We begin today’s page of Sanhedrin on page 76, side 1, five lines down, with the last word on the line. The Gemara is continuing its comparison between the relatives on her side and the corresponding relatives on his side. We previously learned that just as her daughter is forbidden to him, so his daughter is forbidden to her.
Yesterday, the Gemara attempted to derive another comparison: just as, on her side, the mother-in-law and grandmother-in-law are forbidden, perhaps on his side, his mother and grandmother should also be forbidden. The Gemara rejected that derivation, because the grandmother-in-law is forbidden only by rabbinic law. The Gemara now searches for other examples that can be compared between the two sides.
The Gemara says that if this comparison is being learned through the verbal analogy proposed by Abaye, then we should compare his daughter-in-law with her daughter-in-law. On the husband’s side, his daughter-in-law is certainly forbidden by Torah law. The verse says, “The wife of your son is she,” referring to the daughter-in-law who is married to his son. This is not the wife’s daughter-in-law; it is the daughter-in-law from a previous marriage—the wife of his son from another wife.
Since the Torah explicitly forbids his daughter-in-law, perhaps we should compare his side to her side and say that just as his daughter-in-law is forbidden, so her daughter-in-law should be forbidden as well. The Gemara asks how we know that this comparison is valid.
Abaye answers that there is a special exclusion in the verse concerning his daughter-in-law. Why does the Torah need to explain that a daughter-in-law is the wife of one’s son? Everyone knows what a daughter-in-law is. The wording teaches that he is liable only for the wife of his son, and not for the wife of his stepson. This is an exclusion stated explicitly by the Torah. Since the Torah specifically excludes the wife of his stepson, she is permitted.
Rava offers a different explanation. He follows the principle of deriving the basic law from the source and then applying the details according to the local case. There are two possible methods. One method is to derive the law and all its details from the source. The other is to derive only the basic prohibition from the source and then determine the details according to the laws of the case in which the prohibition is being applied.
According to the first method, just as his daughter-in-law is forbidden, so her daughter-in-law would be forbidden. And just as his daughter-in-law is punished by burning, so her daughter-in-law should also be punished by burning. That cannot be correct. According to the opinion that burning is the more severe punishment, perhaps one could explain the punishment on his side by observing that his mother is also punished by burning. Since both his mother and his daughter-in-law receive the severe punishment of burning, one might say that the same should apply on her side.
But on her side, her mother is punished by burning, while her daughter-in-law is punished by stoning. We therefore see that the two sides are not treated identically. Moreover, on his side, his daughter is punished by burning while his daughter-in-law is punished by stoning. Thus, even on his own side, there are cases in which the daughter and daughter-in-law receive different punishments. The Gemara initially raises this as a difficulty, although it later explains that this particular question can be dismissed because the same distinction exists on his side.
There remains another difficulty. On his side, there is no distinction between his mother and his daughter-in-law: both receive stoning. If we are deriving one side from the other, then on her side there should likewise be no distinction between her mother and her daughter-in-law. Yet we already know that her mother receives burning while her daughter-in-law would receive stoning. Therefore, the comparison does not work.
According to the opinion that burning is the more severe punishment, this remains a difficulty. Even if one explains why the punishments differ in severity, the actual punishments are still different: the mother receives burning and the daughter-in-law receives stoning. If the cases are being compared precisely, the punishments should be identical.
The Gemara then considers the second method: derive the basic prohibition from his daughter-in-law, but determine the punishment according to the local case. His daughter-in-law is forbidden, and her daughter-in-law is likewise forbidden. However, the punishment for her daughter-in-law should be learned locally. Since her mother receives stoning, perhaps her daughter-in-law should also receive stoning.
Again, this does not work according to the opinion that stoning is the more severe punishment. One might have said that the daughter-in-law on his side receives stoning because his mother also receives stoning. But on her side, her mother receives burning, which is less severe according to this opinion. Since her side is more lenient with respect to the mother, perhaps we cannot extend the punishment of stoning to her daughter-in-law.
