We are on page 58, beginning with a story. Rabbi Yohanan ben Arzah and Rabbi Yosef ben Nehorai were sitting and drinking wine. A non-Jew was present. The rabbis thought he was Jewish, but he was not.
One of the rabbis said, “This wine is excellent.” The non-Jew then picked up the vessel and poured the wine. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of the one who prohibits the wine, and what is the reasoning of the one who permits it? Both positions have a logic behind them.
The one who prohibits it says that the non-Jew knew it was wine. The one who permits it says that the non-Jew thought it was beer or liquor, not wine.
Why would the one who prohibits it assume that the non-Jew knew it was wine? The Gemara explains that one might have thought as follows: These rabbis were sitting and drinking. Surely they were not drinking beer or liquor. Those drinks were not considered sufficiently distinguished for people of their stature; certainly, these rabbis were drinking wine. The vessel from which they were pouring was not transparent, so when the non-Jew came, he assumed that they were drinking wine. He therefore said, “I will ruin it for them. I will render it forbidden through my pouring.”
The other rabbi, however, said that there was an equally good reason to permit the wine. Surely the non-Jew did not think they were drinking wine. If they were drinking wine, would they have asked him to pour it for them? Since they asked him to pour, he must have assumed that it was beer or liquor. A non-Jew does not perform an idolatrous libation with beer. According to that reasoning, the wine remains permitted.
The Gemara then examines the details. Did the non-Jew not see that it was wine? The Gemara answers that it was nighttime, so he did not know what it was when he picked it up. One might have said that he could smell it, but this was new wine in a new barrel, and the smell of the barrel made it impossible for him to identify the contents.
The assumption in this case is that the wine was in a barrel. The rabbis told the non-Jew to take a ladle, place it into the barrel, and draw out wine for them. The Gemara asks whether placing the ladle into the barrel is considered touching the wine, since the ladle might be regarded as an extension of his hand.
Until this point, the non-Jew had not touched the wine. Now, however, we are considering the possibility that when he inserted the ladle into the barrel, he touched it. Even if he thought that it was beer and did not intend to render it forbidden, perhaps the wine is nevertheless prohibited because he touched it.
There is a principle that when a non-Jew touches wine without intending to drink it, the wine may not be drunk. For example, even if a non-Jew is working with a Jew and does not know that there is wine in a container, his touch can still prohibit the wine for drinking, even though he had no intention of drinking it.
However, the Gemara answers that the non-Jew did not pour the wine directly from the barrel with his hand. Rather, he used the ladle. He did not touch the wine itself; he merely placed his hand into the barrel and poured the wine out with the ladle.
What is the law regarding wine that was moved by a non-Jew? The concern is that idolatrous worship was performed by shaking or moving wine. Once the wine moved even slightly in the manner in which the idolaters served their idols, it could be considered a libation.
Here, however, the non-Jew merely tilted the barrel. As a result of tilting the barrel, the wine moved. That movement was caused by his force, but it was not direct. He did not insert his hand and shake the wine. He tilted the barrel, and the wine moved as a result. This is movement caused by his force, without the intention of rendering the wine a libation.
The Gemara explains what the idolaters would do. If the idol was present, they would pour the wine directly onto the idol. If they had a container of wine and the idol was somewhere else, they would insert their hand into the wine and shake it. That was their method of worship.
Accordingly, the concern here is not that the non-Jew poured the wine into the Jewish person’s cup. The concern is that, by pouring, he caused the wine remaining in the barrel to move. The movement was caused by his force, but it was not direct, and he had no intention of performing a libation.
The Gemara asks why the rabbis did not permit the wine for drinking in such a case. One rabbi wanted to say that the wine was permitted for drinking. How do we know this? The Gemara explains that movement caused by a person’s force is permitted for drinking when it was not done with the intention of performing a libation. From this, we can infer that direct movement without the intention to perform a libation is permitted for benefit, but prohibited for drinking. If this movement caused by force were prohibited even for benefit, then it should also be prohibited for drinking. Since the Gemara permits this movement for drinking, it must be that direct movement without the intention of performing a libation is permitted for benefit.
The novelty of this case is that even when the non-Jew inserted his hand into the barrel, the wine remains permitted for benefit. The further novelty is that, because the movement was indirect and without intention, the wine is even permitted for drinking.
That is why one rabbi wanted to permit the wine. The other rabbi wanted to prohibit it because he believed that the non-Jew knew it was wine. These rabbis were not drinking ordinary liquor or beer. When the non-Jew poured the wine, his intention was to perform a libation. If he had the intention to perform a libation, the wine would be prohibited.
