A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Eli Mansour

Daf Yomi

Bava Metzia 98A - 98B (14th Cycle Daf Yomi Shiur)

Lectured by Rabbi Eli Mansour

Published
July 1, 2025
Duration
00:00

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Gemara, Bava Metzia (Bava Metzia tractate), daf tzadi chet (page 98). Nishmat Yehudah ben Neta (The soul of Yehudah son of Neta); hatzlachah bechol ma'aseh yadav, amen. Refuah sheleimah lechol cholei amo Yisrael (Complete healing for all the sick of Israel), amen. Sarah bat Rita (Sarah daughter of Rita), Simchah bat Na'amah (Simchah daughter of Na'amah). Simchah bat Na'amah. El na refa na lahem (Please, God, heal them), refuat hanefesh (healing of the soul), refuat haguf (healing of the body), otam vechol ha... vechen yehi ratzon venomar amen.

We had a Mishnah. It had four cases, all involving a shomer (keeper) who says the animal was rented to him and therefore, since it died, he is off the hook, while the owner says it was borrowed. We gave different cases where there could be a safek (doubt). Then we said that in the case of the Mishnah, the shomer should have to make a shevuah (oath), but he cannot make one for whatever reason, as we will see now. Since he cannot make a shevuah, he pays.

That was Rava's case: maneh li beyadcha vehalah omer ein li beyadcha ela chamishim: “I only owe you fifty.” What about the rest? Eini yode'a, “I don't know.” So this is not a classical case of modeh bemiktzat (one who admits part). Normally, modeh bemiktzat means that you admit part and are kofer bemiktzat (denies part). Here, he admits part and says, “I don't know about the other fifty.” So you cannot tell the man to swear, because he does not know. He cannot swear that he definitely does not owe it. Therefore, mitoch she'eino yachol lehishava, the din (law) is that he pays. That is the kelal (principle) of Rava.

Now we have to apply that to the case of the Mishnah. Give me a case in the Mishnah where the man cannot swear because he has an eini yode'a situation. The Gemara says: mashkachat lah reisha (You find it in the first clause), the first two cases, bishtayim (with two), veseifa beshalosh (And the end with three). So we have to add some cows here. We will discuss two cows in the first two cases and three cows in the last cases.

What will explain this? Reisha bishtayim. Again, the mafkid (depositor) gave two cows to the shomer. De'amar leh: shtei parot masarti lach, “I gave you two cows. Palga deyoma bishe'elah ufalga deyoma bisechirut: half the day it was for borrowing and half the day was for rental.” That was the first case in the Mishnah. O i nami, that is the second case: chad yoma bishe'elah vechad yoma bisechirut. One day was for borrowing and one day was for rental. Those are the cases.

Umetu tarvaihu be'idan (at the time) she'elah: both died during the borrowing period. The mash'il (lender) says they both died at the time of the she'elah; therefore, you owe me two cows. Ve'amar leh sho'el (borrower): chada be'idan she'elah metah. For sure, one died at the time of the she'elah, so I admit that. Ve'idach, lo yadana ei be'idan she'elah metah ei be'idan sechirut metah. But the other one, I don't know. So this case would normally require a shevuah, in the case of modeh bemiktzat, but he cannot make a shevuah because he does not know. He says, “Eini yode'a.” So mitoch she'eino yachol lehishava, meshalem: since he cannot take an oath, he pays.

Now, if you want to catch up with Rashi here, Rashi says: ka mashkachat lah esek shevuah dematnitin deshadei bivtei parot uveseifa begimel. In the third line of Rashi: reisha dekati dina ala yom o ala sha'ah lo mitokma beparah achat, mikrei ela bivtei, umetu. This man has two claims on two cows. Vezeh tove'o al bet: this man has two claims on two cows. Vehalah modeh lo be'otah shehu mechuyav lo. He admits the one that he owes him. Dameha: he said, “I owe you one.” Vehi mevi'ato lechayev shevuah lashniyah, shetone eini yode'a im chayav im lav. That brings him to a shevuah on the second one, which he says he does not know if he owes or not. The problem is that he cannot make a shevuah on the second one because he does not know. Mitoch she'eino yachol lehishava, meshalem.

Ulehachi nakat metu tarvaihu: that is why it says they both died. De'i bedekayma chada, if one of them were alive, veka'amar leh ahada shaklah vahada eini yode'a, why not give a case where one is alive and he says, “I owe you this one; one of them is shalem, and this one I don't know”? Why not give the case where one is alive and he says, “I don't know”?

So Rashi says: ulehachi nakat umetu tarvayhu, de'i bedekayma chada veka'amar lei achada shakla vechada eini yode'a im beshe'at she'elah im beshe'at sechirut, havei lei hahu demodeh. Look, the case would be one of heilach. We learned on daf what, daled? Where you have heilach, where he gives him one, right? Ve'ika man de'amar heilach patur mishevuah: there is someone who says that with heilach, he is exempt from a shevuah. That would put us into the machloket about heilach. Heilach is where you say, “Take one. Here is one, and this one I don't know.” Then there is a machloket about whether he is obligated in a shevuah. We do not want to get involved with the machloket about heilach. That was a machloket, so we do not want to get involved in that case. We want a case where he would normally be chayav bishevuah, but cannot make a shevuah because of eini yode'a. If one animal were there and he were giving it to him, while about the other one he said, “I don't know,” then it would be the machloket. So we gave the case where both died. That is what Rashi points out here.

