We are learning Massechet Shabbat, daf 117. This learning is dedicated by Benjamin Stavra for a complete recovery for all the sick of Israel, and for the elevation of the soul of Shavuot ben Julia. May his soul be bound in the bond of life. Amen.
Let us begin by returning to a concept we started yesterday. We will read the passage in its entirety and in sequence so that we can understand the Gemara in its context.
The Gemara brought a dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Yishmael regarding the Passover offering when Erev Pesach falls on Shabbat. It is permitted to perform hafshatah on the Passover offering—to skin the animal—but the question is how much of the skin may be removed. Rabbi Yishmael says that one may skin the animal only up to the point where the entrails are exposed. One removes the sacrificial fats, places them on the altar, and stops there. Why should one not do more? Since it is Shabbat, there is no need to do more than is necessary.
The Sages, however, say that one should complete the entire skinning. Their principle is, “Call to God according to His honor.” When one performs an act for God, one should perform it properly. Therefore, once one has begun skinning the animal, one should complete the entire hafshatah, remove the sacrificial fats, and place them on the altar.
The Gemara then quotes Rav Hisda in the name of Rav Huna: What is the reason for Rabbi Yishmael’s position? In other words, Rabbi Yishmael has a valid claim: What gives the Sages the right to permit complete skinning? What is their source?
The Gemara answers that the Sages do have a source. They say to Rabbi Yishmael: If one may rescue a Torah scroll together with its case, even though money is inside the case, then one may also complete the skinning of the Passover offering. Let us examine what this means.
Ordinarily, one is not permitted to carry money on Shabbat. Nevertheless, one may rescue the case of a Torah scroll together with the scroll, even when money is inside. The Gemara explains that the money is being carried along with the case and the Torah scroll. Rashi explains that this is permitted because of the honor of the Torah scroll. One is performing an ordinary, personal act—rescuing the money—for the sake of a sacred act, rescuing the Torah scroll. The personal need is therefore being performed together with the sacred need.
However, Rabbi Yishmael rejects the comparison. The Sages are permitting the removal of money, which involves only carrying an object that is muktzeh. Skinning, by contrast, is a melachah from the Torah. It is one of the thirty-nine categories of labor. Carrying muktzeh is one matter; performing the labor of hafshatah is another. The fact that the Mishnah permits one to carry money together with a Torah scroll does not automatically permit a Torah-level melachah such as skinning an animal.
The Gemara therefore adjusts the discussion. In fact, there are two separate disputes here. The first concerns the skinning itself: How much of the animal may one skin? Rabbi Yishmael permits skinning only until the point where the sacrificial fats can be removed, while the Sages require one to complete the entire skinning.
The second dispute concerns what one does with the animal after removing the sacrificial fats. Everyone agrees that the sacrificial fats may be removed. The question is what may be done with the partially skinned animal. Once the animal is partially skinned, both the meat and the hide may be considered muktzeh. The meat cannot be eaten until it is roasted after Shabbat, and the hide is also not being used at that moment. What does one do with the animal?
Rabbi Yishmael says that the animal must remain where it is. The Sages say that if the animal is lying in the sun, one may move it into the shade. This is a new dispute, separate from the question of how much skinning is permitted.
The Sages attempt to bring a proof from the case of the Torah scroll. They argue that if the Mishnah permits one to move the Torah scroll together with the case and the money inside it, perhaps that shows that one may also move the partially skinned Passover offering. Their claim is that just as one may move the case together with the money, one may move the hide together with the meat.
But this analogy is rejected. In the case of the Torah scroll, the case is a base for a permitted object. The Torah scroll is permitted to be moved, and the money is being moved along with it. The principal object is permitted, and the case therefore becomes a base for a permitted object. In the case of the Passover offering, however, both the meat and the hide are presently unusable. The animal is therefore a base for prohibited objects, and the analogy does not work.
The Sages try a third version of their argument. They say that the Mishnah teaches that if one finds a Torah scroll inside a case containing money, one may rescue the case with the scroll and the money. The wording sounds similar to the issue of moving the hide together with the meat. Once again, the Gemara asks whether this proves that one may move an object that is a base for prohibited items.
