We continue our study of the Daf Yomi, today in Gemara Bava Metzia, beginning on Daf Lamed-Aleph. We pick up where we left off yesterday, on the bottom of the page, in the discussion concerning the principle of "pain of living creatures."
The Gemara introduces a Baraita that states the Torah’s commandment to unload an animal applies when the animal is crouching under its load. This obligation does not apply if the animal is a "chronic croucher" (a term for an animal whose natural state is to crouch), as this is not an unusual occurrence. The obligation arises only when the crouching is a specific event, not a chronic condition. Furthermore, the obligation to unload applies only when the animal is actually crouching. Even if the load is very heavy and one knows the animal will eventually fall, as long as it is still standing, there is no obligation. The phrase "under its load" also teaches that the obligation is to unload, not to load. The Gemara will later clarify this point. Additionally, "under its load" implies that the obligation applies only to a load the animal can tolerate. If the owner overloaded the animal, there is no obligation to help.
The Gemara then questions these distinctions: "What do I care if it's a croucher, a chronic croucher, or standing but destined to fall?" The underlying issue is the animal's pain. If the animal is in pain, one should be obligated to save it. The Gemara concludes that these exceptions must indicate that the principle of "pain of living creatures" is not a Biblical obligation (De'oraita), but rather a Rabbinic one (Derabanan). However, Rebbe Yosef states that the author of this Baraita is indeed Rebbe Yosef, who holds that "pain of living creatures" is a Rabbinic obligation. This makes sense, as one of the cases in the Baraita states that there is no obligation to help if the animal was overloaded, an opinion attributed to Rebbe Yosef.
The Gemara then raises a difficulty: How can we attribute this Baraita to Rebbe Yosef based on the ruling regarding overloading, when the Baraita also states that there is an obligation to unload but not to load? This implies that one is not obligated to load an already unloaded animal. If this means there is no obligation to help reload it, that contradicts other sources. Therefore, it must mean that one can charge money for loading. This opinion, that one can charge for loading, is held by the Rabbanan, who disagree with Beis Shammai. If the Baraita follows the Rabbanan on loading, how can it be Rebbe Yosef's opinion, who is often associated with Beis Shammai? The Gemara answers that Rebbe Yosef can agree with the Rabbanan regarding charging a fee for loading, as this does not contradict his fundamental opinions. Thus, the Baraita can indeed be attributed to Rebbe Yosef.
The Gemara then brings another Baraita regarding helping an animal. It states, "You shall see the donkey of your enemy crouching under its load." This implies that even if one sees the animal from afar, one must go and help. How far is "afar"? The Baraita specifies a distance of seven and a half mil, which is approximately 266 Amot and two-thirds, or about 150 meters. If one sees the animal within this distance, one is obligated to help. The Baraita further states that even after helping a friend load an animal, one must escort the animal for a short distance, about four or five thousand Amot (almost a mile), to ensure the load remains stable. Abaye Bar Hanah states that one can be paid for this escorting, as it involves an investment of time.
The Gemara concludes this section without fully resolving its initial question, but the halakha, as established by the Poskim, is that "pain of living creatures" is a Biblical obligation, and therefore, we must be strict in all related matters.
We now turn to the famous Mishnah of . This Mishnah discusses the precedence when one finds two lost objects (avadot) and can only return one. The Mishnah states that one's own lost object takes precedence even over one's father's lost object. Similarly, one's own lost object takes precedence over one's Rabbi's lost object. However, if the choice is between one's father's lost object and one's Rabbi's lost object, the Rabbi's lost object takes precedence. The reason is that one's father brings one into this world, which is a great accomplishment, but one's Rabbi brings one to the World to Come through Torah study, which is a greater accomplishment. The Mishnah adds that if one's father is also a scholar, then his lost object takes precedence, as he embodies both qualities. Some commentators state that if the father pays tuition for his son's Torah study, he is considered to have facilitated his son's learning, and therefore his lost object would take precedence.