What is the seifa (final clause) case? Back to the Gemara. It says veseifa beshalosh (And the end with three): three cows. What is the case of three cows? De'amar lei shalosh parot natati lecha, “I gave you three cows,” shtayim bishe'elah, two of them were borrowed, therefore you owe me two, ve'achat bisechirut, and one of them was rented. Umetu hanhu tartei deshe'elah: the two cows that died were the two borrowed cows. Therefore, you owe me those two cows.

Ve'amar lei sho'el: the borrower will of course say, in, it is true, chada deshe'elah meitah: one of the borrowed cows died, so I owe you that one. Ve'idach, regarding the other cow that died, lo yadana ei deshe'elah meitah o dekayma deshechirut hi. There are two cows left. He says, “I don't know which cow this is. I don't know if the borrowed cow died and the one that is alive is the rented cow,” in which case that is what you should get back, “o deshechirut meitah,” or the rented cow died, veha dekayma deshe'elah hi, and the one that is alive is the borrowed cow. So he is not sure exactly what happened.

Again, there are three cows here. Basically, he admits to one and denies another, which would make it modeh bemiktzat. But regarding the third one, he says, “I don't know.” Therefore, he cannot make a shevuah on a modeh bemiktzat case because he is not sure whether it was rental or borrowing. So mitoch she'eino yachol lehishava yeshalem—mitoch she'eino yachol lehishava yeshalem.

Back to Rashi: veseifa dekatani sha'al achat vesachar achat. Now the seifa case is that he borrowed one and rented one, ve'eino yode'a eizeh mehen meitah: he does not know which of them died. What is the case of an esek shevuah? We have to create a case where there was a shevuah. The case is where there were three cows, so he admits to one and denies another; that makes it modeh bemiktzat. So, since he is modeh bemiktzat, he is chayav bishevuah. He would have to make a shevuah about the third one, but he cannot because it is eini yode'a.

Umetu hashinayim, be'achat modeh sheshe'ulah haytah vechayav bidmeiha vehi mechayevto shevuah al hashniyah, and that brings him to the obligation regarding the second one. The problem is that he comes along and says, regarding the animal, that he does not know whether it was rental.

Let's read that case again. We are reading the Gemara: veseifa beshalosh. Basically, the mafkid gave three cows to the shomer, and two of them died. Let's make the claims clear: de'amar lei shalosh parot natati lecha, shtayim bishe'elah ve'achat bisechirut. “I gave you three cows, two borrowed and one rented,” and, as it happened, umetu hanhu tartei deshe'elah, the two borrowed cows died. Therefore, you are chayav to pay me for two.

What about the third cow? The third cow is still alive, so he will get that back. Ve'amar lei sho'el: the borrower says, in, chada deshe'elah meitah. For sure, one of the two you are claiming I definitely owe you was borrowed. Ve'idach, regarding the second cow, lo yadana, because now one cow is dead and one is alive. He will say, “I don't know i deshe'elah metah,” whether the borrowed one died, and then I am chayav to pay you, “udekayma deshechiruto,” and the one that is alive is the rented cow; or, “o deshechirut metah,” the rented cow died and “ve-hai dekayma deshe'elah hi,” the one that is alive is the borrowed cow. So he does not know which one it is. Therefore, he cannot make a shevuah because he is eino yode'a, umetoch she'eino yachol lehishava meshalem. That is the case we stated.

We have now learned the case according to Rav Nachman and Rabbi Yochanan: a shomer who is coming to exempt himself from hashavat pikadon (return of a deposit) beta'anah potarto, a claim that exempts him, dahalo hu chayav lehishava. Normally, if you want to exempt yourself, you have to make a shevuah. But in this case, since he cannot make a shevuah because he says eino yode'a, he pays. Beautiful.

Not everybody agrees with that. Ule-Rami bar Chama de'amar arba'ah shomrim tzrichim kefirah bemiktzat vehoda'ah bemiktzat (partial denial and partial admission): this is the famous opinion of Rami bar Chama. Rami bar Chama says that regular shomrim do not swear about the claim; meaning, they do not swear in cases of geneivah va'aveidah (theft and loss). Shomrim do not swear. Ela mai? They swear only in a case of modeh bemiktzat, when the shomrim are obligated to make a shevuah.

What is the case? Venimtza she'ein milvad oto hamamon shehashomer to'en aleha ta'anah potarto mehashavato. Normally, what does the man say? “I am exempt from paying.” Why? Because either I was a socher (renter); that is the shemirah item. However, tzarich sheyihyeh gam ken mamon shehashomer modeh bo, there also has to be money that the shomer admits to, ve'od mamon acher shehu kofer bo. So you actually need money that he admits to and other money that he denies. Then he will make a shevuah about the shemirah: “I was a socher or a sho'el,” and things like that. We do not impose a shevuah on a shomer for no reason unless there is, in that case, a denial and an admission.

Therefore, we need more cows. Kegon she'al hapikadon tove'o shemasar leyado shalosh parot. Let's give a case with three cows again. Vechafar shomer be'achat mehen: he denies one of them, uve'achat mehen hodah she'adayin yeshnah tachat yado: about one of them he says, “Yes, I have that one.” That is a denial and an admission. Chayav. Ve'al hashelishit hu modeh shenimserah lo velo heshivah aval hu to'en aleha ta'anah potarto mehashavah. About the third one, he admits it was given to him and that he did not return it, but he makes a claim that exempts him from returning it. For example, with a shomer chinam (unpaid guardian), we can say it was stolen. For a shomer chinam, it was stolen. Normally, according to this Rabbi, Rami bar Chama, a shomer chinam would not swear that it was stolen and then get off the hook. He would not have to pay; he would just say, “Nignevah,” and be off the hook. He would not swear. What makes him swear? The fact that he denies one thing and admits another. So you have to create cases in which the shomer who swears has a denial and an admission, on different animals.

