A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Gabriel Koskas

Torah Lecture

Gemara Berachot Daf 31B #323 The Halacha Of A Drunk Person And Tefila MP4

Lectured by Rabbi Gabriel Koskas

Published
May 12, 2023
Duration
41:27
Lecture code
RGK-870

Chanah’s Answer to Eli

  • On the top line of Lamed Alef amud Bet, Chanah answers Eli, “Vata'an Chanah vatomer lo adoni” (“And Chanah answered and said, No, my lord”): she tells him that she is not drunk.
  • Ula—or, some say, Rabbi Yosi berabi Chanina—says that “lo adoni” conveyed: “lo adon atah” (“You are not master” in this matter); ruach hakodesh does not rest upon you, since you suspect me. Rabbi Yosi berabi Chanina explains that she included all of this in the words “lo adoni”: she was telling Eli that he did not control the matter and was misjudging her.
  • In another version, “Ika de'amrei,” Chanah meant: “lo adon atah”—is the Shechinah and ruach hakodesh not with you, that you judged me lechaf chovah (the side of guilt) instead of lechaf zechut (the side of merit)? The Gemara calls her chutzpanit (impudent woman), since she speaks this way to an adam chashuv.
  • Chanah asks, “Mi lo yadata de'ishah keshat ruach anochi?”—“Don’t you know that I am a keshat ruach?” The expression literally means a “bow of ruach,” and refers to a good, serious person. She adds, “Veyayin veshechar lo shatiti”: she had not drunk wine or other inebriating substances.
  • Rabbi Gabriel Koskas remarks that ruach hakodesh does not mean that everything is an open book or that it is always present. He also wonders whether someone judging another unfavorably could have ruach hakodesh.

The Obligation to Clear Oneself When Suspected

  • Rabbi Elazar derives from Chanah, “mikan lenechshad bedavar she'ein bo shetzarich lehodi'o”: when someone is suspected of something untrue, the person suspected must inform the other that the suspicion is false. Rashi explains “shetzarich lehodi'o” as requiring the person to clear himself and show that he does not have the alleged bad trait.
  • Rabbi Gabriel Koskas connects this to “Vehiyitem nekiyim me'Hashem umiYisrael”: one must be clear before God and Israel.
  • Rav Hai Gaon offers a further explanation: if someone does not tell the person who suspects him what actually happened, he has a chelek in that person’s chiyuv to judge him lechaf zechut. By explaining the facts, the suspected person gives the other a chance to judge him favorably; without the explanation, the other may have no way to know the truth.
  • Rabbi Gabriel Koskas says that this is a difficult halachah lema'aseh. Even when someone knows he is innocent, he may still need to explain himself. He personally finds this hard, and asks how far a person must go when he knows he is clear and those involved already know what happened.
  • He distinguishes cases: if someone sees him entering a McDonald’s, he should explain; if someone merely sees him walking down the street and thinks he is a bad person, he does not care about that judgment.
  • In a thorny case involving why his group did not go to a beit din, people who do not know the circumstances may misunderstand. If asked, they can be told that goyim were involved and other details were considered, after which they may understand that it was a different situation.
  • Rabbi Gabriel Koskas asks whether a person in a gray-area case must make a public announcement. He recounts that Rav Kotler once came out of the Automat on Fifth Avenue, where the food was taref, and announced that he had entered only to use the bathroom and had not bought or eaten food. Rabbi Gabriel Koskas suggests that a person leaving a gray-area situation may need to explain how it could look and ask people not to judge him wrongly, while noting that the extent of this obligation is unclear.
  • In his own case, Rabbi Gabriel Koskas did not make a public announcement until much later and then kept it mild, so as not to harm anyone or imply that another person was at fault. They could have said that they had a she'elat chacham and asked many chachamim, and that everything was approved; that is what they wrote at the end. He says that before announcing something publicly in a shul, one must consider everyone involved.
  • He says an honest person’s natural response may be to keep quiet: if one is right with God, why care what other people think? Still, Torah appears to demand more through “tzarich lehodia.” Silence can make someone seem suspicious. Conversely, it is wrong for someone to speak publicly about a suspicion without the decency to call or meet first. Rabbi Gabriel Koskas says that anyone who asked them was given an explanation in person.
  • Rashi’s reading implies that the suspected person must clear himself, but Rabbi Gabriel Koskas asks how far that extends in a public situation. He says, “We’re not noheg like that,” and agrees that this is not how people generally practice.

