Achi vere'ai (my brothers and friends), we are at siman (section) kuf-peh-bet, se'if (paragraph) bet. We did the se'if; now we’re going to do the Mishnah Berurah on it. Let’s repeat what Maran (our master) says. Kuf-peh-bet, se'if bet: “kos birkat hamazon (Grace-after-meals cup), einah ela shel... einah ela shel yayin (wine), velo mish'ar mashkin, afillu kava se'udato aleihem” (it must be wine, and not other drinks, even if he established his meal on them). You have to use wine for the kos birkat hamazon. You can’t use other liquids unless, as he is going to say, “ve'ein yayin matzui be'oto makom” (wine is not available in that place), “vehashechar o she'ar mashkin hem chamar medinah, mevarechin aleihen” (and beer or other drinks are the drink of the land; one may bless over them).
We learned a new concept: if there’s a drink of the land, it’s called the drink of the land. When there is no wine, the drink of the land sometimes could supplant, could overtake—good word—could overtake and could be a substitute for the wine. When there's no wine and everyone drinks the drink of the land, then you can use that instead. The Rama said, “mah shenahagu bimdinot ellu levarech al hashechar ein limchot” (the custom in these countries to bless over beer should not be protested). Today people make the blessing over shechar in this country. The Rama says, “veyesh omerim” (and there are those who say): some say they don’t need a cup anyway. They say, “Listen, what I’m doing is extra anyway; I don’t need a cup.” And more than that, chamar medinah is this beer, and people make it part of their meal. Even though we have a lot of wine—what’s that called? We have it, but it’s very expensive. Not everybody can buy wine for their meal. Still, the Rama says it’s better to buy wine.
And the Rama has another halachah (Jewish law); we’re going to see that later. Let’s look at the Mishnah Berurah. Heh: “lo mish'ar mashkin, kemo le'inyan kiddush (sanctification) vehavdalah (separation ceremony), de'eino al she'ar mashkin lekullei alma bimkom dela havei yayin, vehavei chamar medinah” (not other drinks, as with regard to kiddush and havdalah, because everyone agrees that other drinks are not used in place of wine, unless they are the drink of the land). The key, rabbotai, is to remember this: wine is the drink for kiddush, havdalah, and birkat hamazon (Grace after Meals), unless there is something called chamar medinah—the drink of the land. When there's no wine and everyone drinks the drink of the land, then you can use that instead.
“Afillu kava se'udato,” vav: “rotzeh lomar shetoch hase'udah samach al mashkeh zo vehayah ikkar shtiyyato mizzeh” (even if he established his meal, meaning that during the meal he relied on this drink and it was his primary drink). Even if, during the meal, he drank most of this juice—juice or apple juice, grape juice or orange juice—even so, that doesn’t make it significant enough for him to make birkat hamazon on it, “keivan de'ein anshei ha'ir regilim lishtoto tamid bammakom hazzeh” (since the people of the city are not accustomed to drinking it regularly in that place). The whole city doesn’t drink it; just you. You drank it during your meal, but that’s not enough. The whole city has to drink it for it to be chamar medinah.
So it continues: “ein yayin matzui,” zayin. Let’s say there is no wine. “Afillu nimtza yayin ba'ir ella she'eino matzui harbeh umipnei zeh ikkar shtiyyat benei ha'ir hu shechar ush'ar mashkin” (even if wine is found in the city, but it is not readily available, and therefore the main drink of the people of the city is beer and other drinks). Let’s say you’re in a city where wine is not available, or it’s available but not accessible, so most people don’t drink it; they drink other drinks. “Yesh lehakel levarech birkat hamazon al shechar” (one may be lenient and bless over beer for Grace after Meals). You can use beer, this kind of beer, this shechar—mead, this mead beer that they used to have.
Look at the Bach (Bach), who wrote: “af de'eino mechuyav lehader sham achar yayin mikol makom min hachardanim kol makom sheyesh lo yayin beveito yevarech al hayayin” (although he is not obligated to seek wine there, nevertheless, wherever he has wine in his home, he should bless over the wine). The Bach says: listen, if in that city most people drink this beer, you don’t have to go to the store to buy wine; we’re not going to obligate you. But if you have wine in the house, use the wine.
Chet: “me'oto makom, hainu bechol ha'ir, af shebise'ar ayarot bimdinah zo nimtza tamid yayin harbeh” (that place means throughout the whole city, even if in other towns in that country a lot of wine is always available). It goes by city and city; each place is by itself. Even if other cities have a lot of wine, it doesn’t matter. If in your city they drink beer, that’s the main drink of the land, “umevarechin aleihen” (and one blesses over them).
Tet: “ve'im yesh lo shenei minei mashkin kegon shechar umei devash vechayotze vazeh” (if he has two kinds of drink, such as beer and honey drink, or the like). Let’s say you have two drinks of the land. One is actual beer, and one is a honey drink, mei devash, which they used to make. “Ve'echad mehem chaviv alav” (one of them is more beloved to him), “yevarech al oto hammin shehu chaviv alav” (he should bless over the kind that is beloved to him). You make birkat hamazon on the one you like. “Vechol sheken im mittichillah kodem birkat hamazon shatah mimmin echad mipnei chavivuto, vaddai min hakol yevarech alav velo al mashkeh acher, shelo yehe shulchancha male veshulchano shel rabbacha reikam” (all the more so if, before birkat hamazon, he drank one kind because he likes it, he should certainly bless over that one and not another drink, so that your table will not be full while your Master’s table is empty).
For sure, if the drink you like—let’s say you like beer—and people in this town drink both beer and this honey drink, and you drank beer before the meal started, then when you come to birkat hamazon, make sure you use beer. It shouldn’t look like, “Oh, for Hashem I’m going to use this substitute drink.” Use the one you like; that’s the one you drink.
“Aval kol zeh davka im oto hamin hu chamar medinah” (but all this applies specifically if that kind is the drink of the land). “Dehaynu sherigilin lishtoto bamakom hahu” (that is, they are accustomed to drinking it in that place). It’s very hard to know what’s called chamar medinah. There’s no clear definition beyond that the people drink it in that city. “Aval im ein shotin oto ela lifrakim” (but if they drink it only occasionally)—if they drink it only once in a while—“af dive'atzmo chashiv yoter mechavero” (even if it is more significant in itself than another drink). Let’s say you tell me, “You can bring me very expensive beer, Stephen.” Some of these beers are very chashuv, sure, but that doesn’t matter. “Lo havei chamar medinah” (it is not the drink of the land) if they don’t drink it, if they don’t make it part of their drinking. We’re not going to call it chamar medinah.
“Midei dahava ashar mashkim kegon yayin tapuchim veyayin rimonim” (as with other drinks, such as apple wine and pomegranate wine). There’s such a thing called yayin tapuchim and yayin rimonim. You know what that is? Wine from apples or wine from pomegranates. I once had some when I went to Israel, at Amram’s, alav hashalom (peace be upon him). He gave us pomegranate wine. It was very hard, very harsh. He had made it himself, so there’s such a thing. He says that even though it’s chashuv—very chashuv, because it costs a lot of money, has alcohol, and so on—it’s not the drink of the land.
Next, yud: “chutz min...” Does it have to be an alcoholic drink? No. Let’s say the drink of the land, unfortunately, is Coca-Cola, or—That’s what I’m trying to tell you. That’s why I told you we’re going to see in the halachah: Reb Moshe holds that coffee and tea could qualify. Why? What’s called the drink of the land? Reb Moshe says that if someone came to your house, you would invite him: “Sit down, let’s have coffee.” Right? The expression is, “I’m coming over for coffee.” In England: “Tea, anyone?” You know, that’s the drink.
Now, if someone comes to the house and says, “I’m thirsty,” you don’t say, “Oh, Coke. I’ll give you Coke.” But that might—You’re not coming to the house for me to offer you Coke. Right, right. So it’s not a drink of the land. The fact that they drink it—of course they drink it; kids drink it all the time. But drinking it as a chashuv drink is different. Reb Moshe says tea and coffee could qualify if you have no other choice. Other poskim (halachic authorities), Reb Ovadia and others, say, “No, you can’t make kiddush on that.” Sometimes it could happen that you’re stuck and have nothing else, nothing else mamash. You have to figure out a way to do it without making a berachah levatalah (blessing in vain); we’ll see.