The Gemara then presents a fourth version. Perhaps the Mishnah permits one to bring a case containing money from outside into a place of safety in order to rescue the Torah scroll. In that situation, the case contains money alone when it is brought in; the Torah scroll is not yet inside it. Even so, one may bring the case containing money for the sake of rescuing the Torah scroll. If so, the Sages argue, perhaps one may also move the partially skinned Passover offering for the sake of the mitzvah.
The Gemara asks where this additional ruling comes from. The Mishnah says only that one may rescue a Torah scroll together with its case when the case already contains money. It does not explicitly say that one may bring a case containing money from outside in order to save the Torah scroll.
The Gemara answers that since the Mishnah does not require a person to empty the money from the case before rescuing it, we may infer that the case may be brought with the money inside. One is not required to spend time removing the money while the fire is approaching, because the Torah scroll might burn in the meantime. This may be the source for permitting one to bring a container with money inside it to rescue the Torah scroll.
The Gemara then rejects this as well. Perhaps there is a difference between a case that is already inside the house and a case that one is bringing from outside. When the case is already inside, one may rescue it immediately with the Torah scroll because there is no time to waste. But when one is bringing a case from outside, perhaps one must first remove the money. There is time to empty it before entering the burning house. The Mishnah does not necessarily prove that one may carry the case with the money still inside.
Ultimately, the Gemara returns to the original formulation. The Sages said to Rabbi Yishmael: You agree that one may move the case containing money because of the honor of the Torah scroll. Why, then, may one not complete the skinning of the Passover offering because of the honor of the mitzvah?
Rabbi Yishmael answers that the comparison is still not valid. In the case of the Torah scroll, the relevant act is carrying, and the prohibition is rabbinic because of muktzeh. Here, however, the discussion concerns skinning, which ordinarily involves a Torah-level prohibition.
The Gemara responds that this case is different because the skinning is being performed in an unusual manner. The person is not removing the hide in the normal way; he is cutting it into small pieces and removing it piece by piece. Since the act is being performed with a shinui, an alteration from the ordinary manner, the prohibition is rabbinic. Just as the Sages permitted the rabbinic prohibition of moving muktzeh in order to rescue the Torah scroll, they permitted the rabbinic prohibition of skinning in an unusual manner in order to honor the Passover offering.
Now that we have seen the entire give-and-take, let us return to the sugya and examine the stages of the argument more carefully.
The commentators ask why the Gemara thought it could compare moving the hide together with the meat to moving a Torah scroll together with its case. At this point, the Gemara assumes that a base containing both a permitted and a prohibited object is treated as prohibited. If so, how did the Mishnah permit one to move the case containing both the Torah scroll and the money?
The answer would have to be that the Sages made a special dispensation because of the honor of the Torah scroll. If that is the reason, the Sages could make the same type of dispensation for the honor of the Passover offering. We are not discussing the Torah-level labor of skinning at this point; we are discussing moving the partially skinned animal, which is a matter of carrying. If the Mishnah permitted carrying a base containing a permitted and prohibited object because of the honor of the Torah scroll, perhaps it should also permit moving the Passover offering because of the honor of the mitzvah.
The Gemara can answer that this analysis is mistaken. In the case of the Torah scroll, the case is not actually a base for a prohibited object. The Torah scroll is the principal and more significant object. Since the Torah scroll is permitted to be moved, the case is considered a base for a permitted object, despite the money inside. The Mishnah is therefore not an example of a special dispensation for a base containing a permitted and prohibited object.
The Gemara then returns to the fourth version, in which one may bring a case containing money from outside in order to rescue the Torah scroll. There, the case is certainly a base for a prohibited object, and yet it may be moved. This appears to be a stronger comparison to the Passover offering.
Again, however, the Gemara asks who told us that the Mishnah permits bringing the case from outside with the money inside? Perhaps the only inference is that one is not required to empty the case when it is already inside the house. The reason is that if the person stops to remove the money, the Torah scroll may burn. That does not prove that one may intentionally bring a case containing money into the house from outside.
Tosafot offers a straightforward distinction. In the Mishnah, the case and the Torah scroll are a very important permitted object together with the money. In the proposed case, however, one is bringing a case containing money alone. The question is whether one may bring a base for a prohibited object merely in order to use it later for a permitted object. Tosafot explains that if one could remove the money, one would have to do so even in the case of a base that is about to become a base for a prohibited object. There is no proof that one may bring the money inside merely because it will eventually be used to rescue the Torah scroll.