Eli, Ruach Hakodesh, and the Circumstances

  • The Imrei Noam asks two questions about Eli. Since the Shechinah rests upon him, he should presumably be a tzaddik; how, then, could he suspect Chanah instead of judging her lechaf zechut? And why did ruach hakodesh not rest upon him so that he would know she was a keshat ruach?
  • In the discussion, a participant says that a drunk person may be more sincere. Rabbi Gabriel Koskas asks whether a drunk man seems to be praying, and another participant says that speaking with someone for two seconds should reveal whether he is drunk. Rabbi Gabriel Koskas says to ask the police and estimates that in 90% of cases they can tell when they open a car window. He adds that some people naturally look drunk, but the listeners do not know what Eli saw or what the circumstances were.
  • Rabbi Gabriel Koskas distinguishes levels of shikkor: someone who is tipsy can pray, but someone who is drunk cannot. He asks whether the source is the sons of Aharon, but notes that a kohen has a different halachah; that is not the rule about a drunk person praying. He mentions a revi'it—3.3 ounces—as an amount after which one cannot drink and then pray.
  • The Gemara in Shekalim says, “lamdu et hadin” (“they learned the law”). Rabbi Gabriel Koskas asks why the requirement to clear one’s name must be learned from Chanah when Bamidbar already says, “Vehiyitem nekiyim me'Hashem umiYisrael.”
  • The Arugat Habosem explains that “Vehiyitem nekiyim” was said about bnei Gad uvivnei Re'uven, who had brought suspicion upon themselves and therefore had to clear themselves. “She'ein lilmod mikach”: their case cannot establish the rule for people who did not cause the suspicion. Chanah teaches that even someone who did not cause it must inform the other person so that he will not continue to suspect him.
  • Rabbi Gabriel Koskas emphasizes the surprising implication: even if someone did nothing wrong, but others think badly of him, he may have to explain himself. He recalls giving a shiur on the topic; a participant’s wife found it important but also very annoying, and he agrees.
  • He says that caring too much about others’ opinions can make it harder to be honest and do the right thing, because one is always anticipating judgment. In insular communities such as Mexico, Brooklyn, and the Syrian community, concern about what others will say and internal competition can become toxic. He says one must find a balance rather than let concern about opinion become toxic.
  • Building on Ike’s point, Rabbi Gabriel Koskas distinguishes gray-area situations from cases where someone did nothing wrong but is still suspected: in a gray area, he says, one has a duty to come forward and explain. Chanah herself was suspected despite doing nothing wrong, yet she explained herself rather than refusing to answer Eli.
  • A participant notes that Chanah’s case differs from doing something within the norm: unusual conduct may invite suspicion even when it is not an issur. The discussion distinguishes being outside a community’s expectations while doing the right thing from being thought to have transgressed an issur when one has not.
  • One suggestion is that the seriousness of the place where Chanah prayed, and the possible issur, made Eli especially protective of the rule: if Eli had been right, her conduct would have been very serious. The question—whether this was an issur or simply something not accepted—remains the point of the discussion.
  • The listeners know only that Chanah moved her lips without making a sound. Rabbi Gabriel Koskas says the mishkan was not large and notes that Eli was yoshev bapetach. He also says the mishkan stood for 369 years, refers to this as the last massa that they did, places Shiloh north of Jerusalem, and says the gematriya of mishkan is Shiloh.