There is an additional difficulty. On his side, the Torah distinguishes between his daughter and his daughter-in-law: his daughter receives burning, while his daughter-in-law receives stoning. If we are comparing the two sides, then on her side we should also distinguish between her daughter and her daughter-in-law. Her daughter receives burning, so perhaps her daughter-in-law should receive the more severe punishment of stoning.
But then we do not know which punishment to give her daughter-in-law. Should we compare her to her mother, in which case she would receive burning? Or should we compare her to her daughter, in which case she would receive the more severe punishment of stoning? The comparison leaves us with two possible punishments and no basis for choosing between them. Therefore, there is no proof that her daughter-in-law is forbidden.
For that reason, the Gemara concludes that the daughter-in-law in this case is permitted. After the man’s wife dies or the marriage ends, he may marry his former wife’s daughter-in-law. The conclusion is that she is permitted.
The Mishnah then stated that his daughter is punished by burning. We also learned that this applies not only to a daughter born from his wife, but also to a daughter born from a woman with whom he had relations without marriage. The Gemara asks: from where do we know that a daughter born from such a relationship is included?
Abaye initially suggests a logical derivation. If a granddaughter is included in the prohibition and is punished by burning, then certainly the daughter herself should be included and punished by burning. The Gemara rejects this as a mere logical derivation. One cannot derive a punishment through a logical argument alone.
The Gemara explains that this is not actually a logical derivation. It is a revelation of the law. The granddaughter is forbidden only because she is the daughter of his daughter. In other words, the entire prohibition of the granddaughter is rooted in the daughter. Therefore, the verse concerning the granddaughter effectively reveals that the daughter herself is included as well.
The Gemara contrasts this with the case of a paternal or maternal sister. The Torah forbids a sister who is the daughter of one’s father or the daughter of one’s mother. To derive that both types of sisters are forbidden, one would need a logical argument: if a sister from one side is forbidden, certainly a sister from both sides should be forbidden. That would be a true logical derivation, because the paternal and maternal relationships are independent cases.
The case of the granddaughter is different. The granddaughter is forbidden only because she comes through the daughter. She is not a separate relationship from which one is extrapolating. Therefore, the verse about the granddaughter reveals that the daughter herself is also included. Abaye’s language sounds like a logical derivation, but he really means that it is a revealed teaching rather than an ordinary logical argument.
The Gemara offers another source. The verse says, “A daughter of a priest who defiles herself by engaging in immorality with her father—she shall be burned.” Why does the verse say “a daughter of a man who is a priest,” rather than simply “a daughter of a priest”? The additional wording teaches that the daughter is his daughter, but not necessarily the daughter of his wife. This includes a daughter born from a woman with whom he had relations without marriage.
Rashi explains that the verse says, “a daughter of a man who is a priest,” to teach that she is the daughter of the man himself, even though she is not the daughter of his wife. When she commits immorality with her father, she is punished by burning. The phrase “she shall defile her father” indicates that she has engaged in relations with her father, and this is the source for the punishment of burning in the case of a daughter born from such a relationship.
The Gemara then raises a difficulty. The verse concerning the daughter of a priest teaches that she is punished by burning, but the man with whom she had relations does not necessarily receive the same punishment. In the case of the daughter of a priest, the daughter receives burning, while the man may receive strangulation or stoning, depending on the circumstances. If the source for a daughter born from an unmarried relationship is the daughter of a priest, then perhaps the daughter should receive burning while the father receives a different punishment. Yet the Mishnah teaches that the father who had relations with his daughter is also among those who are punished by burning.
Abaye answers that the case of the daughter of a priest is unique. The verse says that she defiles her father. She is punished by burning because she brings disgrace upon her father. In the case of a daughter born from such a relationship, however, the father is the one who is actively defiling the daughter. Since he is the one causing the desecration, he too receives the punishment of burning.