We read Rashi. Rashi says: ule-Rami de'amar daled shomrim bishvu'ot ha'amurot bahem. Regarding the oaths of the four guardians, kegon shomer chinam nishba shenignevah: that would be a case where a shomer chinam swears that it was stolen to get off the hook. Veshomer sachar (paid guardian) nishba shene'ensah: a shomer sachar normally swears that an accident beyond his control happened and is then off the hook. Vesho'el: for a borrower, in every case, only metah meichamat melachah—if it died from its work, that way he would be off the hook. Tzrichim kefirah: we need a denial and an admission, and then you can make the shevuah about the shemirah item, whatever the liability of the shemirah is.

Ve'af al gav deshayecha behu shevu'at shomrim: even though, seemingly, there can be a shevu'at shomrim without any denial, lo mashbe'inan lehu shevu'at shomrim ad dechafar kefirah acharit. We do not make them take a shevu'at shomrim until they have made another denial. What is kefirah acharit? Kegon lahadam (there were never any such things). Lahadam means lo hayu devarim me'olam (Nothing of the sort ever happened). Basically, he says, “You are saying there were three cows, but first of all, it was not even three cows; I never received one.” So he denies one. About the other one, he says, “Yes, that is yours. I owe you that one.” The third cow is the case where he comes along and exempts himself by saying nignevah or metah, or whatever it is, and therefore he should be patur. Since there is a denial and an admission, he can make the shevuah in such a case.

But in this case, uledideih lo mechayev shevuah hoda'ah belo kfirah ve-eini yode'a lav kfirah hi. That is the point. When a man comes along and says, “Eini yode'a,” that is not considered a denial. A denial has to be lo hayu devarim me'olam: “I don't owe it.” Eini yode'a is not enough to count as a denial. Therefore, since it is not enough to count as a denial, he cannot make a shevuah.

Now the Gemara will give the cases. Therefore, mashkachat lah reisha beshalosh veseifa be'arba: we have to add some cows. The first case is three cows, and the last cases are four cows. Reisha beshalosh—what is the case? De'amar leih shalosh parot natati lecha: “I gave you three cows.” Palga deyoma bishe'elah ufalga deyoma bisechirut, which is case number one in the Mishnah: half the day was borrowing, half the day was rental. I nami, on consecutive days, separate days: chad yoma bishe'elah, one full day was borrowing, and the next day was rental.

What happened to the three cows? Of course, they died. Umetu shalosh, shalosh kuleihu be'idan she'elah: all three died at the time of the she'elah. Basically, his claim is that you owe me three cows because it was she'elah, and she'elah is chayav in onsin (accidents beyond control). Therefore, pay me for my three cows. Ve'amar leih sho'el: now the borrower has to make a counterclaim. What is his counterclaim? Chada, one of these cows, lo hayu devarim me'olam. So that is your kefirah bemiktzat. One cow: lo hayu devarim. First you say three; it was not three, you never gave me three, I never got three. I only got two. So regarding one of them, he denies it completely. That is the denial.

Vechada, in, be'idan she'elah metah. The second one, in hachi nami: you are right, it died during the she'elah, and therefore I am chayav to pay you. That is the modeh bemiktzat. So there you have the denial and the admission. Ve'idach, what about the third one you are claiming against me? Lo yadana ei be'idan she'elah metah ei be'idan sechirut metah.

Normally, he would be chayav to pay if it were not a safek. That means you have a denial and an admission. The only problem is that about the third cow he says, “Eini yode'a.” He says, “I don't know when it died.” Vecheivan shehodah be'achat vechafar be'achat, that means nitchayev shevu'at modeh bemiktzat: he has the obligation of a modeh bemiktzat shevuah. Ulefichach yesh lo lehishava gam al ta'anato legabei haparah hashelishit. That would normally bring you to a shevuah about the third cow: you would want to say it died at the time of sechirut. But he does not know for sure whether it died at the time of sechirut. Therefore, mitoch she'eino yachol lehishava meshalem.

Normally, the classic case would be three cows, and he says one of them was lo hayu devarim me'olam, one of them I owe you, and the other one you asked me about was bisechirut, so I do not owe it to you. Then he would make a shevuah. But here, he does not know that it was bisechirut. About the third one, he is mesupak. Therefore, he cannot make a shevuah in such a case. Even though normally he would make a shevuah, because all the variables line up with kofer and modeh, he cannot make a shevuah about the third case. He cannot make a shevuah about something he does not know. How can he make a shevuah if he says he does not know? Therefore, mitoch shelo yachol lehishava, yeshalem.

The point is that you have to add another cow there to get a kofer and a modeh on the two. The third one is the shomer issue: is it safek sechirut or safek she'elah? Basically, what we are trying to do is give a case of mitoch she'eino yachol lehishava yeshalem for one. The easy, simple case, where there are actually two and he rejects one, is not modeh bemiktzat. So we have to create a modeh bemiktzat case where he would be chayav bishevuah. Correct. Correct. Exactly. Chazak uvaruch, chazak uvaruch.

