The Gemara Bava Metzia 76a begins a new chapter, Hasocher Et Haumanim, which discusses the laws of hiring workers. The Mishnah introduces two types of workers: a daily worker (sechir yom), paid by the day, and a contractor (kablan), paid by the job. The Mishnah states, "If they tricked each other (hit'u zeh et zeh), they have no claims against each other except for a complaint (tar'omet)." We will explore what this "tricking" entails and who is involved.
The Mishnah provides examples of situations where this principle applies. If a person hires a donkey driver or a wagon driver as a contractor to deliver materials, such as wood for a wedding canopy (chuppah) or carriage (apiryon), or flutes for a wedding or a funeral, or workers to remove flax from a soaking pit (mishrah)—essentially, any task where delay would cause a loss—and the workers then back out, the law (din) is as follows: If there are no other workers available at the same price, the employer (baal habayit) may hire new workers at a higher price, and the original workers must absorb the difference. This means the original workers will incur a loss. Alternatively, the employer may "trick" the original workers by promising them more money to finish the job, but then only paying them the originally agreed-upon amount. Rashi clarifies that if there are no workers and the flax would be lost, the employer may hire others at a higher price, and the original workers are liable to pay the difference.
The Mishnah continues: "If a person hires workers (umanim) and they retract after doing part of the job, their hand is on the lower side (yadam al hatachtona)." This means they are at a disadvantage. "But if the employer retracts, his hand is on the lower side (yado al hatachtona)." The general rule is, "Whoever changes the original agreement, his hand is on the lower side." Rashi illustrates this with an example: If one gives wool to a dyer to dye it red, but the dyer dyes it black, the dyer's hand is on the lower side. The dyer will be paid the lesser of two amounts: either the cost of the materials and dye, or the value added to the wool by the dyeing. If the enhancement is greater than the cost of materials, the dyer receives only the cost of materials. If the cost of materials is greater than the enhancement, the dyer receives only the enhancement. The payment is always the lesser of the two. Rashi further explains the concept of "their hand is on the lower side" when workers leave mid-job: If the price of workers has increased and no one can be found to finish the job for the original rate, the employer may withhold from the original workers' pay whatever is necessary to cover the increased cost of completing the work, ensuring the employer does not incur a loss. Conversely, if worker prices have decreased, and someone can finish the job for less, the original workers are paid for the portion they completed at the original rate, and the employer benefits from the lower cost of completion. The original workers cannot demand the savings the employer gained from hiring cheaper labor for the remaining work.
The Gemara begins by analyzing the Mishnah's phrase, "If they tricked each other (hit'u zeh et zeh)." It notes that the Mishnah does not say "they retracted from each other (chazru zeh mizeh)," which would imply a direct interaction between employer and worker. Therefore, the Gemara initially suggests that "they tricked each other" refers to workers tricking other workers. For instance, the employer (baal habayit) sends an agent (shaliach) to hire workers. This agent then misrepresents the employer's offer to other workers.
The Gemara explores scenarios: If the employer offered four zuz, but the agent told the workers three, the Gemara asks why the workers would have a complaint (tar'omet). They accepted three, so they should have no claim. If, conversely, the employer offered three zuz, but the agent told the workers four, the Gemara asks if the agent guaranteed the higher price. If the agent guaranteed it, he would be obligated to pay the difference, as established in a related teaching (tanya) about someone who hires a worker to work in his field but points to a neighbor's field instead. In such a case, the employer must pay the worker the full wage, and then the employer can seek compensation from the neighbor who benefited. This demonstrates that if the agent guaranteed the payment, it's not merely a complaint; it's a monetary obligation.
The Gemara clarifies that the case must be where the agent explicitly stated, "Your wages are the employer's responsibility (scharchem al baal habayit)," meaning he did not personally guarantee the higher price. In this situation, if the employer had only offered three zuz, the workers, despite being told four by the agent, have only a complaint against the employer, as the employer never promised four. The Gemara then asks, "A complaint against whom?" It clarifies that the complaint is against the employer, who, despite his agent's misrepresentation, is only obligated for the three zuz he originally offered. The agent is not monetarily liable because he did not guarantee the payment.
The Gemara raises another question: Why not simply determine the prevailing market rate for workers? If the going rate is four zuz, the employer should pay four, regardless of what his agent said, because the employer benefits from the work at that market value. If the going rate is three zuz, then the workers have no basis for a complaint about receiving three. Rashi elaborates that if the market rate is four, the employer must pay four, as he benefited (hanaah) from the work at that value, even if he didn't explicitly instruct the agent to offer four. If the market rate is three, there is no complaint for receiving three.
The Gemara answers that the case is one where there are two prevailing rates: some workers are hired for four zuz, and some for three. In this scenario, the workers can argue, "Had you not told us four, we would have sought employment elsewhere for four." Thus, their complaint (tar'omet) is valid, even though they only receive three from the employer, who only promised three. They lose the one zuz, but have a complaint against the agent for misrepresentation.
