We begin by revisiting a novel teaching discussed previously in the Talmud Bavli, which is now presented as a dispute. The original teaching, attributed to Rav, stated that if one breaks a stick in front of an idol that is worshipped specifically by using a stick (e.g., by banging or waving it), this act is considered a violation. This is because the stick functions as an offering, and breaking it is analogous to slaughtering an animal for a sacrifice. The principle established in the Gemara is that any service performed in the Beit HaMikdash (Holy Temple) that is similar to a service of idolatry renders one liable, even if it is not the idol's usual manner of worship. Thus, breaking the stick, which is like an offering, is akin to slaughtering, and one is liable.
Let us consider this as a dispute concerning the laws of idolatry. Imagine one slaughters a grasshopper in front of any idol, regardless of whether this is its usual manner of worship. Rabbi Ulla would obligate the person, while the Sages would exempt them. This dispute can be understood as follows: Rabbi Ulla maintains that the act is "like slaughtering," meaning that even though a grasshopper does not require actual slaughtering, the act of killing it in this manner is considered a form of slaughtering. This is not worse than breaking a stick, which also renders one liable. We specifically use the example of a grasshopper, not a chicken or bird that requires ritual slaughtering, to highlight that actual slaughtering is not necessary for liability. Just as slaughtering a grasshopper is deemed a sacrificial act and renders one liable, so too would breaking a stick be considered similar.
However, the Sages argue, "We do not say 'like slaughtering.'" They contend that one needs an actual act of slaughtering, similar to the sacrifices in the Beit HaMikdash, to incur liability for idolatry. Therefore, breaking a stick would not be considered a liable act. The Gemara then suggests that perhaps everyone agrees that "like slaughtering" is not sufficient, and actual slaughtering is required, similar to the practice in the Beit HaMikdash. In this view, breaking a stick would not be considered a liable act of slaughtering. So, what then is the case with the grasshopper?
The Gemara explains that a grasshopper is different because its neck is anatomically similar to that of an animal. Therefore, even though it does not require slaughtering, the act of slaughtering it resembles an actual slaughtering. Hence, Rabbi Ulla would deem one liable for slaughtering a grasshopper in front of an idol, as it is "like slaughtering" in its physical execution. A stick, however, has no resemblance to an animal's neck and thus no aspect of slaughtering at all. The Sages, on the other hand, would maintain that since slaughtering is not truly applicable to a grasshopper, one would be exempt.
Rabbi Nachman then said in the name of Rabbi Ulla: If an idol is worshipped by using a stick, and one breaks a stick in front of it, one is liable. This reiterates the principle that breaking a stick is considered like bringing an offering, where the stick is the offering and breaking it is like slaughtering. Since slaughtering was performed in the Beit HaMikdash, any similar service to an idol renders one liable, whether it is the idol's usual manner of worship or not. In this scenario, the stick itself becomes forbidden, as it is now considered an offering to idolatry. Similarly, if one throws a stick in front of an idol that is worshipped by throwing sticks, one is also liable.
Rashi explains that if throwing a stick is the usual manner of worship, one is liable for performing it. However, the stick itself does not become forbidden. This is because for an offering to an idol to become forbidden, it must have a parallel in the Beit HaMikdash. Throwing a stick has no equivalent in the Temple service, unlike the pouring of blood. The Gemara clarifies that throwing a stick is not like pouring blood. When blood is poured, it spills and disperses, which is analogous to being "broken." When a stick is thrown, it remains intact. Therefore, if an idol is worshipped by throwing a stick, one is liable for the act, but the stick itself does not become forbidden because the act of throwing it does not parallel a Temple service like the breaking of blood.
The courtier then asks about the stones thrown at Markulis. Markulis was an idol typically represented by a three-stone structure, worshipped by throwing stones at it. The stones thrown are considered offerings. However, since there is no parallel to throwing stones in the Beit HaMikdash service, the stones of Markulis should not become forbidden. One would be liable for throwing them, as it is the manner of worship, but the stones themselves should remain permissible. The courtier explains that he had this very question himself. The answer is that when the stones are thrown, they become an addendum to Markulis. This means the stones themselves become part of the idol. According to the opinion that an idol belonging to a non-Jew becomes forbidden immediately upon its creation or dedication, once a stone is thrown and added to Markulis, it becomes forbidden, even if it was not individually worshipped or bowed to. The act of throwing it to become part of the existing idol makes it forbidden.
