Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’ah was leaning on his servant as he walked. His servant was named Rabbi Simlai. Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’ah said to him, “Were you in the study hall yesterday, when we permitted the oil of the gentiles?”
A few pages ago, we learned that there was testimony that Rabbi Yehudah Nesi’ah had permitted the decree against the oil of the gentiles. There was a major question as to whether this was a legitimate tradition. Initially, Rav did not accept the testimony. He said that it was impossible and that the testimony could not be trusted. In the end, we said that the Jerusalem Talmud confirms that the testimony was verified. We see the same thing here: this incident demonstrates that Rabbi Yehudah Nesi’ah really did permit the oil of the gentiles.
Eventually, even Rav agreed and drank the oil of the gentiles. Shmuel warned him that if he did not drink it, he would be considered a rebel against the words of the Sages, because the Sages had permitted it. This is also where we saw that today the oil of the gentiles is permitted, and that someone who is stringent regarding it is mistaken and is considered to be acting against the ruling of the Sages.
That was the background to the story. Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’ah said to his servant, “Were you in the study hall last night, when the Sages voted to permit the oil?” Rabbi Simlai replied, “I hope that God will grant us the merit in our time to be able to vote to permit the bread of the gentiles as well. Just as we abolished the decree against the oil, we will abolish the decree against the bread.” The matter had become very difficult for the people.
Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’ah responded, “We cannot do that. They will call us a court that is lenient about everything. We cannot go that far.”
We find a similar idea in the following teaching. Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer testified regarding the grasshopper called the ayal kamsa that it was permitted, and he also ruled regarding the liquids—the blood and water—that were found in the slaughterhouse area of the Temple, that they were pure. Sometimes liquids have the ability to contract impurity and to convey impurity to other objects. They said that the liquids found in the Temple area were pure and, according to one opinion, did not even have the ability to contract impurity. We will see why.
He also taught that someone who came into contact with a corpse would become impure. At first, it is difficult to understand why the Sages would need to tell us that. The Torah already says that one may not touch a corpse and that doing so makes a person impure. Moreover, that is not a leniency; it is a stringency.
In any event, there were two matters in which they were lenient: the grasshopper and the liquids in the Temple slaughterhouse. As a result, they called him Yosef the Permitter, or Yosef the Lenient.
Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’ah said to Rabbi Simlai, “There is a difference between that case and ours. There, they permitted three matters. The third matter—the law concerning a corpse—was also considered a leniency in some respect. That is why they called him Yosef the Permitter: he had permitted three things. You have permitted only one thing, the oil.”
Rabbi Simlai replied, “I have already permitted something else, so I have two leniencies in my pocket. If I now permit the bread, that will be three, and they will call me a court that is lenient about everything.”
What was the other matter that Rabbi Simlai had permitted? It concerned the following case. A man gave his wife a bill of divorce and said, “This is your divorce if I do not return within twelve months.” He then died within those twelve months.
The question is whether the divorce takes effect. The usual rule is that one cannot give a bill of divorce posthumously, after the husband has died. In this case, the man said, “If I do not return within twelve months,” but he did not say that the divorce should take effect from the present moment. Therefore, if he dies, perhaps the divorce cannot take effect retroactively. When twelve months pass, we cannot simply say that the divorce now takes effect, because he is no longer alive.
This has practical consequences. If there is no divorce, the woman is still subject to the laws of levirate marriage and release from levirate marriage. If she had received a valid divorce, she would not have to marry her brother-in-law, because she would no longer be connected to him. Without a divorce, however, if she has no children, the entire procedure of levirate marriage and release from levirate marriage would apply.
The Rabbis ruled that she was free and did not require levirate marriage or release from it. The question is: how could the divorce be effective after the husband’s death?
The answer is that the husband dated the document. Why would he write a date on the document? He must have intended the divorce to take effect on the date that he wrote. The date makes the divorce retroactive. Therefore, even though he died within the twelve months, the divorce takes effect from the time when he was alive. She is divorced and is not subject to levirate marriage or release from it. This was the ruling of Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer, and Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’ah agreed with it.
This is similar to a case discussed by Rashi. A man wants to give all his assets to one of his children after his death. The problem is that after he dies, he cannot transfer property as a gift. Instead, the inheritance will be divided among all the brothers equally. What can he do to ensure that the gift will reach that child?
He writes a document stating, “From today and after my death.” This means that the property belongs to the child from the present moment, so that the father can no longer sell it. However, the child will not receive the fruits and proceeds of the property until the father dies, because the father still wants to benefit from them during his lifetime.
