We begin today’s page of Arachin on page 17b. We are studying the teaching of Onkelos in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: “Anyone who speaks slander is considered to have magnified his sins to the equivalent of the three cardinal sins: idolatry, forbidden relationships, and bloodshed.”
One who speaks slander commits a sin so severe that it is comparable to those three sins. The Gemara brings proof from the use of the word “great.” Regarding slander, the verse says, “A tongue that speaks great things.” Regarding idolatry, it says, “We have sinned a great sin.” Regarding forbidden relationships, Joseph said concerning the wife of Potiphar, “How could I commit this great evil?” Regarding bloodshed, Cain said after killing Abel, “My sin is too great to bear.”
We therefore find the expression “great” used in connection with slander and with each of the three cardinal sins. The Gemara asks: Perhaps the expression refers only to two of the three, since “great things” is plural, and the minimum number represented by a plural expression is two. The Gemara answers: Which one would you exclude? Unless there were a compelling reason to say that two of the sins are more closely connected than the third, there would be no basis for excluding idolatry rather than forbidden relationships, or forbidden relationships rather than bloodshed. Since there is no reason to exclude one more than another, the expression includes all three.
This is an interesting principle that appears many times throughout the Talmud. The Gemara often says that the minimum number represented by a plural expression is two. I had always understood this to mean that since the Torah does not specify more than the minimum, we do not add anything beyond two. However, I found the Ritva at the end of the first chapter of Yoma, at the beginning of the sixth chapter, on page 62b. The Ritva explains that when the Torah uses a plural expression, it is not merely a matter of doubt. It is as though the Torah had explicitly written “two.” Thus, whenever the Sages derive a minimum of two from a plural expression, it is as if the number two were written in the verse itself. That is what the Gemara means here: “great things” indicates two. Nevertheless, in this case, since there are three possible sins and there is no reason to exclude any one of them, all three are included.
The scholars of the Land of Israel said: “Slander is a threefold matter; it kills three.” It kills the person who speaks it, the person who accepts it, and the person about whom it is spoken. The person who speaks is the intermediary between the other two. He takes information about Reuben and spreads it to Simeon; he is the go-between who carries the information from one person to another. That is why it is called a threefold matter.
Tosafot offers another explanation. We learned yesterday that the tongue has three layers of protection: It is inside the mouth, behind a wall of teeth and a wall of lips. The tongue is therefore called “threefold” because the tongue itself is surrounded by three forms of protection: the two walls and the tongue within them.
Rabbi Hama said in the name of Rabbi Hanina: What is written? “Death and life are in the hand of the tongue.” Why is the tongue compared to a hand? Just as the hand can kill, so the tongue can kill. Perhaps one might say that the hand can kill only at close range, in hand-to-hand combat. The tongue, however, is like an arrow. An arrow can kill from a distance—forty or fifty cubits away—and the words of a person can have consequences that reach much farther, even to Heaven. The tongue’s destructive power is therefore greater than that of a hand.
The Gemara compares slander to an arrow because, just as an arrow is shot and the person who is killed may not know who shot it, so too slander can kill anonymously. A person may hear rumors, have his business ruined, and suffer the destruction of his reputation without knowing who began the rumors. Slander is therefore like an arrow: It can kill without the victim knowing who fired it.
Once the verse says that life and death are “in the hand of the tongue,” it is teaching that the mouth can be used both for harm and for benefit. The tongue can bring trouble, and it can also bring reward. It can cause suffering, or it can bring life.
At a Hafez Chaim Heritage dinner, I once presented a thought on the same question: What does it mean that life and death are in the hand of the tongue? Solomon was so wise that he foresaw a generation in which the tongue would have an even farther-reaching power than people could imagine. Today, a person can send a text message or a mass email to thousands of people. Perhaps this is the hint in the expression “the hand of the tongue”: The tongue now operates through the hands. We express ourselves by typing with our hands, and that can become an even more dangerous form of slander.