The Gemara answers that the reason one is not required to remove the money is that the Torah scroll would otherwise be destroyed. The concern is the immediate danger to the Torah scroll, not a general permission to move any base containing muktzeh. Therefore, the situation cannot be compared to the Passover offering.
Finally, the Gemara returns to the original discussion between the Sages and Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Yishmael says that one may skin the animal only until the sacrificial fats are exposed. The Sages say that one may continue and complete the skinning. The Sages attempt to prove their position from the Mishnah concerning the Torah scroll, while Rabbi Yishmael challenges the comparison.
The Sages explain that the skinning here is not the ordinary form of the labor. The person does not need the hide itself. He is skinning the animal only to remove the sacrificial fats. Since the hide is not being used, the act is a melachah she-einah tzrichah legufah—a labor performed for a purpose other than the purpose for which that labor was performed in the construction of the Tabernacle. According to Rabbi Shimon, such a labor is only rabbinically prohibited.
The Gemara challenges this explanation by invoking the principle of an inevitable consequence. Even if the person does not want the hide, he knows that skinning the animal will remove the hide. This appears to be a case of an inevitable result, and an inevitable result is generally treated as though the person intended it.
We have to distinguish this from the ordinary discussion of an inevitable consequence. Ordinarily, a person performs one action, and a separate, unintended action inevitably results. For example, one may drag a bench because one wants to move the bench, but if the bench is heavy, it will inevitably make a furrow in the ground. The person does not intend to make the furrow, but because the result is inevitable, it is treated as though he intended it.
In our case, however, the person is deliberately skinning the animal. There is no question that he intends to perform hafshatah. The question is not whether he intends to skin the animal. Of course he does. He must skin the animal in order to remove the sacrificial fats. The question is for what purpose he is performing the skinning: Is he doing it for the hide, or is he doing it only for the meat and the sacrificial fats?
The principle of an inevitable consequence normally establishes that the person intended the resulting action. Here, we already know that the person intended the act of skinning. The uncertainty concerns the purpose of the act. The Gemara therefore appears to be applying the principle in a different way from the standard case.
The answer is that the person is not skinning the animal in the ordinary manner. He is cutting the hide into thin strips and removing it in an altered manner. Since the action is performed with a shinui, it is only rabbinically prohibited. The Sages therefore permit it because of the honor of the Passover offering, just as they permitted the rabbinic prohibition of moving muktzeh in order to rescue a Torah scroll.
Rashi explains that the labor of skinning was performed in the construction of the Tabernacle for the sake of using the hide. That is a labor whose purpose is the body of the object. Here, the person does not need the hide. He is removing it only so that he can reach the sacrificial fats. Therefore, the prohibition is rabbinic. Tosafot asks how this can be so when the person is knowingly skinning the animal, and the Gemara’s answer is that the skinning is performed in an unusual fashion.
This is a difficult sugya, and it required the entire back-and-forth to understand the different assumptions and conclusions.
Yesterday, there was also a fire in a house in Boca Raton, and the residents managed to save a Torah scroll. The entire house was engulfed in flames, yet the Torah scroll was rescued without water damage or other damage. This is an example of how the learning of the daf can have an effect. We were learning the laws of rescuing a Torah scroll, and the next day there was an actual case in which a Torah scroll was rescued from a fire. The daf is like reading tomorrow’s newspaper.
We now come to the next question: Where may one bring the Torah scroll?
The Mishnah says that one may rescue a Torah scroll together with its case, and that one may bring it to a mavoi that is not mefulash. The discussion will soon require us to review the laws of eruvin, so let us establish the basic picture.
In earlier times, people lived in courtyards. Several houses opened onto one courtyard, and several courtyards opened onto an alleyway called a mavoi. From the mavoi, one proceeded into the public domain.
In the language of the laws of eruvin, a mavoi that is not mefulash generally has three walls: two side walls and a wall at the back. It is open only on one side, toward the public domain. Such a mavoi requires a correction, such as a side-post or a crossbeam, so that there will be a visible distinction between the mavoi and the public domain. It also requires a partnership of the alleyways, or an eruv of the courtyards, which is a separate matter.
A mavoi mefulash generally has openings on both sides. It has two side walls but no back wall, and it is open at both ends. However, the Gemara here is not necessarily using the terms mefulash and not mefulash in their ordinary sense in the laws of eruvin. The Gemara will offer several interpretations, and we must not assume at the outset that the terms have their usual meaning.
