On the top line of Lamed Alef amud Bet (page notation), Chanah answers: Vata'an Chanah vatomer lo adoni (And Chanah answered and said, No, my lord). She answers, “No, I’m not drunk.”
Ula—or, some say, Rabbi Yosi berabi Chanina—says that she told Eli, “lo adon atah (You are not master) in this matter, and ruach hakodesh (Divine inspiration) does not rest upon you, since you suspect me of this.” Rabbi Yosi berabi Chanina says that she included all of this when she said, “lo adoni.” Why did she say “lo adoni”? She could have just said “lo.” “Lo adoni” means, “You are not adon; you don’t control this. You don’t know what you’re talking about. You are misjudging me, and that’s not true.”
Ika de'amrei, some say; hachi amrah leh, this is what she said or meant: “lo adon atah—lav ika Shechinah (Divine Presence) and ruach hakodesh with you, that you judged me lechaf chovah (the side of guilt) and did not judge me lechaf zechut (the side of merit)?” Chutzpanit (impudent woman). She is speaking about an adam chashuv, a chashuv person. Is she saying, “Don’t you have ruach hakodesh? Don’t you know that I’m not drunk? Aren’t you an adon, a chashuv person who knows all this? Why are you judging me badly?” I thought maybe if you judge a person badly, for sure you can't have ruach hakodesh.
“Mi lo yadata de'ishah keshat ruach anochi?” Don’t you know that I’m a keshat ruach—it literally means a bow of ruach, but it means a good person, a serious person? “Veyayin (wine) veshechar lo shatiti.” I didn’t drink any inebriating substances.
Rabbi Elazar says: “mikan lenechshad bedavar she'ein bo shetzarich lehodi'o”—if they suspect somebody of something untrue, they have to let them know. That is what Rashi says: “shetzarich lehodi'o.” The person who was suspected must clear himself and inform the one who suspected him that he does not have that bad trait. “Vehiyitem nekiyim me'Hashem umiYisrael”—you have to do that.
There is a perush (commentary) from Rav Hai Gaon that is very interesting. He says that if you don’t tell someone that you suspect him, you have a chelek (a share) in his chiyuv (obligation) to judge you lechaf zechut. “By not admitting?” By not explaining! If you go to someone and say, “Let me tell you, what you saw is not what it is,” what are you doing? It’s like lifnei iveir (before the blind) of chaf zechut, or of chaf chovah, because the other person has no way of knowing what happened unless you tell him.
This is one of the annoying halachot. You know the truth and know you’re clear, and still you have to explain yourself. I have a very hard time with this; I’m very bad at it. “You cholek (disagree) with the Gemara?” No. It’s a question of honesty. If you’re honest with yourself—which I try to be—and people who were involved know what happened, you may think, “You want to speak, speak. I asked my she'elot (questions). I know I’m good. I’m naki. Maybe I’m wrong; maybe I have to do a little more. You could talk to the people who are saying things and tell them, “If you really want to know the truth, give me a call. We’ll talk.” But people speaking lashon hara like this don’t know what they’re talking about. It’s a little misleading, the whole thing here. How far do you have to go to tell someone you’re not wrong, when you know you’re not wrong and have nothing to do with the accusation? I don’t know. It’s a halachah lema'aseh; it’s not simple.
I think it also depends on the case. If you see me walking into a McDonald’s, yes, I should explain myself. If I’m just walking down the street and you think, “This guy is a bad guy,” I don’t care what you think. But take the case we were involved in. It is thorny, because people who don’t know why we didn’t go to a beit din (rabbinical court), for example, don’t know the circumstances. Someone who asks can hear that there were goyim (non-Jews) involved and that other details were considered, and then say, “Oh, okay, it’s a different story.”
So, in a gray-area case, what do you do? Do I have to make a public announcement? You have to make a public announcement. I have to make a public announcement? Rav Kotler once came out of the Automat on Fifth Avenue, and the whole place was taref. He announced to everyone, “I only went in to use the bathroom. I didn’t buy any food or eat.” When you come out of an area or situation that is a gray area, maybe you need to tell people, “Listen, don’t think I’m like this. I understand how it might look.” People may judge you lechaf zechut, but you don’t know how far you have to go.
Mitzad sheni (on the other hand), I didn’t make a public announcement until much later, and then we made it very mild, because we didn’t want to destroy anybody. An announcement like that could imply that the other person was at fault. That’s the whole cheshbon (calculation). Let’s not talk about it; someone who wants to find out can ask. We could also make an announcement saying that we had a she'elat chacham, asked many chachamim, and everything was approved. That is what we wrote at the end. It was very mild, and we didn’t accuse anyone. But before making a public announcement in your shul (synagogue), you have to be conscious of all the people involved. I think the natural reaction of someone who knows he did nothing wrong and is honest is to keep it to himself. Personally, I have a very hard time with this.
