In Temurah, we begin today’s page, 22b, five lines from the bottom. We are beginning a new discussion that continues for approximately a page and a half. The subject is the principle that when the Merciful One tells a person not to perform an act, the act may either take effect or fail to take effect despite having been performed.
In other words, when the Holy One, blessed be He, says, “Do not do this,” and a person does it anyway, does the action nevertheless take effect? Or do we say that because God said not to do it, the person’s act accomplishes nothing?
We are obviously not discussing every type of transgression. If God says not to perform creative labor on Shabbat and a person performs creative labor, no one argues that nothing happened. Creative labor is a concrete reality: the person performed it. The discussion here concerns cases in which the Torah’s prohibition may itself indicate that the attempted act should not take effect.
We can formulate the question as follows. When the Torah says, “Do not do it,” perhaps it is saying two things: first, do not perform the act; and second, if you perform it, it will not take effect. The question then is whether, in a prohibited act, the consequence is established.
If we say that the consequence is established, we can understand why the person receives lashes. He performed the prohibited act, it came to fruition, and its consequence is present. That is Abaye’s position: the person receives lashes because the prohibited act took effect.
Rava, however, says that the act does not take effect. The person may have performed the act, but because the Torah said not to do it, nothing is accomplished. On the surface, why should he receive lashes? He did not accomplish what he intended to accomplish. Rava answers that the person receives lashes because he violated the word of God, not because the intended result was achieved.
Abaye can respond that the lashes are indeed connected to the result. The person performed the prohibited act, the result occurred, and the proof is before us. Rava, however, says that this cannot be the basis for the lashes, because in many cases the result does not occur at all. The only consistent basis for punishment is that the person acted against the will of the Holy One, blessed be He.
After establishing these two positions, the Gemara will bring thirteen different examples. Sometimes the question will challenge Abaye, and sometimes it will challenge Rava. The general structure is that the Gemara will cite a case that appears to show that the act does or does not take effect. The answer will then be that the case is an exception based on a specific biblical decree.
Thus, when the Gemara challenges Rava by saying, “What do you mean that the act does not take effect? Here we see that it does take effect,” the answer will be that this particular case is an exception established by Scripture. Likewise, when the Gemara challenges Abaye by saying, “What do you mean that the act takes effect? Here we see that it does not,” the answer will also be that this is a specific biblical decree. That is the framework of the discussion.
The Gemara begins: Abaye says that whenever the Merciful One says, “Do not do this,” and the person does it, the consequence is established. If you were to say that the consequence is not established, why would the person receive lashes? Abaye understands that the person receives lashes because the prohibited act successfully produced its result.
Rava says that the act does not take effect. The reason the person receives lashes is that he acted against the word of the Merciful One.
We now turn to the first case, on the first side of the page. A man forcibly violates a young unmarried woman. The Torah requires him to marry her, and it says that he may never send her away. If he nevertheless divorces her, he must take her back, and he does not receive lashes.
This case appears to challenge Rava. According to Abaye, the explanation is straightforward. The divorce did not accomplish its intended purpose, because the Torah requires him to take her back. Since the act was ineffective, he does not receive lashes. But according to Rava, the person should receive lashes simply for violating the word of God. Rava says that it is not necessary for the act to accomplish anything in order for lashes to be administered. The Gemara therefore presents this as a challenge to Rava.
There is a stronger question that Tosafot could have asked. According to Rava, perhaps the divorce should not be valid at all. Why does the Gemara merely say that the divorce does not accomplish its purpose because he must take her back? Why not say that the divorce itself never took effect?
Tosafot answers by pointing to a comparison between divorce and death. Just as the woman becomes free if the man dies, she becomes free through divorce as well. The divorce therefore does take effect; it is simply a divorce accompanied by an obligation to take her back. It is not that no divorce occurred.
Rava answers that this case is different, because the verse says, “He may not send her away all his days.” The words “all his days” teach that the prohibition applies only when he sends her away permanently. The prohibition is not violated by a divorce that does not last forever, because he is required to take her back. He did not send her away “all his days,” and therefore he did not violate the actual prohibition.
He may even say, “I am divorcing you on the day of my death.” That would be a somewhat clever way of avoiding the prohibition, because the divorce would not be permanent during his lifetime. It is certainly not in the spirit of the Torah, but technically it would not constitute sending her away for all his days.
According to Rava, then, this is why the person does not receive lashes. The divorce does not produce the final result of permanently sending her away, and he has also not violated the precise prohibition expressed by the words “all his days.” The biblical phrase teaches that a person violates the prohibition only through a permanent divorce.