Yud: “chutz min hamayim” (except for water). No, you can’t use water. Why? Look at yud: “af al pi sherov shetiyat ha'am mayim, ein mevarechin alav” (even though most of the people’s drinking is water, one does not bless over it). Even though water is what most people drink, you might say that’s the main drink of the land. Most people drink water! But that’s not it; you can’t make a berachah on it. “Vehu hadin kvas umei borsht, af al pi sherov shetiyat hahamonim hem, afilu hachi lo chashivei yoter memayim” (the same applies to kvass and borscht, even though many people drink them; even so, they are no more significant than water).
That kvass—what is it? It’s a Russian drink. He said at the bottom that it’s like a—It bubbles. And borscht, we know. Have you seen borscht in the store? It’s beets; it’s beet juice. They take beets, cook them, and make juice out of them. They used to drink it. He says that’s not it; it’s like water. “VeTischbier”—it’s a kind of beer. “Efshar deyesh lehakel bish'at hadechak, ho'il verov hahamonim shotin mehen” (perhaps one may be lenient in a pressing situation, since many people drink them). Maybe it’s a kind of beer; I don’t know what it says. He calls it a table beer. So maybe if people drink it, you can consider it. You have to see what he wrote over there in the se'if katan in the Baer Hetev.
Yud-alef: “mah shenahagu” (the custom they adopted). Today, the custom is that we do yet make the blessing over shechar. “Shezehu mah shenahagu levarech al shechar, af al gav deyayin matzui ba'ir” (this is the custom to bless over beer, even though wine is available in the city). He says that in his city they have wine, and they still make a berachah on beer. Why? “Kov'im se'udah alav” (they establish their meal around it). He means, even if you don’t consider it chamar medinah, because there’s also a lot of wine available there, “mikol makom, belav hachi yesh omrim, de'im kava se'udato mitechilah al she'ar mashkin, machshiv otam bazeh, umevarech aleihem birkat hamazon, afilu yesh yayin” (even so, there are those who say that if he established his meal from the outset around another drink, he gives it significance and blesses over it for Grace after Meals, even if there is wine).
There are some who hold—we say yesh omrim—that if you make that drink the main drink of your meal, you continue with it for birkat hamazon, because you’re continuing with the drink of the meal, even if there is wine. “Ela deHamchaber satam me'ikra kehach haposkim, delo mahani kevi'uta” (but the author stated the law without qualification, in accordance with those authorities who say that establishing the meal this way does not help). Maran said that even though you established it, we don’t want to rely on that. But he says, “mikol makom, yesh sheratz u la'azor lehakel bazeh, shehayayin beyoker vekasheh lehasigo” (nevertheless, there are those who wish to support leniency in this matter, because wine is expensive and hard to obtain). In the Rama’s case, the wine was very expensive and hard to find. So they have wine, but it’s hard to find and expensive.
Yud-Gimmel, Mem-Tet: “Ve'i efshar liknot yayin” (if it is impossible to buy wine). You can’t buy wine for every meal. And now he says, “Oh, are you going to start using that for everything?” He says no. “Aval le'inyan kiddush vehavdalah mashma degam haRema modeh detzarich lachzor davka achar yayin, keivan deyayin nimtza ba'ir, ela shehu beyoker” (but regarding kiddush and havdalah, it seems that the Rama also agrees that one must specifically go back to wine, since wine is available in the city, even though it is expensive). The fact that wine is around means you have to use wine for kiddush and havdalah, even though it’s expensive. Its being expensive tells me I don’t have to use it for birkat hamazon, so I’ll use the drink of the land. But for kiddush and havdalah, since there is wine around, I have to use wine.
Yud-Daled: “liknot yayin lechol se'udah” (to buy wine for every meal). Even though I can’t afford to buy wine for every meal, “aval im yesh lo yayin beveito, tzarich levarech alav” (if he has wine in his home, he must bless over it). Right, we said the Bach says that if you have wine in your house, use it. “Ve'im yesh lo yayin beveito rak me'at letzorech kiddush vehavdalah, ein tzarich levarech alav, dekiddush vehavdalah lechulei alma ta'un kos, vachamir mibirkat hamazon” (if he has only a little wine in his home, for kiddush and havdalah, he does not need to bless over it, because everyone agrees that kiddush and havdalah require a cup, and they are more stringent than birkat hamazon). A guy says, “I have wine, but I’m saving it for kiddush and havdalah.” Okay, then we’ll leave you alone. Don’t use it; use the drink of the land.
Now, what was the last part of the Rama? The last part of the Rama said that when people make the berachah by themselves, they don’t hold the cup; they leave it on the table. What is that all about? Look at tet-vav at the bottom: “shelo yochaz” (that he should not hold it). “Vehamedakdekim shemevarachim al hakos,” well, let’s say “de'ah rishonah shebese'if alef degam beyachid ta'un kos” (the first opinion in se'if alef, that even an individual requires a cup). There used to be medakdekim—people who are very careful, Steve—who, when they make birkat hamazon even by themselves, hold the cup.
But the Zohar (Zohar) seems to say that an individual should not bless over a cup, only with a zimun (invitation to bless). Therefore, these people who want to be strict with themselves and don’t want to go against the Zohar, what do they do? “Ken mevarchin, ve'einam ochazim beyadam, uvazeh yotzim yedei hakol” (they bless over it but do not hold it in their hands, and in this way they fulfill all opinions). They make the berachah with the cup like this, but they don’t hold it in their hand; they just put it in front of them. So it counts a little bit. It’s not going against the Zohar, but it counts. “De'afilu ha'omerim te'unah kos, harei hakos lefanav al hashulchan” (even according to those who say a cup is required, the cup is in front of him on the table). Even according to the one who says you need a cup, I have a cup, and the cup is on the table. “Achizato einah ela mitzvah min hamuvchar leda'at hakol” (holding it is only the most preferred way to perform the mitzvah, according to everyone). Holding it is only an extra mitzvah anyway. So the fact that I have it means I get the plus without getting the minus of the Zohar.
Tet-Zayin: “nachon minhag zeh,” meaning, “mah she'ein ochazin oto bayadayim” (this custom is proper: not holding it in one’s hands). That’s a good minhag. “Kayom minhag ha'olam she'ein mevarchim al hakos kelal beyachid” (nowadays, the custom of the world is not to bless over a cup at all when alone). Today the custom is not to make birkat hamazon on a cup by yourself, only with a zimun. What’s the problem? It seems the Zohar said not to do it, so even though we have a way out by just putting it down—huh? Heebie-jeebies. Something, I don’t know what. I don’t do it myself, but when I have a zimun, I do it.
Gimmel. Se'if gimmel: “Tzarich she shelo yehei pagum” (it must not be flawed). The cup can’t be pagum, flawed. What does that mean? “She'im shatah shatah mimenu, pegamo” (if he drank from it, he has flawed it). You drink from the cup; it becomes pagum. “Aval shafach mimenu letoch yado o cheli, ein bekach kelum” (but if he poured from it into his hand or a vessel, that does nothing). If you pour from the cup into your hand or onto something else, that doesn’t make it pagum. “Afilu shatah mehakad, mehachavit ketanah, havei pagum” (even if he drank from a small jug, it becomes flawed). Even if you drank from a small jug, you make it pagum. “Aval shatah mechavit shel etz gedolah, ein makpid” (but if he drank from a large wooden barrel, we are not particular). If you drank from the big, huge barrel, you’re not going to make that pagum.
“Yesh mi she'omer she'afilu mayim pegumim pesulim limzog bahem kos shel berachah” (some say that even flawed water is unfit to use to dilute the cup of blessing). Some say—even if you have to make mezigah, you know what mezigah is? Add some water to the wine, three drops. We do three drops al pi Kabbalah (according to Kabbalah), but mezigah was because in those days the wine was too strong and not drinkable, so you had to add water. When you drink water, even that water should not be used if it’s pagum. That means you had a cup of water and drank half of it. Now you need to add some water; don’t use that water to make it, because you drank from it. Drinking from it makes it a pegimah.