According to the first interpretation, the Sages permit one to bring the Torah scroll only to a mavoi that is not mefulash, while Ben Beteira is more lenient and permits bringing it even to a mavoi that is mefulash.
The Gemara asks: What is a mavoi mefulash, and what is a mavoi that is not mefulash?
Rav Hisda explains that a mavoi with three walls and two side-posts is considered not mefulash. The two side-posts are placed at the open entrance, one on each side. Although the entrance is physically open, the two side-posts create the required correction. A mavoi with three walls and only one side-post is considered mefulash.
This interpretation follows the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. We learned elsewhere that the correction of a mavoi is disputed. Beit Shammai says that one needs both a side-post and a crossbeam. Beit Hillel says that either one is sufficient. Rabbi Eliezer says that one needs two side-posts.
According to Rabbi Eliezer, a mavoi with three walls and two side-posts is properly corrected and is therefore not mefulash. A mavoi with three walls and only one side-post is not yet fully corrected and is considered mefulash. Ben Beteira says that because of the honor of a Torah scroll, one may bring it even to the latter mavoi, which has only one side-post. The Sages say that there is no such dispensation: the Torah scroll may be brought only to a properly corrected mavoi with two side-posts.
The discussion also emphasizes that even when there are two side-posts, the matter is not necessarily complete. One may still need a partnership of the courtyards and alleyways. The two side-posts create a properly corrected mavoi, but the courtyards that open into it must still be joined through the appropriate partnership. Thus, according to the Sages, one needs a fully permissible mavoi, with the necessary side-posts and the partnership of the alleyways.
Ben Beteira, however, permits the Torah scroll to be brought even when the mavoi has only one side-post, which Rabbi Eliezer would not consider sufficient for carrying ordinary food.
Abaye challenges this interpretation. If a mavoi with three walls and one side-post is called mefulash, why do the Sages later distinguish between food and a Torah scroll? According to the Sages, a mavoi with three walls and two side-posts is already a properly corrected mavoi. If it is a proper mavoi, why would the Sages permit a Torah scroll to be brought there but not food? The Gemara therefore searches for another interpretation of mefulash and not mefulash.
The Gemara offers a second interpretation. In this interpretation, there are two parallel walls, one on each side, and there is a side-post on each side of the entrance. The question is whether the mavoi is open on both sides or whether one of the openings has been corrected. The terms mefulash and not mefulash are being used in a more precise way than in the standard description of a mavoi.
The Gemara then brings a teaching of Rabbi Yehudah. If a person has two houses on opposite sides of the public domain, he may place a side-post at one house and another side-post at the other house. Alternatively, he may place a crossbeam at each end. In this way, he creates a defined passage between the two houses.
According to Rabbi Yehudah, two side-posts or two crossbeams can create the necessary boundaries even though the passage runs across the public domain. The discussion in our Mishnah can therefore be understood according to Rabbi Yehudah. When the opening is corrected on both sides, it is considered not mefulash. When it is corrected on only one side, it is still considered mefulash, because it remains open on the other side.
According to this interpretation, the Sages say that a Torah scroll may be brought only when both sides have been corrected. Ben Beteira grants a special dispensation for a Torah scroll and permits bringing it even when only one side has been corrected.
The Gemara then asks again: If, according to Rabbi Yehudah, the passage is completely corrected with two side-posts, why do the Sages permit only a Torah scroll and not food? The answer is that the Mishnah is not speaking about a fully corrected passage in the ordinary sense. It is dealing with the particular level of correction required for the Torah scroll, and the Sages do not grant a general permission to carry ordinary objects there.
The Gemara gives another formulation: A mavoi with three walls and no side-post is considered mefulash. A mavoi with three walls and one side-post is considered not mefulash for the purpose of rescuing a Torah scroll. Even Rabbi Eliezer, who ordinarily requires two side-posts for food and drink, may agree that one side-post is enough for rescuing a Torah scroll. The Sages do not permit bringing food to such a mavoi, but they permit bringing a Torah scroll there because of its importance.
Ben Beteira is even more lenient. He says that a Torah scroll may be rescued even to a mavoi that is genuinely mefulash, without any side-post at all. The Sages reject that leniency and require at least the correction of one side-post.