According to Rami bar Chama, the only time even shomrim take a shevuah is in a modeh bemiktzat case. So you need enough cows to create the scenario. Then, with the third one, which we would normally make him swear about, how can he? He is eini yode'a, and therefore—and the seifa is be'arba. The seifa would be four cows. What is the case? De'amar leih arba parot natati lecha: “I gave you four cows,” shalosh bishe'elah, three borrowed, vachada bisechirut. Of course, the three borrowed cows died. Umetu hanach shalosh deshe'elah.

The one that is alive, which we are not discussing, is given back. Ve'amar leih: what is the counterclaim? The borrower tells the mash'il, chada lo hayu devarim me'olam. First of all, it was not four cows; it was only three cows. So he denies one of them completely. That is called kefirah bemiktzat. You say, “Basically, you only lent me two cows. Two of them were borrowed,” because one of them was going to be rented. You are saying two of them were borrowed. Dechada in, deshe'elah metah. You are right; therefore, I owe you one, because one of them actually died while borrowed.

Ve'idach, regarding the third cow that died, lo yadana i disechirut metah o dekaima deshe'elah. I do not know if the rented cow died, in which case I am patur from tashlumin, and the cow that is alive is the borrowed one, so just take it back; o deshe'elah metah, or the borrowed cow died, udekayma disechirut, and this cow here is the rented one.

Let's review the case again. What is the mash'il saying? “I gave you four cows, three borrowed and one rented.” What is the sho'el saying? “No, you only gave me three cows.” What is the mash'il saying? “Three cows died, and the three cows that died were all borrowed, so you have to give me back all four cows, basically. You have to pay me for the three, and also return the one that is alive. Basically, I want all my four cows back.” What does the sho'el claim in response? The sho'el says, “No, chada lo hayu devarim me'olam. You did not lend me three cows; you only lent me two.” He is kofer on the lending. He says, “You did not lend me three cows; you only lent me two.”

The sho'el says, “Chada, one of the cows you say I owe you for—lo hayu devarim me'olam.” So that is kefirah bemiktzat. Vechada, the other cow: in, deshe'elah metah. You are right; I definitely owe you for that second cow. Ve'idach, the third one, I don't know: lo yadana i disechirut metah. I don't know if the rented one died and therefore I am patur, o dekaima deshe'elah, and the one that is alive is the borrowed one, so take it; o deshe'elah metah, and therefore I am chayav, udekayma disechirut.

So kafar be'achat, that is the first cow, vehodah be'achat, that is the second. Harei zeh nitchayev shevuah bemodeh bemiktzat. Ve'al ken yesh lo lehishava gam ken shezo shehaytah sechurah meitah. Then he would have to swear that the third cow, the one that was rented, died. But he cannot swear that it was a rented cow that died because he says, “Eini yode'a.” Keivan mitoch she'eino yachol lehishava, so meshalem.

That is basically how we learn the Mishnah. Now the Gemara goes on to quote the Mishnah: zeh omer she'ulah vezeh omer sechurah, yishava socher shesechurah meitah. Both claims in the case are bari (certain). The case of the Mishnah is that the mafkid says she'ulah meitah, so you owe me a cow, and the other man says bari: “No, it was rented, so I am patur.” What is the din? Yishava socher shesechurah meitah. Let him make a shevuah that the rented cow died, and then he will be off the hook. Those are two bari claims: bari against bari; he swears and is exempt.

Normally, the renter doesn't swear? Why not? He is claiming it was borrowed, so you owe me the money, while the other man says it was rented. Those are two definite claims. If you want to get off the hook and not pay, the Mishnah says you have to swear that it was rented, and then you will be patur.

The issue here is that on amud alef, we learned that this case is not so simple—not one cow anymore. We said the case was that the mash'il makes a definite claim and the sho'el makes an uncertain one. In that case, the first case in the Mishnah, not the bari-bari case, teda, bar Chama ve-Rabbi Yochanan, shehodah miktzat, miktzat tevi'ato. Therefore, you have to extend the case here. It is the same case: you need a couple of cows. Go betziyur zeh shel eizeh parah metah, shehala hifkid beyado shalosh parot. The same case applies here: he gave him three cows, as we learned earlier, shtayim bishe'elah ve'achat bisechirut, two borrowed and one rented, umetu shteihem, and two of the cows died. Hamafkid to'en sheshtei hashe'elot meitu: the depositor claims that the two borrowed cows died, vehashomer modeh she'achat min hameitot achen haytah she'ulah vehu chayav betashlumin. The shomer admits that one of the cows that died was indeed borrowed, and he is liable to pay for it. That is an admission. Aval hu to'en shehasheniyah shemeitah haytah parah sechurah bevadai. About the second one that died, he says he knows it was rented, not a safek, and therefore he is—it's a denial, it's patur. Umuvan bazeh mah shehortah hamishnah shehasocher chayav lehishava. This makes the case one of modeh bemiktzat and kofer, and he has to swear about the claim because he admitted to part.

Aval ledivrei Rav Huna ve-Rav Yehudah, lo hutzrachnu le'ukimta zo. They did not need this explanation, and they explain the Mishnah according to its plain meaning. According to the simple way of learning the Mishnah, it could just be two cows; you do not need a modeh bemiktzat case and all of that. You simply learn that there were two cows, and he says it was rented while the other says it was borrowed. That is bari uvari, and zeh yishava veyipater. Aval ledivrei Rav Huna ve-Rav Yehudah lo hutzrachnu le'ukimta zo, veharei hem mefarshim et hamishnah kifeshutah: they explain the Mishnah according to its plain meaning, that he deposited only two cows with him.

