We delve into a discussion from Gemara Shabbat, focusing on the laws of Shabbat as they pertain to the entire Jewish people. We begin by revisiting yesterday's lesson, where we learned from the word "Besar" in a verse. Normally, one is not permitted to cut off a "tzara'at" (a type of skin lesion). However, the verse states that it is permissible to cut off a "baharet" (a white spot, also a type of skin lesion). The Gemara asks why a specific verse is needed to permit this, given that it is a "davar she'eino mitkaven" – an unintended action – which is generally permissible. If one does not intend to remove the "tzara'at" but it happens incidentally, it should be allowed.
However, Rabbi Yehudah holds that a "davar she'eino mitkaven" is forbidden. Therefore, according to Rabbi Yehudah, carrying this out on Shabbat should be forbidden, even if unintended. The verse "Besar" is thus necessary to teach us that even though Rabbi Yehudah generally forbids unintended actions, in this specific case, it is permitted.
Rava then argues that even according to Rabbi Shimon, who generally permits "davar she'eino mitkaven," there's an exception. If the unintended consequence is inevitable, it is called a "pesik reisha," and even Rabbi Shimon would forbid it. In the case of a brit milah where there is a "baharet," it is inevitable that the "baharet" will be cut. Therefore, the verse "Besar" would be needed even for Rabbi Shimon, to permit this "pesik reisha" that would otherwise be forbidden. Abaye initially did not know this distinction of "pesik reisha," but after hearing it from Rabbah, he accepted it. Thus, all instances in the Talmud where Abaye and Rabbah discuss Rabbi Shimon's view on "pesik reisha" refer to the period after Abaye's acceptance of Rabbah's teaching.
The discussion then shifts to another context. A verse states that one must be careful not to directly remove "tzara'at." However, if it comes off indirectly, for example, by tying shoelaces that rub against the lesion, or by carrying a load on one's back where a stick causes the lesion to detach, it is not considered "la'asot" (a direct act of removal). The Gemara again asks why a verse is needed, as these are "davar she'eino mitkaven" and should be permissible. The answer is again that this verse is needed for Rabbi Yehudah, who generally forbids "davar she'eino mitkaven," especially in a "pesik reisha" case where the removal is inevitable. The novelty of the verse is that even in such a case, it is permitted because the action is not direct.
The Gemara then considers the initial assumption (hava amina) that the verse "Besar" is only needed for Rabbi Yehudah, but not for Rabbi Shimon, because Rabbi Shimon permits "davar she'eino mitkaven." What then would Rabbi Shimon do with this verse? The Gemara suggests that the verse refers to a situation where an adult with a "baharet" explicitly tells the mohel to cut off the "baharet" during a brit milah. In this scenario, the mohel is "mitkaven" (intending) to remove the "baharet." The verse would then teach that even in such a case, it is permissible because the primary intention is the mitzvah of brit milah. However, the Gemara rejects this, noting that if the mohel is explicitly told to remove the "baharet," both the mohel and the person instructing him would be liable. Instead, the verse is understood to refer to a situation where the mohel is "mitkaven" to purify the person, and the removal of the "baharet" is a secondary, albeit intended, outcome.
The Gemara then discusses the case of a father who is obligated to circumcise his son. If the son has a "baharet," the father, as the mohel, would be "mitkaven" to remove the "baharet" in the course of the brit milah. The verse "Besar" teaches that even though the father intends this, it is permitted because of the mitzvah. Rashi explains that the mitzvah of brit milah overrides the prohibition. However, the Gemara raises a point: if there is another person available who is not the father, that person should perform the brit milah. Why? Because a stranger would not have the same "kavanah" (intention) to purify the child from the "baharet" as the father. The father is "mitkaven" to purify the child, whereas a stranger would simply intend to perform the circumcision. This aligns with the principle that when there is a positive commandment (aseh) and a negative commandment (lo ta'aseh) that contradict, if there's a way to fulfill both without transgression, that option should be chosen. If there is no choice, one can rely on the "aseh" overriding the "lo ta'aseh." Therefore, if a stranger can perform the brit milah without the specific intention to remove the "baharet," it is preferable. The Gemara concludes that the father should not even be present, as his presence might imply his intention to remove the "baharet" through the mohel.
