Good morning, gentlemen. Daf Yomi (daily page), Masechet Ketubot (Tractate Ketubot), 58b. Noach (Noah). Noach, the letters nun-chet; chet. Noach matza chen (Noach found favor). Noach matza chen—the same letters. Noach and chen, the same letters. So now you have it like this, rabotai (my teachers).
Yesterday, we gave two reasons, if you remember correctly, why they changed the rule and said that a betrothed woman should not eat terumah (priestly offering). We said that, bidvar Torah (from the Torah), someone who is betrothed could eat terumah, because the verse says, “ish ki yikneh kinyan kaspo” (when a man acquires a person as his monetary acquisition), and “ki yikneh nefesh kinyan ka—.” Yikneh—as long as you acquire her. A person’s slave, an eved Kenaani (Canaanite slave), can eat terumah. It’s an amazing thing. I’m a Jewish guy; I can’t eat terumah. A kohen’s slave, an eved Kenaani, can eat terumah. Good. So his betrothed wife should also be able to.
So how come we don’t let her? We said there is a gezerah (rabbinic decree), for two reasons. Why? She may give some to her family members, because she is still living at home. Or there is mishum simpon (because of a blemish). She may have a blemish that he finds out about later, and he’ll say, “Oh, this marriage is off. I don’t want this marriage.” Then it turns out she was eating terumah illegally the whole time. Retroactively, it’s no good. So what do they do? You only eat once you’re fully married. By then, you’ll know for sure.
The Gemara asked yesterday: What about slaves? There’s no problem of simpon with slaves. Why? Because you just need the slave to work. Outer blemishes you can see. An inner blemish doesn’t bother you; if he has something inside, it doesn’t affect his job.
“Rabbi, can I ask you a question? What happens if you can give her a physical examination months before you get married? Could she eat terumah then?” No. It’s a gezerah. Once they made the rule, they made the rule. That’s it.
Now we’re near the top of the page, about the second line from the top, 58b. Ulla and Rav Shmuel bar Yehudah gave different reasons why we don’t want her to eat terumah too soon. Mikhdi (let’s see now), between the two of them, either way she doesn’t eat: either because she may feed her family, or because you may find a simpon, a blemish. Mai beinaihu? What do I need two reasons for? What’s the practical difference between them?
Ika beinaihu: kibel (accepted), masar (handed over), and halakh (went). There are three different cases. Kibel: Let’s say beforehand he says, “I accept the woman as is.” It’s basically what you’re saying, Jake. But a guy makes the distinction. He says, “Listen, as is, I’m—” The girl’s father goes to the guy and says, “You want to marry my daughter?” “Yes, as is.” You see guys sell houses “as is.” There’s no “Don’t come back to me because the roof is leaking.” Don’t come back to me because you found something. You want her? Yes. Okay, he signs “as is.” In that case, simpon won’t be a problem, but there’s still the other problem: she may feed her family. That’s one case.
Masar: Let’s say he didn’t bring her into the chuppah (marriage canopy), but sent her down with the agents. Remember we learned that the father could send his agents down? At that point, she isn’t going back to give terumah to her family members. So you don’t have that concern, but you still have the blemish concern.
Halakh: The father’s agent went with the husband to deliver the bride to the groom. It’s the same thing; the agents are different. Bottom line, she’s not fully married, but you don’t have the problem of her giving it to her family members.
The next part of the Mishnah brings us a machloket (a dispute). What do you give her? It says, higi'a zman velo nisu (the twelve months passed and they didn’t get married): he has to feed her. What kind of food does he give her? Rabbi Tarfon says, “Give her all terumah.” Rabbi Akiva says, “No, half and half, because she’s going to need to be tamei (ritually impure).”
Abaye said: “The machloket is about a bat kohen (daughter of a priest) betrothed to a kohen. But with a bat Yisrael (daughter of an Israelite) betrothed to a kohen, everyone agrees: half chullin (non-sacred food) and half terumah.” She is a bat Yisrael married to a kohen; she isn’t familiar with these matters. So she must be given chullin for the days she is tamei. If she is a kohen’s daughter, she is already used to it. She knows what to do when she is tamei; she’s been trained. She changes it for something else, whatever. So Abaye said that the whole machloket about how much you have to give is only about a bat kohen. With a bat Yisrael, everyone agrees you have to give half and half.