Now the Gemara is asking a question. If you are learning the case as two cows, what is the case again? He gave him two cows; one is alive and one died. He claims that both were borrowed, and therefore you owe me for a cow. The other man says, “No, one of them was rented, so I do not owe you for that cow.” So this is a simple bari-bari case. Now the Gemara says, ve'amai? In that case, can he make a shevuah? The Mishnah says he makes a shevuah, right? If you are learning that the case is about two cows, the Gemara asks: mah shete'ano lo hodah lo, umah shehodah lo lo te'ano! We had that case with the barley, chittin vese'orim (wheat and barley). That is right, exactly. What is the case here? Mah shete'ano—the animal that died, the one he is claiming, was borrowed—lo hodah lo. In that case, the shomer was not even modeh bemiktzat. Umah shehodah lo: what does the shomer admit to? The cow that is alive. But there is no claim about that; it is automatically—there is no claim about the one that is alive. Therefore, there is no modeh bemiktzat. So what is the case for a shevuah?

He explains it like this: hesber hadevarim (explanation of the matter). This is the tricky part. Bamishnah huzkeru sheloshah mikrim: three cases are mentioned in the Mishnah: the half-day case, the consecutive-day cases, and then sachar achat vesha'al achat, where he borrowed one and rented one. Lefi shitat Rav Huna ve-Rav Yehudah, bishnei hamikrim harishonim lo masar hamafkid lashomer ela parah achat. In the first two cases, the mafkid gave the shomer only one cow, and he wants him to pay, while the shomer says, “Meitah bihyoto sechurah vehu patur.” Since he denies everything, it is clear there is no reason to make him swear; he is kofer hakol (denies everything).

Aval bamikreh hashelishi, shekibel shtei parot umetah achat mehem: in the third case, he received two cows, and one of them died. Achen hu modeh lo beparah kayemet: he admits the one that is alive. Aval hu kofer bechiyuvo beparah hametah: he says the dead cow was rented.

Ume'atah, ilu teva'o hamafkid et shteihen: suppose the mafkid had claims on both cows. “Shtei parot yesh li beyadcha, hasechurah kayemet tachzirenah li, vehashe'ulah metah pera li dameha.” If that were his claim—which is not his actual claim; he did not really have claims about both cows, he is concerned only about the one that died. There is no claim about the one that is alive: give it to me, that is not even a claim. But hypothetically, suppose that were his claim: “I claim the one that is alive and want you to give it back to me; the one that died was borrowed, and I want you to pay me for it.”

What would the counterclaim be? “Shtei parot yesh beyadcha, sechurah kayemet tachzirena li, veshe'ulah metah pera li et dameha.” Zeh meshiv lo: hashe'ulah kayemet ve'ashivenah lecha. He says to me, “No, the one that is alive is the borrowed one, and the rented one died, va'ani...” Az ken hayah chashuv modeh bemiktzat. That would be a classic case of modeh bemiktzat hata'anah, because I have a counterclaim about the cows you claim I have to return as rented: I say that one is borrowed. And about the one that died, which you claim was borrowed, I say it was rented. I am really counterclaiming everything you say, about the very same cows.

However, ela shelashon hamishnah, the wording of the Mishnah—hamaskir omer she'ulah metah—sounds as though he has only one claim. There is no claim about the live one. The live one is there. How can I make a claim about that one? What do I need to discuss the live one for? It is definitely mine. It is alive! Just give it back; it is my cow. You do not have to say it was rented or was not rented. It is my cow; give it back. So if you look at the wording of the Mishnah, the maskir's claim is only she'ulah metah. He is really claiming only about the dead one. Mashma shelo tava kelal et haparah hakayemet: it implies that he did not claim the living cow at all. The tevi'ah is lefi shehu ve'ayin—it is alive, uvarur lo sheyeshivenah lo, and it is clear that they have to return it to him. He is claiming only et haparah hametah bilvad, the dead cow.

What is the nifkad's (person holding the deposit's) answer? Ela shehanifkad heshivo bileshon hoda'ah bemiktzat. What did he say? “In, I'm sorry, ein lecha alai ela haparah hakayemet bilvad, ki zo shemetah sechurah haytah.” Wait, I am answering you about something you did not claim! You did not— I did not claim the live one, and your counterclaim is that the live one is what I owe you. I did not ask for the live one. The live one is not even my claim. Therefore, mah shehodah lo ta'an: what he admits to is not what was claimed. That would not be a normal case of modeh bemiktzat.

“Isn't that inferred?” No, you're right, it might be inferred, but it has to be about the same claim. An inference is not enough. You have to answer his actual claim. You are not answering that claim. You are coming back and saying that you owe me the live one. I never asked you about the live one. You definitely owe me the live one; you know that is not even my claim. You owe me that anyway.

“So his claim should have been about the dead one.” No, if he claimed them—if he claimed them, not that he did not. There is a metzi'ut. Would you say that is the case? If the case were that he claimed both cows, he would say, “I want the one that is alive back because it is rented, and I want the one that died back because it was borrowed.” Good. Then the other man comes along and says, “No, the one that is alive is borrowed, so take it, and the one that died was rented.” Fine. Then he is answering about both cows. But here, he only comes along and says she'ulah metah, and he is not discussing the cow that is alive. Then what is the other man answering? “The one that is alive is borrowed.” I did not discuss that. What is my claim about that? I never made a claim about the one that is alive that you are answering. So that is called mah shehodah lo lo ta'an, umah sheta'an lo...