The Gemara further elaborates on this. When one throws the first stone, that stone is considered an offering, an act of serving the idol. It then becomes part of the idol. When a second stone is thrown, it is a service to the stone thrown before it. Thus, the second stone also becomes an offering to the first, and therefore becomes forbidden. This chain continues: the third stone serves the second, and so on. Every stone is worshipped by the subsequent stone. This leads to a problem: the very last stone thrown would then be permissible, as no subsequent stone served it. The Gemara states that if one could identify the last stone in a pile, it would indeed be permissible. However, in practice, it is impossible to identify the last stone in a pile.
Rav Ashi provides the answer: "Each and every stone becomes an offering to itself and an offering to its fellow." This means that the very act of throwing the stone transforms it into an idol. Therefore, even the last stone becomes forbidden, because at the moment it is thrown, it becomes an idol and is served by the act of throwing itself. The commentators explain that the act of throwing simultaneously makes the stone an idol and constitutes its worship. Thus, every stone, even the last one, becomes forbidden.
We now turn to a Mishnah concerning items found on an idol. If one finds clothes, money, or vessels on the head of an idol, these items are permissible for use. This is because they were not placed there for beautification. However, if one finds a cluster of grapes, stalks of wheat, wine, oil, or flour, or any item typically placed on the Mizbeach (altar) in the Beit HaMikdash, these items are forbidden. This is because it is assumed they were placed on the idol as offerings, even if not for beautification.
The Gemara explains that wine, oil, and flour are forbidden because they were offered on the Mizbeach in the Beit HaMikdash. Therefore, even if this is not the usual manner of worship for the specific idol, the act of pouring or placing these items is considered an offering. It is like the pouring of libations in the Beit HaMikdash, thus making it an offering to idolatry. Two conditions are met: these items were used in the Beit HaMikdash, and the manner of offering (pouring) is similar. However, grapes and stalks of wheat are not typically brought on the Mizbeach, nor is their offering similar to a Beit HaMikdash service. The Mishnah refers to a case where the grapes were cut from the vine, or the stalks from the field, specifically for the idol. The act of cutting itself is considered like slaughtering an animal, and therefore it is considered an offering to idolatry, similar to breaking a stick. The cutting off the plant is analogous to slaughtering.
A new question arises: How do we know that if one brings a blemished animal as an offering to an idol, one is exempt from the death penalty? This applies specifically when bringing a blemished animal is not the idol's usual manner of worship. If it were the usual manner, one would certainly be liable. The exemption stems from the verse in Devarim, "You shall not bring an offering to other gods, for it is only for God alone." This verse implies that one is only liable for offering to idolatry if the offering is similar to what would be accepted by God. Since blemished animals are not accepted by God, one is not liable for bringing them to an idol.
Rava analyzes what type of blemish is being discussed. If it refers to a specific type of cataract in the animal's eye, which was permissible for a Ben Noach (descendant of Noah) to offer on private altars before the Torah was given, then this blemish would not render the animal unacceptable. If a Ben Noach could offer such an animal, then surely offering it to an idol would incur liability. Therefore, the blemish must be a more severe one, such as a missing limb. How do we know that a Ben Noach is not permitted to offer an animal missing a limb? This is derived from the account of Noah and the Teiva (ark).
When God instructed Noah to bring animals into the Teiva, the verse states, "From all living things." Why specify "living things" instead of just "all flesh"? Rashi explains that this means to bring animals whose main organs are functioning, without missing limbs, so they could be offered as sacrifices upon leaving the Teiva. This implies that a Ben Noach cannot offer an animal missing a limb. Therefore, if one offers an animal missing a limb to an idol, one would be exempt, as such an offering is not accepted even by a Ben Noach.
The Gemara challenges this: Perhaps "from all living things" comes to teach that one should not bring non-kosher animals (tereifot) onto the Teiva. A non-kosher animal is one with a defect that will cause it to die. So how do we know about an animal missing a limb? The Gemara responds that the prohibition of non-kosher animals is learned from a different verse, which states that only animals that can reproduce should be brought. A non-kosher animal, for example, one with a punctured brain or a severed leg, cannot reproduce. Thus, "from all living things" teaches us about animals missing a limb.