Abaye said another thing: “The machloket is about an arusah (betrothed woman), but with a nesu’ah (married woman), everyone agrees: half chullin and half terumah.” The law that says to give her terumah—the whole amount, according to Rabbi Tarfon—is talking about an arusah, the daughter of a kohen. Since an arusah lives at her father’s house, her father will take care of her, sell the terumah to someone else, and buy chullin when she needs to become tamei. But if she is home as a nesu’ah, fully married, who will take care of her? What happens when she is tamei? So you can’t give her everything in terumah. Even Rabbi Tarfon would agree: give her half and half.
Tanya nami hachi (we have a baraita that says like this): Rabbi Tarfon says, “Give her all terumah,” as in our Mishnah. Rabbi Tarfon says to give her terumah, all of it. Rabbi Akiva says, “Half chullin and half terumah.” “In what case is this said? With a bat kohen betrothed to a kohen. But with a bat Yisrael betrothed to a kohen, everyone agrees: half chullin and half terumah.” Just as Abaye said before. So the baraita says the same thing: If she is a bat Yisrael betrothed to a kohen, even the other rabbi would agree with Rabbi Akiva that you give half and half.
The baraita also says that part: “In what case is this said? With an arusah, but with a nesu’ah, everyone agrees: half chullin and half terumah.” That’s only if she is betrothed. If she is fully married, no one will take care of her except herself, so you have to give her half and half.
A third opinion: Rabbi Yehudah ben Beteira says, “Give her two-thirds terumah and one-third chullin.” No more than two-thirds of the food may be terumah. So really, he agrees with Rabbi Akiva’s premise that you have to take care of someone when she is tamei, but he says you don’t have to give 50 percent; you aren’t tamei 50 percent of the time. Niddah (menstruating woman), yes; anything that comes out of her body. Zav, zavah (male or female ritual discharge). Five and seven. First of all, in those days you didn’t need five; you needed seven days. Seven days and that’s it. And second, even five and seven is 12 out of 30, so it’s one-third, two-thirds. Close.
Rabbi Yehudah says further, “Give her all terumah, and she sells it and buys chullin with the money.” Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Tarfon both agree that you give her all terumah. Rabbi Yehudah holds that you have to give her terumah, but the groom has to give her a greater amount of terumah, so that after it is sold, the proceeds will buy the necessary amount of chullin.
Aha, that’s why he argues with Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Tarfon also says to give her terumah, but let’s say her allotment, according to the beit din (court), is $100 worth of food a week. I give her $100 worth of terumah. But she can’t eat terumah; she has to trade it, she has to sell it. It’s worth less, because terumah goes for less money—supply and demand. So she’ll end up with only $90 worth. She’s getting less. Rabbi Yehudah says, no, you give her more terumah so that it equals $100. That’s the fourth opinion.
Finally, a fifth opinion: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says, “Whenever terumah is mentioned, give her double in chullin.” That means we’re talking about her being a bat kohen—I mean, an eshet kohen. So he has to give two-thirds, which is much more. A large amount of terumah she can sell for less than its market value. This way, the process isn’t so fraught with difficulty. You have to find a guy and ask, “How much do you want to pay?” “No, I’m giving it to you at a very cheap price.” This way she’ll be able to do fine.
Mai beinaihu? Ika beinaihu tircha (effort). The difference between these two rabbis is how much effort is needed to sell the terumah. According to Rabbi Yehudah, even though you give her more terumah so it will equal the amount of chullin, she still has to make the effort. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, you give her kiflayim (double), so she won’t have a problem selling it.
Next: “The yavam (brother-in-law awaiting levirate marriage) does not feed her terumah.” What did the Mishnah say? Her husband died, and the yavam is waiting. Let’s say 12 months passed. Does she eat terumah? No. Why? They have a pasuk (verse): “kinyan kaspo amar Rachamana vehai kinyan de’achiv hu” (the acquisition of his money; this acquisition belongs to his brother). When the pasuk says “ish ki yikneh nefesh kinyan kaspo,” what is kinyan kaspo? The acquisition of his money—the man who gave money to marry the wife. Here, this yavam didn’t give any money; he’s taking over for his brother. “Kinyan de’achiv hu”—it belongs to his brother. That implies that the yavam won’t be able to feed her.