Therefore, he says: ela et haparah hametah bilvad, ela shehanifkad heshivo bileshon hoda'ah bemiktzat. What did he answer? “Ein lecha alai ela et haparah hakayemet, ki zo shemetah sechurah haytah,” and therefore he is patur.

The Gemara asks: if it needs to be said that in the first two cases there is no reason for a shevuah, sheharei kafar bakol, we know that; denying everything will not lead to a shevuah according to the first opinions. Ela afilu bemikreh shelishi! Why does the Mishnah say there is a shevuah in the third case? Not only should there be no shevuah in the first two cases; there should not be a shevuah even in the third case. But the Mishnah says there is one. In the first case, he denies everything, so why should he make a shevuah? You do not make a shevuah when he denies everything. You see, even in the third case, which is modeh bemiktzat, he admits to something that was not claimed. So why should he make a shevuah in that case?

The Gemara answers: Ula says, al yedei gilgul (extension of an oath). Yes, yud-chet. Correct. yud-chet Sotah. Kiddushin chaf-zayin. Right. What is gilgul shevuah? De'amar leh: the mafkid tells the shomer, ishtave li mihat dechidarkah metah. “Listen, you are saying that the one that is alive is borrowed, and that you are off the hook for the one that died. At least swear to me that it died kidarkah.” Umigu dimishtava dichdarkah metah, mishtava nami dischurah metah. Once you are already making him swear that the cow died kidarkah, and therefore you should be patur, you can also make him swear that the cow that died was rented. So basically, we will roll another shevuah onto him: two oaths.

“No, but is it a case of two cows?” A case of two. So how are you going to get him to make a shevuah? You are right: mah shehodah lo kafar, and so on. So, no, I will make him take a shevuah through gilgul shevuah. How do I make him take a gilgul shevuah? I cannot make him take that shevuah straight off, because he has no claim about the live one. His claim about the live one being borrowed and the dead one being rented is not a case of modeh bemiktzat. That is not a case of modeh bemiktzat. So he says, no, we will have a case where this shevuah comes through gilgul.

How does the gilgul come about? His claim is, “I want you to swear to me that at least the one you say died died kidarkah, and that is why you do not have to pay.” Once he has to swear that it died kidarkah, now we can make him swear that it was also the rented one. So we are bringing it in through the back door, basically. This is gilgul shevuah. Could we have said this for the other case too—for Rami bar Chama, all those cases where we need a gilgul shevuah? Yes, okay, maybe. But we have easier cases: three or four cows work.

He says, keshenitchayev lechavero shevuah kol shehu. We know that; that is just to explain what gilgul shevuah is. Zeh omer eini yode'a vezeh omer eini yode'a: we said yacholoku (they divide it). That is Sumchos. Ha mani? Sumchos, who de'amar mamon hamutal besafek cholkin: “They divide money in doubt.” And the Chachamim say no: hamotzi mechavero alav hare'ayah. “You want to take money out of me, and you do not know.” Therefore, the nifkad, the shomer, does not have to pay. Again, the claimant says, “It was the borrowed cow that died,” while the shomer says, “I don't know; maybe the borrowed cow died,” and the other side says, “No, maybe the rented cow died.” Shema veshema. So it is mamon hamutal besafek. Sumchos says, “Cholkin.” What do the Chachamim say? “No, you want to take money out of me misafek? Hamotzi mechavero alav hare'ayah.” Therefore, the money stays with the shomer.

Now we get to some questions. Ba'i Rami bar Chama. Now we go back to some cases of she'elah biv'alim. Beautiful. She'elah biv'alim. Let's say he borrowed the cow with the ba'al, the owner—then you are off the hook. Remember, you learned the law? She'elah biv'alim, you are off the hook because the owners are there. Before he returned it, sechrah shelo biv'alim. Aha, so he went and rented—or rented again—that cow, I guess at the end of the period, without the owner there. So now the question is mahu? It started off biv'alim and ended off shelo biv'alim. Then I guess something happened to the cow—it was stolen or whatever, or got lost—during the sechirut. At the time of the sechirut, there was no be'alav imo. At the time of the she'elah, there was. So what is the question? It is a new—it is a new lease. Well, that is the question.

The Gemara says: mi amrinan (do we say) she'elah lechudah kayma uschirut lechudah kayma? Is each one independent? Then the sechirut is shelo biv'alim, and therefore he is chayav. O dilma, or perhaps we say, sechirut bishe'elah mimshecha? Is the sechirut a continuation of the she'elah? There are still certain liabilities that are the same. Deha, we are chayav bigneivah va'aveidah (liable for theft and loss), right? That did not change. It is true that maybe the liability is less, but the liability for geneivah va'aveidah stays the same. Therefore, it continues. Regarding what happened—regarding geneivah va'aveidah—there is no difference between she'elah and sechirut. Since there is no difference in that chiyuv between she'elah and sechirut, it is a continuation of the she'elah in relation to that claim, that liability.

Right, right, right, right. I am trying to use the be'alav imo to make him patur, and since the sechirut is a continuation of the she'elah in this respect, nothing changed. If I had be'alav imo then, we can use it, and therefore he will be patur. Or no? This side says that since the liability is the same, in relation to the sechirut, it is a continuation of the she'elah. That is the first side. The first side says they are two different transactions. This was she'elah, but since the geneivah va'aveidah liability did not change—he was chayav for geneivah va'aveidah as a sho'el, and he is chayav for geneivah va'aveidah as a socher—then, regarding that, it is the same liability. Look at the liabilities. Right, I was talking about the liabilities. The liabilities endure; it is the same liability. You want to call him a socher or a sho'el? That is semantics. At the bottom line, it is the same liability. So in that respect, there was a be'alav imo.