The Gemara continues: What is considered slander that is spoken only through implication or tone? Abaye said: For example, a person says, “There is a fire in the house of so-and-so.” What is wrong with that? Perhaps he is merely saying that the person is wealthy, that his oven is always in use, and that his household is constantly cooking.
Abaye answered that this is not yet slander. Rather, it becomes slander when the statement is expressed in a tone of derogation. For example, one says, “Where else could there be a fire except in the house of so-and-so? There is always meat there for his companions.” The additional words, and the tone in which they are spoken, suggest that these people are constantly eating and preparing elaborate meals.
According to the explanation of the Hafez Chaim, the words themselves may be neutral. What determines whether they constitute slander is the manner in which they are said. A person may say something factually harmless in a sarcastic or derogatory tone: “These people want to have a good meal again; they never stop cooking.” The words may be technically true, but the tone reveals a negative intention. The tone itself can therefore be decisive.
Abaye said further: Anything that is said in front of the person about whom it is being said is not considered slander. People often say, “I tell him everything to his face.” But that does not mean that it is permissible to make a derogatory statement to someone’s face. Such a statement may embarrass him, and it may involve other prohibitions.
According to the Hafez Chaim’s explanation, this passage is continuing the previous discussion about neutral statements. The question is not whether one may say genuine slander in front of the person. Rather, if the statement is neutral in itself, one test of whether it was intended negatively is whether the speaker would have been willing to say it in the person’s presence. If he would not say it in front of him, that indicates that he intended the statement negatively. If he would have said it even in front of him, that indicates that it was not intended as slander.
That is the meaning of the statement, “I never had to turn around to see whether he was there.” If he would have said it even in the person’s presence, he had no reason to check whether the person was listening. Again, the Hafez Chaim is speaking only about the neutral type of statement discussed here. He is not permitting one to speak genuine slander in front of the person.
Similarly, the famous principle taught by Abaye in the name of Rav Hunah is that anything said in the presence of three people is presumed to become known. When a person speaks in front of three people, he knows that the information will eventually reach the person about whom he spoke. One friend has another friend, and that friend has another friend, so the information will travel back.
The Hafez Chaim explains that this too concerns a statement that is neutral in itself. If a person says something in front of three people, knowing that it will reach the subject of the statement, that indicates that he did not intend it negatively. A person who intends genuine slander normally tries to speak behind the other person’s back. Thus, the fact that he said it in front of three people is another indication that the statement was not slander to begin with.
These three passages are therefore connected according to the Hafez Chaim. They do not establish a general rule that any slander spoken in front of three people is permissible. The principle that something said in front of three people is not considered slander applies only to a statement that was not inherently slanderous. The fact that it was said openly demonstrates that the speaker’s intention was not negative. The detailed rules and qualifications of this principle require careful study in the Hafez Chaim’s work Shemirat HaLashon, where he devotes many pages to its conditions and applications.
The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the verse, “One who blesses his friend in a loud voice early in the morning—it will be considered a curse for him”? How can blessing someone be considered a curse?
The Gemara answers with the example of a person who was invited to someone’s home and received generous hospitality. The next day, he goes to the marketplace and says, “May God bless so-and-so, who hosted me and worked so hard for me.” People hear this and go to the host’s home, taking advantage of his generosity until he loses his money. The praise itself causes damage, and therefore it is considered a curse.
It may even attract undesirable people. Once people hear that the host is wealthy and hospitable, bullies and other unscrupulous people may come to him and take advantage of him. Even ordinary people may repeatedly arrive at his home expecting to be fed. The person who praised him may therefore have harmed him through his blessing.
The simple meaning of the verse, however, is different. It refers to someone who rises early in the morning, before people have prayed, and loudly calls out, “Good morning!” He may wake someone who stayed up all night studying and has just gone to sleep before the morning prayer. He may wake a baby or disturb people who are sleeping. Thus, one should not shout greetings in the street early in the morning. A greeting that is normally positive can become a curse when it is said loudly and at an inappropriate time.