“And after they get married, too?” “No, after they get married, for sure!” “Oh, okay. But wait. Rashi learns—how is it a kinyan? Isn’t it an automatic kinyan with the yibbum (levirate marriage)?” He hasn’t done yibbum yet. She is waiting for yibbum, but she is connected; there is zikah (levirate bond). Right, there is a zikah, a connection. That connection isn’t strong enough. “Ki yikneh kinyan”—you have to make a kinyan.
Now Rashi seems to say that even if the yevamah (woman awaiting levirate marriage) had already been eating from her husband—her husband was a kohen and fed her—and then he died, she has to stop. Rabbeinu Tam wants to say no: once she started eating, she can continue eating.
They also mentioned what you said: once she did yibbum, for sure there’s no question that she can; she’s considered his wife in all respects. That’s for sure. How about the first part, where she wasn’t even his wife yet? Then it could be forbidden to the brother, because they weren’t married yet, but they were engaged. He didn’t really consummate the marriage; it’s like a pending—
“You don’t want the first case, where the first husband did not consummate?” “Yeah, he didn’t get that far, because he was waiting that time, and then he died.” He was giving her the food, or whatever, but he hadn’t married her yet. Right. So she’s in limbo, and maybe she isn’t permitted yet, because only after he married her could she fall to yibbum: yibbum applies because he got married and didn’t have children.
“You want to know if there’s yibbum with an arusah?” There is yibbum. There is yibbum with an arusah; even with betrothal, there is yibbum. She hasn’t eaten yet unless she waited 12 months, but there is yibbum. Okay.
What does the Mishnah say? “She spent six months in front of the husband”—six months in front of the yavam—or all but one day in front of the husband, or all of that in front of him; she doesn’t eat. The Gemara asks: “Now, if you say that when most of the 12 months were spent with the husband, she doesn’t eat because one day was not in front of him, do you need to say that if one day was in front of the husband and 11 months in front of the yavam, she doesn’t eat?” What do I need that case for? You’re right.
Zu ve’ein tzarich lomar zu katani (this case, and certainly that case). It’s a format of saying this case and certainly that case. Many times, that is the style of the Tanna’im (early rabbinic sages): they mention all the cases in certain formats. This covers it anyway. Or lo zu af zu (not only this, but also that); you have the other way around, too.
“This was the first teaching,” the mishnah rishonah (first teaching). But afterward they learned that a woman may not eat terumah until she enters the chuppah. Why? We said before: Ulla, or some say Rav Shmuel bar Yehudah, said, “Because of simpon.” Oh, no, I’m sorry; this is a new Gemara telling us the reason why the second court ruled that a woman does not eat terumah until she enters the chuppah. Why? Another Gemara says it was only because of simpon, because we’re afraid of a blemish that would annul the wedding.
The Gemara says, “One minute, I don’t understand you.” Bishlama le’Ulla: Ulla was the one who said before that the reason we don’t let a woman eat terumah as soon as she is betrothed is that she may feed her family members. “The first one was because perhaps they would pour her a cup in her father’s house; the later one was because of simpon.” Don’t forget, boys, there were two cases, two gezeirot (rabbinic decrees).
The Gemara first asks: When a woman is betrothed, can she eat terumah right away? Yes, de’oraita (from Torah law), she could eat; “ki kinyan kaspo hu” (for she is his acquisition)—she is his. Why can’t she eat? We had two reasons before: She may give some to her family members, or there may be simpon. According to the one who says she may give some to her family members, that is why we don’t let her eat as soon as she is betrothed.
Then you tell me: After 12 months, really she is entitled to eat from her husband. Could she eat terumah? Originally they said yes, and then they changed their minds. The mishnah acharonah (later teaching) said no. Why? Because of simpon. So that works well. The first time, the concern wasn’t simpon; it was that she might feed her family members. That’s why, at the time of betrothal, they didn’t let her eat. Later, when she had waited 12 months, she was supposed to eat from her husband. Should they give her terumah? Originally they said yes, and then the second beit din said no. Why? Simpon. Very good. I understand. First they had one reason; now they have another reason.
But according to Rav Shmuel bar Yehudah, the first time was because of simpon, and the later time was because of simpon. What’s the difference? Rav Shmuel bar Yehudah had said earlier that when she first got betrothed, the reason they didn’t let her eat terumah was simpon. Then they said that after 12 months, we’re not worried. All of a sudden, the second beit din said no, we are worried about simpon. What changed? First you said she can’t eat right away because of simpon. Then you said that if she waits 12 months, she’s fine and can eat. Then the beit din retracted and said no, she can’t eat, because of simpon. You knew that reason before and allowed it. Now you don’t allow it? What changed?