This explanation, however, relies on the opinion that a non-kosher animal cannot reproduce. What if one holds that a non-kosher animal *can* reproduce? Then "from all living things" would not exclude non-kosher animals. In that case, how do we know about an animal missing a limb? The verse states, "Bring into the Teiva to keep alive with you." From the word "with you," we learn that the animals must be similar to Noah – just as Noah was not a non-kosher person, so too the animals should not be non-kosher. This is how we learn about non-kosher animals. Therefore, "from all living things" teaches us about animals missing a limb, which a Ben Noach cannot offer.
One might argue, what if Noah himself was a non-kosher person? The Torah states, "Noah was perfect." But perhaps "perfect" refers to his character traits, not his physical body. The Gemara clarifies that the Torah explicitly states Noah was "perfect" in his ways, implying physical perfection as well. Furthermore, even if Noah were non-kosher, it would make no sense for God to instruct him to bring only non-kosher animals into the Teiva. Therefore, it is certain that Noah was not non-kosher. Thus, "to keep alive with you" teaches that animals must be like Noah, meaning not non-kosher. Since all animals brought into the Teiva were eventually offered as sacrifices, this teaches us that a non-kosher animal cannot be brought as an offering. Consequently, "from all living things" teaches that an animal missing a limb also cannot be brought as an offering.
Now, what does the phrase "to keep alive" teach us? If we only had "with you," one might think God merely wanted Noah to have company, and therefore animals that would die (non-kosher ones) were excluded. But this would still permit bringing old animals or those incapable of bearing children, as long as they were not non-kosher. The phrase "to keep alive" comes to teach us that the animals must be capable of perpetuating their species, excluding those that cannot bear children. So, to summarize: "from all living things" teaches that an animal missing a limb cannot be offered. "With you" teaches that a non-kosher animal cannot be offered. And "to keep alive" teaches that animals must be capable of reproduction.
Returning to the original law, the Gemara began by stating in the name of Rabbi Hanan that if one offers a blemished animal to an idol, one is exempt. This refers to an animal missing a limb, not one with a cataract, as the latter would incur liability. The exemption for a missing limb is derived from the Noah story, where God instructed Noah to bring only complete, living animals. Therefore, if one offers an animal missing a limb to an idol, one is exempt.
The Gemara then asks how we know that one is liable for slaughtering an animal for an idol, even if slaughtering is not the idol's usual manner of worship. A verse states, "And they shall no longer offer their sacrifices to their goat-demons." If this verse were referring to offering sacrifices in the usual manner, it would be redundant, as that is known from another verse: "How the nations serve their gods." That verse teaches that any way non-Jews serve their idols is forbidden. Therefore, the verse "And they shall no longer offer their sacrifices" must teach a novel teaching: even if one serves an idol in a manner that is not its usual way, one is still liable. For example, even if Markulis is worshipped by throwing stones, if one brings a sword and slaughters an animal for it, one is liable.
The Gemara clarifies that this verse is needed for a different novel teaching found in a Baraita, concerning the laws of private altars (bamot). Before the Mishkan was built, private altars were permissible. If a person consecrated an animal for an offering, they could bring it on a private altar. However, once the Mishkan was built, private altars became forbidden. The verse "And they shall no longer offer their sacrifices" refers to two cases: firstly, an animal consecrated and offered on a private altar while the Mishkan was already in existence. This is certainly forbidden. Secondly, an animal consecrated when private altars were permissible, but then offered on a private altar after the Mishkan was built. This too is forbidden. The verse teaches that both situations are forbidden.