The nafa mina would be: does he have to pay? A she'elah has onsin. A socher has less liability, but the liabilities we are talking about here are the same. You are right, but the liabilities we are talking about did not change because the animal was stolen in this case. The animal was stolen, so nothing changed regarding the sho'el-to-socher liability. Therefore, the question is whether it is connected, a continuation. He would have been chayav as a sho'el and chayav as a socher, so be'alav imo. The sechirut did not add anything regarding geneivah va'aveidah; he already had that. So regarding that, it is just a continuation. That is the tzad echad (one side). Right, he got less, but in relation to—but in relation to geneivah va'aveidah, nothing changed. The Gemara says that with onsin, he would be patur. Right, right, right. Nothing was added. Nothing changed.

Im timtzei lomar (If you were to say), sechirut bishe'elah meishach shaycha. So take the second side: the sechirut is a continuation of the she'elah and is connected. Therefore, if it was biv'alim, it is biv'alim now. What about this case, the reverse? Secharah biv'alim: let us say you originally rented it with the owner there. Then what happened? Ushe'elah shelo biv'alim. You continued it without the owner there. The question is: what happened here? Then, obviously, the animal died kidarkah. The animal died kidarkah, which is something you would be patur for as a socher and chayav for as a sho'el.

The Gemara asks: mahu? She'elah bisechirut vadai lo shaycha. The chiyuv of a sho'el regarding onsin certainly does not apply, you cannot say that it carries over to the sechirut. Therefore, it is a separate matter, and he would be chayav because it is shelo biv'alim. O dilma, keivan deshaycha bemiktzat: perhaps, since there is some carryover regarding geneivah va'aveidah, even though that is not what happened here, there are certain liabilities that are the same. So keman deshaycha bekulah damei: we consider it as if it carries over in its entirety. Wow, that is a stretch. Since there are already similar liabilities, we consider it as if it is a continuation, connected to the original sechirut, which was biv'alim. That is a chiddush.

That means, I guess, he is saying this: once you say that the be'alav imo applies in part, right away it applies to the whole thing. You do not split the be'alav imo. Be'alav imo, be'alav imo. In relation to certain liabilities, like geneivah va'aveidah, they are the same. You are right that in relation to onsin they are different. But once be'alav imo applies to certain liabilities, then be'alav imo carries over. Or do you say no: regarding what this is chayav for, he was not chayav earlier? It started with sechirut. With sechirut, he would be patur, and then for this he would be chayav. So there is no carryover. Or do you say no, they are similar in certain respects, and that is enough of a connection to say that be'alav imo carries over, and therefore he would be patur?

The Gemara says a third case: im timtzei lomar, lo amrinan keivan deshaycha bemiktzat keman deshaycha bekulah. We do not say that because the liabilities are partly similar, it carries over in full. Therefore, sechirut followed by she'elah is not be'alav imo, and he will be chayav to pay.

However: she'elah biv'alim usecharah shelo biv'alim vechazrah vesha'alah. She'elah biv'alim is patur for sure, right? Then he rented it without the owner before returning it, and afterward borrowed it again without the owner. So the question is mahu, chozer veni'or (returns and reawakens)? You have she'elah biv'alim, then no be'alim, no be'alim, and you end with she'elah. Since we started with she'elah biv'alim and ended with she'elah, do we say the two she'elot are connected and have the same liability?

The Gemara explains the sides: hadar atya lah she'elah leduchta: the she'elah goes back to its original place, its original be'alim, and therefore he will be patur. O dilma afseka lah sechirut benei uveinei: perhaps the sechirut interrupts it in between. Ilu sha'al vechazar vesha'al, hadavar barur shegam hashe'elah hashniyah haytah nechshevet she'elah biv'alim. If he borrowed and then borrowed again, it would be clear that the second she'elah was considered she'elah biv'alim. Aval achshav shehaytah sechirut beintayim: but now there was sechirut in between. Veniftar beintayim: basically, he was patur from something in between. He was patur from onsin, which is a lower liability than she'elot, so perhaps the sechirut in between interrupts. Therefore, you could say that the kinyan (acquisition) of the she'elah stopped, and this is a new kinyan of she'elah without be'alim. That is one side.

O shedannin lomar she'achshav chazar kedin hashe'elah harishonah limkomo? Or do we reason that now it returned to the status of the first she'elah? Ki anu omrim shehkinyan harishoni hayah kayam gam bizman hasechirut. We say that the first kinyan was still in effect during the sechirut. She'elah and sechirut have similarities, so this is a continuation with less liability, but the kinyan itself is the same. Therefore, when you bring back the she'elah, it goes back to the original. The sechirut is not enough of a hefsek (interruption) to break it. There are similar liabilities that keep it alive. They would not carry over to it, but they would keep the final she'elah connected to what it was. The sechirut is not enough to break it, because there are similar liabilities in sechirut. Even though we just said it is less, the question is whether the she'elah goes back. Okay?

Again, im tifshot lomar lo amrinan keivan deshaycha bemiktzat keivan deshaycha bekulah: we do not say that the partial liability connects it. But here, where there is partial liability and it is going back to the original, maybe we do.