The Gemara says: Ika beinaihu bedikat chutz (external examination). The question between the two different batei din was whether a superficial examination is enough to eliminate the possibility that a defect will retroactively invalidate the kiddushin (betrothal). Mar savar (one authority holds): bedikat chutz shemah bedikah. The first court thought that after 12 months it would have come out; the defect would be seen. Meaning, the first beit din said, “What do you want? What are you asking? Baruch Hashem.” The first beit din held that after 12 months the man would make a superficial examination and make sure she had no blemish. You know, show her from here, show her from there.
“So he’s getting a third-party woman to do it?” “No, that’s not what this rabbi held.” He held, “Mar savar, bedikat chutz shemah bedikah.” The second beit din said, “No, bedikat chutz lo shemah bedikah.” That’s not enough. It isn’t enough that people will see her after 12 months. By then, enough people have already seen her from different angles; they know she has no blemish. Therefore, the second beit din said, “We don’t take any chances. Wait until you’re fully married, and you know each other; then you’ll be able to tell.” A superficial examination doesn’t really count.
No, originally they thought it did. Then the second beit din changed its mind and said, “It’s not sufficient. People are still going to get scared. The blemish might not show up in the initial examination. He’s going to want a real, intimate, one-on-one examination.” That can only happen if they get married. One-on-one. One-on-one.
It would almost be something that you’d be mistaber (reasonable), because you would think that most human beings are normal. I know, but if a non-kohen eats terumah, it’s very serious. Even for abnormal cases, you have to be worried.
Nu, Mishnah, rabotai: Hamakdish ma’aseh yedei ishto (one who consecrates his wife’s handiwork). This is really going to come up in connection with obligations and a person’s rights to his wife and her rights to him. Hamakdish ma’aseh yedei ishto: a person consecrates his wife’s earnings. She works, and he says, “You know what? I’m making it hekdesh (consecrated property).” Every woman has to do a certain amount of work. The Gemara will tell us later, a few pages from now—about a week from now—we’re going to see that a woman has obligations, too. A man has obligations to his wife: he has to feed her and clothe her. She also has to work a certain amount and give it to him. Her earnings go to him. He consecrates them and says, “I want to make them kadosh (holy).”
What’s the halachah (law)? Harei zo osah ve’ochelet: No, it doesn’t work. She continues to work and eat. So what happens to the proceeds? It does not chal (take effect). Her earnings do not become consecrated. She keeps the money? She could use the earnings to buy herself food. We’ll see later that the Gemara will explain the exact case here. The Gemara will explain exactly why.
What if she works extra? You mean, like this: There’s a certain amount of mandatory earnings she has to give him. The first 20 hours, something like that? No, a certain amount of money, I’d say, based on how much he gives her to eat. But if she works more than that and he consecrates that part, does that work? Rabbi Meir says, “Hekdesh.” Yes, it’s consecrated. Rabbi Yochanan HaSandlar says, “Chullin.” No, it stays chullin. The Gemara will explain why.
Later, the Gemara will explain technically that when a woman works, the basic amount she works goes toward what he gives her for mezonot (sustenance). He provides her sustenance. Every woman wants a little extra baksheesh. She needs a little extra money. For jeba, you need money in your pocket. Right, you need extra money? That extra money says, “Okay, I’ll give you. You give me your extra work.” The extra work you do, “I’ll give you extra money.” That’s called motar (surplus). The Gemara will see which tit for tat allows him to make it hekdesh and which does not.
So the Mishnah starts like this: The regular earnings—it doesn’t work; he can’t make them hekdesh. The extra, the motar, is a machloket. Rabbi Meir says hekdesh; Rabbi Yochanan HaSandlar says no. Let’s see why the Gemara says that. We have to go through the details of the case.
Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: “A woman can say to her husband, ‘I don’t want to be supported by you, and I won’t work for you.’” Rav Huna said a huge chidush (novel teaching). A woman can say to her husband, “Listen, honey. I don’t want to be supported by you. I’m not going to work and give you my income. I’ll pay my own way, okay?” She makes more than he does. He’s giving her $100 for food. “I make $500 a week. I don’t need your measly $100. I don’t need to be supported, and I’m not doing this for you.” Can I say that? It depends. It depends on what the purpose of the takanah (enactment) was to begin with.