It is important to understand the practical conclusion. The Torah scroll is not considered a matter of saving life. In a case of danger to life, one violates Shabbat as necessary. For a Torah scroll, however, the permission is limited. One may rescue it only to a place where carrying is permitted according to the relevant rabbinic requirements. If there is no permissible mavoi to which it can be brought, one may not simply carry it anywhere. The sanctity of Shabbat remains in force even when one is rescuing a Torah scroll.
This demonstrates the seriousness of Shabbat. Even though the Torah scroll is extremely important, the Sages did not permit carrying it into a place where carrying is prohibited. The permission extends only to the particular rabbinic restrictions that they waived, not to every prohibition.
One might ask why the Gemara does not simply interpret mefulash and not mefulash in the ordinary manner: a mavoi open on both sides versus one closed on one side. Why does the Gemara develop these unusual interpretations involving side-posts? The reason is that if we use the ordinary definitions, the Sages would appear to be permitting the Torah scroll to be carried in a mavoi that is not sufficiently corrected for ordinary carrying. The Gemara therefore searches for an interpretation in which the Sages’ position remains consistent with the required corrections.
The halachic discussion in the Shulchan Aruch reflects these distinctions. The permission to rescue a Torah scroll is limited to certain circumstances, such as a private domain or a mixed courtyard with three walls and a side-post. The Sages did not permit carrying the Torah scroll into every type of open public area. The details demonstrate that this is a specific leniency for a Torah scroll, not a general permission to violate the laws of carrying on Shabbat.
We now turn to the laws of rescuing food.
The Mishnah says that one may rescue food for three meals: the amount appropriate for a person, and the amount appropriate for an animal for which one is responsible. If a fire breaks out on Shabbat, one may rescue the food necessary for the three meals of Shabbat. The quantity is calculated according to how much each person eats, and according to the number of people in the household. One may also rescue the food necessary for the animals one is obligated to feed.
If the fire breaks out on Friday night, there are still three meals ahead: the meal on Friday night, the meal on Shabbat morning, and the third meal. If the fire breaks out in the morning, perhaps only two meals remain. If it breaks out later in the day, perhaps only one meal remains.
The Sages, however, say that one may always rescue food for three meals, regardless of when the fire breaks out. The allowance is based on the three meals of Shabbat rather than on the precise number of meals that remain at that moment.
The Gemara asks why the amount is limited. The person is not performing a prohibited act in order to rescue the food. He is rescuing permitted food, and he is bringing it to a mixed courtyard, where the Mishnah permits him to carry. Why not let him rescue all the food in the house? Why limit him to three meals?
Rava answers that a person becomes panicked over his property. If we allow him to rescue everything, he will become flustered and may attempt to extinguish the fire. The limitation is designed to prevent him from becoming overwhelmed and violating Shabbat more seriously. By telling him that he may rescue only the food for three meals, we limit the number of times he goes in and out and reduce the possibility that he will try to save everything he owns.
Rashi explains that this is not primarily a concern about muktzeh. The food itself is permissible to move, and the issue is not that the food is prohibited. The issue is the person’s panic over his property and the danger that he will come to extinguish the fire.
This also explains why the limitation applies even though rescuing the food is itself permitted. It is a rabbinic safeguard against a person’s confusion and panic. The Sages sometimes impose an additional restriction because of the fear that a person will become so anxious about his possessions that he will violate a Torah prohibition.
The Gemara then discusses a case in which a barrel of wine broke on the roof. The wine is spilling, and the person may place a vessel beneath it in the courtyard to catch the wine. However, he may not bring another vessel and catch the wine as it falls through the air, then pour it into the first vessel. Nor may he bring a vessel next to the roof so that the wine will flow directly into it.
At first, it is difficult to understand the distinction. Why should it matter whether the vessel is placed on the ground in the courtyard or brought up to the roof to catch the wine? In either case, the person is trying to save the same wine.
The Gemara answers that this too is a safeguard against panic. If we allow him to bring additional vessels, climb onto the roof, and maneuver them beneath the spilling wine, he may become flustered and eventually carry a vessel directly into the public domain. Therefore, the Sages permitted only the passive arrangement: place one vessel on the ground in the courtyard and allow the wine to fall into it. They did not permit the person to carry another vessel up to the roof or to collect the wine in the air.