I found an interesting passage in Tosafot in Bava Metzia, page 23b. The Gemara there discusses three matters about which a Torah scholar may alter the truth. One of them concerns hospitality: If someone asks him where he ate, he need not reveal the identity of his host, because publicizing the host’s generosity may cause people to take advantage of him.
Tosafot quotes the verse as saying, “One who blesses his friend loudly in the morning, and in the evening—it will be considered a curse for him.” The extra words “and in the evening” do not appear in the version of the verse that we have. Tosafot evidently had a different textual version of the Book of Proverbs.
This is connected to a famous story about Rabbi Shach. Rabbi Shach had been in the home of his uncle, Rabbi Isser Zalman Meltzer, the author of Even HaAzel. Rabbi Shach himself wrote a work on Maimonides called Avi Ezri. On one occasion, they were discussing verses from Scripture, and Rabbi Shach quoted a verse. The Rebbetzin, who was in the kitchen, called out that he had quoted it incorrectly. Rabbi Isser Zalman asked her whether she knew the verse from Scripture. She answered that Rabbi Shach knew it from Tosafot. Since Tosafot had a different textual version containing the words “and in the evening,” Rabbi Shach had quoted the verse according to Tosafot, whereas the verse itself does not contain those words.
Rav Dimi said in the name of Rav Safra: A person should never speak excessively about the goodness of his fellow, because from praising him excessively, one may come to speak about his faults. If a person says again and again, “He is exceptional, he is wonderful, he is perfect,” someone may eventually respond, “Calm down; he is not as great as you are saying.” Alternatively, the excessive praise may cause people to identify the person’s weaknesses. One must therefore be careful not to praise someone beyond measure.
Maimonides discusses this in the laws of character traits. He includes it within the category of the “dust of slander.” There is direct slander, and there are statements that may lead to slander even though they are not slander in themselves. The Gemara says that most people are involved in theft, a minority are involved in forbidden relationships, and everyone is involved in the dust of slander. The point is not that everyone speaks actual slander, but that people say things that can lead to it.
Maimonides writes that one who speaks about the goodness of his fellow in front of people who dislike him is engaging in the dust of slander, because this may cause them to speak about the person’s faults. The glosses on Maimonides add that in front of people who love the person, it is permissible to praise him. This is connected to the teaching in Ethics of the Fathers concerning Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai, who would praise his students and describe their qualities.
Rabbeinu Shmuel explains differently. In his view, one may not praise a person excessively even in front of those who love him, because excessive praise itself may eventually lead to mention of his faults. Thus, the issue is whether the praise is excessive, not merely the attitude of the people listening. This disagreement is important because it shows that the Rambam regards the matter as a form of the dust of slander, whereas Rabbeinu Shmuel understands it as an actual prohibition for everyone.
The Gemara relates a story. Rav Dimi, the brother or relative of Rav Safra, became ill. Rav Safra came to visit him. Rav Dimi said, “Do you observe everything that the Sages said?” Rav Safra answered that he did. Rav Dimi then asked, “Do you observe the teaching that a person should not speak excessively about the goodness of his fellow, because from his praise one may come to speak about his faults?” Rav Safra answered, “I had never heard that teaching. Had I heard it, I would have observed it.”
The Ben Ish Chai, in Ben Yehoyada, explains the exchange as follows. Rav Dimi was ill, and he wanted Rav Safra to speak about his merits so that the merit of those good deeds would stand for him in Heaven. When Rav Safra remained silent, Rav Dimi began to speak about himself, saying that he observed everything the Sages taught. Rav Safra responded that there was a teaching warning against excessive praise, because praise can arouse accusations. When a person is praised in Heaven, the angels may respond, “Yes, but there is also an accusation against him.” Excessive praise can therefore arouse opposition.
