The Mishnah says that when an army enters a city peacefully, open barrels of wine are forbidden, because we assume that the soldiers may have poured from them as an idolatrous libation or drunk from them. Sealed barrels, however, remain permitted. During wartime, when the army is entering to fight, even open barrels remain permitted, because the soldiers do not have the time to perform a libation with the wine.
The Gemara challenges this from a teaching in Massechet Ketubot: If a city is surrounded by an army, all women of priestly lineage in that city become forbidden to their husbands, because we must assume that they were violated. An Israelite woman, by contrast, becomes forbidden to her husband only if she was with the other man willingly; a woman of priestly lineage becomes forbidden even when it occurred against her will.
What do we see from there? Even when an army enters during wartime, the soldiers apparently have time to commit sins. They take the women of priestly lineage and violate them. If so, perhaps they also have time to make an idolatrous libation with the wine.
The Gemara answers that pouring a libation is not a significant temptation for them. They do not have a strong inclination toward that act, and therefore they will not take the time to do it. They do, however, have a strong inclination toward sexual relations, and for that they will make time even during wartime. The inclination toward libation is not strong enough to overcome the urgency of the war, whereas their inclination toward sexual relations is strong enough to do so.
The Mishnah then discusses Jewish laborers who work for non-Jews. If a Jewish slave or worker sends the non-Jew a barrel of wine as payment for his wages, the worker may say, “Give me the value of the wine in money instead.” Before the non-Jew has accepted the wine as payment, the Jewish worker may choose to receive money, and there is no problem. The non-Jew can sell the barrel and give him the money, or pay him from his own funds. The Jew is owed money; he did not instruct the non-Jew specifically to pay him with idolatrous wine.
Once the wine has entered the non-Jew’s possession, however, the Jew may not take the barrel back in exchange for money. At that point, the wine is already considered idolatrous wine, and it cannot be exchanged for its monetary value. Before the non-Jew accepts the barrel, the Jew may say, “Sell the barrel and give me the money.” After the non-Jew has accepted it, that is no longer possible.
The same principle applies to other payments. A Jew may tell a non-Jew, “Go and pay my tax to the king.” Even if the non-Jew chooses to pay the tax with idolatrous wine, the Jew is not considered to have instructed him to pay with such wine. The Jew merely told him to handle the tax; the non-Jew may pay it in whatever manner he chooses. The Jew can then reimburse him.
But a Jew may not tell the non-Jew, “Take my place and appease the tax official for me.” That is different. In that formulation, the non-Jew is appointed to act as the Jew’s representative. If he pays with idolatrous wine, it is as though the Jew himself paid with that wine. Everything depends on how the Jew appoints him. If he says, “Handle this for me, and I will reimburse you,” that is permitted, because he has not specified how the non-Jew should make the payment. If he says explicitly, “Take my place,” then the non-Jew is acting as his representative, and the Jew may not benefit from the idolatrous wine.
The Gemara asks whether this can be reconciled with the earlier case. The answer is that the two cases are comparable only with respect to saving the Jew from the tax collector. When the Jew says, “Handle it for me,” the non-Jew may handle it in any way he chooses. But when the Jew says, “Take my place,” he is appointing the non-Jew to act in his place, and that creates the problem.
The next Mishnah discusses a Jew who sells wine to a non-Jew. If they agree on a price before the wine is measured and transferred, the money is permitted. The non-Jew then draws the wine toward himself, and at that point it becomes his. If he subsequently touches it, he is touching his own wine, and there is no problem. If the wine is measured before they agree on a price, however, the money is forbidden.
Rashi explains the reason. Ordinarily, a non-Jew acquires an object through drawing it toward himself. In this case, the non-Jew brings his own barrel, and the Jew pours the wine into it. As the wine is poured, the non-Jew is drawing it toward himself, and this acquisition would ordinarily take effect immediately. But that is true only when the price has already been established. Once the price has been agreed upon, the non-Jew is considered to have acquired the wine through the act of drawing it, even though he has not yet paid. The money is merely owed to the Jew.
Thus, if the price was settled first, the wine becomes the non-Jew’s property before he touches it. When he later touches the wine, he is touching wine that already belongs to him. If, however, no price was agreed upon, the act of drawing does not acquire the wine, because the non-Jew has not yet decided to acquire a particular amount at a particular price. The wine therefore remains in the Jew’s possession. If the non-Jew touches it at that point, it becomes idolatrous wine in the Jew’s possession, and the Jew may not then collect payment for it.