An alternative interpretation (ibayeit eima) suggests that the second worker was actually an employer himself, accustomed to hiring others rather than being hired. He could claim, "Had you not told me four, it would have been beneath my dignity (zila bi milta) to take this job. I only accepted because I expected higher pay." His complaint is rooted in the perceived insult of working for less than his usual status demands.
A third interpretation (ibayeit eima) reverts to the idea that we are discussing regular workers. The normal price is three zuz. The workers' complaint is, "Since you told us four, we worked harder and performed a higher quality of work (avita shapirta), commensurate with a four-zuz payment." The Gemara questions this, asking why not simply assess the quality of the work. The Gemara answers that the work involved digging furrows (rifka), which, by the time it was inspected, had filled with water (malei mayya), making it impossible to ascertain the quality of the digging. Since they cannot prove their claim of superior work, they revert to the going rate of three zuz, and thus have only a complaint. If the furrows had not filled with water, and they could prove their enhanced effort, they would indeed be paid more than three zuz.
A final interpretation (ibayeit eima) returns to the scenario where the employer offered four zuz, but the agent told the workers three. The Gemara previously stated that if they accepted three, they have no complaint. Now, the Gemara refines this: The workers can argue, "Don't you follow the verse, 'Do not withhold good from its owners when it is in your power to do it' (Al Timna Tov Miba'alav)?" This complaint is directed at the agent for depriving them of the higher wage the employer was willing to pay. While this is a moral complaint, it does not create a monetary obligation, as they accepted the lower price.
The Gemara then considers another case: If the employer said three zuz, and the agent said four, and the workers responded, "We accept whatever the employer said (kemo she'amar baal habayit)." The question is whether they are relying on the agent's word (that the employer said four) or the employer's actual word (which was three). Rashi clarifies that "whatever the employer said" means they trust the agent that the employer indeed offered the higher price (four). They are not trying to get less money; they are trusting the agent's representation of the employer's offer. If the agent had guaranteed the payment, he would be liable for the extra zuz. However, if the agent said, "Your wages are the employer's responsibility," and the employer only offered three, then the workers have only a complaint, as the employer did not agree to four.
The Gemara then presents the true question: What if the employer offered four, the agent said three, and the workers responded, "Whatever the employer said"? Are they relying on the agent's word (that the employer said three), thus accepting three and having only a complaint against the agent? Or are they relying on the employer's actual word (four), and thus should receive four? This is the core dilemma. Rashi reiterates this question, asking whether the workers rely on the agent's word and accept three, with only a complaint against the agent for the missing zuz, or if they do not trust the agent and intend to follow the employer's actual offer, thereby entitling them to four.
To resolve this, the Gemara introduces a case from Gittin. A woman tells an agent, "Bring me my bill of divorce (get)" (Havei Li Gitti), making him an agent for delivery (shaliach holacha). The agent goes to the husband and says, "Your wife said, 'Receive my bill of divorce for me' (Hitkabel Li Gitti)," implying he is an agent for reception (shaliach kabbalah). The husband then says, "Here it is, as she said (Hela Kemah She'amra)." Rav Nachman, in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha, in the name of Rav, rules that "even if the get reaches her hand, she is not divorced (afilu higia get leyada eino megureshet)." The Gemara explains that the husband relied on the agent's word that he was an agent for reception. Since the wife did not appoint him as such, his agency for reception is invalid. Furthermore, the husband did not appoint him as an agent for delivery. Thus, no valid agency was established, and the divorce is ineffective.
The Gemara deduces from this Gittin case that the husband relies on the agent's word (adibura didei kasmich). If the husband had relied on the wife's actual instruction ("Bring me my get"), he would have implicitly appointed the agent as an agent for delivery, and the divorce would have been effective upon the get reaching her hand. Since the divorce is invalid, it proves the husband relied on the agent's misrepresentation. Applying this to the workers' case, when the workers say, "Whatever the employer said," they are relying on the agent's representation of the employer's words. Therefore, if the agent said three, they are stuck with three, and only have a complaint (tar'omet) against the agent.
The Gemara refutes this comparison, stating, "Is this truly a comparison (hachi hashta)?" It argues that the Gittin case is fundamentally different. The Gemara explains that the proof would only be valid if the Gittin case involved a functioning agency. For instance, if the wife had said, "Receive my get for me," and the agent told the husband, "Your wife said, 'Bring me my get'," and the husband responded, "Here it is, as she said." If Rav Nachman had then ruled that the divorce is effective when the get reaches the agent's hand (implying reception), it would prove the husband relied on the wife's original instruction. Or, if Rav Nachman had ruled that it's effective when the get reaches her hand (implying delivery), it would prove the husband relied on the agent's misrepresentation. In such cases, where the agency is still valid, we could discuss whose word the husband relies on. However, in the actual Gittin case presented, the agent completely uprooted his agency (akar shaliach leshlichutei legamrei). By claiming to be an agent for reception ("Receive my get for me") when he was only appointed for delivery ("Bring me my get"), he effectively refused to act as an agent for delivery. Therefore, regardless of whose word the husband relied on, the agency was broken, and the get is invalid. Thus, the Gittin case cannot serve as a proof for the workers' scenario.