The verse "And they shall no longer offer their sacrifices" specifically refers to consecrated animals that were offered on private altars at the time the Mishkan was built. This is clearly a punishable offense. Another verse states, "You must bring your offerings to God alone," indicating that offerings must be brought to the Mishkan. The word "pen" (lest) in the verse "lest you offer your sacrifices in any place you want" indicates a negative commandment. This teaches that if one offers a sacrifice on a private altar when the Mishkan exists, it is forbidden. Other verses in that section, such as "in order that they will bring their offerings in the fields," refer to animals consecrated when private altars were permissible, but then offered in the fields (i.e., on private altars) after the Mishkan was built. The verse states that even though these sacrifices had a permissible status at the time of their consecration, offering them in the field is like offering them to idolatry. This teaches that anyone who brings an offering on a private altar when the Mishkan exists is like one who offers it in the field. The instruction to bring it "to God" teaches that it must be brought to the Mishkan and not elsewhere. Such an act incurs spiritual excision (karet), similar to the case where an animal was consecrated and offered on a private altar after the Mishkan was built. The phrase "this shall be an eternal decree for them" applies only to the first case, where karet is incurred. In the second case, where the animal was consecrated during the time of private altars but offered on a private altar after the Mishkan was built, it is forbidden, but karet is not incurred. Nevertheless, the verse clearly teaches that one may no longer sacrifice outside the Mishkan.
So, if "And they shall no longer offer their sacrifices" refers to sacrifices on private altars, how do we derive from it the law that one is liable for offering to an idol even if it's not the usual manner of worship? Abba explains that the verse teaches two things. The phrase "And they shall no longer offer" by itself refers to the prohibition of bringing sacrifices outside the Mishkan. The continuation, "to their goat-demons," is a separate teaching, indicating that one may not sacrifice to other gods. Thus, the verse conveys two distinct prohibitions: one against offering outside the Mishkan, and another against sacrificing to idols, even in an unusual manner. This is how we know that one is liable for slaughtering for an idol even if it is not its usual manner of worship.
We return to the Mishnah: If one finds money, garments, or vessels on the head of Markulis, these items are permissible for use. They were not placed there for beautification. Money, for instance, is not typically used for beautifying an idol. However, if one finds grapes, crowns made of stalks of wheat, wine, oil, or flour, or any items typically brought on the Mizbeach, these are forbidden. This is because they are considered offerings to Markulis, even if not for beautification. Any item brought on the Mizbeach is assumed to be an offering to the idol.
The Gemara asks for the source that items placed for beautification of an idol become forbidden. Chiya Bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: One verse in Devarim states, "And you saw their detestable things, their idols of wood and stone, silver and gold that are with them." This implies that wood and stone, which are not typically for beautification, become forbidden if placed before the idol. Another verse says, "Do not covet the silver and gold that is on them." This refers to items placed for beautification. The Gemara infers that the verse referring to "with them" (wood and stone) is similar to the verse referring to "on them" (silver and gold). Just as silver and gold become forbidden only when placed for beautification, so too wood and stone become forbidden only when placed for beautification. If wood and stone were forbidden even when not for beautification, the verse mentioning silver and gold would be redundant. The fact that both verses are used teaches that only items placed for beautification become forbidden.
The Gemara challenges: Is money an item of beautification? The Mishnah states that money found on Markulis is permissible. The Gemara explains that this refers to a wallet of money tied and hanging from the idol's neck, not placed for beautification but perhaps for storage or payment to a priest. Similarly, garments found on the idol are permissible if they are folded and placed on its head, not for beautification. Vessels are also permissible if, for example, a bucket is turned upside down on its head, which is not a beautifying act.
Rabbi Yosef Bar Hanina then states a tradition: "All that is within the partition of an idol is like outside it for Baal Peor and Markulis." This means that for these two specific idols, there is no distinction between items found inside or outside their enclosure. For other idols, items like water and salt, which are not for beautification but were brought as offerings within the enclosure, are forbidden. Outside the enclosure, only items of beautification are forbidden. But for Baal Peor and Markulis, due to their unique modes of worship (defecating for Baal Peor, throwing stones for Markulis), the usual rules of enclosure do not apply. The Gemara questions this: If these idols are worshipped by such debasing acts as defecation, surely water and salt, even if not for beautification, would be forbidden if found inside the enclosure, as they would be considered offerings. The point is that these idols are served without any sense of modesty or distinction between inside and outside. Therefore, any item found, whether inside or outside, whether for beautification or not, is considered an offering and becomes forbidden. For a regular idol, items like water and salt found outside the curtain, if not for beautification, are permissible because offerings are usually made inside the curtain. But for Baal Peor and Markulis, there is no such distinction; their offerings are made anywhere, without regard for walls or modesty. Therefore, any item found in their vicinity is considered an offering and becomes forbidden.