Why does the document say, “From today and after my death”? Because the gift takes effect now, while the father is alive, even though the child will receive the proceeds only after the father dies. If the gift did not take effect until death, it would not be valid, because one cannot give a gift after death. Otherwise, the other brothers would divide the property equally with him. Similarly, if there were a creditor, the creditor could seize the property, because the gift would not be valid. The date on the document demonstrates that the gift takes effect from the present moment.
The same reasoning applies to the bill of divorce. Since the husband wrote the date on the document, he intended the divorce to take effect from that date. Rabbi Simlai therefore said, “I have already permitted the case of the woman who received this type of divorce. She does not require release from levirate marriage, and I have also permitted the oil. If you now ask me to permit the bread, that will be three matters. They will call me a court that is lenient about everything.”
It says that Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba taught in the name of Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’ah that this was the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’ah, but that the Sages did not agree with him throughout his lifetime. Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’ah was the grandson of Rabbeinu Hakadosh. The story with which we began concerned Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’ah. He was the one who was lenient regarding the case of the bill of divorce, but the Sages did not agree with him. He attempted to permit this matter throughout his lifetime, and some say that all his colleagues disagreed with him. It was considered a major leniency.
Once again, this explains why he said that he could not be lenient again. He already had two leniencies, and permitting the bread would be a third. They would call him a court that permits everything.
Rabbi Elazar raised a related question. Now that we know the ruling in the case of the bill of divorce—that the woman is permitted—is she permitted immediately, before the twelve months have passed? Or must she wait until the twelve months pass, and only then, when her husband has not returned, does the divorce take effect?
One might understand why she would not have to wait. The husband is dead and clearly will not return. What reason could there be to make her wait twelve months? The only possible concern is that people may not know that he died. They may know only that he made a condition involving twelve months, and then see that the woman is being permitted to marry before the twelve months have passed. In another case, they might see a woman marrying within twelve months even though her husband had not died, because they would not know about the special circumstances of this case. That could lead to a serious error.
It would therefore be logical to institute a decree requiring her to wait, in case people do not know that the husband has died but do know about the twelve-month condition. They might see her marrying before the twelve months have passed and conclude that such a condition does not need to be fulfilled. That was the question.
Someone interrupted that if this were the concern, then no widow would be able to remarry. The answer is that an ordinary widow can marry once her husband dies. The concern here is specific to the bill of divorce and the condition involving twelve months.
The Gemara responds that this is an excellent question, but why ask it regarding the case of Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’ah? There is an explicit Mishnah in Tractate Gittin that discusses a similar case, and the same question could have been asked there.
The case in the Mishnah is as follows: A man says, “This is your divorce from now, if I do not return within twelve months.” He then dies within the twelve months. Does the divorce take effect immediately, since the condition has been fulfilled and the document says “from now,” or must one wait until the twelve months have passed?
The answer is, “You are right; the question could have been asked on the Mishnah. However, you were present when Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’ah made this decree, and you may have heard what he said. I am asking you because you were there at the time that he ruled on this matter. I could ask the Mishnah, but it would not respond. Since you were present when the decree was made, perhaps you know the answer.” The Gemara does not provide an answer to the question.
The Gemara then becomes sidetracked into several other cases involving bills of divorce. Rav raises another case. A man tells his wife, “This is your divorce when the sun rises.” The expression means sunrise, when the sun comes out. It does not mean that the sun will become especially hot; it is simply a poetic way of saying “sunrise.”
If the husband dies during the preceding night, everyone agrees that she is a widow. The question is whether she is also divorced. In this case, everyone agrees that she is a widow, but is she divorced as well? The issue is that he did not write a date on the document. He only told her verbally that the divorce would take effect at sunrise.
Perhaps the wording “on the condition that” is treated as equivalent to “from now.” There is a well-known principle that whenever someone says, “on the condition that,” it is as though he said, “from now.” If so, when he said, “This is your divorce on the condition that the sun rises,” it is as though he said that the divorce takes effect from now, with the condition being fulfilled at sunrise. Since the husband died during the night, the divorce would have taken effect while he was still alive.
Rav Huna agrees with this reasoning: whenever a person says, “on the condition that,” it is treated as though he said, “from now.” The disagreement concerns only the time when the condition is fulfilled. In the case of “if I do not return within twelve months,” the issue is whether the word “if” means that the divorce takes effect only later, when the condition is fulfilled, or whether it is treated like “from now.”