We’re going to see now that the next few halachot will tell us how to make wine un-pagum. Pour it back in the bottle, right? Back in the bottle, or add something to it. This is a very big halachah that applies to kiddush and havdalah, and also at a berit milah (circumcision ceremony). The guy makes the first berachah, “savri, borei peri hagefen,” gefen, and then he’s going to give the berachot to other people. The guy wants to drink the wine. Once he drinks from it, he has made it pagum. Now they’re making the berachot on a kos pagum. So add some more wine; have the wine there and add some more wine, or don’t drink it until you—So you can’t throw it in the—
Yesterday was my grandson’s—my great-grandson’s berit. They gave me a gefen. I made the berachah. I went like this: poured a little onto my hand and drank like this, just to make the berachah valid. Then, when I got the cup back, I drank from it. Baruch Hashem le'olam amen ve'amen.
“Rabbi, in grape juice, is it not necessary to put three drops of water?” When using grape juice—chazak ubaruch. Rabbi Yaakov, thank you so much. Everybody looks very light today. Did everybody go to the Shabbos climate in Florida or something? What happened? They’re all zooming in. They found out Orlando has a sale. Oh, Orlando! All right. Kids were beating up my daughter this weekend. We didn’t go to Florida because she’s supposed to give birth. “Shouldn’t have the kid.” Shame. “You didn’t go because of you.” “Yep.” Zayag. “Miss you, Rabbi.” “Miss you more.” Come on. Men, you had an event last night, right? NyQuil, DayQuil? I know, I also got a cold yesterday. Called it a day. Sometimes that helps.
B'Hashem na'aseh venatzliach. Okay, rabbotai, today’s daf (page) is daf mem. We have to start at the bottom of yesterday’s page. I have to bring you back up to speed. It’s very technical.
The whole issue started with Rabbi Ya'akov. The famous Rabbi Ya'akov said in a beraita (early rabbinic teaching) that the ox of the yetomim (orphans) pays chatzi nezek, half price. Not yetomim—ketanim, underage. Chashu (deaf, mentally incompetent, and minor). Chashu: cheresh, shoteh vekatan (deaf, mentally incompetent, and minor). Rabbi Ya'akov says you pay half price. Now, we don’t know what he’s teaching us. What do you mean, pay half price? The first three times, everybody pays half price. So they had to understand that Rabbi Ya'akov is teaching me something new. You have Rava and Abaye, each one giving his own pshat (interpretation). The Gemara is going to tell us now.
The two possibilities are like this. Listen carefully, because you’re going to miss it. That’s the whole page, 39b, before we start, right before daf mem. Either we’re talking about a tam (unforewarned ox). Now, it can’t be a standard case of a tam, which pays half price. Rabbi Ya'akov doesn’t have to teach me that; every kid knows a tam pays half price. So he has to be teaching me something. It could be talking about a mu'ad (forewarned ox), but the tam portion stays in its place. As we learned before, the Gemara told us there’s a rabbi who holds that “tam bimkomo omedet, tzad tamut bimkomah omedet” (the tam portion remains in its place). Rabbi Yehudah is the one who holds that even a mu'ad—even if an ox gores four times—the fourth time, half of it is a tam. The tam never leaves. That means half of it gets paid migupo, from the body of the ox that gored. The other half you pay me'aliyah, from your bank account. You always have to divide everything in half.
So it could be that Rabbi Ya'akov was telling us it’s talking about a mu'ad, but half of it has to come from its own body. Rabbi Ya'akov holds that you can’t appoint an agent for a cheresh, shoteh, or katan. We had an opinion yesterday that you don’t appoint a representative. So the tam part can’t collect, and he ends up collecting 50 percent. Which part? He ends up paying the mu'ad part, because it’s talking about a mu'ad. He pays 50 percent of the mu'ad part because he can’t pay the tam part. Why? Because we don’t appoint an agent for a tam. That’s one way to explain it. That’s Abaye.
So that’s what the Gemara is going to say now: “Amar lei Abba bar Abba le-Ravina” (Abba bar Abba said to Ravina), four lines from yesterday’s page, “Bishlama le-Abaye de-amar peligi, shapir” (it works well according to Abaye, who says they disagree). It comes out like this: Rabbi Ya'akov and Rabbi Yehudah disagree, because Rabbi Yehudah holds that we do appoint an agent in the case of a tam, and Rabbi Ya'akov says we don’t. That works well. What does “it works well” mean? Abaye is the one who says they argue, because Rabbi Ya'akov said one thing and Rabbi Yehudah said something else; they argue with each other.
“Ela le-Rava de-amar lo peligi” (but according to Rava, who says they do not disagree)—Rava wanted to say Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Ya'akov do not disagree. That means Rabbi Ya'akov holds that you do appoint an agent in the case of a tam. So how does he learn the Mishnah? Rava had to learn that it’s talking about a mu'ad that was guarded with lesser guarding. Therefore, the half portion of the mu'ad was considered guarded, so you’re exempt, and you’re liable for the tam part. That’s why you pay half. So instead of doing that, the Gemara asks: “Ad de-mokit lei be-muad, nokmeh be-tam” (if it is possible to establish it as a mu'ad, let us establish it as a tam). Why make it so difficult? You tell me that we do appoint an agent in the case of a tam, so just tell me we’re talking about a tam, and he pays half-damages for that reason. Why make it so difficult?
“I le-Rabbi Yehudah de-avad lei shemirah pechutah” (if it is according to Rabbi Yehudah, where lesser guarding was provided)—how would you learn the case? What kind of guarding did he do? So the case was that he did shemirah pechutah (lesser guarding), a mediocre level of guarding, “velo avad lei shemirah me'ulah” (and he did not provide superior guarding), and therefore you’re going to pay for the tam. So say it’s talking about a tam, and you didn’t guard it correctly for a tam.
“I le-Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov” (if it is according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov), who holds that both need the same amount of shemirah, and lesser guarding is enough for both, you have to say it’s a case “delo avid lei shemirah kelal” (where he did not guard it at all). He didn’t watch it at all; that’s why he’s liable for half. Where do we find this? “De-tanya Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov omer, echad tam ve-echad mu'ad she-shemaran shemirah pechutah peturin” (it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says that both a tam and a mu'ad are exempt if they were guarded with lesser guarding). Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds that both a tam and a mu'ad need only lesser guarding, not the big one—not like Rabbi Yehudah.
And what is the question? Now the Gemara finishes the question: “Ha ka mashma lan de-Rabbi Yaakov, dema'amidin lahen apotropus le-tam ligbot mi-gufo” (it teaches us that Rabbi Ya'akov appoints a guardian for them so that the tam can collect from its body). Rabbi Ya'akov would be teaching us that the case is talking about a tam that gored, and you pay half price. Well, big deal; every tam pays half price. No, because he’s a cheresh, shoteh, or katan. Some people hold that we don’t appoint a representative for them. Rabbi Ya'akov holds that you do, and that’s why you pay half price. That would be the novelty. Why make it more difficult? Talk about a mu'ad and tell me the half price. The first half stays with the tam.
“Amar lach, hachi ka'amar, chada de-it bah tarte ta'ama” (he can say to you, this is what he means: one teaching contains two reasons). Ravina answers: I’ll tell you why I did that. I want to teach you one ruling that has two rulings in it. Hold on. I’m sorry. Okay, it comes out—it’s all right, that’s good. Rava would rather answer that Rabbi Ya'akov is teaching one ruling that has two underlying reasons. Why does the mu'ad owned by a deaf-mute pay half price? A mu'ad needs lesser guarding, the tam portion remains in its place, and we appoint an agent in the case of a tam.
Because in Rabbi Ya'akov’s second beraita, Rabbi Ya'akov explains Rabbi Yehudah’s ruling, and Rava understood from there that he agrees with Rabbi Yehudah. Therefore, Rava wants to learn it the same way as Rabbi Yehudah: it’s talking about a mu'ad that was guarded with lesser guarding, meaning mediocre guarding, which is good enough for a mu'ad but not good enough for a tam. So the first half—But now it’s a mu'ad; shouldn’t it have any tam in it? No. We hold that the half that is tam stays there. So he’s going to pay as a tam. And what’s the chiddush? The chiddush is that we appoint a representative even for a tam. So he’s telling me both chiddushim. Not only that: he’s also telling me that a mu'ad remains like a tam, and that a tam needs superior guarding while a mu'ad doesn’t. He wants to teach me all these laws; he’d rather tell me that way. The reason he went the long way was to teach me this.