If you know you did the right thing, what do you care? “Jump in the lake, everybody. I don’t care. As long as I’m good with God, I’m good with God.” But it seems the Torah wants a little more than that. You have that “tzarich lehodia”—you have to inform him. Not saying anything can make you look suspicious. On the other hand, it’s wrong if someone really has a suspicion and has the nerve to talk, especially publicly, without having the decency to call or meet. Anyone who asked us, we sat down with and explained it, and that was the end of it.
From Rashi, it mashma (it implies) that you have to clear yourself. But how far do you have to go when it is a public situation? We’re not noheg like that. I agree; we’re not noheg like that.
The Imrei Noam says that Chanah asked Eli two things. “Kevan sheShechinah shoreh 'alav, mistama tzaddik hu”—since the Shechinah rests upon him, presumably he is a tzaddik (righteous person). If so, how could he suspect her and not judge her lechaf zechut? He must not have the Shechinah! The second question is, “Vechi ein Ruach Hakodesh shoreh 'alav leida she'ishah keshat ruach hi?” Why did ruach hakodesh not rest upon him so he would know that she was a keshat ruach? Those are the questions the Imrei Noam asks.
Wouldn’t someone with ruach hakodesh know? It doesn’t mean everything is an open book, and ruach hakodesh is not always present. One participant says, “when you're drunk you're more sincere.” The speaker asks, “What about a drunk man? You ever spoke to a drunk man you think he's he's praying?” Someone says you just need to talk to the person for two seconds to realize he is not drunk. The speaker says, “Look, ask the cops,” and estimates that when they open the window, “in 90% they'll know if the person is drunk or not.” Some people naturally look drunk. But we weren’t there, and we don’t know what Eli saw or what the circumstances were.
There are different levels of shikkor: if you’re tipsy, you can pray; if you’re drunk, you cannot. What is the source? Is it the sons of Aharon? The kohen (priest) has a different halachah, though; that is not the halachah about a drunk person praying. There is a revi'it—3.3 ounces—that you cannot drink and then pray.
The Gemara in Shekalim says, “lamdu et hadin” (they learned the law). Where did they learn that you have to clear yourself and your name? There is a pasuk (verse) in Bamidbar: “Vehiyitem nekiyim me'Hashem umiYisrael.” So why do we need to learn it from Chanah?
The Arugat Habosem explains that the pasuk “Vehiyitem nekiyim” was said about bnei Gad uvivnei Re'uven—they were the ones who brought the suspicion upon themselves. Therefore, they had to clear themselves so that people would not suspect them. “She'ein lilmod mikach” (one cannot derive from this): we cannot derive from their case a rule for people who did not cause the suspicion themselves. But from Chanah we can learn that even someone who did not cause the suspicion must still inform the other person, so that he will not suspect him.
So from Chanah we learn that even if I didn’t do anything, but people still think badly of me, I may have to explain myself. That is surprising. How far do you go? I once gave a shiur (lesson) on this topic, and your wife was very enthusiastic about it. She said it was really a very important topic, but at the same time very, very annoying. I think the same way.
When you’re an honest individual, the last thing you care about is what other people think of you. At least that’s my personality. If you care too much about what people think, you can’t always be honest or do the right thing, because you’re constantly thinking about how someone else will judge you. It becomes fake. In very insular communities—Mexico, Brooklyn, the Syrian community—there can be a lot of internal competition and concern about what someone will say. It becomes toxic, and a lot of people suffer from it. The only way not to let it become toxic is not to care what people think about you. But you have to find a balance.
I think the distinction is that, like Ike said, when you are in a gray-area situation, it is your duty to come out and talk about it. In an area where people suspect you and you did nothing, people suspect you—Chanah! And still, it says she has to go out and explain herself. She could have just said, “Eli, I'm not even going to answer you. You're totally...” She needs to go, “Listen, don't think about me badly. Let me tell you.”
A participant pointed out that Chanah’s case is different from doing something that is within the standard. Nobody would suspect you for something you did that is not weird; there is always something you did that is not within the norm. Another distinction is between being outside a community’s expectations while doing the right thing and being considered to have transgressed an issur (prohibition) when one has not. In some communities, the expectation is that everyone stays inside a certain box. Chanah, though, was not over an issur. It is hard to explain the difference. One suggestion was that the gravity of the place where she was praying, and of the possible issur, made Eli more protective of the rule. If Eli had been right, what she was doing would have been very serious. But is it an issur, or is it simply not accepted? That is exactly the question.