As for the fact that he touched the barrel, that is a separate discussion. Touching the barrel itself is not the issue. The issue is that he moved the wine and caused it to move. The question is whether that movement was direct or indirect, and whether he intended to render the wine forbidden.
We continue on page 58, side two, with a new question. Rabbi Asi asked Rabbi Yohanan about wine that a non-Jew diluted with water. Rashi explains that the non-Jew did not touch the wine itself; he poured water into it. The wines were very strong, and people would pour water into the cup to dilute them.
Before answering the question, Rabbi Yohanan objected to the terminology. “Why are you using such a fancy word? I have never heard that word used. Use the regular terminology: he diluted the wine.”
Rabbi Asi replied, “I am using the language of the biblical verse.” The verse says that she slaughtered her animals and diluted her wine. “I am using the wording of the verse.”
Rabbi Yohanan answered that the Bible has its own way of speaking, while the Sages have their own way of speaking. We speak in the terminology of the Sages. The proper term is that he diluted the wine.
What is the law? The Sages tell a Nazirite to go around the vineyard and not come close to it, because they are concerned that he might come to eat a grape. Technically, a Nazirite may walk through a vineyard; he is prohibited only from eating grapes. Nevertheless, the Sages added a safeguard so that he would not come to violate the prohibition. They therefore tell him to go around the vineyard and stay away from it.
Similarly, the wine in this case should technically be permitted because the non-Jew did not touch it and therefore did not perform a libation. Nevertheless, the wine may not be drunk. The reason is that, by pouring water into the wine, he caused the wine to move through his force. Although he did not move it directly, the movement resulted from the water that he poured in.
This is a safeguard against a possible violation. The wine is prohibited only for drinking; it remains permitted for benefit, meaning that it may be sold. The case is no more severe than the case we learned earlier, in which a non-Jew touched wine unintentionally. For example, when a non-Jew was in a palm tree and, while climbing down, accidentally touched the wine, we said that the wine may not be drunk but remains permitted for benefit.
There is, however, a question. The case of the person who fell from the tree was a complete accident. Here, the non-Jew deliberately did something to the wine: he poured water into it. Although he did not intend to perform a libation, he did intend to dilute the wine and caused it to move. Perhaps this case should be treated more strictly.
That is a valid question. It may be more stringent because the non-Jew caused the wine to move, even though the movement was indirect. Nevertheless, the Gemara does not give us a reason to prohibit it for benefit. The wine is prohibited only for drinking.
The Gemara then relates that Rabbi Yohanan came to a place called Botzra. He saw Jewish people eating produce without separating the required tithes. He prohibited the produce and told them that they were not permitted to eat it.
He then saw water that non-Jews worshipped, while the Jewish people were drinking from it. He also told them that this was prohibited. Afterward, he came to Rabbi Yohanan—rather, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish came to Rabbi Yohanan—and reported what he had seen.
Rabbi Yohanan told him, “Put your jacket back on and go back to them. Tell them that what you told them was prohibited is actually permitted. Do not even take off your jacket. Go immediately and tell them that it is permitted.”
What had happened? Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish had misunderstood the location. He thought that Botzra was within the Land of Israel and therefore assumed that the produce was obligated in tithes. Since the people had not separated tithes, he prohibited the produce. In fact, Botzra was outside the Land of Israel, so the produce they were eating was permitted.
He was also mistaken about the water. A non-Jew cannot prohibit public water by worshipping it, because a non-Jew cannot prohibit something that belongs to the public. Since this was a public stream, the water remained permitted. He was therefore wrong for that reason as well.
The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yohanan followed his established position. Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yotzadak that public water cannot become prohibited through idolatrous worship. From this, the Gemara infers that private water can become prohibited.
But there is another principle: something attached to the ground cannot become prohibited through idolatrous worship. Mountains do not become prohibited. Water that is still attached to the ground should likewise not become prohibited. Therefore, even private water should remain permitted if it is attached to the ground.
The Gemara answers that the case concerns water that became detached, like a wave. The water rose above the stream and then fell back down. At the moment when the water separated from the stream, the non-Jew worshipped it. Since it was temporarily detached, the principle that something attached to the ground cannot become prohibited does not apply.
The Gemara explains that there was a strong current. The water would sometimes rise above the stream, separate from it, and then fall back down. The non-Jew bowed down to the water while it was detached. Therefore, this case does not have the status of water attached to the ground.
One might ask why Rabbi Yohanan had to give this reason. Why not simply say that a non-Jew cannot prohibit somebody else’s water? The wording seems to indicate that only public water cannot become prohibited, while private water can.
