that view, Rabbi Abba needed to state explicitly that in this particular case the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
Thus, the statement of Rabbi Abba reveals a dispute about Rabbi Yohanan’s general method. One opinion says that Rabbi Yohanan follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in every case except the three specified exceptions. The other says that each case must be considered on its own, and that Rabbi Yohanan’s position here must therefore be stated separately.
The Gemara brings another teaching. A person was taken into captivity and left fields behind. Since no one was caring for the fields, they were likely to become ruined. The question is whether the field should be given to a relative who would eventually inherit it, so that the relative could work the field and benefit from its produce.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the relative should be allowed to work the field. Just as deteriorating produce may be sold in order to preserve the owner’s property, the field may be given to the relative so that it will not be ruined while the owner is in captivity.
The Sages say that the field should not be given to the relative. One might learn from this that even though the owner’s produce may be sold in order to prevent a loss, the relative should not be brought into possession of the property merely because the owner is in captivity.
The Gemara cautions against making the two disputes dependent on one another. Perhaps the reason the Sages prohibit the sale of produce is unique to produce. There are two possible explanations: a person prefers his own produce, or the owner may already have designated it as sacred agricultural produce. The field case involves different considerations.
It is possible to hold that produce may not be sold while still maintaining that a field may be given to a relative to work. Conversely, one could hold that a relative should not receive the field while maintaining that certain produce may be sold. The two laws need not share the same reasoning.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel happened to rule in favor of selling the produce and also in favor of giving the field to the relative. That does not necessarily mean that both rulings derive from one principle. He may have reached the same practical conclusion in two separate cases for two separate reasons.
The Gemara then presents the dispute directly. Rab says that the field should not be given to the relative, while Shmuel says that it should be given to the relative so that it will not be ruined.
If witnesses testify that the owner died in captivity, everyone agrees that the field is given to the relative who inherits it. Once it is known that the owner died, there is no concern about giving the field to the heir.
Rashi explains that when it is known that the owner died, the heir will care for the field properly because it is now his own property. If the owner later appears and it turns out that he was actually alive, the relative will be treated like a sharecropper for the period during which he worked the field. He will receive a share of the produce for his labor.
There is a reason one might otherwise object to giving the field to the relative. The relative might work the field aggressively, trying to produce as much as possible before the owner returns, and thereby weaken the field. But when the relative has heard that the owner died, the field is effectively his. He will not want to ruin his own property. He will work it in the ordinary manner, and if the original owner truly died, the field will remain his. If the owner returns, the relative will still receive compensation for his work.
The dispute concerns the case in which the owner was merely taken into captivity and there is no testimony that he died. Rab says that the field should not be given to the relative, because the relative may assume that the owner will return soon and try to extract as much produce as possible before that happens. In doing so, he may damage the field.
Shmuel says that the field should be given to the relative. Since the relative will be treated as a sharecropper if the owner returns, it is in his own interest not to ruin the field. His compensation will depend on the field continuing to produce in the future, so he will care for it properly.
The Gemara raises a question from a verse describing the curses. The verse says that the men will be killed, their wives will become widows, and their children will become orphans. If the men are killed, their wives will obviously become widows and their children will obviously become orphans. Why does the verse mention these consequences separately?
The Gemara explains that the wives will become widows in the sense that they will be unable to remarry. The husbands will have disappeared into captivity, and it will be uncertain whether they are alive or dead. The wives will therefore become agunot, unable to marry because there is no reliable testimony establishing that their husbands died.
The children will become orphans in the sense that they will be unable to inherit their fathers’ property. Since it will not be known with certainty whether the fathers are dead, the children cannot simply take possession of the fields.
This seems to contradict the ruling that when a person is taken into captivity, his field is given to a relative to work. The children are also relatives and potential heirs. Why are they not given the fields?
Rava answers that the children may not be given the fields to sell. The field may be given to them to cultivate, but not to dispose of permanently.
The Gemara relates that a similar incident occurred in Nehardea. A person was taken into captivity, and his children wanted to sell his fields. Rav Sheshet derived from the teaching that the fields should not be given to the children.
Another sage objected: That is not necessarily the meaning of the teaching. Perhaps the teaching means only that the children may not be given the fields to sell, but they may be given the fields to tend and cultivate. He criticized this interpretation with a humorous expression, saying that it was characteristic of the scholars of Pumbedita to force an elephant through the eye of a needle—to fit an overly elaborate interpretation into a straightforward passage.
His point was that the teaching plainly places the children in the same category as the wives. Just as the wives are unable to remarry altogether because it is uncertain whether their husbands died, the children are not given control of the property altogether because it is uncertain whether their fathers died.
Since the wives cannot remarry at all, the statement concerning the children should likewise be understood broadly: the children are not given the fields at all. They may not be given possession merely to sell them, nor may they be given possession merely to cultivate them. The uncertainty about the father’s status prevents the children from taking control of the property until his death is established.