The Gemara discusses a scenario where a person muzzles a cow, but only performs a partial act of muzzling. For instance, they might place a muzzle on the animal, but someone else then leads it to the threshing grounds. Similarly, if someone harnesses two different species of animals together, which is forbidden as mixed species (kilayim), but doesn't take them to the plowing ground, they have only completed half of the forbidden act. In such cases, only the individual who actually brings the animal to the threshing grounds while it is muzzled, or who guides the mixed species for plowing, incurs the prohibition. This is because the Torah's prohibition against muzzling an ox applies specifically when it is threshing, and the prohibition against mixed species applies when they are actively being guided for work.
The Gemara then considers a case where one muzzles an animal "with a voice." This means they repeatedly shout "stop" at the animal, preventing it from eating, rather than physically attaching a muzzle. Or, in the case of mixed species, they guide the animals by shouting commands instead of physically leading them. The ruling on whether this constitutes a prohibited act is subject to a dispute. One opinion holds that speaking, which involves moving the mouth and jaw, is considered an "action" (ma'aseh) for which one would incur lashes (malkut). This aligns with the general rule that lashes are only given for a prohibition that involves an action (lav she'yish bo ma'aseh).
Tosafot raises a question regarding this opinion, noting that Rabbi Yochanan is elsewhere understood to hold that verbal acts do not constitute an action for the purpose of lashes. For example, cursing someone is a verbal act, but it does not incur lashes. Tosafot resolves this by explaining that in the context of muzzling or guiding animals, the verbal command directly results in a physical action by the animal. Therefore, a verbal command that leads to an action is considered a ma'aseh, making one liable for lashes.
The Gemara then challenges Rabbi Yochanan's position from the law of temurah. Temurah refers to the forbidden act of attempting to switch the sanctity of a consecrated animal to an ordinary, non-sacred animal. If one does so, both animals become consecrated. The Mishnah states that "all may perform temurah," meaning both men and women can be subject to this law. It clarifies that this is not an encouragement to perform temurah, but rather an acknowledgment that if one does so, the sanctity takes effect, and the person incurs lashes. This Mishnah seems to imply that even a verbal declaration of temurah, without a physical act, incurs lashes, which contradicts the idea that lashes require a ma'aseh.
In response, the Gemara suggests that this Mishnah aligns with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one incurs lashes even for a prohibition that does not involve a physical act (lav she'ein bo ma'aseh). The prohibition of temurah is "do not switch it" (lo yahalifenu), which is purely verbal. The Gemara further explains that Rabbi Yehuda's view is often seen in cases like leaving over a Paschal offering until the morning. The Torah forbids leaving it over, but if one does, there is a subsequent commandment to burn it. Since the transgression can be rectified, one does not receive lashes. However, Rabbi Yehuda would argue that if the transgression could not be rectified, one would receive lashes even though leaving something over is not a physical action. Thus, the Mishnah on temurah, which imposes lashes for a verbal act, could be attributed to Rabbi Yehuda.
The Gemara then objects to attributing the Mishnah of temurah to Rabbi Yehuda. The opening clause of the same Mishnah, "all may perform temurah," is understood to include an inheritor (yoresh) who attempts to transfer the sanctity of an animal inherited from his father. However, Rabbi Yehuda holds that an inheritor cannot perform temurah, nor can he perform the laying of hands (semicha) on his father's animal, as semicha must be done by the owner. Therefore, the Mishnah cannot be entirely according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara resolves this by stating that a Tanna (a Mishnaic sage) might adopt Rabbi Yehuda's view on one point (receiving lashes for a verbal act) while disagreeing with him on another (the inheritor's ability to perform temurah).
The Gemara then discusses the case of someone who rents an animal, muzzles it, and uses it for threshing. This person would incur lashes for the act of muzzling and would also be obligated to compensate the owner for the food the animal was deprived of. The compensation is specified as four kav for a cow and three kav for a donkey. The question arises: why must he pay if he already receives lashes? There is a general principle that one does not pay if they receive capital punishment (mitah) or lashes (malkut); rather, the stronger of the two punishments is applied. The Gemara suggests that this Mishnah follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that one does both pay and receive lashes. This is supported by a case where false witnesses (edim zomemim) are given lashes and also made to pay the monetary damages they intended to inflict.