Rav Dimi answered that he had never heard this teaching, but that if he had heard it, he would have fulfilled it. At first glance, this is difficult. If he never heard the teaching and therefore never fulfilled it, what did he mean by saying that he would have fulfilled it? He was saying that he had established himself as someone who followed the teachings of the Sages. Therefore, even though he had not known this particular teaching, his commitment to the words of the Sages demonstrated that he would have followed it had he known it.
I once heard a similar idea from Rabbi Yehuda Ades, of blessed memory, at a eulogy for Rabbi Chaim Shmuelevitz. He discussed the law that at a eulogy one may exaggerate somewhat in praising the deceased. Rabbi Ades asked: How can Judaism give permission to lie at a funeral? The Torah says, “Distance yourself from falsehood.”
He answered that when a person intends to perform a good deed but is unable to do so, God considers it as though he performed it. At a eulogy, one may therefore speak about what the deceased would have done had the opportunity arisen. If we know that a person possessed a certain quality, we may say that had the relevant situation occurred, he would have acted accordingly. This is not considered a falsehood, because the person’s established character indicates what he would have done, and God credits him as though he had done it.
For example, a person may have been unable to study because of his livelihood, but he was constantly involved in Torah whenever he had the opportunity. One may speak of him as someone who was always devoted to Torah, because his character demonstrates that he would have continued learning had circumstances allowed it. This explains Rav Dimi’s statement: Although he had never heard the teaching, his established commitment to the words of the Sages meant that he would have fulfilled it, and that too could be counted among his merits.
Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan that seven matters bring skin afflictions. They are slander, bloodshed, a false oath, forbidden relationships, arrogance, theft, and stinginess.
How do we know that slander brings skin afflictions? The verse says, “The one who slanders in secret, him I will destroy.” The expression “I will destroy him” is connected to the laws of a person who becomes completely afflicted with the skin disease.
How do we know that bloodshed brings such afflictions? The verse says concerning Joab, after he killed Abner, “There shall not fail from the house of Joab one who has an issue, or is afflicted with a skin disease.” David cursed Joab that these afflictions should remain in his family. This demonstrates the connection between bloodshed and skin afflictions.
How do we know that a false oath brings skin afflictions? The prophet Elisha cured Naaman, the minister of Aram, and refused to accept payment. Gehazi, Elisha’s servant, went after Naaman and falsely claimed that Elisha had changed his mind and wanted payment. Naaman made Gehazi swear that this was true. Gehazi swore falsely and accepted the payment. When he returned, Elisha knew what he had done and said to him, “The skin disease of Naaman shall cleave to you and to your descendants.” Thus, a false oath brings this punishment.
How do we know that forbidden relationships bring skin afflictions? Pharaoh was afflicted when he took Sarah. The verse says, “The Lord afflicted Pharaoh with great afflictions.” Pharaoh had attempted to commit the sin, but the act itself did not take place because an angel intervened. This passage is used to support the principle that with regard to non-Jews, God may punish even an intention that was not carried out. Pharaoh’s intention was to take Sarah, and although the act failed, he was afflicted.
There is a distinction here. We generally say that with regard to the Jewish people, God does not combine an evil thought with an action. The proof from Pharaoh involves a non-Jew, for whom the intention is treated as though the action had occurred. Moreover, this was not merely an abstract thought of immorality; Pharaoh had actually attempted to carry out the act. Nevertheless, the angel stopped him before he succeeded.
How do we know that arrogance brings skin afflictions? The verse says concerning King Uzziah that when he became powerful, his heart became arrogant to the point of destruction. He entered the Temple and attempted to perform the service reserved for the priest. As a result, he was afflicted with a skin disease and became afflicted until the day of his death.
How do we know that theft brings skin afflictions? Before the priest declares a house afflicted, the occupants must remove everything from the house. The Sages explain that this is a measure-for-measure punishment. A person who stole money and accumulated it in his home is forced to remove everything from the house when the priest comes.