Rashi explains that the verse concerning the daughter of a priest is teaching a special law connected with the honor of her father. She is the one who disgraces him through her conduct. That is why she receives burning while the man receives the punishment applicable to him. In the case of the father and his daughter, the father himself is causing the disgrace. Therefore, it is possible that he receives the same punishment of burning.
Rava gives another answer. We are trying to identify the punishment of a man who has relations with his daughter born from an unmarried relationship. The verse about the daughter of a priest is not necessarily teaching that the man receives a different punishment. In that case, the man may be treated as one who had relations with a married woman, because the daughter of a priest described in the verse is either married or betrothed. He therefore receives the punishment associated with a married woman.
But the daughter born from the unmarried relationship is forbidden because she is his daughter, not because she is a married woman. If we were to give the father the punishment of a man who had relations with an unmarried woman, he would receive no punishment at all. That is impossible. The daughter would receive burning, while the father would receive nothing, even though he committed the prohibited act with his own daughter. Therefore, the verse must be teaching that in this case the father also receives burning.
The Gemara then asks where the prohibition itself comes from. Until this point, the discussion has focused on the punishment. According to Abaye and Rava, the prohibition can be derived from the same verse through the daughter and granddaughter relationship. But according to the teaching that derives the punishment from the phrase “a daughter of a man who is a priest,” where do we derive the prohibition?
Rabbi Elazar answers that the prohibition is derived from the verse, “Do not profane your daughter by causing her to engage in immorality.” The verse is understood as prohibiting a father from giving his daughter over for immoral purposes.
Rabbi Yaakov challenges this interpretation. Perhaps the verse is not addressing a father who has relations with his own daughter. Perhaps it is warning a father not to marry his daughter to a priest, since once she marries a non-priest she can no longer eat consecrated food. That would be a form of profaning her status. Maybe “do not profane your daughter” means that the father should not lower her status by marrying her to a Levite or an Israelite.
The Gemara rejects this interpretation. The verse explicitly connects the profanation with immorality. It is speaking about giving the daughter over for relations that are not for the purpose of marriage. The verse therefore teaches that a father may not hand his daughter over to immoral conduct.
The Gemara notes that the verse uses the singular expression, “Do not profane,” and perhaps this teaches two things: a father may not give his daughter over to immorality, and he may not commit the act himself. Abaye and Rava, however, do not need this verse for the second point, because they already derive the prohibition from the other verses. They use the verse to teach only that a father may not give his daughter over to immoral conduct.
Rabbi Ami says in the name of Rabbi Yitzchak that the verse also warns against marrying one’s daughter to an elderly man. If the man is unable to have a normal marital relationship with her, she may eventually seek relations elsewhere. The father should therefore not marry his daughter off before she is mature enough, nor should he marry her to someone who is unable to fulfill the marital relationship.
Rabbi Akiva teaches that one of the worst types of poverty among the Jewish people is a wicked and cunning poor man who delays marrying off his daughter after she has matured. The Gemara asks why such a person is described both as poor and as cunning. If he delays the marriage, he is obviously acting for his own benefit; he wants his daughter to continue working and supporting the household.
Abaye explains that the phrase means a person who is poor and therefore cunning. He keeps his daughter from marrying because he needs her labor. Perhaps she works in his store, and he does not want to hire another worker or lose the money she brings in. His poverty leads him to act in a way that can cause his daughter to become exposed to improper conduct.
Rabbi Akiva therefore advises people to be cautious of those who offer guidance according to their own interests. When someone gives advice, one should consider whether the adviser benefits from the decision. A person may appear to be acting for the sake of Heaven, but in reality he may be protecting his own financial or personal interests.
For example, a father may reject every potential match for his daughter, claiming that none of the candidates is suitable. The daughter should ask whether her father is truly concerned for her welfare or whether he wants her to remain at home because she works for him. If he has a personal interest in preventing the marriage, she should recognize that his advice may not be objective.