Rava offers a different explanation. He compares the case to the law of a "harlot's hire" (etnan zonah). If a man pays a harlot with an animal, that animal is forbidden as a sacrifice. Rava extends this to a case where a man has relations with his mother and pays her. The money or animal given as payment is considered etnan zonah. Although the court (Beit Din) would not enforce payment in such a case (as the man is liable for capital punishment), if he does pay, the payment is considered valid etnan. This demonstrates that even when a debt cannot be enforced by Beit Din due to a more severe punishment, the obligation to pay still exists in principle. Similarly, in the muzzling case, while Beit Din cannot force payment for the deprived food (due to the lashes), there is still a heavenly obligation to compensate. If he does pay, the payment is considered valid. This implies that the payment for the deprived food is not a direct result of the muzzling, but an independent obligation.
Rav Papa provides a third answer. He explains that when one rents an animal, the renter immediately incurs an obligation to feed it. The prohibition of muzzling, however, arises later, when the animal is actually working. Since these two obligations (feeding the animal and not muzzling it while working) do not arise simultaneously, the payment for food is not a consequence of the muzzling. Instead, it is an independent obligation that existed from the moment the animal was rented. The Rabbis established a measure for this food, such as the daily amount an animal eats.
The students in the study hall of Rav Papa bar Abba asked him several questions, to all of which he responded with a prohibition (issur), explaining that he did not want them to become lax in their observance. The first question was whether it is permissible to knead dough with milk, essentially making dairy bread. This is forbidden by rabbinic decree (gezeirah) because people might assume bread is neutral (parve) and then eat the dairy bread with meat. If one does make dairy bread, it is forbidden to eat it. Similarly, it is forbidden to smear the sides of an oven with the fat from a sheep's tail, as this would make the bread baked in it meat-flavored, leading to the concern that it might be eaten with milk. If this is done, the oven must be burned out. The Gemara notes that if the bread is made in a special, recognizable shape indicating it is dairy, it would be permissible.
The next question was whether it is permissible to place a male and female of different animal species together in a pen. This relates to the prohibition of crossbreeding (harba'at kilayim). The concern is whether merely placing them together constitutes a forbidden act, or if the actual act of mating is required. Rav Papa bar Abba ruled that it is forbidden, but clarified that this is a stringent measure (chumra), not a fundamental prohibition (issur kelal). He referenced Shmuel's teaching regarding testimony in cases of adultery (ni'uf), where witnesses do not need to see the actual act of penetration, but merely the couple lying together in a manner indicative of adultery. However, regarding crossbreeding animals, the actual act of penetration is required for the fundamental prohibition. Nevertheless, Rav Papa bar Abba was stringent to prevent laxity among the workers.
Bar Ammi challenged this stringency, citing a verse that states, "You shall not crossbreed your animal" (Leviticus 19:19). He argued that if the verse had simply said, "You shall not crossbreed your animal," he would have thought it forbidden even to merely hold the female animal by its horns while a male of the same species mounted it. The addition of the word "crossbreed" (kilayim) teaches that the prohibition applies only to different species. This implies that even holding the horns of a female animal of a different species while a male mounts it is forbidden, without requiring actual penetration. This would contradict the idea that actual penetration is required for the fundamental prohibition of kilayim.
The Gemara clarifies that the term "holding" (achizah) in this context refers to actual entry, but the Torah uses a more modest expression. Rav Yehuda states that for an owner, it is permissible to assist in the mating of animals of the same species, even by directly aiding the male's entry. This is because a person involved in their work is not expected to harbor improper thoughts. However, it is forbidden for someone who is not the owner or is not working to look at animals mating, as this could lead to inappropriate thoughts. The Gemara concludes that the prohibition of kilayim is an additional prohibition that applies even to merely holding the female of a different species, not just actual penetration.
The Gemara then revisits the question of placing different species in the same pen. Rabbi Nechemiah, the Head of the Exile in Babylon (Rosh Galut), was asked about placing two animals of one species and one of another in the same pen. One might argue that the animals will naturally mate with their own kind. However, there's a concern that workers might facilitate crossbreeding. Rav Papa bar Abba maintained his stringent ruling, prohibiting it due to concern that workers might become lax and actively cause crossbreeding.
The Mishnah continues by discussing the laws of a laborer (po'el) eating from the produce while working in the field. The Torah grants this privilege. The Mishnah states that if a worker uses their hands, or legs, or even shoulders (e.g., carrying something), they are entitled to eat. This is based on the verse that states a worker "goes into his friend's vineyard and eats," without specifying which body parts are used for work. The Gemara connects this to the law of an ox threshing, which is also allowed to eat while working. An ox uses all four legs, which are compared to hands and legs. Therefore, a human worker must also be engaged in work with their hands and legs to be entitled to eat. The Gemara then questions what would happen with animals like geese or chickens, which only have legs. It leaves this question unresolved (teiku).