What does Abaye do with the words “all his days”? Abaye does not need those words to teach that the divorce is ineffective. For him, that is already obvious: the person must take her back, so the divorce did not accomplish its purpose. Abaye uses “all his days” to teach that taking her back is mandatory, not optional.
Without those words, I might have thought that once the man divorced her, he had violated the Torah, but that taking her back was merely something he could choose to do. The verse teaches that he is obligated to take her back. According to Abaye, the divorce is ineffective in terms of permanently removing her, and “all his days” teaches that he must restore the marriage.
There is another version of the discussion. According to that version, the case presents a question to Abaye in a different way. If a person’s prohibited acts generally take effect, then why does this divorce not result in lashes? The answer is that this is a specific biblical exception. The Torah commands him to take her back, making the prohibition one that can be corrected through a positive commandment.
This is the principle of a prohibition that is rectified by a positive commandment. The person violates a prohibition by divorcing her, but the Torah gives him a way to repair the violation: he must take her back. Since the prohibition can be corrected, he does not receive lashes immediately.
According to this version, Rava does not need to say that the divorce is ineffective. In general, Rava can maintain that a prohibited action does not take effect, but in this case the Torah’s wording creates a special structure. The words “all his days” teach that the person must take her back, and because the prohibition can be corrected, he does not receive lashes.
Abaye, according to this version, says that the act itself does not take effect because the divorce is not conclusive. The man remains obligated to take her back. The words “all his days” are needed to teach that this obligation is mandatory. In either version, the discussion distinguishes between the effectiveness of the divorce and the separate obligation to restore the marriage.
The first case is therefore the most complicated of the examples. According to one approach, “all his days” teaches that the divorce is not considered permanent, and therefore the prohibition has not been violated. According to another approach, the divorce is effective, but the Torah commands the man to correct the violation by taking her back. These are different explanations and should not be merged.
We now come to the second case. A person has good produce and inferior produce. The Torah does not allow him to take the inferior produce as the priestly offering in order to exempt the superior produce. The Torah says that the choice portion must be given. The Mishnah nevertheless teaches that if he did take from the inferior produce, the offering is valid.
This appears to support Abaye. The person violated the prohibition, but the act was effective. He separated an offering, and the offering remains an offering. If the act were ineffective, the Mishnah should have said that he must perform the separation again. Instead, it says that the offering is valid.
Rava answers that this case is an exception based on the verse that calls the prohibited act a sin. Rabbi Ila explains that the verse says, in effect, “Do not bear a sin through it.” Why would the Torah call it a sin if nothing had happened? The verse indicates that the person did perform an act and that the offering took effect.
According to Rava, the verse is therefore a specific biblical decree teaching that, in this case, the offering is effective. Normally, Rava says that when the Torah prohibits an act, the act does not take effect. Here, however, Scripture explicitly calls the act a sin, indicating that it produced a result.
What does Abaye do with the phrase “do not bear a sin through it”? Abaye already knows that the offering is valid, because the Mishnah explicitly says so. He does not need the verse to teach that the act takes effect. He explains that the verse teaches something else: taking inferior produce is not merely a failure to perform the preferred practice; it is an actual transgression.
One might have thought that using inferior produce is simply a matter of failing to perform the mitzvah in the best possible manner. The ideal is to use the finest produce, but perhaps if a person used inferior produce, he would merely have missed the preferred practice, while the act would remain valid. The verse teaches that he has committed a sin. It is not merely a less preferable performance.
This also explains the wording used by Rashi: the person is called a sinner. According to Abaye, the verse is needed to establish that the person’s conduct is an actual prohibition, not merely a failure to fulfill the mitzvah in the most ideal fashion.
The discussion then turns to another type of offering. The Torah prohibits taking an offering from one species for the purpose of exempting another species. For example, one may not use grapes for olives or olives for grapes. If a person nevertheless separates an offering from one species for another, the act does not take effect.
This appears to be a strong challenge to Abaye. Here the person violated the prohibition, but the Torah says that the offering is ineffective. Abaye answers that this is another specific biblical decree. The repeated wording in the verse teaches that one species cannot be substituted for another in this manner.
Abaye explains that without the repeated wording, one might have thought that only two specifically mentioned species could not be substituted for one another. The verse discusses the finest portions of wine and oil, and one might have understood the prohibition as limited to those two categories. The additional wording teaches that the prohibition applies even to other combinations, such as grain and wine, or grain and oil, and even from one type of grain to another, such as wheat and barley.
