A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Shmuel Choueka

Torah Lecture

Mishna Berura Siman 182 Seif 2 + Daf Yomi Bava Kama Daf 40

Lectured by Rabbi Shmuel Choueka

Published
December 12, 2023
Duration
71:08
Lecture code
RSC-973

Mishna Berura, Siman 182 Seif 2: The Cup for Birkat Hamazon

  • Rabbi Shmuel Choueka reviews Maran’s ruling that the kos birkat hamazon should contain yayin, not another drink, even if the person established his meal around that drink. If wine is unavailable in the place, however, beer or another drink that is chamar medinah may be used.
  • The Rama says that the custom in his countries to bless over beer should not be protested. He also cites an opinion that one need not use a cup at all; nevertheless, the Rama says it is preferable to use wine when possible.
  • The Mishnah Berurah compares Birkat Hamazon with kiddush and havdalah: other drinks do not ordinarily replace wine, but chamar medinah can serve as a substitute where wine is unavailable.
  • A person’s own reliance on a drink during the meal does not make it chamar medinah. Even if he drank it as his primary drink, it does not qualify if the people of the city are not regularly accustomed to drinking it.
  • “Wine is not available” can mean that wine exists in the city but is not readily accessible or is not commonly drunk there, so the main drink of the city is beer or another beverage. In that situation, one may be lenient and use that drink for Birkat Hamazon.
  • The Bach says that although one need not go out to seek wine, if one has wine at home, one should bless over it.
  • Chamar medinah is determined city by city. The fact that wine is plentiful in other towns in the country does not change the status of a place where the local population mainly drinks another beverage.
  • If two drinks are chamar medinah, one should use the kind he prefers. This is especially so if he drank that kind before Birkat Hamazon: he should use it rather than another drink, so that his own table is not full while “his Master’s table” is empty.
  • These preferences apply only to a drink that people in that place regularly drink. A beverage does not become chamar medinah merely because it is valuable or prestigious if people drink it only occasionally. The Mishnah Berurah gives yayin tapuchim and yayin rimonim—apple wine and pomegranate wine—as examples: even if they are important or costly, they are not chamar medinah without regular local use. Rabbi Shmuel Choueka recalls tasting homemade pomegranate wine in Israel at Amram’s; he describes it as very harsh.
  • The drink need not be alcoholic. Rabbi Shmuel Choueka cites Reb Moshe’s view that coffee or tea could qualify in a situation with no other choice, since they are customary drinks to offer a guest—for example, “come over for coffee” or “tea” in England. He distinguishes this from beverages such as Coca-Cola, which people may drink frequently but do not generally offer as the customary, significant drink of hospitality.
  • Reb Ovadia and other poskim disagree about using coffee or tea for kiddush. Rabbi Shmuel Choueka notes that in a situation with no alternative one must work out what to do without making a berachah levatalah.
  • Water cannot be used, even though it is what most people drink. The same applies to kvass and borscht: even if many people drink them, they are not considered more significant than water. The Mishnah Berurah allows that Tischbier might be considered in a pressing situation because many people drink it; Rabbi Shmuel Choueka is uncertain about its exact identity and refers to the Baer Hetev.
  • The Mishnah Berurah discusses the custom to bless over beer even when wine is available in the city. Some authorities hold that if a person established his meal around another drink from the outset, he may continue with it for Birkat Hamazon even when wine is available. Maran’s unqualified ruling follows those who do not accept that establishing the meal makes the other drink sufficient.
  • Nevertheless, some support leniency when wine is expensive and difficult to obtain. This may explain the Rama’s custom regarding beer.
  • The Mishnah Berurah distinguishes Birkat Hamazon from kiddush and havdalah: even if wine is expensive, if it is available in the city, one must specifically use wine for kiddush and havdalah.
  • If someone cannot afford to buy wine for every meal, he may use chamar medinah for Birkat Hamazon. If he has wine at home, however, he should use it. If he has only a small amount reserved for kiddush and havdalah, he need not use it for Birkat Hamazon, because kiddush and havdalah universally require a cup and are treated more stringently.