The same principle applies to a person who marries his daughter to an elderly man, marries off his young son to an older woman, or returns a lost object to a non-Jew in a way that suggests that he is equating the obligations toward a non-Jew with those toward a Jew. These actions are described as attaching one thing to another improperly, as though one were combining a satisfied person with a hungry one or a young woman with an elderly man who cannot fulfill the marital relationship.
The Gemara then discusses someone who returns a lost object to a non-Jew. The concern is not necessarily the act itself, but the message it conveys. If he acts as though he is returning the object solely because of a general ethical principle, rather than because of the Torah’s command, he may be demonstrating that he does not distinguish between the obligations toward a Jew and those toward a non-Jew.
The Gemara brings the verse, “Then you will call, and God will answer.” This verse teaches that when a person responds to the needs of others, God responds to him. The true form of repentance is not merely to fast, beat one’s chest, and say, “I have sinned.” The prophet’s rebuke teaches that one must also care for orphans and widows, clothe the person who lacks clothing, and give bread to the hungry. Repentance requires acts of kindness and responding to injustice.
The idea is that when another person calls out and we answer, we activate the corresponding divine attribute. Then, when we call out, God answers us. This is the meaning of the verse: if you want God to answer you, answer the plight of others.
The verse also teaches not to hide oneself from one’s relatives. The greatest charity begins at home. A person may find it easier to show kindness to someone far away, but responsibility begins with one’s own family. One must be close to one’s relatives and treat them as relatives before extending that concern elsewhere.
This does not mean that one may give a position to an unqualified relative. That would be nepotism. But if a relative is qualified, there is nothing wrong with giving him preference. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein was asked about a position for which there was a qualified relative and an unrelated candidate. He said that if the relative is qualified, the relative should be chosen. That is not favoritism in the negative sense; it is loyalty to one’s family.
If a person is unqualified, he should not receive the position merely because he is a relative. But when two people are suitable, it is proper to give preference to the relative. Many businesses hire nephews and other family members because they feel a responsibility toward their family. If a relative needs a job and is capable of doing it, there is value in helping him.
This principle applies first to one’s immediate family and then more broadly. It is easier to love a person who lives far away than to maintain a relationship with a brother whom one has not spoken to for twenty-five years. The command to draw close to one’s relatives requires beginning at home.
The Gemara also teaches that one who loves his wife as himself and honors her more than himself, guides his sons and daughters along the proper path, and marries off his children near the time when they become mature receives blessing. The verse says that he will know that there is peace in his household and that he will visit his dwelling and not sin.
Honoring one’s wife more than oneself can mean purchasing clothing for her when one can afford only one suit, because a woman’s honor is connected with her clothing. It can also mean providing respectable clothing for one’s children. When the children are dressed properly, it brings honor to the mother, because people praise her when her children look well cared for.
The Gemara asks how this can be reconciled with the earlier teaching that one should not marry off a young boy to an older woman, since the young boy is not yet ready for the relationship while the woman is. Here, however, the Gemara praises a person who marries off his children close to the time of maturity. It answers that “close to maturity” does not mean an actual child. It refers to someone who is already approaching maturity, such as a young person who is nearly twelve and a half years old.
The Sages further teach that a person should love his neighbors, draw close to his relatives, marry off his niece, and lend money to a poor person at the time of his need. Regarding such a person, the verse says, “Then you will call, and God will answer you.”
When a poor person will not accept charity, one may give him a loan instead. The giver understands that the money may never be repaid, but calling it a loan preserves the recipient’s dignity. He does not feel that he is being treated as a charity case. This too is an act of kindness.
We now return to the earlier discussion concerning a man who has relations with his mother-in-law. The verse appears to mention two women. One interpretation understands the verse as referring to the mother and grandmother of the wife. According to Rabbi Ishmael, the word that appears in the verse indicates that only one of the two women receives the punishment. The wife herself is permitted, while the mother-in-law is forbidden.