Rava, who generally says that the act does not take effect, does not need the verse to teach that the offering is ineffective. He needs the repeated wording to establish the broader scope of the prohibition—to teach that all the different species may not be mixed and matched. Thus, Abaye learns from the verse that this is a prohibition rather than merely a failure to perform the mitzvah ideally, while Rava learns from it the precise categories of species that may not be substituted.
The Gemara next discusses consecrated property designated for the priests. When a person declares property forbidden as such, the Torah says that it may not be sold or redeemed. It belongs to the priest, and it cannot be treated like ordinary consecrated property that can be redeemed.
The Mishnah teaches that priestly consecrated property has no ordinary redemption. It is given to the priest. If a person nevertheless attempts to redeem it, the redemption does not take effect. This appears to support Rava, because the prohibition says not to redeem it, and the attempted redemption is ineffective.
According to Abaye, however, the act should have taken effect. Abaye says that when the Torah prohibits an act, the act generally remains effective. Why, then, does the attempted redemption here accomplish nothing?
The answer is that the verse says that this property is “most holy.” The special status of this consecrated property means that it remains in its sanctity. Although the general rule would be that a prohibited act takes effect, the Torah specifically teaches here that redemption does not take effect.
Rava does not need the verse to teach that the redemption is ineffective, because according to Rava that is the general rule. He needs the wording to teach another law concerning a firstborn animal that develops a permanent blemish.
Normally, when an ordinary consecrated animal develops a blemish, it can be redeemed. A firstborn animal, however, is compared in certain respects to animal tithes. The Torah says that a firstborn animal may not be redeemed. One might therefore think that it also may not be sold, because animal tithes may not be sold.
The verse teaches that a blemished firstborn animal may be sold. The priest may sell it, even though it retains the sanctity associated with a firstborn offering. Rashi clarifies that the priest is not selling it to another priest as though the object belonged to the buyer; rather, the priest who owns it may sell it. The special wording teaches that the prohibition against selling does not apply in this case.
The comparison with animal tithes teaches that, like consecrated property designated for the priests, animal tithes cannot be sold or redeemed. The special verse concerning the firstborn limits that comparison and teaches that a blemished firstborn animal may be sold.
The next case concerns substitution. The Torah says that a person may not exchange one consecrated animal for another. Nevertheless, the Mishnah teaches that if he performs the exchange, the second animal becomes consecrated, and the person receives lashes.
This appears to support Abaye. The person violated the prohibition, but the action was effective: the second animal became consecrated. If the act did not take effect, the second animal should not have acquired sanctity.
Rava answers that substitution is another specific exception established by Scripture. The Torah says that the substituted animal becomes consecrated. The verse is needed precisely because, without it, we would have assumed that the second animal does not become consecrated.
Why would we not simply say that the second animal becomes consecrated while the first one loses its sanctity? The verse teaches that the second animal becomes consecrated without removing the sanctity of the first. Both animals are consecrated.
Thus, according to Rava, the verse teaches two things: first, that the second animal becomes consecrated even though the substitution was prohibited; and second, that the original animal remains consecrated as well. The act is effective only because of the special biblical decree.
The sixth case concerns a firstborn animal that develops a blemish. In the case of most consecrated offerings, a blemished animal can be redeemed, and even an animal substituted for it can be redeemed. The exception is a firstborn animal and an animal tithe. If a firstborn animal develops a blemish, it does not have ordinary redemption.
This again appears to show that the attempted redemption does not take effect, which would challenge Abaye. The explanation is that the Torah gives the firstborn a special status. The words concerning its holiness teach that it remains holy and is not redeemable in the ordinary manner.
Rava asks why that verse is needed. If Rava’s general principle is that a prohibited act does not take effect, then the attempted redemption would fail without any special verse.
Rava answers that the verse teaches that a firstborn animal and an animal tithe possess sanctity that allows them to be offered, but a substitute for such an animal does not have the same status. The substitute remains holy, but it is not offered on the altar.
Abaye also needs a verse for this law. The verse says that the firstborn itself is offered, while its substitute is not offered. Rava accepts that explanation, but he uses the additional wording to teach another law: when the blood of a firstborn or an animal tithe becomes mixed with blood that is otherwise offered on the altar, the mixture may still be placed on the altar. The different bloods do not cancel one another.
How do we know that bloods of different offerings do not nullify one another when mixed? The Gemara brings the service of Yom Kippur. The Torah requires taking blood from the bull and blood from the goat. If the bloods are mixed, the larger quantity of blood from the bull should theoretically nullify the smaller quantity from the goat. Nevertheless, the Torah continues to refer to both bloods, teaching that they remain distinct within the mixture.