The discussion then moves to the general rule that a brit milah not performed at its proper time ("milah shelo bizmanah") does not override Shabbat or Yom Tov. We explore four sources for this rule. The first source is from the laws of the Korban Pesach. Just as one cannot burn the leftovers of the Korban Pesach on Yom Tov if it was slaughtered on the 14th of Nisan (a weekday), because burning is a "melachah" (forbidden labor) that was prepared on a weekday, similarly, a brit milah not performed on its proper eighth day (which is considered a "chol" or weekday activity) cannot be done on Yom Tov or Shabbat.
The second source, according to Abaye, is derived from the verse "Olad Shabbat Beshabbato," which teaches that only sacrifices born on Shabbat can be offered on Shabbat. It implies that a "chol" (weekday) item cannot be brought on Shabbat. Since a "milah shelo bizmanah" is considered a "chol" activity, it cannot be done on Shabbat or Yom Tov.
The third source is from the word "Levado" in the verse "Hu Ya'aseh Lachem" regarding Yom Tov. "Lebado" teaches that only "okhel nefesh" (food preparation) activities that could not have been done beforehand are permitted on Yom Tov, but not "makshirim" (preparatory actions) that could have been done earlier. The Gemara uses a "kal v'chomer" (a fortiori argument) to show that "milah shelo bizmanah" should not override Shabbat. Just as "tzara'at," which is a severe impurity, is pushed aside for "avodah" (Temple service) on Shabbat, and "milah shelo bizmanah" pushes aside "tzara'at" (as we learned that one must perform a brit milah even if there's a "tzara'at" in that place), one might think that "milah shelo bizmanah" should also push aside Shabbat. However, the word "Lebado" comes to teach us that it does not.
The fourth source clarifies that while a positive commandment (aseh) generally overrides a negative commandment (lo ta'aseh), this is not the case when the negative commandment is itself accompanied by a positive commandment. Yom Tov is both an "aseh" (to celebrate) and a "lo ta'aseh" (to refrain from labor). Therefore, the "aseh" of brit milah does not override the combined "lo ta'aseh" and "aseh" of Yom Tov.
We then discuss Rabbi Akiva's rule: any "melachah" that could have been performed before Shabbat (e.g., "makshirei milah" - preparations for brit milah) does not override Shabbat. However, any "melachah" that cannot be done before Shabbat (e.g., the actual "shechitah" - slaughtering - of the Korban Pesach, which must be done on the 14th of Nisan) does override Shabbat. Rabbi Yehudah, in the name of Rav, applies this rule to both "makshirei milah" and "makshirei Pesach," stating that they do not override Shabbat. The Gemara explains that both cases are necessary: if we only learned it from brit milah, one might think that since there is no "karet" (excision) penalty for not performing brit milah on a child, "makshirim" might not override Shabbat. But for Korban Pesach, where there is "karet," one might think "makshirim" do override Shabbat. Conversely, if we only learned it from Korban Pesach, one might think that since there are no "thirteen covenants" associated with Pesach, "makshirim" do not override Shabbat. But for brit milah, with its thirteen covenants, one might think "makshirim" do override Shabbat. Thus, both cases are needed to teach that "makshirim" do not override Shabbat in either instance.