The Gemara explains that private water can indeed become prohibited if it is detached. If a non-Jew worships his own water while it is still attached to the ground, it remains permitted because of the principle that something attached to the ground cannot become prohibited. But if the water rises and becomes detached, it can become prohibited.
When the non-Jew struck the water with his head and caused it to rise, there was an act performed by a person. The Gemara is discussing the situation in which the water separated and then fell back down. The fact that private water can become prohibited in such a case does not necessarily tell us what the law is when the separation occurred on its own.
The Gemara compares this to an earlier discussion concerning stones that became detached from a mountain. The mountain itself does not become prohibited. The question was whether stones that separated from the mountain become prohibited. There was a dispute: one side said that they become prohibited, while the other said that they remain permitted. This was a dispute between the sons of Rabbi Chiya and Rabbi Yohanan.
The stones had separated by themselves; nobody struck them or detached them. The question was what the basis of the rule was. Is the reason that a mountain cannot become prohibited because a person has no ownership or involvement in its creation? If so, a detached stone should perhaps become prohibited. Or is the reason that the mountain is attached to the ground? If that is the reason, then once the stone separates, it may become prohibited.
There are therefore two possible approaches. One can say that the issue is whether a person had a role in creating or owning the object. Nobody created the stone, so perhaps there is no reason for it to become prohibited. Alternatively, one can say that the relevant principle is attachment to the ground. Once the stone is detached, it may become prohibited.
The Gemara had recorded the dispute but had not identified which authority held which position. It now attempts to infer that Rabbi Yohanan was the one who said that detached stones become prohibited. Since Rabbi Yohanan said that water can become prohibited when it separates from the ground, it would follow that he also holds that a stone separated from a mountain can become prohibited.
However, the Gemara rejects this proof. In the case of the water, Rabbi Yohanan was discussing a situation in which a person struck the water and caused it to separate. There was an act performed by a person. In the case of the stones, they separated by themselves. There may be a different law when the separation occurs without human action.
Therefore, one cannot prove from the case of the water which position Rabbi Yohanan held in the dispute concerning the stones. In the water case, the non-Jew himself caused the water to rise and separate. In the case of the stones, nobody caused them to separate. It is possible that when a person causes the separation, the object becomes prohibited, while an object that separates on its own remains permitted.
The Gemara then brings another story. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish came to a place where Jewish girls had become pregnant by non-Jews who had circumcised themselves but had never immersed in a ritual bath.
He also saw wine that a non-Jew had diluted and sent to Jewish people. In addition, he saw a type of bean called lupine, which non-Jews had cooked. He came back and reported what he had seen, but initially did not say anything about the Jewish girls, the wine, or the cooked food.
He then went to Rabbi Yohanan and repeated what he had seen. Rabbi Yohanan said, “Announce that the children are illegitimate, that the wine is prohibited, and that the food is prohibited, because the people in that place are not knowledgeable in Torah.”
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish asked how the children could be considered illegitimate. A man who has relations with a non-Jewish woman produces a child whose mother is Jewish if the mother is Jewish, but how does that make the child illegitimate in the technical sense? Illegitimacy is associated with serious prohibitions, and this case requires explanation.
Rabbi Yohanan was following his own position. Rabbi Yohanan held that a person is not considered a convert until he undergoes immersion in a ritual bath. Therefore, the men in question were still non-Jews, despite having circumcised themselves.
Rabbi Yohanan held that relations between a Jewish woman and a non-Jew create illegitimate children. This was Rabbi Yohanan’s position, although the practical halachic ruling does not follow it. The Gemara is presenting Rabbi Yohanan’s individual view in this discussion.
As for the wine, Rabbi Yohanan said to prohibit it because of the rabbinic safeguard concerning wine diluted by a non-Jew. Although the non-Jew did not touch the wine directly, he caused it to move by pouring water into it. The case is compared to the instruction given to a Nazirite to stay away from a vineyard. The wine is not necessarily prohibited by the basic law, but the Sages instituted a safeguard.
One might ask why Rabbi Yohanan referred to the wine as wine associated with a non-Jewish libation, which seems to imply that it is prohibited even for benefit. Until now, we had learned that this case was prohibited only for drinking and remained permitted for benefit.
Perhaps Rabbi Yohanan was being more stringent with these people because the practice was widespread. They were repeatedly diluting wine in this manner. Rabbi Yohanan may have feared that if he permitted the wine for benefit, they would become accustomed to the practice and eventually treat other cases of non-Jewish involvement as permitted. He therefore imposed a stricter ruling in that community.