The Mishnah continues with other cases: If both one's father and one's Rabbi are carrying a load and need help, one helps the Rabbi first, then the father. If both are in prison, one redeems the Rabbi first, then the father. Again, this is unless the father is also a scholar.
The Gemara asks why one's own lost object always takes precedence. The Torah states that one is not obligated to impoverish oneself. One's sustenance comes first; one must protect one's money. However, the Gemara also quotes a teaching that if a person is overly obsessed with protecting their money and constantly fears loss, they will ultimately become needy. This implies that while one is permitted to prioritize one's own financial well-being, one should strive to act "above the law" and sometimes set aside personal financial concerns to help others. The Ben Ish Chai tells a story illustrating this point: A boy saw his freezing grandfather in the street and asked his father for a coat. The father directed him to an old coat in the attic. The boy cut the coat in half, explaining that he needed to save the other half for his father, for when he, too, would be old and in need. The Ben Ish Chai explains that this illustrates the principle that how one treats one's elders will eventually be reciprocated by one's own children.
Regarding the precedence given to the Rabbi, the Gemara clarifies which type of Rabbi is meant. It refers to a Rabbi who taught one wisdom (chokhma), meaning the logic and reasoning of the Mishnah and Gemara. It does not refer to a Rabbi who merely taught one Mikra (Chumash) or Mishnah (the text without in-depth analysis). Rabbi Yehuda states that any teacher from whom one derived the majority of one's wisdom is considered one's Rabbi. Even if one learned only one Mishnah from him, or even just one term, like "Zuhama Listeron" (a type of skimmer spoon used to remove foam from a pot), that teacher is considered one's Rabbi, and one is bound to respect him.
Shmuel once tore his garments in mourning for a scholar who explained to him a Mishnah about the doors of the Beit HaMikdash. The Kohen would use two keys to open these doors. One key required the Kohen to insert his hand up to his armpit to turn the lock, while the other opened quickly. This explanation of the keys' mechanism was considered profound enough for Shmuel to treat the scholar as his Rabbi.
Ulla states that scholars in Bavel would stand for one another and tear their garments upon each other's passing, treating every scholar as their own Rabbi. Rashi explains that because they sat together in the study hall, aggressively questioning and learning from each other, each became a Rabbi to the other. However, regarding lost objects, they would only give precedence to their primary Rabbi, the one from whom they learned the majority of their Torah, aligning with Rabbi Yehuda's opinion.
Rav Chazda once asked Rav Huna: What if a student teaches his Rabbi, meaning the Rabbi needs information from the student? Does the student still consider him his Rabbi? Rav Huna, who was Rav Chazda's Rabbi, took offense, interpreting the question as a personal slight, implying that Rav Chazda saw himself as teaching Rav Huna. Rav Huna declared, "I don't need you; you need me!" This incident led to a forty-year estrangement between them. Rav Chazda fasted forty fasts as atonement for offending Rav Huna, who in turn fasted forty fasts for suspecting Rav Chazda's intentions. From this, we learn that one does not fully understand one's Rabbi until one has studied with him for forty years.
Rabbi Yitzchak states that the Rabbi referred to in the Gemara, whose lost object takes precedence, is not necessarily one from whom one learned the majority of one's Torah, but even one from whom one learned a single item. The Gemara questions this, as Rabbi Yochanan generally rules according to the Stam Mishnah (an anonymous Mishnah), and our Mishnah's use of "Rabbi" implies a teacher of profound wisdom (Gemara), not just a single point. The Gemara clarifies that "wisdom" (chokhma) in this context refers to the majority of one's wisdom, aligning with Rabbi Yehuda.
The Gemara then discusses the relative value of different types of Torah study. Those who study Mikra (Bible) are praised for their good character, but it's not the highest form of study, as Torah She'Ba'al Peh (Oral Law) is essential for understanding Mikra. Those who study Mishnah are praised, and it brings great reward. However, the study of Gemara is considered the greatest, encompassing all other forms of study. The Gemara notes an apparent contradiction: elsewhere, it is stated that one should "run to study Mishnah more than Gemara."