How do we know that stinginess brings skin afflictions? The verse says, “The one who owns the house shall come and tell the priest, saying, ‘It appears to me that there is an affliction in the house.’” The Sages explain that this refers to a person who claims that his house and possessions belong only to him, and who refuses to lend his utensils to others. God therefore exposes what he had hidden. His neighbors may see that he actually owns the objects he had denied possessing. One neighbor may say, “Yesterday you told me that you did not have a lawn mower; now I see that you do.” Another may say, “You told me that you did not have a screwdriver, but here it is.” The person’s stinginess is exposed publicly.
Rav Anani bar Sason asks: Why is the section concerning the priestly garments written next to the section concerning the offerings? It teaches that just as the offerings atone, so too the garments of the High Priest atone.
The tunic atones for bloodshed, as it says concerning Joseph that his brothers took his tunic, slaughtered a goat, and dipped the tunic in the blood. The Sages understand this as a hint that the immersion of the tunic atoned for bloodshed. Of course, this does not mean that the tunic atones for the murderer himself; a murderer is liable for death. Rather, it atones for the people who allowed the murder to occur and did not protest. A society that allows bloodshed to take place also requires atonement. The Torah says that the land cannot tolerate innocent blood, and the tunic brings atonement for the broader community.
The trousers of the High Priest atone for forbidden relationships, because they cover the nakedness of the body. The turban atones for arrogance. Rabbi Hanina said that something placed high should come and atone for the sin of an elevated attitude.
The belt atones for improper thoughts of the heart. The Sages explain that this refers to thoughts of idolatry. The belt was worn directly over the heart, and it was thirty-two cubits long, corresponding to the numerical value of the word “heart.” It therefore atones for thoughts of the heart.
The breastplate atones for errors in judgment, as the verse says, “You shall make a breastplate of judgment.” The ephod atones for idolatry. The verse says, “Without an ephod and the teraphim,” indicating that when there is no ephod, there are teraphim, meaning idolatry. The ephod therefore atones for the thought and the act of idolatry.
The robe atones for slander. Since it had bells at its bottom that made noise, it atoned for the sound produced by slander. The headband atones for brazenness. The verse says that it was placed on Aaron’s forehead, and another verse uses the word “forehead” in connection with the brazen face of a woman who pursues forbidden relationships. The headband therefore atones for brazenness.
The Gemara asks: We were just taught that slander brings skin afflictions. How can we also say that the robe atones for slander? The Gemara answers: It depends on whether the slander produced results. If the slander succeeded in creating a quarrel or causing harm, then the person receives skin afflictions. If the slander did not achieve its purpose, did not reach the person about whom it was spoken, and did not cause a quarrel, then the robe can atone for it.
The Hafez Chaim emphasizes this distinction. When the slander produces a quarrel, it is called slander that has achieved its results, and skin afflictions come upon the person. When it does not achieve its results, there is still a sin that requires atonement, but the robe can atone for it.
The Alshich HaKadosh offers a lesson from the bells and pomegranates on the robe. The Torah describes them as alternating: a bell and a pomegranate, a bell and a pomegranate. The Alshich asks why the verse does not say that a pomegranate was between two bells. The answer is that the bell makes noise, while the pomegranate is silent. The Torah is teaching that a person should remain silent for twice as long as he speaks. Silence is a greater and better quality than speech. Even the way the Torah describes the garments teaches that one should place silence between one sound and the next.
The Gemara now raises a difficulty. Miriam spoke about Moses, and her speech did not create a quarrel, yet she was afflicted. How can that be reconciled with the distinction between slander that produces results and slander that does not?
There is another related difficulty. We have learned that the robe atones for slander and that the incense atones for slander. After Korah’s rebellion, the people complained against Moses and Aaron, saying that they had caused the deaths of the people. God brought a plague upon them, and 14,700 people died. Moses instructed Aaron to take the incense and bring it among the people. The incense atoned for the plague, and the plague stopped.
The incense was an inner service performed privately, and it atoned for private slander, which is generally spoken behind a person’s back. The robe, by contrast, atones for public slander. Thus, we have to distinguish not only between slander that succeeded and slander that did not succeed, but also between public and private slander.