The practical lesson is that when selling wine to a non-Jew, the price must be settled before the non-Jew handles the wine. One should not allow him to taste it, touch it, or otherwise handle it while it still belongs to the Jew.
Rashi’s explanation focuses on the acquisition. The act of drawing acquires the wine when the non-Jew intends to acquire it, and agreeing on the price gives that intention its necessary definition. Once the non-Jew has agreed to pay a particular amount, he takes the wine with the understanding that it is now his, and the money is simply a debt. Without an agreed price, the non-Jew’s act of drawing does not yet create an acquisition.
Rav Amemar states that an act of drawing by a non-Jew is an acquisition, even though the non-Jew has not yet paid the Jewish seller. The same applies in both directions: when a Jew buys from a non-Jew, the Jew’s act of drawing acquires the item, and when a non-Jew buys from a Jew, the non-Jew’s act of drawing acquires it.
Rav Amemar attempts to prove this from the conduct of the Persians. When they send gifts to one another, they do not retract them. Once the recipient has taken the gift, it is considered his, because the act of drawing has acquired it. Rashi rejects this proof. Perhaps they do not retract their gifts because of their pride. Once they have given a gift, it would be embarrassing for them to ask for it back. Their refusal to retract the gift may have nothing to do with the legal effectiveness of the act of drawing.
The Gemara then examines whether an act of drawing acquires an item when a non-Jew is involved. Rav Ashi brings a teaching from Rav. Rav instructed those who sold wine that, when they measured wine for a non-Jew, they should take the money first and only afterward measure and pour the wine. If the non-Jew did not have the money, they were to lend it to him and then have him repay the loan. The essential point was that the sellers should receive payment before pouring the wine.
Why did Rav require this procedure? If the sellers did not take the money first, the wine could become idolatrous wine while it was still in the Jewish sellers’ possession. They would then be accepting payment for idolatrous wine. Once they had received the money, however, the wine would already belong to the non-Jew, and it would not matter what he did with it afterward.
Rav Ashi argues that this proves that an act of drawing does not acquire an item for a non-Jew. If it did, the sellers would not need to take the money first. They could pour the wine into the non-Jew’s barrel, and the non-Jew would acquire it through the act of drawing before touching it. If he then made it into idolatrous wine, it would already be his. The fact that Rav nevertheless required the sellers to be paid first indicates that the act of drawing was not effective.
The Gemara challenges this proof. Perhaps Rav’s case involved wine being poured into the non-Jew’s own vessel, which already contained idolatrous wine. The wine would become forbidden as soon as it touched the wine at the bottom of the vessel, before the act of drawing could acquire it. In that case, Rav required payment first because the wine would become forbidden while it was still in the Jew’s possession.
If that is the case, the Gemara continues, perhaps the wine would nevertheless be acquired as soon as it entered the airspace of the non-Jew’s vessel. This would be an acquisition through lifting, since the non-Jew is holding the vessel, and lifting is another form of acquisition. Before the wine touched the idolatrous wine at the bottom, it would already have entered the non-Jew’s control.
The Gemara responds that even if the wine entered the airspace of the vessel, that would not necessarily acquire it. The vessel is not necessarily considered the non-Jew’s courtyard for purposes of acquisition. A person’s vessel does not automatically acquire an object for him when it is located in another person’s domain. Thus, if the non-Jew’s vessel is standing in the Jew’s courtyard, the non-Jew’s vessel may not acquire the wine merely because the wine entered its airspace.
Another possibility is that Rav was discussing a case in which the non-Jew was holding the vessel. If he was holding it, the act of lifting could acquire the wine, and there would be no need for the Jew to receive payment first. The fact that Rav required payment indicates that this was not the case. The vessel was on the ground, and the non-Jew’s vessel did not acquire the wine through the Jew’s courtyard.
Even in that case, however, the Gemara raises another difficulty. A courtyard can acquire an object for its owner when the object enters the courtyard’s airspace. If the non-Jew’s vessel is on the ground in the Jew’s courtyard, perhaps the non-Jew’s vessel should function as his courtyard and acquire the wine as soon as it enters the vessel’s airspace.