The last case: secharah biv'alim, usha'alah, vechazar usecharah. He is starting a similar case, but reversed: sechirut, with she'elah in between. You had sechirut biv'alim, so he would be patur. But then, before he returned the animal, he borrowed it without the owner. Vechazrah usecharah: before returning it, he went back to sechirut. Mahu? What is the safek here? Mi amrinan atya lah sechirut leduchta: does the sechirut go back to its original place, o dilma afseka lah she'elah benei uveinei? Or perhaps the she'elah interrupts it?

Why would the she'elah interrupt it? That is the toughest case. You have sechirut, then something worse comes along, so if anything it just adds liability. Then you go back to the limited liability with be'alim, seemingly. So why should she'elah interrupt it?

Tosafot raises this question: shekeivan she'anu omdim achshav behanachah sheshe'elah bisechirut shelefaneha lo shaycha. The she'elah that follows the sechirut is not connected to it. Normally, we said—what was the case of sachar and then sha'al? You have to say that because it is connected, whatever the wording was. No, we said—what was the din? How did that happen? Right. And we do not want to say that. If we had im tifshot lomar not to say that, right? We do not want to say that.

So seemingly, if there is sechirut followed by she'elah, the she'elah automatically breaks it. So what do I—what do you mean that the sechirut comes at the end? Once you have a she'elah, and she'elah is not shayach to sechirut—that is how we came out on that question. Sachar vesha'al: how did we conclude? We said no, the she'elah is not connected to the sechirut. Well, maybe it is connected in part because there are— But we said no. Im timtzei lomar that it is not, then how could you now have a question that if you have she'elah and then sechirut at the end, it will be connected? The first she'elah broke the connection to the first sechirut, so it is game over. That is Tosafot's question. Harei nimtza sheshe'elah be'emtza haytah shelo biv'alim: that is it, game over. Ve'im ken, ech efshar lomar shehasechirut acharita techashev sechirut biv'alim? Shekvar paska habe'alim besof hasechirut harishonah. That is Tosafot's question. Bomb question. Do you understand Tosafot's question?

What do we say about sachar vesha'al? We had two sides. Do you say that even though there was sechirut biv'alim and then she'elah shelo biv'alim, the she'elah is connected to the sechirut in certain respects, even though it is not connected regarding the matter we are discussing? The animal died kidarkah, and sechirut would make him patur while she'elah would make him chayav. But you are right: since the geneivah va'aveidah liability is the same, we can consider it a continuation. Or do you say no: sechirut lechud, she'elah lechud—separate liabilities?

The Gemara came along and said, if you want to say it is a different liability, okay: you have she'elah, sechirut, she'elah, and sechirut. You cannot have another sechirut. The second she'elah broke it up. We said that they're not shayach to each other. So what would I think, that if you have a second sechirut, that it goes back to the first sechirut? You have something in between that broke it, namely the she'elah.

Teireitz haRosh: shelo amru sheshe'elah sheniyah tihyeh chashuvah keshe'elah shelo biv'alim, ela le'inyan achrayut onsin bilvad. They did not say that the second she'elah is considered she'elah shelo biv'alim except in relation to liability for onsin. Oh! Aval adayin hi chashuvah keshe'elah biv'alim le'inyan achrayut geneivah va'aveidah (liability for theft and loss). Oof. Ah, that is a chiddush: what we wanted to say above, that the she'elah breaks and is not connected to the sechirut, applies only regarding its added liabilities, the onsin. But regarding geneivah va'aveidah, it would be considered shemirah biv'alim, because that is what it is connected to.

So, see, that was not a safek about what it is connected to; it is definitely connected. The question is whether ons would also be considered? Do we add onsin into this? But geneivah, for sure, we are going to add. When we learned this, we thought we were adding nothing; it was not shayach. But now the Rosh says no: regarding geneivah va'aveidah, which is definitely shayach to sechirut, it would for sure be considered biv'alim, and therefore if that is what happened, he would be patur. The only she'elah was whether you could even consider onsin biv'alim, which is something she'elah is normally chayav for. The Gemara said maybe not.

Once he says that—aval adayin hi chashuvah keshe'elah biv'alim le'inyan achrayut geneivah va'aveidah—ve'al ken yesh lomar she'einah mafseket bein shtei hasechiryot. Therefore, perhaps it does not break the connection, because regarding certain things there was still a connection. That is why the Gemara has the question.

So you have sechirut, then she'elah, then another sechirut. Since the Gemara did not say conclusively that the she'elah after the sechirut totally breaks the connection, regarding certain things, like geneivah va'aveidah, which they share, it would be considered be'alav imo. The only question was whether it would be considered connected regarding onsin, where we wanted to say it might break it. Therefore, we can still ask whether, if you have sechirut with a she'elah that might be connected regarding geneivah va'aveidah, and now you go back to sechirut, it returns to the original sechirut because there is a connection.

Basically, the Rosh answers you: you thought that when we said it was not shayach, we meant it was not shayach at all. But no, there are still some ramifications. The question was only more limited. Maybe it is not shayach regarding the onsin element, because that is the added liability. But the geneivah is definitely still there; why should that change? They both had that liability. We were only thinking about whether that geneivah liability carries over to onsin. Maybe it does not. That is how he answers that question over there: al ken yesh lomar she'eino mafsik bein shtei sechiryot.

And the other side of the question is, no, maybe since she'elah has the added liability of onsin, maybe not. Those are the two sides of that question. Okay, beautiful. That's that.