The Hafez Chaim discusses this at length in Shemirat HaLashon, in the section concerning Korah. He explains that when slander produces results, skin afflictions come upon the person. When it does not produce results, there is a further distinction: If it was spoken publicly, the robe atones; if it was spoken privately, the incense atones.
But there is an apparent problem. The proof that the incense atones for slander comes from the incident involving Aaron, Moses, and the people. That slander was public. The entire congregation complained against Moses and Aaron openly. How, then, can the Gemara use that incident to establish that the incense atones for private slander?
The Hafez Chaim gives an extraordinary explanation. The complaint of the people was directed against Aaron as well as Moses. Ordinarily, public slander that does not produce results would be atoned for by the robe. But the people could not benefit from Aaron’s robe because they were attacking Aaron himself. They could not say that Aaron’s garment should atone for slander directed against Aaron. Therefore, the incense that Aaron brought every day could not atone, because it was a private service and the slander had been public. Nor could Aaron’s robe atone, because the accusation was directed against Aaron personally. Consequently, a special act of incense was required to stop the plague.
The Hafez Chaim then discusses Miriam. Miriam’s speech did not cause a quarrel, so ordinarily it would have been a case of slander that did not produce results. Since she spoke privately, one might have expected the incense to atone. Yet she was afflicted. The answer is that Miriam was not merely speaking about an ordinary person; she was speaking about Moses, the most trusted prophet, whom God had chosen to transmit His commands. To speak against Moses was a much more serious matter.
According to this explanation, Miriam should have received a more severe punishment for speaking against Moses. Moses prayed for her, and his prayer moved the punishment from death to skin affliction that lasted only seven days. The verse itself records that Miriam was punished because she spoke improperly about Moses, even though she spoke privately and did not create a quarrel.
The Gemara asks another question: Why is the person afflicted with a skin disease required to sit alone outside the camp? It answers that he separated a man from his wife and a man from his fellow through his slander. Therefore, he too must be separated from the community.
The Gemara asks a second question: Why does the Torah require the afflicted person, during his purification process, to bring birds? Since the Holy One, blessed be He, says that he acted like a bird by chirping and speaking, he should bring a bird that chirps. The Gemara does not explain here why two birds are required, one of which is slaughtered and the other released.
One explanation is that the person is not being told to remain silent altogether. One bird is slaughtered, symbolizing that he must stop the forbidden speech. The other bird is released, symbolizing that speech itself is not forbidden. A person may and must use his tongue for Torah study, prayer, and words of wisdom. He must stop only the speech that is forbidden.
The Torah says, “You shall not hate your brother in your heart.” One might think this means that a person may not strike him, curse him, or verbally abuse him. Those acts are certainly prohibited, but the verse is addressing hatred in the heart. It is speaking about the hidden resentment that a person harbors within himself.
The Torah continues with the command of rebuke. How do we know that if a person sees his fellow doing something wrong, he must rebuke him? The verse says, “You shall surely rebuke your fellow.” If he rebukes him and the person does not accept the rebuke, how do we know that he must repeat it? The repeated expression teaches that he must rebuke him again, even several times.
Perhaps he must continue even when the other person’s face becomes embarrassed. The verse therefore says, “You shall not bear a sin because of him.” One may not create a new sin while rebuking someone. Causing him shame is itself a sin. The command of rebuke must therefore be carried out without humiliating the person.
Rabbi Tarfon said, “I wonder whether there is anyone in this generation who knows how to accept rebuke.” Whenever someone rebukes him, he responds, “Remove the splinter from between your teeth.” The person answers, “Remove the beam from between your eyes.” In other words, the one who rebukes has his own serious faults. He points out a small problem in someone else while ignoring the much larger problem in himself.