“I’m sorry, excuse my ignorance, but how come a tam needs superior guarding if it’s a tam, and a mu'ad needs less?” We said it’s a pasuk (verse). We’re going to have it on page 46. We don’t know; there isn’t really a great reason. It’s a halachah le-Moshe mi-Sinai (law given to Moses at Sinai). “Well, that doesn’t make sense.” It does. I know. There are reasons; we’ll see a little bit. “But you understand my question?” Well, I know. We’ve been talking about this the last couple of days. “Yeah, I know that, but—” Right. It comes out because—I’ll give you a little bit of logic. Once the guy gored a few times, you already know his technique, so you know how to watch him. You know which way he goes. The first three times, he goes this way; you don’t know where. “Hava talya, hava talya. Hava talya.” And does it tie in with the whole question of whether it’s considered watched or not considered watched, like we learned before? You know, we said, is it a “kenasa” or is it a—Definitely, it’s going to have to go with that too. We’ll see that on page 45, 46.
Ravina says a different pshat in the machloket (dispute) between Rabbi Ya'akov and Rabbi Yehudah. They do disagree. One rabbi said they don’t disagree: Rabbi Yehudah said you’re liable, Rabbi Ya'akov said you pay half price. What, are they arguing or not? So we said, “No, they’re not arguing. He says you’re liable; he says you pay half price.” It was just explaining it. Ravina wants to say, “No, they do argue.” They argue over whether a change of ownership—a change of jurisdiction—changes the legal status. How? “You're going to have a mu'ad ve-nitpake'ach ha-cheresh, nishtapeh ha-shoteh, ve-higdil ha-katan” (a mu'ad whose deaf owner regained his hearing, whose mentally incompetent owner recovered, or whose minor owner came of age). Let’s say the guy’s ox was a mu'ad while it was under the minor. The kid was underage, and his ox gored three times. By the time the ox gored for the fourth time, the kid had grown up, or the cheresh started hearing again. Does the change of jurisdiction start the whole process all over again?
Rabbi Yehudah holds, “harei hu kechezkato” (it remains in its established status). Rabbi Yehudah says no, he has to pay full price. What’s the difference? It gored three times, then the fourth time—okay, the owner changed; he became an adult, or he became able to hear again. He stopped being a crazy guy. It doesn’t matter; the ox is still a mu'ad. “VeRabbi Ya'akov savar rashut meshaneh” (Rabbi Ya'akov holds that a change of ownership alters the status). We had this before. Rabbi Ya'akov holds that a new jurisdiction starts it all over again. He has to start the whole—What’s the argument for that? Because I told you: it’s still the same animal. “I know, but you don’t remember that in order to be a mu'ad, you have to bring him to beit din and warn him in front of an owner.” Okay. So now there’s a new owner; it’s like a new sheriff in town. “But the guy says, ‘You did it when I was a kid. Now I’m an adult.’” Yes, Albert. “Sorry, I was thinking: if the guy made a sale to somebody else and it’s already classified as a mu'ad, now it’s with a new guy, it’s still a mu'ad, right?” “Not mu'ad?” So why wouldn’t everyone always sell their products? Who wants to buy a mu'ad? Unless it’s a mekach ta'ut (sale made in error), then you fool him, and you know that the sale is batel anyway.
“Tanu rabanan” (the Sages taught). Let’s go to a new Gemara, but it’s going to come back a little bit to some of the things we said. “Apotropusin meshalmin min ha'aliyah, ve'ein meshalmin kofer (ransom payment)” (guardians pay from superior property, but do not pay kofer). Apotropus (the agent) has to pay from choice property if the animal they were watching causes damages, but they don’t pay kofer.
Now you know what kofer is, rabbotai. Kofer is when the ox gores a human being four times and kills him, chaz veshalom, lo aleinu. The owner has to pay kofer because really he has to die. It’s as if the Torah wants him to die. The Torah says, “venatan pidyon nafsho kechol asher yushat alav” (he shall give the ransom for his life according to whatever is imposed upon him). He gives the redemption of his soul, like he—Usually, a murderer can’t get out of it by paying. Here, it’s not him; it’s his ox. Okay, he’s responsible. He has to pay kofer.
Which kofer does he pay: his own redemption, his own money, or the value of the nizak (damaged party)? It’s a machloket. We’ll see in a minute. But here it says the representative doesn’t pay. Now the Gemara wants to know why. The Gemara tells us why: it must be that kofer is a kaparah (atonement) for letting your ox do this. And this representative—the animal doesn’t belong to him; it belongs to the yetomim.
“Man tana kufra kaparah? Man tana ha de'amar dekufra kaparah, veyatme lav benei kaparah ninhu?” (Who is the authority who teaches that kofer is atonement? Who is the authority who says kofer is atonement, and that minors are not subject to atonement?) The owner is a minor, and they can’t be said to need atonement; they’re underage. That’s why they don’t pay kofer. Who is the author? “Amar Rav Chisda, Rabbi Yishma'el beno shel Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah hi” (Rav Chisda said: it is Rabbi Yishma'el, son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah). It was taught: “venatan pidyon nafsho, demei nizak” (he shall give the ransom for his life: the value of the injured party). The verse says he has to give the worth of his soul. Whose? The damaged party’s. He has to give the worth of the damaged party. “Rabbi Yishma'el beno shel Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah omer, demei mazik” (Rabbi Yishma'el, son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah, says: the value of the damager). No, it’s the damager, the owner of the ox.
What’s the machloket? “Mai lav beha kamipalgei? DeRabanan savrei, kufra mamona hu” (don’t they disagree over this? The Rabbis hold that kofer is monetary compensation). The tanna kamma (first authority) holds that kofer is compensation, so you have to say it’s the value of the damaged party who was killed. “VeRabbi Yishma'el beno shel Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah savar, kufra kaparah” (Rabbi Yishma'el, son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah, holds that kofer is atonement). The one who says you pay the value of the mazik probably says you pay because he needs kaparah. He has to expiate his sin. He has to pay his own value.
Is that true? “Amar Rav Pappa, lo” (Rav Pappa said: no). You don’t have to go that far. “Kulei alma kufra kaparah hu” (everyone agrees that kofer is atonement). I can make everybody hold that it’s atonement. “Vehacha beha kamipalgei, deRabanan savrei bidnizak shaiminan” (and here is where they disagree: the Rabbis hold that we assess the injured party). When you give the value of the injured party, you’re obtaining atonement. “Rabbi Yishma'el beno shel Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah omer, bidmazik shaiminan” (Rabbi Yishma'el, son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah, says we assess the damager). No, you have to give your own value to obtain atonement. They could both hold that it’s atonement. You don’t have to make that the machloket.
What’s the reason for the Rabbis? “Ne'emrah shitah lemattah, ne'emrah shitah lema'alah” (the same expression is stated below and above). The Torah says the word “yushat alav”—it was imposed upon him. And that’s what it says above, when it talks about a pregnant woman who miscarries. What’s the pasuk? “Anosh ye'anesh ka'asher yashit alav ba'al ha'ishah venatan biflilim” (he shall be fined as much as the woman’s husband imposes upon him, and he shall pay through the judges). You remember the case? Two men are fighting, and a man hits a pregnant woman and causes the baby to come out, which means it died. What’s the halachah? The Torah uses the word “yashit alav,” as though they impose it on him. “Mah lehalan bedinei demazik” (just as there, it is the law of the damager)—over there, for sure, you pay the worth of the baby—“af kan bedinei demazik” (so here too, it is the law of the damager). So here too, if it says that kofer is imposed upon him, you impose the kofer of the value of the damaged party.
What does Rabbi Yishma'el hold? “Rabbi Yishma'el beno shel Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah savar venatan pidyon nafsho ketiv” (Rabbi Yishma'el, son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah, holds that it is written, “he shall give the ransom for his life”). He has to ransom his life. Whose life? The damager’s. And what do the Rabbis hold? No, you’re right: it is written, “pidyon nafsho,” but we assess it like the law of the damager. Paying the value of the injured party will ransom the person’s life. We do want to ransom the damager’s life, because he did a terrible thing; he deserves to die. We want to obtain atonement for him, but we don’t have to pay the price of his life. Paying the injured party’s value will expiate his soul.