Holding a Cup When Alone

  • The Rama’s discussion concerns whether a person blessing alone should hold the cup. The first opinion in Seif 1 requires a cup even for an individual; some especially careful people therefore held one when reciting Birkat Hamazon alone.
  • The Zohar appears to say that an individual should not bless over a cup, and that the cup is used only with a zimun. To accommodate both views, some people bless with a cup placed in front of them but do not hold it.
  • Even according to the opinions that require a cup, a cup standing on the table is present. Holding it is a mitzvah min hamuvchar, not the basic requirement.
  • The Mishnah Berurah calls this a proper minhag. Rabbi Shmuel Choueka says that nowadays the common custom is not to use a cup for Birkat Hamazon when alone, only with a zimun; he says he does not personally use one when alone.

Seif 3: A Cup That Is Not Pagum

  • A cup for a berachah must not be pagum. If someone drinks from the cup, it becomes pagum; pouring from it into one’s hand or another vessel does not flaw it.
  • Drinking from a small jug makes it pagum, while drinking from a large wooden barrel is not treated that way.
  • Some say that even pagum water should not be used to dilute a kos shel berachah. Rabbi Shmuel Choueka explains that mezigah originally meant adding water to strong wine to make it drinkable. The three drops used today are added al pi Kabbalah.
  • The following halachot will discuss ways to make wine un-pagum, including adding more wine. The issue applies to kiddush, havdalah, and a berit milah, where someone may make the berachah on the wine and then drink from a cup that others will use for their berachot.
  • Rabbi Shmuel Choueka relates that at his great-grandson’s berit he made the berachah, poured a little wine onto his hand, and drank from there; when the cup was returned to him, he drank from it.
  • A question was raised about whether grape juice requires the three drops of water; no ruling on that question is given in this segment.

Bava Kama, Daf 40: Rabbi Ya'akov’s Teaching About an Ox Owned by a Katan

  • The discussion returns to a beraita of Rabbi Ya'akov, initially described as concerning orphans and then clarified as concerning ketanim, as well as a cheresh and a shoteh. Rabbi Ya'akov says that their ox pays chatzi nezek. Since a tam ordinarily pays half-damages, the Gemara asks what new teaching Rabbi Ya'akov is adding.
  • One possible explanation involves a mu'ad whose tam portion remains in place, according to Rabbi Yehudah. Even after an ox becomes a mu'ad, half remains tam: the tam portion is paid migupo, from the ox’s body, while the other portion is paid me'aliyah, from the owner’s property.
  • Abaye explains that Rabbi Ya'akov and Rabbi Yehudah disagree about appointing an apotropus for a cheresh, shoteh, or katan. On this explanation, the tam portion cannot be collected because no agent is appointed for it, so the amount ultimately paid is half.
  • Abba bar Abba asks Ravina how this works according to Rava, who says Rabbi Ya'akov and Rabbi Yehudah do not disagree. Rava’s explanation makes Rabbi Ya'akov accept appointing an agent for a tam. The Gemara asks why the case must be made a mu'ad; it could simply be a tam, which pays half-damages.
  • If the case is a tam according to Rabbi Yehudah, the proposed explanation is that it was given only shemirah pechutah, rather than shemirah me'ulah. But according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, who says that the same lesser guarding suffices for both a tam and a mu'ad, the case would have to be one where the ox was not guarded at all.
  • The suggested novelty is that Rabbi Ya'akov appoints an apotropus for the ketanim so the tam portion can be collected from the ox’s body. Rava answers that the teaching contains more than one reason: it teaches both that a guardian may be appointed for the tam and that a mu'ad retains its tam portion, with the associated rules of guarding.
  • Rabbi Shmuel Choueka notes that the difference in guarding requirements is based on a pasuk and is described as a halachah le-Moshe mi-Sinai. He offers a practical rationale: after an ox has gored several times, its behavior is more predictable and it is easier to guard. He says the discussion will continue on pages 45–46 and relates to the earlier question of what counts as proper guarding.
  • Ravina offers another explanation of the dispute: Rabbi Yehudah holds that the ox retains its established status after a change in the owner’s circumstances, while Rabbi Ya'akov holds that a change of reshut changes its status. For example, if an ox became a mu'ad while its owner was a katan, and the owner later came of age, Rabbi Yehudah says it remains a mu'ad; Rabbi Ya'akov says the new reshut resets its status.
  • The discussion distinguishes this from simply selling an already-mu'ad ox to a new owner. Rabbi Shmuel Choueka notes that a buyer would not ordinarily want to buy a mu'ad, except in a case of mekach ta'ut, when the sale could be void.