In the case where the husband says only, “This is your divorce when the sun rises,” and he dies during the night, everyone agrees that she is not divorced, because he did not write a date and did not say that it should take effect from the present moment. The disagreement is in a case where he says, “This is your divorce from now if I do not return within twelve months,” or, “This is your divorce on the condition that the sun rises.” The question is whether the condition makes the divorce retroactive or whether it takes effect only when the condition is fulfilled.
The Mishnah therefore presents a parallel case: “This is your divorce from now if I do not return within twelve months.” The husband dies within the twelve months. Is the divorce valid immediately, because it was stated to be from now and the condition will ultimately be fulfilled, or must one wait until the twelve months have passed? That is the same question that could have been asked regarding Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’ah’s ruling.
Returning to the earlier teaching, Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer permitted the grasshopper called the ayal kamsa. The Gemara asks what species this was. Rav Pappa said that it was the shushiva species. Rabbi and Rabbi Hiyya bar Ami, in the name of Shmuel, said that it was the susbil species. Thus, different traditions identify it differently.
The dispute concerns whether a long head is one of the identifying signs of a kosher grasshopper. According to one opinion, the grasshopper has a long head, and this is a sign that it is kosher. The Torah identifies four kosher grasshoppers: the arbeh, the sol’am, the hargol, and the chagav. We know those four species, and we identify other species by comparing them with them.
Rashi explains that the shushiva is a type of grasshopper with a long head. The Tannaim disagree about whether a long head is included among the relevant signs. One approach understands the four species mentioned by the Torah as a general category and the characteristics of those four species as the specific identifying signs. According to that approach, one may apply those characteristics to other species, but not accept an entirely different characteristic such as a long head.
There is, however, another approach. The four species have several identifying characteristics: they have legs, wings that cover most of their bodies, and special legs with which they jump. According to one opinion, every kosher grasshopper must have these same four characteristics. Since the four species do not have long heads, a long head is not a sign of kashrut.
According to the other opinion, a grasshopper does not have to be identical to those four species. It must merely resemble them in some identifying way. Therefore, a long head can be sufficient to identify it as kosher, even though the four species mentioned by the Torah do not have long heads. Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer was the one who was lenient and accepted a long head as an identifying sign.
Regarding the susbil species, everyone agrees that a long head is not among the four signs expressly derived from the Torah. Another question concerns the wings. The wings must cover most of the grasshopper’s body. What if they cover just barely more than half of the body?
According to Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer, it is sufficient if the wings barely cover the majority of the body. According to the other Rabbis, the wings must cover the majority in a noticeable way. It cannot be merely a technical or barely measurable majority. Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer was therefore lenient in this matter as well.
The second matter in which Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer was lenient involved the liquids found in the slaughterhouse area of the Temple. The liquids included blood and water. Rav said that the word “pure” means that they were genuinely pure and could not contract impurity at all. Shmuel said that they could themselves be impure, but could not convey impurity to other objects.
According to Rav, the liquids were completely pure. His reasoning is that the impurity of liquids is rabbinic. When did the Rabbis decree that liquids could contract impurity? They made that decree outside the Temple. In the Temple, they did not apply the decree, because they did not want to increase impurity in the Temple area.
Shmuel, however, holds that liquids can contract impurity by Torah law. The rabbinic decree concerns their ability to convey impurity to other objects. The Rabbis applied that decree outside the Temple, but in the Temple they did not apply the decree that liquids could convey impurity. Thus, according to Shmuel, the liquids could be impure themselves, but could not transmit that impurity to something else.
The dispute between Rav and Shmuel therefore concerns both the Torah law and the rabbinic law. Rav holds that, by Torah law, liquids do not contract impurity at all. The Rabbis enacted that liquids could become impure, but they made that enactment only outside the Temple. Shmuel holds that, by Torah law, liquids can become impure. The rabbinic enactment that they can transmit impurity was not applied in the Temple.
Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer also ruled that someone who touched a corpse would become impure. The Gemara asks why this should be considered a leniency. If a person touches a corpse, the Torah itself says that he becomes impure. Why should Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer be called Yosef the Permitter because of this? If anything, he should be called Yosef the Stringent.
The answer is that there is a difference between touching the corpse itself and touching someone who touched the corpse. The Rabbis had ruled that even someone who touched a person who had touched a corpse could become impure. Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer disagreed and said that only someone who touched the corpse itself becomes impure. Someone who touched the person who had touched the corpse does not become impure. That was a leniency, and this is why he was called Yosef the Permitter.