The Gemara now tells a side story. It has to do with kofer, but it’s a different story. It goes like this: “Meshabbach leih Rava leRav Nachman beRav Acha bar Ya'akov de'adam gadol hu” (Rava praised Rav Acha bar Ya'akov to Rav Nachman, saying that he was a great man). Rava tells Rav Nachman about a certain rabbi, Rav Acha bar Ya'akov. He must have come to town, so you have to know he’s a great person. They bring down at the bottom that you’re not supposed to praise someone too much because it’s going to cause a backlash. A guy starts saying, “lo lo leshabeach adam yoter midai, zeh gadol, tzaddik” (one should not praise a person too much: he is great, he is righteous). Flattering? “Flatter—not to him, about him, because you start saying too many good things, and one guy says, ‘Oh yeah? I know this, I know that.’” So don’t go overboard. Just say he is good: “adam gadol hu” (he is a great man).
So Rav Nachman said, “Amar leih lechishyavo leyadcha haveihu li” (he said to him: when he comes to you, bring him to me). Bring him to me; I want to see him and talk to him. When he came to him, Rav Nachman said, “Be'i minai milta” (ask me a question). “I heard you’re a great man. Ask me a question.” So he asked him a question: “shor shel shenei shutafin” (an ox belonging to two partners), how do they pay kofer? Two partners, and their ox gored four times. The fourth time, they have to pay kofer. How do they pay? “Meshalem hai kofer vehai kofer?” (Does each one pay a whole kofer?) Is each one going to pay a whole kofer? “Kofer echad amar Rachamana velo shenei kofrin” (the Merciful One said one kofer, not two). The Torah says kofer, not two kofrin. I—you want to say half and half? “Hai chatzi kofer vehai chatzi kofer?” (This one pays half a kofer and that one pays half a kofer?) “Kofer shalem amar Rachamana velo chatzi kofer” (the Merciful One said a whole kofer, not half a kofer). The Torah says you have to pay kofer, not half a kofer. How do you fit it into the pasuk?
“Ad yativ ad yativ veka me'ayein bah” (as he sat and sat, he pondered it). Rav Nachman sat and pondered. I love the word “pondering.” You understand? He was sitting there, thinking it over. He asked him another question. He stumped the rabbi again. “Amar leih tenan chayavei arachin memashkenin otan” (he said to him: we learned that those liable for fixed-value vows are required to provide collateral). Somebody who owes an erech—you know what an erech vow is, Jake? He gives the worth of his, how much is his worth, his wife, his kid, whatever he says: “erki alai” (my value is upon me). The law is that we’re afraid he’s not going to pay it. You know why? There’s no kaparah; it’s just an obligation. So you have to take a mashkon (collateral) from the guy.
“Chayavei chata'ot va'ashamot ein memashkenin otan” (those liable for sin and guilt offerings are not required to provide collateral). But if a guy owes a chatat or an asham, he needs kaparah. He knows he needs kaparah, so he’s not going to hesitate to pay. “Chayavei kofrin mai?” (What about those liable for kofer?) He asked him: what about a guy who is liable for kofer? Does he have to have kaparah or not? What’s the question? “Keivan dekaparah hu kechata'ot va'ashamot dami” (since it is atonement, it is like sin and guilt offerings). We said kofer is atonement. So he’s like chata'ot va'ashamot. “Mechammat chamira aleih velo ba'ei mashkonei” (because it is severe for him, we assume he will take it seriously and does not need collateral). We assume he’ll be strict about it and won’t need security.
“O dilma keivan delechavreih hu deka mitba leih mamona hu velo legavo'ah hu velo chamir aleih uva'ei mashkonei” (or perhaps, since the money is owed to another person and not to Heaven, he does not take it seriously and does need collateral). Who do you give the kofer to, gentlemen? To a person. Good. You give it to the guy. “Oh, I have to pay the guy? I’m not paying that. What for?” But they don’t want to enforce it? I know, but that’s the question: should beit din (the court) take security? Why do you need security? Take the actual money. “Until then, I have to get ready. I have to cash my thing. I’m not liquid like some people.” So, “I have to—whatever.” “Oh, you’re not liquid? Give me your watch as security.” Why? “Watch kaparah?” Yeah, but I know how you’re going to feel. We know how the guy’s going to feel. He’s not going to take it seriously. When you pay God, yeah, that’s one thing. You’re paying another guy. I don’t like the guy to begin with anyway, you know what I’m saying?
“O inami, keivan dehu lo chata, mamona hu de'azik, lo chamira milta ileveih, uva'ei mashkonei?” (Or perhaps, since he did not sin and it is his property that caused the damage, the matter is not severe for him, and he does need collateral.) Another reason to say you need a mashkon: “I didn’t do it; my animal did it.” Okay, you’re going to hold me responsible? Fine, but do I need collateral? Yeah, because you’re not so serious.
So he asked him question number two after he asked him question number one. He answered him: “Amar lei: shevakan, ufni! Istapak li bechada ched...” “I can already—You silenced me with the first question. I don’t know the answer. You stumped me once; you’ll stump me again?” So he answered him well. Sometimes he asks a question and doesn’t have an answer. “Tanu rabanan.” What’s the answer? We don’t know. We’ll see.
“Tanu rabanan.” We’re now going back to this reshut meshaneh (ownership change alters status) issue. This is going to be more interesting, because the case is like this: “she'alo bechezkat tam” (he borrowed it with the presumption that it was a tam). A guy goes to someone and says, “Could you lend me your ox?” It’s like telling a guy, “Can I borrow your car?” I’m assuming it’s a tam. “Venimtza mu'ad” (and it turned out to be a mu'ad). You didn’t tell me—“amart li?” (Did you tell me?) You didn’t tell me this was a mu'ad. Is he obligated to tell him? “Oh, yeah.” “Because I have to—” “Depends.” “Oh, depends. You have to watch it more, not watch it more, whatever. That’s what he’s going to say.” And he’s not paying rent; he’s borrowing. He’s a borrower. Yeah, he’s a balash. “No, balash—but it has more responsibility, don’t forget.” He’s supposed to have more responsibility. He does, because he’s a balash. But, yeah, no, sho'el (borrower): if the thing dies, drops dead, he has to pay. He pays everything. Right, unless it was working during work. Right, right; work-related. Okay.
So here, he borrowed it, and it turns out—what happened? It gored. Now he has to pay the guy $1,000. Who pays? “Be'alim meshalmin chatzi nezek, vesho'el meshalem chatzi nezek” (the owners pay half-damages, and the borrower pays half-damages). The owner pays half, and the sho'el pays half. Why? Is that under all conditions? We tell him—the baraita says—you borrowed it on the condition that it was a tam. For a tam, you’re prepared to pay chatzi nezek. “Okay, I didn’t tell you about the mu'ad.” Okay, I’ll pay the other half. Makes sense.
Now, “hu'ad beveit sho'el,” let’s say it became a mu'ad in the borrower’s house. It gored three times in his house, and now it’s going for the fourth time. “Vehichziro labe'alim” (and he returned it to the owners), and now it gores over there. What do you do? “Be'alim meshalmin chatzi nezek, vesho'el patur miklum” (the owners pay half-damages, and the borrower is exempt from anything). Once I return it to the owner, I say, “Too bad, honey, you’re in charge.” The sho'el is patur. “What do you mean? It became a mu'ad under your jurisdiction.” “I know, but I gave it back to you. I gave it back to you; you take care of it.” Here they say he pays half. The Gemara is going to explain why.
“Amar mar: she'alo bechezkat...” Let’s first take the first half, the first borrowing: “she'alo bechezkat tam, venimtza mu'ad, be'alim meshalmin chatzi nezek, vesho'el chatzi nezek.” Why? Let him say to the owner, “tora she'ili, aryeh lo she'ili” (I borrowed an ox, not a lion)! Usually an ox doesn’t gore at all. A tam pays chatzi nezek, you’re right, but why? Because most of the time it doesn’t gore. So now you gave me a gorer; it’s like you gave me a lion. I didn’t want a lion; I wanted an ox. Why should I have to pay at all?