Apotropusin and Kofer

  • A beraita teaches that apotropusin pay damages from me'aliyah but do not pay kofer.
  • Rabbi Shmuel Choueka explains kofer as the payment required when a mu'ad ox kills a person. The Torah describes it as a ransom for the owner’s life. The dispute includes whether the amount is assessed according to the nizak or the mazik.
  • Rav Chisda identifies the authority behind the view that minors do not pay kofer as Rabbi Yishma'el beno shel Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah. The Rabbis say “demei nizak,” the value of the injured party; Rabbi Yishma'el says “demei mazik,” the value of the damager.
  • The Gemara first suggests that this is a dispute over whether kofer is monetary compensation or kaparah: the Rabbis would treat it as money, while Rabbi Yishma'el would treat it as atonement.
  • Rav Pappa rejects that explanation and says everyone agrees kofer is kaparah; they disagree only about how to assess it. The Rabbis assess the nizak, while Rabbi Yishma'el assesses the mazik.
  • The Rabbis derive their view from the phrase “yushat alav,” linking it to “yashit alav” in the law of the pregnant woman who miscarries after being struck. Since that payment is assessed as the law of the mazik, they apply the same approach to kofer.
  • Rabbi Yishma'el focuses on “pidyon nafsho,” the ransom for his life, and therefore assesses the mazik. The Rabbis agree that the purpose is to ransom the mazik’s life, but hold that paying the value of the nizak accomplishes that kaparah.

Rav Nachman’s Questions About Kofer

  • Rava praises Rav Acha bar Ya'akov to Rav Nachman as “adam gadol hu.” Rabbi Shmuel Choueka notes the caution against praising someone excessively, lest the praise prompt others to expose faults; the restrained praise is that he is a great man.
  • Rav Nachman asks Rav Acha bar Ya'akov how two partners pay kofer when their ox kills someone. If each pays a full kofer, there are two payments, but if each pays half, the Torah’s requirement of a full kofer seems unmet. Rav Nachman sits and ponders the question; no answer is given here.
  • Rav Nachman then asks whether someone liable for kofer must provide collateral. Those liable for erech are required to provide collateral, while those liable for chata'ot and ashamot are not, since their need for kaparah is expected to motivate payment.
  • The question is whether kofer is like a kaparah and therefore requires no collateral, or whether it is different because the payment goes to another person rather than to Heaven. Another possible reason to require collateral is that the owner may feel less personally responsible because it was his animal that caused the damage.
  • Rav Acha bar Ya'akov says that the first question has already stumped him and declines the second. The segment does not provide an answer to either question.

Borrowed Ox: Tam or Mu'ad

  • A beraita discusses an ox borrowed on the presumption that it is a tam, which turns out to be a mu'ad. The owners pay chatzi nezek and the sho'el pays chatzi nezek.
  • If the ox became a mu'ad while in the sho'el’s house and was then returned to the owners, the owners pay chatzi nezek and the sho'el is patur.
  • The sho'el might protest, “I borrowed an ox, not a lion.” Rava answers that the case is one where the sho'el recognized that the ox was a nagchan.
  • The sho'el might still argue, “I borrowed a tam, not a mu'ad.” The response is that he would have owed chatzi nezek even if it had been a tam.
  • He might argue that a tam is paid for migupo, not from his own money. The response is that he would still have had to compensate the owner for the ox.
  • He might also argue that if it had been a tam, he could have admitted and been exempt under the rule modeh beknas patur, or that he could have hidden it. The Gemara considers the argument even according to the view that chatzi nezek is mamona, and discusses the difference between Rabbi Akiva’s and Rabbi Yishmael’s positions on collecting from the animal.
  • Tosafot asks that the sho'el did not actually confess or hide the ox. The Gemara answers that the case is one where beit din seized it immediately, before he had an opportunity to do either.
  • The owners might then argue that the sho'el caused their ox to be seized and left them unable to litigate. The answer is that if the sho'el had returned it to them, the court would have taken it from them as well.
  • The sho'el might say that if it had been returned, he would have hidden it. That argument is relevant where the owner has no other assets. The Gemara invokes Rabbi Natan’s rule: where A owes B and B owes C, C can collect directly from A. Since the sho'el is liable to the owner and the owner is liable to the nizak, the sho'el is directly liable to the nizak. The discussion thus applies Rabbi Natan’s rule to obligations such as damages, not only to ordinary debts.