The Gemara then asks whether even this distinction is really a rabbinic matter. Perhaps the person who touches someone who touched a corpse also becomes impure by Torah law. The Torah says that someone who touches a corpse becomes impure, and the Sages derive that impurity can continue to be transmitted when the impure person is still in contact with the corpse.
By Torah law, if a person touches someone who is touching a corpse at that moment, he can become impure for seven days. The Rabbis extended the same seven-day status to someone who touches that person even when he is no longer touching the corpse. Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer disagreed with that extension. He said that the person who touched the one who had touched the corpse should retain the status of impurity prescribed by Torah law—one day, or impurity lasting until evening—rather than being treated as impure for seven days. Again, he did not accept the rabbinic stringency and was therefore lenient.
At first, the discussion was understood differently, but the conclusion is that everyone agrees that direct contact with a corpse results in seven days of impurity. Everyone also agrees that touching a person who is himself touching the corpse results in seven days of impurity. The new point derived from the verse is that this applies while the person is still in contact with the corpse.
When, then, is the impurity limited to one day? It is when a person touches someone who had touched a corpse but is no longer in contact with it. The Torah leaves that person with the status of impurity lasting until evening. The Rabbis came and extended the seven-day status to that case as well. Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer rejected that extension and retained the Torah-level status of one day. That was the leniency for which he was called Yosef the Permitter.
The Gemara asks how we know that there is a distinction between contact while the person is still touching the corpse and contact after he is no longer touching it. One verse says, “Anyone who touches a corpse, the body of a person who has died, and does not purify himself, defiles the Sanctuary of God; that person shall be cut off from Israel. He has not had the water of lustration sprinkled upon him; his impurity remains.” This teaches that the direct contact with the corpse involves seven days of impurity.
Another verse says, “And anyone who touches a person who has been in contact with a corpse shall be impure.” That verse does not specify seven days. The Gemara reconciles the verses by saying that one verse refers to contact while the person is still in contact with the corpse, and the other refers to contact after he is no longer in contact with it. That is the basis for the distinction.
Rava cautioned the scholars not to use empty vessels to attribute illogical statements to Rav Nahman. The expression refers to putting something into an empty container. In other words, one should not cite Rav Nahman’s name for a statement that does not make sense. Rav Nahman did not say that Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer was lenient regarding all these laws of contact with a corpse.
Rav Nahman actually said that Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer was lenient regarding a different matter: uncertainty about impurity in the public domain. The case had nothing to do with the details of touching a corpse or with the question of whether the impurity lasts one day or seven days.
The general rule is that when there is uncertainty about impurity in a private domain, the person is impure, but when there is uncertainty about impurity in the public domain, the person is pure. Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer taught that a person in a case of uncertain impurity in the public domain is pure. That was the ruling for which he was called Yosef the Permitter.
The Gemara asks what is novel about that ruling. The Sages had already established it. We derive the law from the case of a suspected woman. A suspected woman is secluded with a man, and we do not know whether she had relations with him. Nevertheless, the Torah treats her as impure. From the case of the suspected woman, the Gemara derives that uncertainty regarding impurity in a private domain results in impurity. Since the suspected woman was secluded in a private domain, the law applies to a private domain.
Why, then, do we need Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer to teach the law of uncertainty in the public domain? He was simply correct. The answer is that although the law was known to the Sages, they did not publicize it. They were concerned that people would begin applying the leniency outside its proper limits.
Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer nevertheless went and announced it publicly: “Everyone, uncertainty about impurity in the public domain is pure.” Rabbi Yehuda said that markers should be placed to inform people precisely where the public domain ended and where the private domain began. The markers were not for purposes of carrying on Shabbat; they were intended to show people where this law of uncertainty about impurity in the public domain applied and where it did not.
There was a tradition that this law had been known among the earlier scholars, but that it was later publicized. When people would come before Rabbi Yannai with a case involving uncertainty about impurity in the public domain, he would tell them, “There is water in the river. Go immerse yourself.” He did not tell them explicitly that they were pure. This demonstrates that the Sages did not want to publicize the leniency, whereas Rabbi Yosef ben Yo’ezer did publicize it. That was another reason they called him Yosef the Permitter.
We now return to the Mishnah and begin discussing the law of food cooked by gentiles. This is a very relevant law, and the Gemara will now present the details concerning foods cooked by gentiles that Jews are not permitted to eat.