Rabbi Tarfon’s point may also be that there is no one in his generation who is genuinely qualified to rebuke another person. Everyone is guilty of sins, and the person being rebuked can respond, “You are telling me to do this, but you are doing something much worse.” Rebuke is therefore an extremely delicate command. It requires knowledge, sensitivity, and the ability to avoid embarrassing the person.
The Alshich offers a beautiful explanation of the phrase, “You shall not bear a sin because of him.” He understands it as a warning not to elevate the sin when rebuking someone. Instead, elevate the person. Tell him, “You are such a good person and such a righteous individual. How could someone like you have done such a thing?” If one presents the sin as overwhelmingly terrible, the person may feel crushed and become unable to improve. One should lift the person rather than magnify the sin.
This explains the verse in Proverbs: “Rebuke a wise person and he will love you; do not rebuke a scoffer, lest he hate you.” The simple reading is that one should rebuke a wise person but not a scoffer. The Alshich explains that the verse is also teaching how to rebuke. Say to the person, “You are wise; you should know better.” Do not say, “You are a scoffer.” If you lower the person, you break him. If you elevate him, he may accept the rebuke.
Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said, “I call Heaven and earth to testify that many times Rabbi Akiva was punished because of me, because I reported his actions to Rabban Gamliel.” Nevertheless, he added, “How much more did he love me.” This fulfills the teaching, “Do not rebuke a scoffer lest he hate you; rebuke a wise person and he will love you.”
The straightforward understanding might be that Rabbi Akiva loved Rabbi Yohanan more, even though Rabbi Yohanan had caused him to be rebuked. But the wording suggests the opposite: Rabbi Yohanan says that his own love for Rabbi Akiva increased. The explanation is that one loves another person only if the love is mutual. Rabbi Akiva must have shown Rabbi Yohanan even greater love after the rebuke, and as a result their relationship became stronger rather than weaker.
Rabbi Abba bar Zavda asked: What is preferable—rebuke given for the sake of Heaven, or humility that is not entirely for the sake of Heaven? The question concerns a person who sees another doing something wrong. He may rebuke him for the sake of Heaven, or he may remain silent out of humility, although his humility is not entirely for the sake of Heaven.
The Gemara answers that humility is greater than all other qualities, even when it is not entirely for the sake of Heaven. We are taught to engage in Torah and mitzvot even when our initial motivation is not pure, because through acting for an improper motivation, one may eventually come to act for the sake of Heaven. Thus, humility that is not entirely pure may still be preferable to rebuke that is offered for the sake of Heaven.
The Gemara illustrates this with a story. Rav Huna and Hiyya bar Rav were sitting before Samuel. Hiyya bar Rav said to Samuel, “Rav Huna is hitting me and giving me trouble.” Rav Huna replied, “I will not do it again.” He accepted the rebuke without arguing.
After Hiyya bar Rav left, Rav Huna told Samuel, “Do you know why I was acting that way toward him? It was because he had done these things to me.” Samuel asked him why he had not said that while Hiyya bar Rav was present. Rav Huna answered that he could not say it in front of him, because he did not want to embarrass a descendant of Rav.
Here we have the classic example of someone who could have defended himself and delivered a rebuke but chose humility instead. Rav Huna could have said, “I am treating you this way because of what you did to me.” Instead, he remained silent and accepted the criticism. Why is this called humility that is not entirely for the sake of Heaven? Because after Hiyya bar Rav left, Rav Huna still told Samuel what had happened. Had his humility been entirely for the sake of Heaven, he would have remained silent altogether. Since he eventually explained himself, his humility was not complete, but it was nevertheless preferable to a rebuke that might have embarrassed Hiyya bar Rav.
Rabbi Elazar Shach was accustomed to sitting at the back of the study hall. People once asked him why he did not sit in the front. He answered that he had a tradition from the Hafez Chaim: If a person sits in the front, he is almost certain to come to arrogance. If he sits in the back, there remains at least the possibility of humility—even humility that is not entirely for the sake of Heaven. The Gemara teaches that such humility is still preferable.