Whether a Change of Reshut Changes the Ox’s Status

  • The Gemara revisits the two clauses about the borrowed ox. Rabbi Yochanan says the teaching is “broken”: the one who taught one clause did not teach the other, because they appear to rely on conflicting rules about whether reshut changes the ox’s status.
  • Rava says that since the first clause holds that reshut does not change the status, the final clause must hold that too. The reason the sho'el is exempt after returning the ox is that the owner can say, “It is not within your power to make my ox a mu'ad”; the owner would have guarded it differently.
  • Rav Pappa takes the opposite approach: since the final clause holds that reshut changes the status, the first clause does too. The exception in the first clause is that the owner’s name remains on the ox wherever it goes, so borrowing it is not a complete change of reshut.
  • Rabbi Shmuel Choueka clarifies the distinction between ownership and reshut: an item can belong to someone while being held by another. A stolen item is no longer in the owner’s reshut because it was taken against his wishes, while an item given to a cleaner remains the owner’s even though it is in the cleaner’s possession.
  • A sho'el takes on substantial duties to care for and guard the borrowed animal, but the animal still bears the owner’s name. The discussion compares this to an encumbered debt: if Shimon owes Reuven and Levi owes Shimon, Reuven may collect from Levi when Shimon lacks property.
  • Rabbi Shmuel Choueka also distinguishes a cleaner’s responsibility as an uman from the question of whether the item remains in the owner’s reshut.

Arena Ox and Fitness for the Altar

  • The Gemara says that a shor ha-itz­tadin, an arena ox made to fight, is not liable to be put to death, based on “ki yigach velo she-yagichuhu”—it gores, rather than being made to gore. The Gemara asks whether it may be brought as a korban.
  • Rav says it is kasher because it was coerced; Shemuel says it is pasul because an aveirah was done through it.
  • The Gemara cites exclusions from the pesukim: rove'a and nirba, an animal involved in sexual activity; ne'evad, an animal worshipped as an idol; muktzeh, an animal designated for idolatry; and noge'ach, a goring animal.
  • Rabbi Shimon asks why both rove'a and noge'ach are specified. The answer is that each has a feature not found in the other: for rove'a, ones is treated like ratzon; for noge'ach, ones is not treated like ratzon. Also, a noge'ach pays kofer, while a rove'a does not.
  • This appears to support Rav: if an ox was forced to gore, the rule that coercion is not like choice suggests that it can be brought as a korban. The Gemara answers that the distinction between coercion and choice concerns whether the ox is put to death, not its eligibility for the altar; there is no corresponding verse about korbanot.
  • The Gemara then examines why a rove'a does not pay kofer. Abaye says the case is that it copulated but did not kill the woman, who was later executed by beit din. One might have thought the animal’s action counted as causing her death; the teaching says it does not incur kofer on that basis.
  • Rava says the case is that the animal’s copulation did kill her. The distinction from a goring ox is that keren has an intention to cause damage, while the rove'a acts for its own pleasure.
  • This bears on the earlier case of an animal that walks normally and steps on a child in the injured party’s courtyard: the question is whether kofer applies when the animal’s action was not intended to cause damage. Abaye’s approach would allow kofer in the comparable case where copulation caused death; Rava’s distinction points the other way.
  • The final beraita supports Rav: an arena ox is not liable to be put to death and is kasher for the altar because it was coerced.
Words in this lecture2
Gemaraגמרא
Terms Gemara, the Talmud's discussion of the Mishnah. English: Commentary on the Mishnah
Also written: Gemarah, G'mara, Guemara, gmara
Plural: gemarot, gemaras
Pasukפסוק
Terms Pasuk, a verse. English: Biblical verse
Also written: Passuk, posuk, psuq
Plural: Pesukim, psukim, p'sukim, psuqim, Pesukei, psukeem