The Gemara reconciles this by explaining that the statement praising Gemara as the highest form of study was made during the time of Rebbe, when Gemara study was so emphasized that people neglected Mishnah, forgetting the names of the Rabbis and their rulings. The second statement, encouraging Mishnah study, was a corrective measure to rebalance the curriculum. Rashi provides historical context, explaining that after the students of Shammai and Hillel multiplied, there was much confusion and many differing opinions. Rebbe then compiled the Mishnah, organizing the halakha and establishing definitive rulings. While Gemara provides elaboration and analysis of the Mishnah, people began to neglect the Mishnah's text. Thus, the call to "run to study Mishnah" was to ensure its preservation, as Mishnah can be studied quickly, while Gemara requires more deliberate, in-depth analysis.
The Gemara further emphasizes the importance of Gemara study by citing a verse: "Tell my nation their sin, and the house of Jacob their iniquity." This refers to scholars (my nation) whose unintentional errors are treated as intentional sins, because they possess the capacity to learn and should have studied correctly. The "house of Jacob" refers to common people, whose intentional sins are treated as unintentional, as they lack the deep understanding of the scholars. This highlights that scholars are held to a higher standard and must study the Talmud meticulously, as a mistake in understanding the Mishnah can lead to incorrect rulings and severe consequences. Gemara study is crucial for clarifying the Mishnah, resolving contradictions, and preventing misinterpretations.
The Gemara then quotes a verse, "Listen to the word of God, you who tremble at His word." The "tremblers" are the scholars who toil to understand the Mishnah clearly. The verse continues, "Your brothers said, those who hate you..." The "brothers" are those who study Mikra, as there is no disdain between them and the Gemara scholars. But the "enemies" are those who study Mishnah without Gemara, as they are seen as neglecting the full depth of halakha and are sometimes looked down upon by Gemara scholars. The verse concludes, "they will rejoice in your joy," meaning that even those who only study Mikra or Mishnah, despite the internal contention, will ultimately merit to rejoice in the Messianic era, perhaps after a period of rectification. Even the Am Ha'aretz, who may not have a strong claim to Torah scholarship, will ultimately be part of this rejoicing, perhaps after a period of punishment and atonement. This concludes our study of with a hopeful prediction about the coming of Mashiach.
We now begin a new chapter, discussing the laws of watchmen (shomrim). The Mishnah presents a case where one gives an animal as collateral to a friend, who watches it for free. This is called a (unpaid watchman), who has limited liability. If the animal is stolen or lost, the watchman is normally required to swear that he was not negligent. However, if he chooses not to swear, he can simply pay for the loss. If, after he pays, the thief (ganav) is found, the thief must pay double the principal value. If the animal was slaughtered or sold by the thief, the payment is four or five times its value. The question is, to whom does the thief pay? The Mishnah states he pays the watchman. Since the watchman paid the owner for the lost item, he effectively owns it and is entitled to all benefits, including the penalties (kefel, arba'ah vechamisha). However, if the watchman swore that he was not negligent and did not cause the damage, and then the thief is found, the thief pays the owner directly, as the item still belongs to the owner.
The Gemara questions why the Mishnah presents two cases: an animal and vessels. In both cases, the watchman's liability and the thief's payment are similar. The Gemara explains that the case of the animal is necessary because watching an animal requires significant effort. Therefore, when the watchman pays, the owner is presumed to "sell" him the rights to the penalties (kefel, arba'ah vechamisha) in recognition of his hard work. However, watching vessels requires less effort, so one might think the owner would not transfer these rights. Thus, the Mishnah teaches that even with vessels, if the watchman pays, he receives the penalties. Conversely, one might think that only with vessels, which are less expensive, would the owner transfer the penalties as a "tip" to the watchman. But with an animal, which is more valuable, the owner might not. Therefore, both cases are needed to teach that in both scenarios, if the watchman pays, he receives the penalties. Furthermore, the four or five-fold payment only applies to animals, not vessels, which only incur a double payment. Therefore, both cases are necessary to cover all scenarios.