Rabbi Yoshiah understands that the bloods on Yom Kippur were mixed, and this serves as the proof that one offering’s blood does not nullify another’s. Rabbi Yonatan, however, maintains that the bloods were placed on the altar separately. According to Rabbi Yonatan, the proof that bloods do not nullify one another comes from the verse concerning the firstborn and the animal tithe. Thus, the entire discussion is accounted for through the laws of the firstborn.
The seventh case concerns an animal tithe. As with a firstborn animal, a blemished animal tithe cannot be redeemed in the ordinary way. The Mishnah says that other consecrated offerings that develop a blemish may be redeemed, and their substitutes may also be redeemed, with the exception of a firstborn and an animal tithe.
This again appears to challenge Abaye. The attempted redemption does not take effect, even though Abaye maintains that a prohibited act generally takes effect. Abaye answers that there is a comparison between the firstborn and the animal tithe. Since the Torah establishes that redemption does not take effect with regard to a firstborn, the same rule applies to an animal tithe.
The eighth case concerns the order in which priestly gifts are separated. It is a transgression to separate the priestly offering before separating the first portion given to the priests. The Torah says that the first portion must come from the full produce, and that it may not be delayed. The order is therefore first the initial portion and then the priestly offering.
The Mishnah nevertheless teaches that if a person separated the priestly offering before the first portion, the act is effective. This seems to challenge Rava. Rava says that a prohibited act generally does not take effect, yet here the Mishnah says that what he did is valid.
Rava answers that this case can be corrected. The verse says that the various gifts must be separated, and the prohibition applies to a case in which the order can be repaired. For example, if the first tithe was given to the Levite before the priestly offering was separated, the Levite can still separate the priestly offering from what he received and give it to the priest. Because the error can be corrected, the act is effective.
The Mishnah’s wording—“even though he violated a prohibition, what he did is valid”—is therefore significant. It teaches that this is not merely a preferred order in which the person failed to perform the ideal practice. It is a prohibition, but one whose consequence can be repaired.
Abaye does not need the verse to teach that the act is effective, since that is his general position. He needs the verse to distinguish between different stages of the produce. If the Levite takes the produce while it is still in the stalks, before it has reached the stage at which the obligation of the priestly offering applies, he is not required to separate the offering. If he takes it after it has been collected into a pile, the obligation already applies, and he must separate the offering.
Thus, the verse teaches the distinction between taking the produce while it is still in the stalks and taking it after it has been gathered. The issue is not whether the act takes effect; according to Abaye, it does. The issue is when the Levite becomes obligated to make the appropriate correction.
The ninth case concerns a priest who marries a woman whom the Torah prohibits him to marry. The Mishnah says that the marriage takes effect, but the woman’s status changes, and the child born from the relationship becomes disqualified as a priest.
This appears to show that the prohibited marriage is effective, which supports Abaye. If the marriage did not take effect, the child would have a more serious status, that of an illegitimate child. The fact that the child is called a disqualified priest indicates that the marriage did take effect.
Rava can answer that the verse specifically calls the child disqualified as a priest, establishing that the marriage is effective in this case. According to Abaye, that additional wording is not needed to prove that the marriage takes effect. Abaye uses it to teach that not only does the child become disqualified, but the woman’s status also changes.
If the woman had been the daughter of a priest, she would lose her right to eat the priestly offering in her father’s household. She would also lose the status associated with the priestly family in other areas, such as the laws of the firstborn redemption. The wording therefore teaches that she becomes disqualified as well.
There is an additional question: why does the Mishnah need to specify the case of the daughter of a priest? Even if she was not the daughter of a priest, there are other practical consequences to her changed status. The disqualification affects her standing in several areas, not only her ability to return to her father’s household and eat the priestly offering.
This point had personal significance for me because I prepared this page yesterday, when my grandson had his firstborn redemption ceremony. I thought it would be a good sign that the page itself contained a discussion of the laws of redemption. I prepared the entire page, and then the discussion ended with this additional practical implication. May the merit of the Torah bring blessing.
Returning to the main discussion, the sequence of cases has established the structure of the disagreement. Abaye generally maintains that when a person performs a prohibited act, the act takes effect, and the person receives lashes because the result was achieved. Rava generally maintains that the act does not take effect, and that the lashes are for violating the word of God. Each side explains the opposing cases through specific biblical decrees or through the particular structure of the prohibition.