Alternatively, there may have been a dispute about whether the men who had circumcised themselves but had not immersed were considered non-Jews. Rabbi Yohanan treated them as ordinary non-Jews in every respect.
What did Rabbi Yohanan say about the lupine? He told them that the lupine cooked by the non-Jews was prohibited because the people there were not Torah-oriented.
Why should the fact that they were not Torah-oriented make a difference? The prohibition of food cooked by a non-Jew does not apply to something that can be eaten raw. Lupine, however, cannot be eaten raw, so it is subject to the prohibition of food cooked by a non-Jew.
Rabbi Yohanan was applying the principle that food which is normally served on the table of kings, together with bread, is subject to the laws of food cooked by a non-Jew. Lupine is not normally served on the tables of kings. Therefore, for ordinary Torah-observant people, there would be no reason to prohibit it on that basis.
However, these people were not knowledgeable in Torah. If Rabbi Yohanan told them that the lupine was permitted, they might draw an incorrect conclusion and begin permitting foods that were genuinely subject to the prohibition of food cooked by a non-Jew. They did not understand the reasoning and distinctions involved. Rabbi Yohanan therefore told them that the lupine was prohibited.
In other words, the food was technically permitted because it was not food normally served on the table of kings. Nevertheless, Rabbi Yohanan prohibited it in that particular community because the people were not sufficiently knowledgeable to apply the distinction correctly.
If they had been Torah scholars, the lupine would have been permitted. The ruling was not based on the status of the lupine alone, but on the concern that these people would misunderstand the ruling and extend it to other foods.
Tosafot points out that we follow both principles. We take into account whether the food can be eaten raw, and we also take into account whether it is food normally served on the table of kings. Tosafot explains that the principle concerning food that can be eaten raw is not the only consideration; both principles are relevant.
The Gemara then asks a new question: May a non-Jew bring grapes to the winepress? The grapes are in a basket, and a Jewish person wants the non-Jew to carry them to the press. The grapes will eventually be crushed there.
We already learned that once the wine begins to flow in the winepress, it becomes prohibited if a non-Jew is involved. The new question is whether the non-Jew may carry the grapes in the basket before they reach the press.
Rashi does not explain precisely what the question is. The Rashbam, cited in Tosafot, explains that the question is whether the non-Jew may bring the basket of grapes to the winepress. The concern is that the grapes are piled on top of one another in the basket and may begin to crush one another. Juice may begin to emerge, and the non-Jew could touch it. According to this explanation, the grapes might already become prohibited in the basket.
Tosafot objects that this was not what we had said previously. We had said that the wine becomes prohibited in the winepress when it begins to flow there. Why should it become prohibited already in the basket?
Tosafot therefore offers another explanation. The question is not about carrying the basket. Carrying the grapes is not itself a problem. The question is whether the non-Jew may pour the basket of grapes into the winepress. There is already wine or grape juice in the winepress, and when he empties the grapes into it, his hand might touch the wine that is already there.
At the moment he pours the grapes into the winepress, the grapes and their juice are moving downward. The concern is that his hand may touch the wine in the press. If a non-Jew touches that wine, it may become prohibited.
One can understand the question in two ways. According to the Rashbam, it may be prohibited for the non-Jew to bring the grapes because liquid could emerge in the basket and he might touch it. According to the other explanation, carrying the grapes is permitted, and the question concerns only pouring them into the winepress, because his hand might touch the wine already there.
The distinction is important. The wine in the press belongs to the Jewish owner, and it is already moving as it flows. There is no reason to prohibit the movement merely because the non-Jew is carrying grapes toward it. The concern is specifically that, while emptying the grapes, the non-Jew might touch the wine with his hand.
The Gemara brings a teaching of Rav Yema in the name of Rav Kahana: A non-Jew who brought grapes in a basket to the winepress does not prohibit the wine. This appears to answer the question. Even though he pours the grapes into the press and juice begins to drip, the wine remains permitted.
But perhaps the teaching means only that if he already did so, the wine remains permitted. It may still be prohibited initially to ask him to do it. Just as we sometimes tell a person to stay away from a vineyard even though the produce would technically remain permitted, perhaps here as well the action should not be performed initially, although the wine is permitted after the fact.
In any event, the Gemara’s conclusion is that bringing the basket of grapes is not itself a problem. The concern discussed by the commentators is whether the non-Jew’s hand might touch wine during the pouring, but the teaching indicates that the wine remains permitted.
The Gemara then relates another story. A non-Jew fell into a barrel of wine. He had fallen in while trying to retrieve an etrog. The etrog was sinking toward the bottom, and the non-Jew put his hand into the barrel and caught it before it sank.