The Gemara says, “Kasavar”—this Rav holds that when the Rabbis enacted a law that he should support his wife, mezonot ikar (support is primary). The main thing the Rabbis want is for a husband to take care of his wife’s mezonot. “And her handiwork is because of eivah (resentment).” So why does he get her ma’asei yadehah (her handiwork)? Otherwise, there would be ill will. He would say, “I’m working and feeding you, and you’re working and keeping your money yourself?” A lot of us have that—never saw that? “I work and I feed you. Now you’re working and keeping the money yourself?” Yeah, what do you do? So eivah—it could be resentment, ill will. The Rabbis said, “No, she has to give him what he feeds her.”
About that, “When she says, ‘I don’t want to be supported, and I won’t work,’ ha-reshut beyadah (the choice is hers).” Since the whole purpose was for her—she was the main recipient—the mezonot were for her. The tachlit (purpose) of the takanah was for her. Since she is the one who is the main recipient of this enactment, she has the right to say, “I don’t want it. I don’t want to be supported, and I won’t work.” That’s Rav’s opinion, okay? That’s his opinion.
Now the Gemara will ask a question. Meytivi (an objection is raised) from a baraita: “Tiknu mezonot tachat ma’asei yadehah” (they instituted support in exchange for her work). They enacted support in exchange for the earnings. It’s much more the other way around. There, it seems that because he gets her earnings, they enacted that he has to feed her. So which way does it start? It seems there that the takanah is ma’asei yadehah, and then they gave her mezonot for that. If that’s true, then she couldn’t say, “I don’t want to work.” The main thing was that the Rabbis made her work and give to her husband. Because she works and gives to her husband, he has to feed her. So how can she say no?
The Gemara says you have to change it around: Eima (say instead), “Tiknu ma’asei yadeha tachat mezonot.” No, you have to reverse it. Put the two together, but the real takanah was mezonot, with her earnings in exchange.
Leima mesayei lei (let us support this): Let’s see, our Mishnah is good proof. Hamakdish ma’aseh yedei ishto, harei zo osah ve’ochelet. What, isn’t this talking about a woman who is being supported? Our Mishnah says the man wants to consecrate his wife’s mandatory earnings, but she can still work and eat. Why? Aren’t we talking about a case where she is supported by her husband? We’re talking about a man who is willing and able to support his wife, and the Mishnah says her earnings are not his to consecrate.
Let’s see how Rashi learns this. Rashi says something very important here. The Mishnah cannot refer to a case where she is actually receiving support from her husband, because then her earnings would be his, and his consecration would take effect. If he is supporting her mamash (actually), and she is working for him, then the earnings go to him. So why does the Mishnah say, “Hamakdish ma’aseh yedei ishto”—it doesn’t chal—“harei zo osah ve’ochelet”? Why not? It would take effect. They’re mine; I can make them kadosh.
It must be that the Mishnah is talking about where he supports her, is willing and able to support her, and she refused that support. So I see that when she refuses support, her husband has no rights to her earnings. That’s why he can’t make them kadosh. “Mai lav binzonet?” What, isn’t she being supported? Rashi says he has assets; he has mezonot, he has something to give her, and he wants to feed her, but she says, “No, I don’t want to.” She has the right to say, “I don’t want it.” That’s like Rav Huna.
It must say, “No, beshe’einah nizonet”—maybe the case is talking about where she is not being supported. He doesn’t have the means to support her. That’s why he isn’t entitled to her earnings, and that’s why the consecration has no effect. So it has nothing to do with Rav Huna. If he isn’t feeding her, Steve, she has to make her own money. He can’t make it kadosh. He had a claim on it? No claim.
So if that’s the case, “If she isn’t supported, what does it teach us? It’s obvious.” What would the chidush be? “Even according to the one who says that the master can tell the slave, ‘Work for me, and I won’t feed you,’ that applies only to an eved Kenaani, because it doesn’t say ‘with you’ about him. But an eved ivri (Hebrew slave), about whom it says ‘with you,’ ‘ki tov lo immach’ (it shall be good for him with you), has to be treated as your equal.” No, you can’t do that.
All the more so your wife. For sure, you can’t tell your wife, “Work for me and I won’t feed you.” So if you can’t do that, what did the Mishnah have to say if it’s talking about a case where he isn’t feeding her, and he says, “I want your stuff to be kadosh”? Who are you? You aren’t giving me anything, and you want to make my stuff kadosh as if you own it? What right do you have? It would be as if you told me you weren’t feeding me, but I should work anyway.