Rava said: “Hacha bemai askinan, shehikir bo shehu nagchan” (what are we dealing with here? A case where he recognized that it was a gorer). No, the case is that he knew it was a gorer. He knew it had an aggressive nature; he saw it. Even though he didn’t know it had gone through the whole process, he saw, you know, every time he got near it, it was snorting. He saw the guy was—So therefore he has responsibility.
Let him say, “tam she'ili, mu'ad lo she'ili” (I borrowed a tam, not a mu'ad). He says, “Yeah, but still, I didn’t borrow a mu'ad; I only borrowed a tam.” The answer back is, “Mishum de'amar lei: sof sof it...” (because he says to him: in any case...). “Amar leh, palga nizka ba'it leshalumei, hashta nami zil shaleim palga nizka” (he says to him: you have to pay half the damage in any case, so now go and pay half the damage). He tells him, “Okay, you’re right. Let’s say you had borrowed a tam. How much would you pay? Half. Okay, I’m only asking you to pay half. You’re right, it’s a mu'ad; just pay the half.”
Let him say, “i tam havah mishtaleim migufo” (if it were a tam, it would be paid from its body), not from me. It wouldn’t cost me anything; it comes right from the ox’s body. But now you’re making me pay half out of my pocket. “Mishum de'amar leh sof sof at lav tora ba'it leshalumei ledidi?” (because he says to him: in any case, don’t you have to pay me for the ox?) Yes, but if it were a tam, they would have taken the ox to pay the damaged party, but you would have had to pay me for the ox. At least you’d have to bring me back an ox. Bottom line, how you get there is up to you. Borrowers pay; you have to cover the loss. Whatever it is. Okay, sorry. So he says, “What’s the difference? Pay half anyway.” “I didn’t tell you.” Okay, so pay the half.
Let him say, “i tam havah modina ufatrina” (if it had been a tam, I would have admitted and been exempt). What’s the halachah? “Modeh beknas patur” (one who admits to a fine is exempt). Oh boy, he would have run—“So if I had, I would have run to beit din and said, ‘Look, it’s a fine,’ and how would I get out of this? I would have gotten out; I wouldn’t have had to pay anything.” “Ve'afilu leman de'amar palga nizka mamona” (even according to the one who says half-damages are monetary). Remember, we had a machloket about whether half-damages are a fine or money. Even the one who holds that half-damages are money, let him say, “i tam havah, havah ma'arikna leh le'agma” (if it had been a tam, I could have driven it to the marsh), and he wouldn’t have gotten anything. “That’s legitimate?” No, it says at the bottom you’re not allowed to do that, but I have—What does that mean, he would have taken it to the—He would have hidden it. “I don’t understand.” It means that if you can’t find the animal, you can’t take it to beit din to be judged. No, you can’t collect from the animal’s body, migupo, if it’s a tam. You can’t collect from the person, so, okay.
“Wait, what are you saying? The din is—now it’s a mu'ad, and now there’s no option to say that, so therefore you’re making me obligated to pay.” Do you say it’s actually from the body, or just that the value is set based on the value of the body? No, remember we had a machloket, Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael. “Rabbi Akiva, it’s like Rabbi Akiva?” No, he says only like Yishmael, because according to Rabbi Akiva, even an animal that is a tam—Even in the forest, wherever it would have been, he owns it. It already belongs to the damaged party anyway, automatically. Right, so you would have to—And if you had driven it away, you would have to pay the damaged party.
So Tosafot (Tosafot) brought up the question you guys had: lema'aseh, he did not confess; he didn’t hide the ox. So what’s his ta'anah? And if he had—He could say, “I didn’t have an opportunity, because immediately after it gored, you told me it was a mu'ad. As soon as I borrowed it, as soon as it gored, you came and told me it’s a mu'ad. You left me with no options.” The Gemara says, “Ela hacha bemai askinan kegon de'akdimu beit dina vetafseh” (rather, what are we dealing with here? A case where the court acted first and seized it). We’re talking about a case where the beit din, as soon as it gored, grabbed it first. You have no chance to confess; you have no chance to run it to the marsh.
“I hachi ba'alim amai mashlamei chatzi nezek?” (If so, why do the owners pay half-damages?) In any case, why do they have to pay half? Let them say to him, “At pasadteih letora'i beyda deman delo matzina le'ishta'u'ei dina bahadeh” (you caused my ox to be in the hands of someone with whom I can’t litigate). The owner should say to the borrower, “Because of you, my ox went into the hands of somebody against whom I can’t litigate my claim in court. I can never fight against—can never fight against Uncle Sam in court. You allowed the court to seize the ox, and you’re causing me to pay. I’m the owner, but maybe we could have figured out another shtick.”
“It’s hard to understand,” he says. You should have thought of that. You should have hidden it or done something. “Mishum de'amar lei, i ahadarteih neihalach, lav minach havu shaklei leh?” (because he says to him: if I had returned it to you, wouldn’t they have taken it from you?) He says, “What are you talking about? What would I have done? Should I have turned the ox over to you? They would have taken it from you too.” So there’s no difference between me and you. Either way, the fact that the court took it means we have to pay.
Let him say, “i ahadarteih neihali, havah ma'arikna leh le'agma” (if you had returned it to me, I would have driven it to the marsh). “No, if you had returned it to me, I would have driven it to the marsh, and the court couldn’t seize it.” “Mishum de'amar leh sof sof lav me'alyah mishtaleim?” (because he says to him: in any case, isn’t it paid from superior property?) But it’s a mu'ad; you have to pay from your choice property. “Hanicha heicha de'it leh nichsei” (that works where he has property). He says, “You’re right. If I have property, you’re right.” “Heicha delit leh nichsei, mai icha lemeimar?” (where he has no property, what can be said?) Let’s say the owner doesn’t have any other property. He says, “You would have given it to me; I would have hidden it.”
“Mishum de'amar leh ki heichi demishta'abdana ledidach hachi nami mishta'abdana lehach” (because he says to him: just as I am obligated to you, so too am I obligated to him). He says, “Just as I would have given the ox to you and you would have hidden it, right? Because he has no other assets.” Bottom line, you know the famous Rabbi Natan? It was taught: “Rabbi Natan omer minayin lenosheh bachavero maneh vechavero bachavero minayin shemotzi'in mizeh venotenin lezeh?” (Rabbi Natan says: from where do we know that if one person owes another one hundred, and that person owes a third person, the money is collected from the first and given to the third?) A owes B and B owes C. What’s the halachah? A pays C directly. “Talmud lomar venatan la'asher asham lo” (the verse says, “he shall give it to the one to whom he is indebted”). We had that many times. Since the borrower is liable to the owner, and the owner is liable to the damaged party, the borrower himself is liable to the damaged party. So what are you going to tell me? “I should have given you the ox.” What’s the difference? I would have had to pay him anyway. So I see that our Gemara says Rabbi Natan’s lien applies only where there’s no other property, and it applies not only to debts but also to other obligations, like damages and things like that.
Good. That’s case number one. Case number two: “hu'ad beveit sho'el vehichziro lib'alim” (it became a mu'ad in the borrower’s house, and he returned it to the owner). The borrower had it, it became a mu'ad in his domain, and then he returned it to the owner. What do we say? “Be'alim meshalmin chatzi nezek, sho'el patur miklum.” How come the owner can’t make a claim against the borrower, saying, “Now it’s worth less. You should have watched it better. You damaged my bull, because your lack of shemirah caused it to be worth less. Now it’s a mu'ad”? “This is in the second case now?” Yeah. Okay, let’s see. It says the owner has to pay half and the borrower is patur.
Why? “Mishum deha reshut meshaneh” (because in the second case, ownership changed). You might have understood the seifa that way: why was it a mu'ad? Why does the owner have to pay half? He should pay the whole thing. It must be reshut meshaneh, a change of jurisdiction. But in the first case, “reisha reshut einah meshaneh” (in the first case, a change of ownership does not alter the status). In the first case, it was a mu'ad with the owner, then it went back to him, and it became a tam. What happened to that rule? It could switch?