“Bat Beliya'al” and Prayer While Drunk

  • Chanah tells Eli, “Al titen et amatcha lifnei bat beliya'al.” Rashi reads this not as “before a worthless woman,” but as “al titneini kebat beliya'al”—“Do not consider me a worthless woman”—and “lechashdeini beshichrut”—“to suspect me of drunkenness.” Beliya'al is a strong insult, meaning a rebellious or wicked person; the rendering “base woman” is also discussed, with “base” meaning low.
  • Chanah continues, “Ki merov sichi vecha'asi dibarti ad henah” (“For out of my great complaint and grief I have spoken until now”).
  • Rabbi Elazar derives that a drunk person who prays is ke'ilu he serves avodah zarah. The Gemara connects “lifnei bat beliya'al” to “yatz'u anashim bnei beliya'al mikirbecha”; just as the latter refers to avodah zarah, so does the former. Rabbi Gabriel Koskas notes that beliya'al conveys something severe, without restraint or control.

Shulchan Aruch: Prayer After Drinking

  • The Shulchan Aruch, siman tzadi-tet, se'if alef (section 99, subsection 1), says that if someone drank a revi'it of wine, “al yitpalel ad sheyasir yeino”: he should not pray until the wine has dissipated. A revi'it is 3.3 ounces.
  • The Mishnah Berurah says that even someone accustomed to drinking a lot, who is not at all drunk after a revi'it, should nevertheless not pray lechatchilah after drinking that amount.
  • If someone drank more than a revi'it, the Shulchan Aruch says that if he can speak before the melech, his prayer, if he prayed, is “tefilato tefilah.” If he cannot speak before the melech, his prayer is “tefilato to'evah,” and he must pray again once the wine has dissipated.
  • Rabbi Gabriel Koskas adds that it is “lav davka” to reduce the issue simply to whether a person remembers the words: someone may remember but be unable to stand. He says that two distinctions are brought, without elaborating on them further.
  • If the time for prayer has passed, the person makes it up at the next prayer, as someone who erred unintentionally; he is treated as shogeg.
  • The Hagah says that Keri'at Shema follows the same rule as prayer, but that the other berachot may be said even while drunk.
  • The Shulchan Aruch says that mefigat ha-yayin occurs through walking a mil—18 minutes—or sleeping for a little while. This applies when the person drank a revi'it. If he drank more, sleep makes him more drunk, walking delays the wine’s dissipation, and riding certainly dissipates it. For each shatui, the measure depends on what he feels will dissipate the wine. Rabbi Gabriel Koskas tentatively places shatui before shikkor, probably before a revi'it, and the discussion raises whether such a person can still speak before the king.

The Rema and the Strength of Wine

  • The Rema says people are not careful with yeinot shelanu because they are not strong, and therefore pray even after drinking. All the more so, he says, if they are holding a siddur, since shichrut me'at will not make them forget the words.
  • Rabbi Gabriel Koskas notes that the Rema and Shulchan Aruch lived around the same time, in the 1500s, and supposes they were discussing the same wine despite living in different places.
  • He digresses on vines brought from elsewhere and replanted in Israel: this may give kedushat Eretz Yisrael, but the vines originated elsewhere. He says there are very few vines truly native to Israel, and that even their history is uncertain. He says there is only one winery in Israel making what he calls genuine Israeli wine from Israeli grapes, and that he has an unopened bottle. He was told that the wine is much stronger than others; he is unsure of the winery’s name, saying “Jerebel or Jezreel.”

Other Questions About Drunkenness

  • Rabbi Gabriel Koskas mentions another category, shikkor keLavan, connected to Lavan Ha'Arami and described as a “white man’s drunk.”
  • The discussion asks whether a drunk person can count as ten if he can keep his eyes open and say amen. Rabbi Gabriel Koskas recalls a previously learned machloket about whether a sleeping person counts; the halachah they saw was that he does. He distinguishes this from Shavuot night, when everyone is awake all night.
Words in this lecture1
Pasukפסוק
Terms Pasuk, a verse. English: Biblical verse
Also written: Passuk, posuk, psuq
Plural: Pesukim, psukim, p'sukim, psuqim, Pesukei, psukeem