Rav Nachman, in the name of Rav Papa bar Abba, describes the process of pressing grapes. Workers would press grapes by walking across them, first in one direction (up and down) and then in the other (across), forming a crisscross pattern. Until they complete both directions, they are considered to be working on grapes and may only eat grapes. Only once they have completed the crisscross motion, signifying the start of wine-making, are they permitted to drink wine. This illustrates the principle that a worker may only eat from the species they are currently working on.
The next Mishnah states that if a worker is working with figs, they may not eat grapes, and vice versa. However, a worker may refrain from eating until they reach the best parts of the field where the fruit is most delicious. They can then eat all their allocated food in that preferred spot. The Mishnah emphasizes that workers are only allowed to eat while actively engaged in work, not when they sit down to take a break. This is to prevent them from rationalizing extended breaks for eating.
However, the Mishnah adds a rabbinic enactment (takanah) made "to prevent loss for the owner" (mishum hashev aveda leba'alim). This takanah allows workers to eat "while walking from row to row" (ochlim ba'alichatan me'omen le'omen). This means that when they finish one row and are walking to the next, they may eat. This is considered less disruptive to the owner's work than eating while actively working. The Mishnah also states that a donkey may eat while it is unloading. The Gemara seeks to understand this last point.
The Gemara first addresses the question of whether a worker picking grapes from a less valuable vine may eat grapes from a better vine, given that both are the same species. The question is whether the right to eat depends on the specific item being worked on or the general species. The Gemara proposes that perhaps one can only eat from the specific grapes being placed into the owner's basket. However, it then cites a precedent from an ox threshing, which is allowed to eat from attached produce (mechubar). If an ox is yoked and pulling a wagon, with a picker in front, it cannot reach the grapes being picked. Therefore, it must be eating from other grapes nearby. This suggests that as long as it is the same species, it is permissible to eat from a different area.
The Gemara refutes this proof by suggesting that the ox might be eating from a very long vine (zimora aruka) that extends to its mouth, so it is still eating from the same vine the picker is working on. The Gemara then returns to the Mishnah's ruling that one cannot eat figs while working on grapes. This implies that if one is working on figs, they can eat other figs. The Gemara clarifies that this applies even if the fig trees are intertwined (mudlet) with grapevines. In such a case, even though one might be moving figs to get to grapes, if they are only putting grapes in the basket, they can only eat grapes. But if two fig trees are intertwined, and the worker is moving and cutting both, they can eat from those figs because they are working on them and putting them in the basket. This suggests that both conditions are necessary: it must be from the same species (mimin) and from the item one is actively working on (mimah).
The Gemara then questions the Mishnah's statement that a worker may refrain from eating until they reach the best spots. If one can eat from any part of the same species, why must they wait? Why can't they just go to the better spot, pick the fruit, bring it back to their current working area, and eat it? The Gemara answers that this would involve "wasted time" (bitul melachah) for the owner. However, if the worker's family were present and could bring the better fruit without disrupting work, it would be permissible. This indicates that the restriction is due to practical considerations, not a fundamental halachic prohibition.
The Gemara then re-examines the rabbinic enactment allowing workers to eat while walking from row to row. It considers two interpretations. One interpretation is that walking between rows is not considered "work." Therefore, from a Torah perspective, a worker would not be allowed to eat during this time. The Rabbis, however, permitted it because the owner would prefer this to the worker eating during active work, which causes more disruption. This implies that one cannot eat from one vine while working on another, as walking between vines is not considered work on either. The second interpretation, "Ika De'Amrei," posits the opposite: walking between rows *is* considered "work." In this view, the rabbinic enactment allowing eating while walking between rows is necessary because, from a Torah perspective, one cannot eat from the grapes of a previous row while considered to be "working" on the next row. Both interpretations lead to the conclusion that the Gemara does not have a conclusive proof regarding whether one can eat from a different part of the same species while working on another part.
Finally, the Gemara returns to the Mishnah's concluding statement that a donkey may eat "when it is unloading." The Gemara asks how the donkey can eat during unloading, as the load is typically removed in one go, leaving nothing for the animal to access. The Gemara explains that the Mishnah means that the donkey may eat from its load during the entire journey, until it reaches the point of unloading. This is supported by a Baraita which states that a rented donkey or camel may eat from the load on its back, but the renter may not actively take fruit from the load and feed it to the animal. The animal must be able to access the food itself. This clarifies that the right to eat applies while the animal is carrying the load, not specifically during the act of unloading.