“Amar Rabbi Yochanan tavra, mi sheshanah zo lo shanah zo” (Rabbi Yochanan said: it is a broken teaching; the one who taught this did not teach that). You’re right. The one who learned this one didn’t learn that one; they don’t fit together. Rava said, “Mideha reshut einah meshaneh, seifa nami reshut einah meshaneh” (since the first clause holds that a change of ownership does not alter the status, the final clause also holds that it does not). No, the owner changing doesn’t alter it. So why, in the seifa, do you pay only half? “Seifa hainu ta'ama” (the final clause has this reason): “Mishum de'amar leh lav kol keminach dima'adat leh letorai” (because he says to him: it is not within your power to make my ox a mu'ad). You’re saying, “You made my ox a mu'ad. You didn’t guard it correctly.” So I disagree; it can’t become a mu'ad. If you return it, I would have watched it better. The borrower’s defective guarding doesn’t influence the owner. The owner says, “I’m going to watch it better.”
Rav Pappa says the other way around: “Mideha seifa reshut meshaneh, reisha nami reshut meshaneh” (since the final clause holds that a change of ownership alters the status, the first clause does too). I hold that both cases—both cases—change of ownership changes the status. So why didn’t it change in the first case? “Ela reisha hainu ta'ama, mishum dechol makom shehu shem ba'alav alav” (rather, the first clause has this reason: wherever it is, the owner’s name is upon it). Wherever a borrowed ox goes, the owner’s name is on it. Although it’s now in the borrower’s charge, it’s still to some degree under the owner’s jurisdiction. The mu'ad status stays in effect. A new jurisdiction does alter the ox’s status, but he wants to say that going from an owner to a borrower is not called a new jurisdiction. It’s always the borrower. So he’s always at least half responsible.
“It’s always considered him. So why would he ever lend?” “He’s a ba'al chesed, right? Ba'al chesed—they can—Every time we do, we take a risk. You lend someone a car; you don’t know what’s going to happen. Believe me, maybe they dent it; they can break the car. And the car was sitting a couple days; you need to move it.”
“So what does that mean, that he didn’t have the right to make it a mu'ad? Meaning, was that ox still that ox in this case?” Yeah. The ox is still the ox. There’s nothing—I didn’t say it doesn’t have it. It says because it’s not called reshut meshaneh. Really, changing jurisdiction would change the status. But when it’s—I’m the owner. I gave it to you to watch; I’m still the owner. I gave it to you to borrow; I’m still the owner.
I’ll give you an example: if I have my suit at the cleaners, is my suit not under my jurisdiction? “It’s yours.” It’s mine. “There are two things in halachah: shelo and birshuto.” It’s mine and under my jurisdiction. It’s there; it’s my jurisdiction even though it’s mine, for sure. He’s watching it; he’s cleaning it for me. Does he have the same level of liability? “Gannav, no.” If a gannav stole it from me, it’s called eino birshuti. It’s mine; it’s not under my jurisdiction because he took it from me against my wishes.
“And the borrower?” By a borrower, you’re saying no, it’s still—“You’re saying that—” But he’s not doing anything for you. Doesn’t matter. I gave it—I gave it. A borrower has so much responsibility for it. “You’re saying the cleaner is not responsible?” No, he’s responsible too. That’s another thing, but it’s still called my jurisdiction. Rabbi, “mah legabei chov shenishta'abed? Chov meshu'abad” (what is this compared to a liened debt? A debt is encumbered). Shimon is liable to Reuven, and Levi is liable to Shimon. Does Reuven go to Levi? Yes. If Shimon doesn’t have money, he can go.
If I borrow somebody’s behemah (animal), I have new responsibilities, because, first of all, I have to make sure that the behemah doesn’t get hurt under my jurisdiction. So I have to pay, right? When you say there’s jurisdiction and ownership, yes, you own the behemah, but now I have to take care of it, feed it, care for it, and protect it from all kinds of dangers, right? And likewise, protect it and guard it against causing damage. So what does it mean that I didn’t have the ability to make it a mu'ad? Meaning, while it’s under my jurisdiction, while I’m borrowing this animal, it’s more—this animal—“It’s not going to change mu'ad.”
So this transfer to the borrower is not a true change of ownership. Wherever a borrowed ox goes, the name of its owner is upon it. It’s still called Joe’s ox. “So it should come out the opposite: it’s still your ox and it gored three times, so why is it not a mu'ad? It never stopped being yours. I might be using it, but it’s still yours, so it’s still a mu'ad. Why would it become a mu'ad?” No, he’s talking about—he borrowed it when it was a mu'ad, and now I made it a mu'ad. “No, it’s a tam. It gored twice during your—” It went—“And the third one with me.” No, it gored three times with the borrower, regardless of whether the borrower did proper shemirah. “Right, it’s still a mu'ad.” It can’t become a mu'ad; that’s what—“See, you can’t do it. You don’t have the right.”
“No, it was a mu'ad when it was by you. Now, when it comes back to me, the question is whether it changed or not.” So according to this opinion, it doesn’t change, because it was always mine. “Hu omer shezeh chozer lihyot tam. Chozer lihyot tam. Berega shehu chozer laba'alim...” (he says that this returns to being a tam when it returns to the owner...). “I’m confused about this one line.” “Hu chozer lihyot tam, az hu meshalem lav kol keminach demeyadat leih letora'i. Velakech chozer hashor lihyot tam birshut haba'alim.” Are we reading the same thing? No, I don’t think so. “No, we are up to the next—we are at Rav Pappa.” You’re reading the first one. I’m already at Rav Pappa. “Yeah, I know, but I’m curious about that one line.”
“Okay, I’m at Rav Pappa. I want to go back to that cleaner for a minute. If I get my clothes to the cleaner and he ruins them, who’s responsible?” He has to pay. “The cleaner?” Yeah, that’s different; it’s a responsibility because he’s an uman, a cleaner. I had a case, unfortunately—I don’t want to say too many details. A lady cut a sheitel, cut a wig, and she said, “You know, I’m not really good at it. I’m not a professional.” “You could do it.” “Are you sure?” “Yeah, why not?” She ruined it. “Claim?” No, the owner says she ruined it. She wanted her to pay the full price. “Why’d she give it to her if she wasn’t professional?” She wanted—she—“I’m mitvaffer. I’m mitvaffer.” “Chalaqah?” I know. You learn extra things. “No, I’ve never heard that before. What word is that?” “You’ve done what? Chochech? Never heard of it.” “Saving money.” “I’m mitvaffer.” Oh, yeah, I never heard that. “You’ve heard that?” Oh, that. That’s a very common thing. Yeah. Okay, good.
All right, let’s go, boys; we’ve got to move. A guy has a mu'ad, sells it to someone else, and it’s not a mu'ad anymore, right? He wants to buy it back. Do you hit the reset button? No? Start again? “What? I don’t—I think you have to start again.” Let’s see. It’ll come back to this on our own. Let’s go to that.
“Shor ha-itztadin, eino chayav mitah” (an arena ox is not liable to be put to death). What do we say? The ox of the arena, right? The stadium ones, the bullfight ones—it’s not chayav mitah, because it says, “ki yigach velo she-yagichuhu” (when it gores, not when it is made to gore). “Iba'ya lehu, mahu le-gabbei mizbe'ach?” (They asked: what is its status regarding the altar?) Could you bring it as an offering on the altar? We know you’re not allowed to bring a korban (offering). There’s a pasuk that says—The Gemara tells us “min”—later on, the Gemara will give us pesukim that tell us certain animals are disqualified. What about this one? Is it disqualified or not?
Rav says it’s kasher (fit), and Shemuel says it’s pasul (disqualified). Rabbi Levi, come in. “Rav amar kasher: anus hu” (Rav says it is fit: it was coerced). It didn’t kill by choice, so therefore—“Killed.” Killed, but they made it kill. Go ahead. So you got to kill him. It’s not—you can’t bring it as a mizbe'ach, as a korban. There’s a pasuk we’re going to see later. There’s a pasuk that disqualifies a killer. It says not this one; it’s not a killer. They made it kill.