The Gemara then offers a new interpretation for the Mishnah's phrase "they tricked each other (hit'u zeh et zeh)." It suggests that the Mishnah's author (Tanna) uses "tricked" to refer even to "retracting" (chazru) from an agreement. This means the Mishnah is indeed discussing the employer or the worker backing out of the job. A Baraita supports this: "If a person hires workers, either day workers or contractors, and they tricked the employer (hit'u et baal habayit)," meaning they quit, "or the employer tricked them," meaning he fired them, "they have no claims against each other except for a complaint." This implies that "tricked" can refer to backing out.
The Baraita clarifies: This rule of having only a complaint applies only if they did not yet begin the work. However, if the workers set out for the job, for example, porters who arrived but found no grain to transport, or field workers who found the field too moist, the employer must pay them a full wage (sekharam mushlam). However, "full wage" here does not mean the full amount they would have earned for completing the work. It means a reduced payment, as "one who carries a full load is not like one who returns empty-handed," and "one who performs work is not like one who sits idle." So they receive a reduced compensation for their effort in coming to the job.
Similarly, regarding contractors who backed out: The rule of having no claim applies only if they did not begin the work. But if they started the work, their completed portion is assessed, and the employer must pay them for it. For example, if they agreed to cut a harvest for two sela'im (eight dinarim), and cut half, they are paid one sela (four dinarim). Even if the market price for the remaining half of the work has increased to six dinarim, the employer still pays the original workers only four dinarim for their half, resulting in the employer paying a total of ten dinarim (four to the first workers, six to the new ones) for a job originally priced at eight. Alternatively, the original workers can finish the job and receive the full two sela'im they were promised, not the increased market rate.
Rabbi Dosa offers a different calculation: He assesses the value of the work yet to be done. If the remaining half of the job now costs six dinarim, the employer pays the original workers only two dinarim (instead of four), so that the total cost to the employer for the entire job remains eight dinarim (two to the first workers, six to the new ones). In this view, the original workers absorb the loss due to the increased market price. They can also choose to finish the job and receive the full two sela'im they were promised.
The Baraita further limits these rules: The dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Dosa applies only to tasks where delay does not cause a loss (davar she'ein avud). However, if the workers' quitting would cause a financial loss (hefsed) to the employer, they cannot retract. In such a case, the employer may hire new workers at an exorbitant price, even forty or fifty zuz per day (far exceeding the original three or four zuz), and the original workers must absorb this loss. The employer can also "trick" them by promising them double pay to finish, then only paying the original amount. This is permissible because their retraction would cause a loss.
This rule of hiring new workers at an exaggerated price applies only if there are no other workers available to hire. If there are other workers available, and the original workers tell the employer, "Go hire from these others," then the employer has only a complaint against them, and cannot charge them for the higher price of new workers, as he could have avoided the loss by hiring the cheaper available labor.
A student recited the Baraita before Rav, stating that the employer must pay a full wage (sekharam mushlam) to workers who showed up but found no work. Rav Chiyya, Rav's uncle, interjected, "If I were the employer, I would only pay them as an idle worker (k'poel batel), not a full wage." The student responded by pointing to the Baraita's subsequent lines, which clarify that "full wage" does not mean the full amount, but a reduced amount, acknowledging the difference between a loaded and empty return, or a working and idle person. This implies the student and Rav Chiyya were in agreement on the principle of reduced payment, but Rav Chiyya had not heard the full text of the Baraita.
Some say that Rav Chiyya had heard the entire Baraita, but still argued, "If I were the employer, I would pay them nothing at all!" He questioned why any payment should be made if no work was performed. The Gemara resolves this apparent contradiction by distinguishing between two scenarios: If the workers inspected the field the night before (desiyera la'ar'a me'orta), knowing its conditions and potential for flooding, and still showed up, any loss is theirs (psida d'poalim). The employer is not liable. However, if the employer did not show them the field beforehand (lo siyera la'ar'a me'orta), the loss is the employer's (psida d'baal habayit), and he must pay them as an idle worker. This is exemplified by Rava's ruling: If one hires workers to dig furrows, and rain floods the field, if the workers inspected the field the night before, the loss is theirs. If not, the loss is the employer's, and he pays them as an idle worker. This distinction highlights that responsibility for compensation depends on whether the workers had prior knowledge of the conditions.