The Gemara says, “You’re right. Really, we’re talking about that case. How come the Mishnah had to tell us that?” Seifa itztericha lei (the latter clause was necessary). It needed to tell us the second part of the Mishnah: “Motar: Rabbi Meir says hekdesh; Rabbi Yochanan HaSandlar says chullin.” In the second case, where he consecrates his wife’s excess earnings, even when he does not support her, Rabbi Meir still holds that the consecration takes effect after she dies, and her husband inherits her. The Gemara will explain later that the case here is talking about when he consecrates her earnings and is not feeding her. Okay, the regular earnings are not his. What about the extra she makes? If she died, they would go to him as his inheritance. That’s what he made kadosh. That’s why Rabbi Meir holds that it’s kadosh, and Rabbi Yochanan HaSandlar holds he can’t make it kadosh. We’ll see why.
Ufliga de-Resh Lakish (and it disagrees with Resh Lakish). Let’s go back to Rav Huna. Rabotai, the issue at hand is this: What is the main purpose of the Rabbis’ decree? Rav Huna said the main purpose is that the man has to feed his wife. In line with that, they said she has to give him her earnings. But if she chooses not to, the ball is in her court; she can say, “I don’t want to.” That’s Rav Huna.
Resh Lakish argues with that. Resh Lakish said, “Don’t say that Rabbi Meir’s reason is that he holds that a person can consecrate something not yet in existence.” Instead, Rabbi Meir’s reason is, “Since he can force her to do her work, it is as if he said to her, ‘Let your hands be consecrated to their Maker.’” Resh Lakish holds that the husband can force his wife to work and give him her earnings, and she cannot say, “I will be supported by you; I will not work and give you my income.”
Rabbi Meir agrees that one cannot consecrate the earnings themselves; they are not yet in existence. We’ll see later that the machloket is whether a person can consecrate something not yet in existence or not. Can I say, “Next year’s crop from my apple tree, I want it to be hekdesh”? There’s nothing there. The leaves are first falling off; the fruit still has to grow. You’re consecrating something not yet in existence; it isn’t in the world. We’ll see later that the Gemara will compare this to whether a man can go to a woman who is a goyah (non-Jewish woman) and say, “I want to marry you after you become Jewish.” Is that a tenai (condition)? No, it’s not a tenai. “When you become Jewish, I want to marry you.” What are you doing now? She’s a goyah. That’s something not yet in existence. There’s a machloket about whether you can do it.
So the Gemara says: We thought Rabbi Meir said that the man could make her motar, her extra money, kadosh because he inherits it, and he is making it kadosh now. No, the Gemara says, Resh Lakish says that’s not the pshat (plain meaning). Since Rabbi Meir holds that it’s more practical for a man to say, “I can force you to work,” the husband can say to his wife, “You have to work.” The takanah was mainly for the husband: she has to work, feed him, and give her earnings to her husband. Because of that, he has to give her mezonot—not because of her mezonot. It’s the other way around. The main purpose is that the wife has to give her earnings to the husband.
“Mitoch sheyachol lechofah al ma’aseh yadeha, na’aseh ke’omer lah yikdeshu yadayich le’oseihem” (since he can compel her to work, it is as if he said to her, “Let your hands be consecrated to their Maker”). Therefore, when he said to her, “Let your hands be consecrated to their Maker,” he isn’t consecrating the work or the money she’ll make later; that is not yet in existence. A guy is allowed to say, “I’m making my tree kadosh for next year’s fruit.” The tree is here. He can’t say, “I want next year’s crop.” Today, in the business world, they sell futures. They sell 10 years from now’s oil production. They do that. But according to the Torah, we’re going to say you can’t consecrate something in the future. I can consecrate the tree now for next year’s earnings. Here, too, I want your hands—see the hands?—to be kadosh with regard to whatever they produce.
Na’aseh ke’omer: It is as if he said, “Yikdeshu yadayich le’oseihem.” Now, if she has the option to say, “I will not be supported by you; I’m going to feed myself. Leave me alone,” how can he consecrate her hands? The husband would not be able to consecrate her hands. Even if you say he is consecrating her hands and not the fruit that comes from them, she could say to him, “Get lost. They aren’t your hands; they aren’t yours.” Obviously, Resh Lakish, who learns this pshat, does not learn like Rav Huna. He learns that the main takanah is for the husband. She owes it to him, and he wants to make it kadosh. He can’t make the fruit kadosh, because it isn’t yet in existence, but he can make her hands kadosh.