Our Mishnah states that all necessities for brit milah may be done on Shabbat. These include cutting the "orlah" (foreskin), performing "peri'ah" (tearing the inner membrane), performing "mitzitzah" (drawing blood), applying a bandage, and grinding cumin for medicine. If the cumin was not ground before Shabbat, it may be ground with one's teeth. Similarly, if a mixture of wine and oil (a medicinal item) was not prepared before Shabbat, the ingredients may be applied separately. One should not make a "haluk" (a sleeve to keep the foreskin down) in the usual way, but rather use a simple cloth. If this cloth was not brought before Shabbat, one may carry it on one's finger in a "chatzir" (courtyard without an eruv), which implies a rabbinic prohibition, not a Torah prohibition. The Gemara questions why, if these actions are permitted, they are limited to a "chatzir," suggesting that perhaps carrying it in this manner is a "shinui" (unusual method) to avoid a rabbinic prohibition.
The Gemara then asks what "kol sorkhei milah" (all necessities of brit milah) comes to include, since the Mishnah already listed many items. It includes cutting "tzitzin" (small pieces of flesh) that invalidate the brit milah, as long as the mohel's hand is still engaged in the brit milah. If the mohel has already withdrawn his hand, he may only go back to remove "tzitzin" that invalidate the mitzvah, but not those that are merely for aesthetic enhancement. The Mishnah's ruling that one may return to cut "tzitzin" that invalidate the mitzvah is attributed to Rabbi Yishmael, in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, in the name of Rabbi Rokhel. This is analogous to the case of the Korban Pesach, where the Sages permit skinning the animal completely, even after a pause to remove the head, whereas Rabbi Yishmael restricts it to the necessary extent.
The Gemara then presents a different explanation for the Mishnah's ruling, based on the laws of "lechem hapanim" (showbread). The "lechem hapanim" must always be on the table in the Beit Hamikdash ("lechem panim tamid"). To change the bread, new loaves are brought in while the old ones are simultaneously removed, ensuring the table is never empty. This implies that "tamid" (always) means continuous, without any break. According to Rabbi Yose, however, "tamid" can refer to a process that is not literally continuous but has a connection from beginning to end. If we follow Rabbi Yose, then even if the mohel withdraws his hand, returning to complete the brit milah is still considered part of one continuous process. The Gemara uses this to explain how one can fulfill the commandment to learn Torah day and night ("yomam valayla") even with breaks, as long as there is consistent learning during both day and night periods.
The Gemara then discusses a mohel who performs a brit milah on Shabbat but leaves "tzitzin hame'akvin" (pieces of flesh that invalidate the brit milah). Such a mohel is liable for "karet" (excision) not for the brit milah itself, but for desecrating Shabbat. This applies even if he intended to perform a mitzvah, because he did not complete it properly. The Gemara then presents a case where a mohel begins a brit milah one minute before Shabbat ends, knowing he cannot finish it. He is liable for desecrating Shabbat because he should not have started an action that he could not complete within Shabbat, especially since it would not be a valid brit milah.
Finally, we discuss "mitzitzah," the drawing of blood after brit milah. Rav Papa states that a mohel who does not perform "mitzitzah" is a danger (sakana) to the child and should be removed from his position. The Mishnah allows "mitzitzah" to be performed on Shabbat, implying that it is crucial. The Gemara asks why, if "mitzitzah" is not explicitly commanded in the Torah, it is permitted on Shabbat, which involves the "melachah" of "chaburah" (wounding/drawing blood). The answer is that because it is a "sakana" (danger) to the child if not performed, it overrides Shabbat. The Gemara refutes the idea that the blood drawn during "mitzitzah" is already present and merely being removed, thus not constituting "chaburah." It asserts that the blood is indeed drawn from within, making it a "chaburah," and its permissibility on Shabbat is solely due to the danger to life. This is supported by the Mishnah categorizing "mitzitzah" with other medicinal procedures like applying a bandage and grinding cumin, which are also permitted on Shabbat due to their medical necessity. The historical custom of performing "mitzitzah bapeh" (by mouth) is noted, with the caveat that the mohel must be healthy. The Gemara concludes with a story of Rabba giving medical advice during a lecture, much to the chagrin of the doctors present, who felt their secrets were being revealed. He assured them he had left one secret for them, just as Rabbi Amar once told the speaker to leave him one secret during a wedding.