The answer is that one person’s courtyard does not acquire an object for another person. The non-Jew’s vessel cannot acquire the wine while it is located in the Jew’s domain. Therefore, as the Jew pours the wine into the vessel, the wine remains the Jew’s property. When it touches the idolatrous wine on the bottom of the vessel, it becomes forbidden while still in the Jew’s possession. That is why Rav instructed the sellers to take payment first.
The Gemara then considers the possibility that the problem was the idolatrous wine on the lip of the vessel rather than the wine at the bottom. If the wine being poured touches the lip before any acquisition through the vessel’s airspace can take effect, it becomes forbidden immediately. Payment must therefore be received first, before pouring begins.
At this point, Rav Ashi’s attempted proof is understood as follows: Rav Ashi wanted to prove that an act of drawing does not acquire an item for a non-Jew from Rav’s instruction to the wine sellers. Rav told them to obtain payment first because otherwise the wine would become forbidden while remaining in their possession. Rav Ashi reasoned that if the non-Jew acquired the wine through drawing, there would be no such concern. The Gemara responds that perhaps Rav’s instruction was based on the idolatrous wine on the lip of the non-Jew’s vessel, or on the fact that the vessel was located in the Jew’s domain. Consequently, Rav’s instruction does not necessarily prove that the act of drawing is ineffective.
The Gemara next discusses the view of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. He teaches that when idolatrous wine becomes mixed with the Jew’s permitted wine, the mixture may be sold to non-Jews, provided that the value of the idolatrous wine is deducted. According to that view, there would be no need to insist on receiving payment before pouring in this case. Even if the wine became forbidden while in the Jew’s possession, the Jew could sell the mixture and deduct the value of the idolatrous wine.
The Gemara answers that Rav was not following Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in this matter. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits this arrangement only when separate barrels have become interchanged and one does not know which barrel contains the permitted wine and which contains the idolatrous wine. He does not permit the wine itself to become mixed together in the same vessel. In the case under discussion, the wine itself comes into contact with the idolatrous wine on the lip or at the bottom of the non-Jew’s vessel. Therefore, that leniency does not apply, and Rav required payment before the wine was poured.
The Gemara then returns to the statement that an act of drawing acquires an item in a transaction with a non-Jew. This can mean either that the non-Jew acquires from a Jew through drawing, or that a Jew acquires from a non-Jew through drawing. The Gemara brings another Mishnah to examine this principle.
A Jew purchases scrap pieces of silver from a non-Jew. After taking the material, he discovers among the pieces an object of idolatry. If he has not yet paid the non-Jew, he may return the material. If he has already paid and performed the act of drawing, he may not return the idolatrous object. Since the act of drawing acquires the material, the idolatrous object is now in the Jew’s possession, and he cannot nullify or dispose of another person’s idolatry. He must deal with it as property that he acquired.
The Gemara asks: If the act of drawing acquires the material, why may the Jew return it in the first case? The answer is that the Jew made a mistaken acquisition. He thought he was acquiring scrap pieces of silver and did not know that the bag contained an object of idolatry. Since the acquisition was based on a mistake, he may return it. This is true whether or not he has paid.
Why, then, does the Mishnah distinguish between the case in which he paid and the case in which he did not? In the first case, if he did not pay, he can say that he never knowingly acquired a bag containing idolatry, and he may return the entire purchase. In the second case, once he has paid, there is an additional concern: it appears that he is returning an item that already belongs to him. People may see a Jew purchasing an object containing idolatry, paying for it, and then returning it. That appearance prevents him from simply returning the item after payment.
Technically, the act of drawing is effective even in the mistaken case. Once the Jew picked up the bag, he acquired it. The ability to return it is based on the mistaken acquisition, not on the claim that the act of drawing was ineffective. Before payment, the mistake can be recognized and the transaction can be undone. After payment, although the original mistake still exists, returning the item creates the appearance that the Jew is transferring or returning idolatry that has already become his property. Therefore, the Mishnah does not allow him to return it after payment.
The practical distinction is thus between the acquisition itself and the consequences of the mistaken transaction. The act of drawing acquires the material, but the Rabbis permitted its return before payment because the Jew did not know what he was acquiring. After payment, the additional concern of how the transaction appears prevents him from returning it, even though the discovery of the idolatrous object was still a genuine mistake.