“He didn’t say that!” The Gemara will ask, “Velo amar lah hachi?” He didn’t say all those words in the Mishnah. “Since we know Rabbi Meir says, ‘Ein adam motzi devarav le-vatalah’ (a person does not utter words in vain), it is as if he said to her, ‘Yikdeshu yadayich le’oseihem.’” Rabbi Meir holds in another Gemara that when a man makes a legal declaration with improper wording, do we say he meant gibberish, Steve? No. We assume he meant something effective.
For example, if Reuven vows to contribute Shimon’s erech (fixed valuation) to the Temple, and Shimon is a 25-year-old male, basically Reuven is giving 50 biblical shekels. Right? Uh-huh. Now let’s say it’s an infant less than a month old; he has zero value. Rabbi Meir says that if a person vowed to contribute the erech of an infant less than a month old, instead of giving the erech, he has to give the market value.
Don’t forget, there are two kinds of value a person can have. The Torah gives a certain value; that’s called erech. Most of us, I’m sorry to say, have no value. Our value—anybody over 60 is chameisar (fifteen), yes, 15, valueless! You guys are a little bit younger; you have much more value. But if you go by value on the slave market, an older guy could be worth more if he’s smart, if he’s more talented. He could be worth more, right?
This guy said, “I want to give the erech of a 20-day-old infant.” They look up the Torah; it says there is no value. So he did it le-vatalah (in vain), nothing. Motzi devarav le-vatalah. Rabbi Meir says, “No. Ein adam motzi devarav le-vatalah. A guy doesn’t talk for nothing; he meant something. You have to extrapolate his words to mean his value on the slave market. He’s worth something.” Right? Same thing over here: when he said, “Mekdish ma’aseh yedei ishto,” you can’t make the ma’aseh kadosh. It must mean, “Yikdeshu yadayich le’oseihem”—I’m going to make the hands kadosh. Otherwise, the words would be meaningless.
Who says that? This is all the pshat in Rabbi Meir according to Resh Lakish. The Gemara asks, “Does Rabbi Meir hold that a person can’t consecrate something not yet in existence?” Is Rabbi Meir on record as holding that? Ve-hatanya (and it was taught): “Ha’omer le’ishah, ‘Harei at mekudeshet li le’achar she’etgayer, le’achar shetitgayeri’” (one who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me after I convert, or after you convert”); “le’achar she’eshtachrer, le’achar shetishtachreri” (after I am freed from slavery, or after you are freed); “le’achar sheyamut ba’alich” (after your husband dies). Imagine a guy goes to an eshet ish (married woman) and says, “After your husband dies, I want you to be my wife.” Or, “After your sister dies”—he is married to her sister. Basically, he’s saying, after his wife dies, right? Or, “After your yavam does chalitzah (levirate release ceremony) for you”—then you’re free on the market, and I want to marry you, right?
Rabbi Meir says, “She is mekudeshet,” besiman tov. Why? Because a person can consecrate something not yet in existence! The Gemara says, “You’re right. Is that so? Yes.” The Gemara answered like this: You’re right, Rabbi Meir does hold like that. “From this, we haven’t learned that.” Resh Lakish meant to say that from our Mishnah you can also learn that a person can consecrate something not yet in existence, but he wanted to tell you it doesn’t have to be that way. It could be that he is consecrating his hands.
You want to tell me he is consecrating the handiwork itself, mamash? Because it isn’t yet in existence? Yes, that would fit Rabbi Meir, too. Resh Lakish said, “I didn’t want to go there. I didn’t want to be bound to say Rabbi Meir goes according to his own view. I have another pshat for understanding it, but it is true.”
Let’s finish the end of the Gemara. What happens to the motar, the leftover? You tell me the extra is kadosh. Rabbi Meir says, “Hekdesh.” So it comes out like this: When a person wants to make his wife’s earnings hekdesh, why aren’t they kadosh? The Mishnah says they aren’t kadosh. Either because they aren’t his to make kadosh, or because Resh Lakish holds that the husband can force his wife, and really the earnings are his. But I can learn the Mishnah because the earnings are something not yet in existence. Even though Rabbi Meir himself holds that you can consecrate something not yet in existence, I can learn the Mishnah that way. That’s how we’ve learned it until now.