The opening term refers to cooked vegetables and similar cooked foods. The Mishnah says that when a gentile cooks the food, it may not be eaten. The Gemara asks for the source of the prohibition against eating food cooked by a gentile.
Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Hiyya that the source is a verse. When the Jewish people wished to pass through the land of Sihon, they said, “You shall sell me food for money, so that I may eat, and give me water for money, so that I may drink.” The Gemara compares the food to the water. Just as the water remained in its natural state, so too the food must remain in its natural state.
According to this interpretation, food that has not been changed from its original state may be eaten from a gentile. If the gentile did something to the food—namely, cooked it—the food may not be eaten. The Gemara challenges this derivation. What if the gentile merely roasted kernels of wheat? The wheat is still in its natural state; it was only roasted.
There is a teaching that roasted wheat remains permitted. This demonstrates that roasting alone does not necessarily make the food prohibited. The Gemara therefore modifies the derivation. Just as water is not changed from its original form, so too food that has not been changed from its original form remains permitted.
The Gemara challenges this as well. What if one has wheat and grinds it into flour? The food has changed from its original form. Would flour prepared by a gentile be prohibited?
The answer is that the relevant comparison is to water that has not changed through fire. Food that has not changed from its original form through fire remains permitted. Grinding is not the issue. Even though grinding changes the food, it does not change it through fire. Roasted wheat also remains permitted, because roasting does not change it from its original form in the relevant way.
The Gemara then asks: where does the verse mention fire? The verse merely speaks about food and water. The derivation is therefore not a Torah-level source that food cooked by a gentile is prohibited. Ultimately, the law of food cooked by gentiles is rabbinic. The Rabbis established that food which is changed through fire by a gentile is prohibited.
What is the reason for the prohibition? Rashi states in the Mishnah that it is because of social closeness. If a Jew becomes accustomed to eating and drinking with gentiles, he may become close to them and eventually marry into them.
In another passage, however, Rashi gives a different reason. He says that the purpose is to prevent a Jew from becoming accustomed to eating at a gentile’s home, where the gentile might feed him something impure or add non-kosher ingredients. The Jew begins eating the food that the gentile prepares and may eventually eat other prohibited foods as well.
Rashi therefore appears to give two reasons: preventing social closeness that could lead to intermarriage, and preventing a person from becoming accustomed to eating food prepared by a gentile, including food containing prohibited ingredients. Tosafot and the Ramban favor the reason involving intermarriage. Some authorities say that both reasons apply, which would explain why Rashi gives one reason in the Mishnah and another reason elsewhere.
Some authorities further say that the prohibition applies only when a gentile cooks in the gentile’s home. If a gentile servant cooks in a Jewish home, the concern of social closeness does not apply in the same way, because the Jew is not visiting the gentile’s home. The concern about being served prohibited ingredients may also be different, since the Jewish household owns the ingredients and controls the kitchen.
Indeed, this is the opinion of Maran in the Shulchan Aruch: there is no distinction between food cooked by a gentile outside the Jewish home and food cooked by a gentile inside the Jewish home. In both cases, it is considered food cooked by a gentile.
It is nevertheless useful to know the other opinion, because in a situation where one needs an additional factor in order to be lenient, that opinion may be relevant. According to the Shulchan Aruch, food cooked by a gentile is prohibited whether the Jew goes to the gentile’s home and the gentile cooks for him or the gentile comes to the Jewish home and cooks for him.
That is the general rule, but we now need to discuss the details. Outside the Jewish home, nobody disputes that the issue of food cooked by a gentile can apply. The question is whether every restaurant automatically falls under this prohibition. We have not yet discussed what causes food to be classified as food cooked by a gentile, or what removes that classification.
It may be that if a gentile merely turns on the fire, the food is no longer considered food cooked by a gentile. We need to determine whether the gentile must actually participate in the cooking process or perform some act in the cooking itself. Therefore, one cannot simply say that everything in a restaurant is automatically prohibited as food cooked by a gentile.
There may also be room for distinctions according to different communities. For Ashkenazim, one may sometimes begin considering additional factors, because the concern of social closeness does not apply in the same way in a restaurant: it is not the gentile’s private home. The concern about being served prohibited ingredients may also not apply in the same way in a restaurant. These opinions can therefore become additional factors in a lenient ruling, although all the details still need to be examined.
As a general matter, of course, one should try to observe the stricter position when possible. We will now proceed to examine all the details of the law.