“Shemuel amar pasul: harei ne'evad bo aveirah” (Shemuel says it is disqualified: a transgression was committed through it). What’s the difference? It did an aveirah (transgression). It did—at the end of the day, it did kill. Let’s see the pasuk. Here the Gemara is going to bring the pasuk: “min ha-behemah, min is always a mi'ut (limitation), lehotzi et ha-rove'a ve'et ha-nirba” (from the animal: to exclude an animal that copulated with a person or was used sexually). You cannot bring an animal that was used sexually or that was—It went with them, or they went with it; you can’t bring it. “Min ha-bakar, lehotzi et ha-ne'evad” (from cattle: to exclude an animal worshipped as an idol). It was worshipped. “Min ha-tzon, lehotzi et ha-muktzeh” (from the flock: to exclude an animal set aside for idolatry). Muktzeh means designated for an idol. “U-min ha-tzon, lehotzi et ha-noge'ach” (and from the flock: to exclude a goring ox). The “u” is to exclude the noge'ach, the gorer; you can’t bring it.
“Amar Rabbi Shimon: im ne'emar rove'a, lamah ne'emar noge'ach? Im ne'emar noge'ach, lamah ne'emar rove'a?” (Rabbi Shimon said: if it says an animal that copulated with a person, why does it say a goring ox? If it says a goring ox, why does it say an animal that copulated with a person?) If you tell me about an ox that copulated with a person—I mean, the ox did it; it initiated it—what do you have to tell me about noge'ach? Once you know one, you know the other, no? He says no. Each one has a certain action, each one has a certain status that the other one doesn’t have. “Mipnei she-yesh be-rove'a she-ein be-noge'ach, ve-yesh be-noge'ach she-ein be-rove'a” (because there is something in an animal that copulated with a person that is not in a goring ox, and something in a goring ox that is not in an animal that copulated with a person).
“Rove'a asah vo ones ke-ratzon” (in the case of an animal that copulated with a person, coercion is considered like choice). The animal was used sexually; we consider coercion like an act committed by choice. What does that mean? What’s the halachah if a man takes an ox and copulates with it? The ox didn’t do anything, has he? So you got to kill him. It’s not—you can’t bring it as a mizbe'ach, as a korban. So, for rove'a, ones (coercion) is like ratzon (choice). “Noge'ach lo asah vo ones ke-ratzon” (in the case of a goring ox, coercion is not considered like choice). If it gores, it’s not—If it didn’t do it itself—Only if the ox gores. But if it was compelled to gore, you see that coercion in the case of goring is not the same.
So we see that an animal that copulates with a person is more stringent than an animal that gored. On the other hand, “noge'ach meshalem kofer, rove'a eino meshalem et ha-kofer” (a goring ox pays kofer, while an animal that copulated with a person does not pay kofer). A noge'ach has to pay kofer; a rove'a doesn’t. “Lefichach hutzrach lomar rove'a, hutzrach lomar noge'ach” (therefore it was necessary to mention the animal that copulated with a person, and necessary to mention the goring ox). That’s the beraita.
We learn at least one thing from this beraita: “rove'a asah vo ones ke-ratzon.” What does that mean? “Noge'ach lo asah vo ones ke-ratzon.” For what halachah? Not for a korban? The beraita tells me that the sin of a rove'a is worse, because even if it was done against its will, it counts. In the case of a gorer, if it was done against its will, it doesn’t count. That means it doesn’t count for a korban: since you made it gore against its will, you can bring it as a korban. So I see from here that it should be fit as a korban. That’s a question against Shemuel.
No. “Le-katla” (it refers to putting it to death). That’s what it means regarding killing it. An ox that killed a person is put to death, but if it was coerced, you don’t kill it. That I hear. “Hachi nami mistabra de'i amrat lekorban, noge'ach lo asa bo ones kirtzon, lav ones didei ketiv, lav ratzon didei ketiv?” (It also stands to reason that if you say it refers to an offering, it is not written that coercion is not like volition in the case of a gorer, nor that its own volition is written.) He says: if you want to say that the difference is about the mizbe'ach, about whether it can be offered as a korban, in the case of an animal that gores a person, the law of coercion is not written for it. What does that mean? The Torah expressly differentiates between goring performed under coercion and goring performed by choice. There’s no such pasuk when it comes to a sacrifice. The beraita says, “noge'ach lo asah vo ones ke-ratzon.” With regard to what? A korban? We don’t know; there’s no pasuk about a korban. How could you tell me that for a noge'ach, the Torah did not make ones like ratzon? For what law? The Torah never spoke about a korban. The only thing it must be talking about is killing. It must be for killing. That makes sense, because as far as the animal’s liability for killing, the Torah does say whether it does it on purpose or not. We’ll see: “ki yigach,” as it just said.
“Amar mar.” What does it say? “Noge'ach meshalem et hakofer, rove'a eino meshalem et hakofer.” Because we already said a noge'ach is stricter than a rove'a, you can’t learn one from the other. A noge'ach pays kofer. If the ox gores four times, he pays kofer. A rove'a, which copulates, doesn’t pay. What’s the case? If it copulated and killed her, of course it has to pay kofer. “Mai li katlah bekarnav, mai li katlah berevi'ato?” (What difference is there whether it killed her with its horns or through copulation?) At the end of the day, what’s the difference between killing with its horn and killing by copulating with her?
It must be a case where it copulated but didn’t kill. The fact that it doesn’t pay kofer is because it didn’t kill. Kofer is only for killing; it’s a redress for an act of killing. When there’s no killing, there’s no possibility of kofer. So why could you tell me that a rove'a is exempt from kofer? The idea of kofer doesn’t apply to a rove'a. It’s only copulation; it has nothing to do with killing a person. So what was the case? If it killed her when it copulated, then it killed her and would pay kofer. If it didn’t kill her, what does that have to do with kofer? Why are you telling me, “Oh, it’s exempt from kofer”? It’s not exempt.
Abaye said: Here’s the case: “Le'olam derav'ah velo katlah” (it is always a case where it copulated but did not kill). It copulated but didn’t kill her. “Atyuha levet din vekatluha” (they brought her to court and executed her). The woman was brought to court, and they killed her for the sin of bestiality, because she ended up liking it. The animal did it, and she went along with it, and they warned her. “Mah d'teima, kema'an dekatlah dami, ka mashma lan” (lest you say it is like the animal killed her, it teaches us otherwise). You might say, in the end it did kill the lady. It didn’t kill her itself, but it indirectly caused her to be killed. So I would think you should be liable for kofer. It teaches us that you don’t pay kofer.
Rava said: “Le'olam derav'ah vekatlah” (it is always a case where it copulated and killed her). It copulated and killed her. And as for your question, what’s the difference between killing with its horns and killing through copulation? “Keren kavanato lehazik, hai kavanato lahana'at atzmo hu” (in the case of a horn, its intention is to cause damage; here, its intention is for its own pleasure). It’s a big difference. The animal committed bestiality and killed the lady in the process, but it wasn’t intending to. It was intending to have its own pleasure. With keren, you pay kofer because it’s “kavanato lehazik”—its intention is to cause damage. It wasn’t intending to kill her, ken.
What’s the machloket between Abaye and Rava? “Beregel shedarsa al gabei tinok bachatzer hanizak” (in the case of an animal that stepped on a child in the injured party’s courtyard). We had this before. We had this case. Who remembers it? An animal is walking, minding its own business in the street. “No, chatzer hanizak, in someone’s courtyard, and it stepped on a kid, lo aleinu, and killed the kid.” It didn’t gore him. “Reshut harabim?” No, yachid. It has to be regel (ordinary animal movement); in reshut harabim (public domain), it’s patur. It went into reshut hayachid (private domain), gored the guy—It didn’t gore; it stepped on the guy. Do you have to pay kofer? What’s the question? We asked that before; it’s on page 26. Then—here, the animal was moving normally. It didn’t have bad intent, so it’s regel, yet it killed.
The question is: do you pay kofer or not? According to Abaye, it should pay kofer, because Abaye wants to say that if the animal copulated and killed, it would also pay kofer, even though it didn’t intend to. Rava said, “No, without intention it doesn’t work.” Let’s finish the last line. It was taught in support of Rav: “shor itztadin eino chayav mitah, ve-kasher legabei mizbe'ach, mipenei shehu... ki hu kemo anus” (an arena ox is not liable to be put to death, and it is fit for the altar, because it is like one who was coerced). So Rav wins over here, Jake. An arena ox isn’t put to death, and you can bring it on the altar, because it’s not its fault; it was forced. “Forced?” Could bring it as a korban. Right?