Rabbi Akiva interprets the verse differently. He understands it as referring to both women, so that both the mother-in-law and the grandmother-in-law are included. The Gemara asks what practical difference there is between the two interpretations, since both agree that the mother-in-law is forbidden.
Abaye explains that the disagreement concerns how the verse is expounded, not necessarily the final halachic result in the ordinary case. Rabbi Ishmael understands the wording as referring to one woman, while Rabbi Akiva understands it as referring to both.
Rabbi Ishmael derives the grandmother-in-law through another exposition. Rabbi Akiva learns both women directly from the wording of the verse. The Gemara then explains that the practical difference concerns what happens if the wife dies. According to Rabbi Ishmael, the mother-in-law remains forbidden even after the wife’s death, and he is liable for the severe punishment if he has relations with her. According to Rabbi Akiva, the punishment applies only when both women are present—that is, while the wife is alive. After the wife dies, the mother-in-law remains forbidden, but the severe punishment does not apply.
We now proceed to the next section of the Mishnah, which discusses those who are executed by the sword. The murderer and the inhabitants of a city that worships idolatry are executed by the sword.
A murderer is executed by the sword whether he killed his victim with a stone or with a piece of metal, whether he held the victim under water or under a fire until the victim died, or whether he caused the death through another direct act. If he sent a dog after the victim and the dog killed him, he is liable. If he took a snake and caused it to bite the victim, he is also liable.
The Mishnah distinguishes between different forms of using a metal object. With respect to a stone or piece of wood, the object must generally be of a size capable of killing in the ordinary manner. With metal, however, even a small sharp object can kill. A sharp needle, for example, can cause death even though it is much smaller than the measure required for an ordinary stone or piece of wood.
Rabbi Yehuda teaches that when the Torah mentions a stone or a piece of wood, the verse uses language associated with the hand. This indicates a measure comparable to the size of a hand. But metal can kill regardless of its size, and therefore the Torah does not give it a specific measure.
This teaching applies when the sharp point of the metal pierces the victim. If someone strikes another person with the flat side of a metal object, the object may need to be large enough to kill through the force of the blow. But when the sharp point pierces the victim, even a very small object can be fatal.
The Mishnah also says that if a person held another under water or under a fire until he died, he is liable. The first part of the Mishnah teaches that this is true even if he did not push the victim into the water. Someone else may have pushed the victim in, or the victim may have fallen in on his own. If the defendant then held his head under the water and prevented him from emerging, he is liable, because the victim could not escape only because of the defendant’s action.
The latter part of the Mishnah teaches that if the victim could have escaped, the defendant is exempt. Even if the defendant pushed him into the water, if the victim could have swum out or otherwise saved himself and failed to do so, the defendant is not liable for murder. The determining factor is whether the defendant’s action prevented the victim from escaping.
The Gemara asks why holding a person under water should make the defendant liable. One might have thought that only a direct act of killing creates liability, while preventing a person from escaping is indirect. The Gemara answers that the verse includes a person who restricts another and prevents him from leaving.
The Gemara brings a related dispute concerning an animal. If a person confines another person’s animal in the sun and the animal dies from the heat, Ravina holds that he is liable, while Rav Acha bar Rav holds that he is exempt.
Ravina derives liability through a logical argument. A murderer is liable even though he is not liable when the death occurred accidentally or under coercion; nevertheless, in the case of damage, a person is liable even in circumstances involving negligence or lack of intent. Since a person is generally responsible for damage he causes, he should certainly be liable for confining the animal in a place where it dies.
Rav Acha bar Rav rejects this reasoning. The verse concerning murder says, “The murderer shall surely be put to death.” The wording limits the law to an actual murderer. It does not extend the punishment to one who merely caused an animal to die by preventing it from escaping.
The Gemara explains that the phrase in the verse is used to distinguish murder from ordinary damage. The law of murder requires the specific act of killing, whereas the laws of damages may impose liability for causing harm through other means. Therefore, according to Rav Acha bar Rav, the person who confined the animal is exempt from the punishment associated with murder.