We only know that she was moving her lips and no voice. The mishkan (Tabernacle) is not big. Eli was yoshev bapetach—he's sitting by the—
The mishkan (Tabernacle) was there for 369 years. That's the last massa that they did. Shiloh is north of Jerusalem. Gematriya (numerical equivalence) of mishkan is Shiloh.
The source says that Chanah told Eli, “Al titen et amatcha lifnei bat beliya'al.” Rashi reads it not as “before a worthless woman,” but as “al titneini kebat beliya'al” (Do not consider me a worthless woman), “lechashdeini beshichrut” (to suspect me of drunkenness). Beliya'al is a strong insult, meaning a rebellious or wicked person. The rendering “Base woman” came up; “base” is a way of saying low.
Chanah continues, “Ki merov sichi vecha'asi dibarti ad henah” (For out of my great complaint and grief I have spoken until now). Rabbi Elazar says that from here we learn that a drunk person who prays is ke'ilu (as if) he serves avodah zarah (idolatry). The Gemara connects “lifnei bat beliya'al” with “yatz'u anashim bnei beliya'al mikirbecha,” and says that just as there, the reference is to avodah zarah, so here, too, it is avodah zarah. The point is that the word beliya'al already conveys something very severe, something without restraint or control.
Let’s learn the halachot of praying while drunk. The Shulchan Aruch, siman tzadi-tet, se'if alef (section 99, subsection 1), says: “Shatah yayin,” if he drank wine, “kedei revi'it” (a quarter-log measure), “al yitpalel ad sheyasir yeino.” He should not pray until his wine has dissipated. A revi'it is 3.3 ounces. The Mishnah Berurah says that even if he is accustomed to drinking a lot and is not at all drunk from a revi'it, he should nevertheless not pray lechatchilah (at the outset) after drinking a revi'it of wine.
If he drank more than a revi'it, the Shulchan Aruch says that if he can speak before the melech (king), then, if he prayed, “tefilato tefilah” (his prayer is a prayer). If he cannot speak before the melech, then, if he prayed, “tefilato to'evah” (his prayer is abhorrent). He has to pray again when his wine has dissipated. Lav davka—not exactly; you could remember. You remember, but you're not able to stand. There are two differences, that's what they bring here. Even if the time for prayer has passed, he makes it up with the next prayer, as someone who erred unintentionally; we consider him shogeg.
The Hagah (gloss) says that the rule for Keri'at Shema (recitation of the Shema) is like the rule for prayer, but he may say the other berachot (blessings) even while drunk. How long is mefigat ha-yayin (dissipation of the wine)? The Shulchan Aruch says: derech mil u-sheinah kol she-hu mefigin et ha-yayin—a mil, which is 18 minutes, or sleeping a little bit, dissipates the wine. That applies when he drank a revi'it. If he drank more, sleep makes him more drunk, and walking delays the dissipation of the wine; if he is riding, the journey certainly dissipates it. For each person who is shatui, the measure is according to what he feels will dissipate his wine. Shatui is before shikkor, probably before a revi'it. You can still talk to the king. No. Shatui...
The Rema says that people are not careful with yeinot shelanu, because they are not strong, and they pray even after drinking. All the more so if they pray from a siddur (prayer book) in their hands, since they will not forget the words because of shichrut me'at. The Rema and Shulchan Aruch lived around the same time, in the 1500s, and presumably were discussing the same wine, though they lived in different places. They went to Bordeaux, to California, whatever, and they buy the actual bushes, and they replant them in Israel. So it's kedushat Eretz Yisrael, whatever you want, but the tree is from somewhere else. The tree that is native from Israel, there's very few that are really native from Israel. And even that, we don't know; maybe a few hundred years ago it did come like that, we don't know. What we know today is that there's only one winery in Israel that does the real Israeli wine from Israeli grapes. I have a bottle at home that I haven’t opened, but I was told this wine is much stronger than the others. Jerebel or Jezreel, I don’t know.
There is another category mentioned elsewhere: shikkor keLavan, connected to Lavan Ha'Arami—a “white man’s drunk.” There was also a question about whether a drunk person can count as ten if he can keep his eyes open and say amen. We had learned a machloket (disagreement) about whether a sleeping person counts, and the halachah we saw was that he does. That is not the situation on Shavuot night, when everyone is up all night.