The concern was that, once his hand was inside the barrel, he might shake it slightly and thereby move the wine. If he had intended to do so, the wine would have become prohibited. At the time he inserted his hand, however, he was acting spontaneously and was occupied with retrieving the etrog. He had no intention of performing a libation.
Once he caught the etrog, however, the situation changed. Now he had the etrog in his hand, and on the way out he could decide to ruin the wine. The rabbis therefore told the Jewish people to hold his hand. They should prevent him from moving it, tilt the barrel, and empty all the wine. Once the barrel was empty, they could allow him to remove his hand.
The fact that the non-Jew had inserted his hand into the wine was not the concern, because he had no intention of performing a libation when he did so. The concern was that, after retrieving the etrog, he might deliberately shake the wine on his way out.
This appears similar to the earlier case in which a person inserted his hand into a barrel to measure the wine. There, we said that the wine could not be drunk. Why is the present case different? In the earlier case, the non-Jew had an ongoing intention to measure the wine. His action on the way in and on the way out was part of the measuring process.
Here, however, the non-Jew was initially occupied with catching the etrog. Once he caught it, that activity was finished. At that point, he could turn his attention to the wine and deliberately move it. Therefore, the rabbis held his hand so that he could not shake it.
Tosafot discusses this distinction. In the measuring case, the non-Jew remains occupied with measuring even as he removes his hand, so his intention continues on the way out. In the etrog case, once he catches the etrog, he is no longer occupied with that task. He may then turn his attention to the wine and have an intention to move it.
The Gemara then records a case in which a non-Jew deliberately moved Jewish wine. He inserted his hand into the wine and intentionally shook it. In that case, the wine is unquestionably prohibited, including for benefit. We had permitted wine for benefit only when the non-Jew moved it without intending to perform a libation.
When the non-Jew intentionally shakes the wine in order to perform a libation, there is no question that the wine is prohibited. The Gemara asks whether the Jewish owner can nevertheless receive compensation from the non-Jew who ruined the wine.
The answer is that the owner may demand compensation. This is not considered selling the prohibited wine. He is not asking the non-Jew to purchase prohibited wine or asking for permitted wine in exchange for it. Rather, the non-Jew damaged the owner’s property, and the owner is demanding payment for the value of the wine that was destroyed.
The non-Jew cannot say, “I made the wine prohibited, so I owe you nothing.” If a person damages someone else’s property, he must compensate the owner. The owner is not deriving benefit from the prohibited wine; he is receiving compensation for the loss caused by the non-Jew.
Rav Ashi asks where this principle can be derived. The Gemara brings a teaching: If a non-Jew renders a Jew’s wine prohibited through a libation, even when he does so away from the idol, the wine is prohibited.
There are two possible explanations for this teaching. One is that an actual act of idolatrous worship is involved only when the wine is poured before the idol. The other is that a non-Jew has no right to render another person’s wine prohibited against that person’s will.
According to the first explanation, the wine becomes prohibited because the non-Jew performed an act associated with idolatrous worship. According to the second explanation, the issue is that the non-Jew cannot impose the prohibition on the Jewish owner’s property against the owner’s will.
We do not follow the position that says that the wine is permitted because the non-Jew did not perform the act in front of the idol. We also do not follow the position that says that a non-Jew can never render another person’s wine prohibited. Nevertheless, the discussion supports the idea that the non-Jew is responsible for the damage.
The question is whether the wine becomes intrinsically prohibited through the non-Jew’s act, or whether the Sages merely imposed a prohibition as a safeguard. If the non-Jew himself caused the wine to become prohibited, then he is the damaging party, and the owner can demand compensation from him.
That is the basis of Rav Ashi’s reasoning. Even though the wine is prohibited for benefit, the Jewish owner is not selling it. He is seeking reimbursement for property that the non-Jew destroyed. The non-Jew performed an act that damaged the owner’s property, and therefore he must pay for the damage.
One might argue that perhaps the Sages were the ones who prohibited the wine as a safeguard. If so, why should the non-Jew be liable? The owner could say that the rabbis prohibited the wine, not the non-Jew.
The Gemara responds that the teaching indicates that the non-Jew himself is considered to have rendered the wine prohibited. Otherwise, there would be no basis for saying that the owner may demand compensation from him. The prohibition is therefore attributed to the non-Jew’s act, and he is treated as a person who damaged another’s property.
Accordingly, the conclusion is not that the owner may sell the prohibited wine. Rather, he may go to the non-Jew who caused the damage and demand payment for the value of the wine that he ruined.