But how are we going to learn the second part of the Mishnah: the motar, which Rabbi Meir holds is hekdesh? Why is there hekdesh? When does it become kadosh according to Rabbi Meir? Rav u-Shmuel (Rav and Shmuel) both say, “Motar le’achar mitah kadosh” (the surplus becomes consecrated after death), like we studied before. He meant it should be kadosh after she dies, because he is going to inherit her; so it becomes kadosh afterward.
But Rav Ada bar Ahavah says, “Motar me-chayim kadosh” (the surplus becomes consecrated during life), even while she is alive. As soon as it is produced, it is his to consecrate.
Rav Pappa had a question about this. Be-mai? What are we talking about? “Ileima de-ma’aleh lah mezonot u-ma’aleh lah ma’ah kesef le-tzorkheha”—if our Mishnah is talking about a man who really provides her with food and gives her an extra small silver coin for her needs, then her extra earnings really are his. What is the reason for the one who says it becomes kadosh only after death? Since he is fulfilling his obligation to her, he is entitled to her earnings. So why did Rav u-Shmuel say the excess earnings are his to consecrate only after he inherits her, after she dies? They should be his right now, too. He’s giving her the extra money; it becomes his. It should be kadosh.
“Ella she-ein ma’aleh lah mezonot ve-eino ma’aleh lah ma’ah kesef le-tzorkheha”—maybe he isn’t feeding her, and he isn’t giving her the extra money. If that’s true, what is the reason for the one who says it becomes kadosh during her lifetime? How could Rav Ada say it is kadosh during her life, without an inheritance? On what basis? He isn’t giving her anything. What is the pshat in that machloket? “Le’olam be-ma’aleh lah mezonot ve-eino ma’aleh lah ma’ah kesef le-tzorkheha.” He is providing her with food, but not giving her the extra coin.
Rav u-Shmuel hold, “Tiknu mezonot tachat ma’asei yadeha, u-ma’ah kesef tachat motar” (support was instituted in exchange for her work, and a small coin in exchange for the surplus). Rav u-Shmuel hold, as we said, that the support provision is exchanged for her mandatory earnings. She gives him earnings; he gives her support. What about the excess? He has to give her the extra coin. You don’t give it to her—no takanah, no washin’. Since he isn’t giving her the extra coin, “motar didah havei” (the surplus belongs to her). If that’s true, how can he make it kadosh? The Mishnah says it becomes kadosh after death, when he inherits it. That’s Rav u-Shmuel.
But Rav Ada bar Ahavah holds, “Tiknu mezonot tachat motar, u-ma’ah kesef tachat ma’asei yadeha”—the opposite. The Rabbis instituted the support provision in exchange for her excess. She gives him the excess, and he feeds her. What about when he gives the extra money, the tip? That is in exchange for her mandatory earnings. “Keivan de-ka yahiv lah mezonot, motar dideih havei.” According to Rav Ada, it’s strange: the reason he is allowed to make her extra work kadosh is because he is feeding her. Why would I say they instituted that her earnings go to him in exchange for the extra food he gives her—meaning that he feeds her in exchange for the extra money she makes?
Mai ka miplagei? Mar savar, “midei de-shkhi’ach mi-midei de-shkhi’ach” (something common in exchange for something common). Rav u-Shmuel hold that something common was enacted for something common. That makes sense. It’s common for him to feed her, and common for her to work. The simple work and the feeding go against each other.
Mar savar, “midei de-kayitz mi-midei de-kayitz” (something fixed in exchange for something fixed). What does that mean? He has to give her a ma’ah, a small silver coin, per week. She is obligated to produce the weight of five sela’im (shekels) every week. Those are both fixed amounts. So he says it makes more sense that they made a takanah for one in exchange for the other. If you tell me he feeds her whatever she needs to eat, it’s up in the air; we don’t know how much she needs to eat. If you tell me she’s going to work, how much will she work? Whatever she does, she could make more or less. But the extra is a certain amount. There’s a certain amount that he gives her, the silver sela. According to Rav Ada bar Ahavah, the mandatory earnings are a set amount, the amount she makes, five sela. Oh, that’s a set amount. One in exchange for the other—it makes sense that they made one for the other.
We’ll see this tomorrow night, rabotai, at 9:15, b’ezrat Hashem. Baruch Adonai l’olam amen v’amen (Blessed is Adonai forever, amen and amen).