The permission is limited to the one vessel already placed on the ground. The concern is not what he does with that vessel once it is there. The concern is the additional activity of bringing more vessels, moving back and forth, and becoming involved in a complicated rescue operation. The Sages wanted the person to do as little as possible.
The Gemara also says that one may not use a subterfuge by bringing guests in order to save more wine. One may invite guests to drink the wine, because then the wine is being used for a permitted purpose. But one may not invite people merely as a pretext, knowing that they will not actually drink, in order to rescue more wine. The guests must be genuinely invited to consume it.
The Gemara attempts to connect this issue to a dispute concerning an animal and its offspring. On a festival, one may take an animal out of a pen for slaughter. One may not take out both the mother and its offspring if one will slaughter only one of them, because taking out the second animal is an unnecessary effort. The question is how one can save both.
One opinion says that a person may take out the first animal with the intention of slaughtering it and then change his mind and decide to slaughter the second. Another opinion says that he may take out the first animal, change his mind, and then take out the second. This dispute concerns whether one may use a legal subterfuge in order to accomplish a permitted result.
The Gemara suggests that the same dispute might apply to the wine. The opinion that permits a person to change his mind regarding the animal would also permit him to invite guests after the wine begins spilling, with the intention that they drink it. The opinion that does not permit such a subterfuge would require him to invite the guests beforehand rather than inviting them only in order to save the wine.
The Gemara rejects the comparison. In the case of the animal, there is an element of suffering to the animal. Because of the concern of causing pain to a living creature, perhaps the Sages permitted the subterfuge. That does not prove that they would permit a subterfuge merely to prevent the loss of wine. The fact that one may use a legal device in a case involving the suffering of an animal does not mean that one may use it simply because property is being lost.
The Gemara then returns to the matter of inviting guests. The guests must be invited for a genuine purpose. If they are invited to drink, then their drinking is permitted. But if they are invited only so that the owner may save wine that they will not consume, that is a prohibited subterfuge.
The Gemara brings another teaching concerning bread. If one rescued clean bread from a fire, he may not return to rescue inferior bread. However, if he rescued inferior bread, he may return to rescue clean bread. The principle is that one may make a logical improvement, but one may not first rescue the superior item and then claim that he has changed his mind and now wants the inferior item.
For example, if a person rescued coarse bread for the three meals, he may later return and rescue fine bread. The second act is an improvement. But if he rescued fine bread, he may not return and say that he now prefers the coarse bread. There is no logical reason for that change, and it appears to be a subterfuge designed only to save more food.
Rashi explains that coarse bread may lose its appearance or become less attractive, whereas clean bread remains desirable. Even when the Sages permitted a legal subterfuge, it must be a reasonable and credible change, not an artificial maneuver.
The Mishnah also teaches that one may rescue food from Yom Kippur for Shabbat when Yom Kippur falls on Friday, but one may not rescue food on Shabbat for Yom Kippur when Yom Kippur falls on Sunday.
If Yom Kippur is on Friday, the person must eat on Friday night, which is already Shabbat. He cannot go shopping on Friday night, so he needs to have the food in his house. Although it is Yom Kippur at the time he is rescuing the food, he is rescuing it for the Shabbat meal that will follow that night.
If Yom Kippur is on Shabbat, however, he is not rescuing the food for Shabbat, because he will not eat on Shabbat. He is rescuing it for Saturday night, after Yom Kippur. Since food can be obtained after Yom Kippur, there is no reason to permit rescuing it on Shabbat.
The Gemara asks why the Mishnah needed to present the case of Yom Kippur. It could have given a simpler case in which one may not rescue food on Shabbat for Saturday night. One answer is that because Yom Kippur is a mitzvah to fast, a person might have thought that perhaps one may rescue food on Shabbat in preparation for breaking the fast. The Mishnah therefore teaches that even this is not permitted. Another possibility is that the Mishnah is referring to food needed for children, who may be fed on Yom Kippur when necessary.
We also learned that one may rescue food for three meals, but not unlimited quantities, because a person becomes panicked over his property. The purpose of the limitation is to reduce the number of trips he makes into the burning house. If he is permitted to go in and out repeatedly, the fire continues to spread while he is occupied with his possessions, and he may eventually attempt to extinguish it. Limiting him to the necessary amount of food allows him to act quickly and leave.
The Mishnah then discusses bread that was left in the oven before Shabbat. If Shabbat has already begun and the person remembers that the bread is still in the oven, he may rescue the amount needed for three meals. He may also tell other people, “Come and rescue food for yourselves.” Each person may rescue the amount needed for his own three meals.
However, he may not remove the bread with the ordinary baker’s paddle, because that is the way bread is removed during the week. He must remove it in an altered manner. The act of removing bread from the oven is not itself necessarily a Torah-level melachah, but since it can be done with a shinui, the Sages required the change.
The general principle is that whenever a permitted need can be accomplished through an alteration, the Sages prefer that the person perform it in that manner. Even when the underlying prohibition is rabbinic, they do not permit the ordinary weekday method when an altered method is available.
Rav Hisda says that a person should rise early on Friday morning to purchase what he needs for Shabbat. The verse says, “And it shall be on the sixth day, and they shall prepare what they bring.” The preparation should begin on Friday, and it should not be postponed until the final moments before Shabbat.
This is also the practice regarding preparations for Shabbat. One should not wait until the last minute. The preparations, like the collection of the manna, should begin early in the day. Although some preparations may begin earlier in the week, the primary preparation should take place on Friday.
Rabbi Abba says that on Shabbat a person must recite the blessing over two loaves. The loaves should be held together, but one cuts only one of them. The two loaves commemorate the double portion of manna that fell on Friday.
Rabbi Zeira would cut a large piece of bread after reciting the blessing and eat from that piece throughout the meal. During the week, cutting such a large piece might appear gluttonous. On Shabbat, however, it demonstrates honor for Shabbat. Since he does not conduct himself that way every day, the unusual size of the piece indicates that he is honoring the Shabbat meal rather than simply indulging himself.
The Gemara says that a person should eat more on Shabbat. The food of Shabbat is a special gift, and one should strengthen himself with it and eat properly. For some righteous people, eating more than usual may be difficult because it goes against their nature. Nevertheless, the Shabbat meal is intended to be honored with appropriate food and sufficient eating.
The Gemara concludes with the principle that we began with eruvin and end with eruvin. When the mitzvah of an eruv of the courtyards was practiced by placing bread in a particular home, the people would sometimes eat that bread on Shabbat. Since the bread had already been used for one mitzvah, they would use it for another mitzvah by eating it during the Shabbat meal.
This raises the general question of using one mitzvah object for another mitzvah. We do this in other contexts as well. There are practices of using items associated with one mitzvah for another sacred purpose, such as using the myrtle branches from the lulav for Havdalah or using the branches of the aravah for another mitzvah.
The point is not that the object contains a magical quality. There is no special luck in the coins used for the redemption of the firstborn, and there is no magical property in an object that was used for a mitzvah. Rather, there are two ways to understand the practice. It may be a beautification of the first mitzvah, demonstrating that the object is so precious that one will use it only for sacred purposes. Alternatively, it may be a beautification of the second mitzvah, demonstrating that one wants to perform the second mitzvah with an object that has already been used for a mitzvah.
This is the intention one should have. It is not merely a segulah. It is a form of beautifying the mitzvah. Either one is honoring the first mitzvah by continuing to use its object for sacred purposes, or one is honoring the second mitzvah by using an object that was already connected to a mitzvah.
This idea can also explain the practice of using the coins from the redemption of the firstborn for charity. The coins were used for the mitzvah of pidyon haben, and using them for another mitzvah shows the importance one attaches to the first mitzvah. The father should not object simply because he wants to keep the coins. The purpose is not that the coins have a special power. Rather, using them for charity can demonstrate how precious the mitzvah of pidyon haben is to him.
One should not misunderstand this as a claim that the coins themselves bring luck or guarantee anything. The value lies in the mitzvah principle: an object used for one mitzvah can be used again for another sacred purpose as an expression of respect for mitzvot.
Tosafot raises a final question about the case of Yom Kippur. If one may not rescue food on Shabbat for Motzaei Shabbat because one can prepare food after Shabbat, why does the Mishnah specifically mention Yom Kippur falling on Sunday? The answer is that one might have thought that because eating after Yom Kippur is connected to the mitzvah of eating after the fast, perhaps one may rescue food in advance. The Mishnah teaches that this is not permitted. One may prepare the food after Yom Kippur; one may not rescue it on Shabbat for that purpose.
This concludes the sugya.