We begin four lines up from the bottom, toward the middle of the page. The discussion concerns an ox that has been trained to gore. Ordinarily, when an ox kills a person, the ox is put to death. The question is whether the same law applies in the cases under discussion.
The animal may have committed either an act of sexual violation or an act of goring. In both cases, the animal is put to death. It would seem simple that once we know the law in one case, we should know it in the other. However, the Gemara explains that each case has a leniency that the other does not have, and therefore neither can be derived from the other.
In the case of sexual violation, the law applies whether the act was committed willingly or under coercion. The animal is put to death regardless of whether it acted intentionally. In the case of goring, however, the law applies only when the goring was intentional. If I had been told only the law of sexual violation, I would not have known the law of goring, because the law of sexual violation applies even under coercion, whereas goring applies only when the animal acted intentionally. Conversely, if I had been told only the law of goring, I would not have known the law of sexual violation, because the law of sexual violation applies even when the act was coerced.
The Gemara therefore says that both cases must be stated. The case of sexual violation teaches that coercion and intention are treated alike with respect to the animal’s being put to death. The case of goring teaches that the animal is put to death only when it gored intentionally.
The Gemara then asks what practical difference this distinction has. It may be relevant to whether the animal is disqualified from being used as a sacrifice. The verse concerning goring teaches that only an intentional act creates this disqualification, but an act committed under coercion does not necessarily do so. Thus, if an animal gored intentionally, it would be disqualified from the altar; if it gored accidentally or under coercion, that particular disqualification would not necessarily apply.
This seems to raise a difficulty against Rav, who says that such an animal is disqualified from the altar. The answer is that the difficulty is actually against Shmuel. Shmuel teaches that the animal is treated as disqualified for the altar, whereas the discussion had suggested that an act committed under coercion should not create that disqualification. The practical distinction between an act committed under coercion and one committed intentionally is therefore not necessarily whether the animal is put to death, but whether it may be brought as a sacrifice.
The Gemara challenges this explanation. Perhaps the difference between sexual violation and goring is not a matter of sacrificial disqualification at all. The verses do not clearly indicate that this is the distinction. The difference may instead concern the law of putting the animal to death. With regard to goring, the Torah explicitly distinguishes between the different circumstances of the animal’s act. We therefore cannot simply assume that the distinction concerns sacrificial use; it may concern the animal’s execution.
Rashi explains the matter in this direction. With regard to goring, the law distinguishes between an animal that gored intentionally and one that gored under coercion. The discussion is therefore examining whether the same distinction applies in the case of sexual violation, or whether that case is treated differently.
There is another discussion concerning the ransom payment that applies when an ox kills a person. The owner of an ox that kills a person is required to pay a payment known as ransom. The question is what happens when the animal committed a sexual violation but did not kill the person.
If the case is one in which the person died and the court subsequently put the animal to death, then what difference does it make whether the animal killed through goring or through sexual violation? In either case, the animal ultimately killed a person, and one might have thought that the owner should pay the ransom. The Gemara therefore says that the case must be one in which the animal committed the sexual violation but the person did not die from the act.
The Gemara then asks why the owner would not pay the ransom. One possible answer is that the person did not die as a result of the animal’s act. The ransom payment applies only when the animal actually caused the person’s death. If the person survived the act, there is no ransom payment.
Abaye answers that the case is one in which the person did not die from the act itself, but was subsequently brought before the court, and the court put him or her to death. One might have thought that this should still be considered as though the animal had killed the person indirectly. The animal committed the act, and the person ultimately died because of the legal consequences of that act. Abaye therefore teaches that this is not treated as the animal’s having killed the person, and there is no ransom payment.
Alternatively, the Gemara explains that the person may have died during the act itself, but the reason there is still no ransom payment is that the animal acted for its own pleasure rather than with an intention to cause damage. In the case of goring, the animal’s act is directed toward causing harm. In the case of sexual violation, however, the animal acts for pleasure. The ransom payment applies when the animal’s intention is to cause harm, not when it acts for its own gratification.
In my opinion, this is the dispute between Abaye and Rava. According to Abaye’s first answer, if the animal itself had caused the person’s death, there would have been a ransom payment. There is no payment only because the court, rather than the animal, ultimately caused the death. According to Rava, even if the animal had caused the person’s death, there would still be no ransom payment, because the animal acted for pleasure and not with an intention to cause harm.
There is another possible practical difference between Abaye and Rava. Consider an animal that trampled a child under circumstances involving the damage category of trampling, where the ordinary obligation is limited to the value of the damaged property. According to Abaye, the owner might have to pay the ransom even though the animal did not act with an intention to cause harm. Abaye requires that the animal actually kill the person; he does not require a specific intention to injure. Rava, however, would say that there is no ransom payment, because the act was not performed with an intention to cause harm.
Rashi explains that according to Abaye, even when the animal did not intend to cause damage, the owner pays the ransom if the animal killed the person. According to Rava, the intention to cause harm is essential. Since that intention was absent, there is no ransom payment.
A teaching is brought in support of Rav: an ox that has been sentenced to death is not itself killed by the court, but it is disqualified with respect to the altar because it is comparable to an animal that has been killed. This clearly follows the view of Rav, who says that the animal is disqualified for sacrificial use.
It is striking that we are studying the laws of an ox sentenced to death at the same time that people have been discussing the running of the bulls. Many people were killed or injured in that event this week, including incidents unlike anything that had happened there for decades. It is an unusual coincidence that we are learning about an ox sentenced to death while people are placing themselves in danger by running among bulls.
Of course, one may ask how intelligent it is for a person to put himself in such danger. These people knowingly enter a dangerous situation. I also heard about someone who jumped from the Empire State Building and died. What should one expect? If a person deliberately enters a place where he is likely to be killed, the danger is obvious. That is not the case we are discussing here, but the comparison is worth noting.
Let us return to the animal itself. The animal may be an ox or another animal, and the law concerns an animal that has become dangerous. If the animal kills a non-Jewish slave, the owner pays the slave’s owner thirty shekels. This is a fixed amount, regardless of the slave’s actual value. Whether the slave is worth one hundred maneh or a much smaller amount, the payment remains thirty shekels.
A famous question arises. How can there ever be an ox that is considered established as dangerous and that kills a person, thereby creating an obligation to pay the ransom? If an ox kills while it is still in its initial status, the court puts it to death. It should never remain alive long enough to become established as dangerous.
One answer is that an animal can become established as dangerous without having killed anyone. For example, the animal may repeatedly charge people, and each time the people manage to escape. If the animal is clearly dangerous and would have killed them had they not run away, the court may determine that the animal has become established as dangerous even though no one was actually killed.
This resembles the running of the bulls. The bulls are alive, and they pursue people. The people run away, and no one is killed in the particular incident. Nevertheless, the fact that the people had to flee demonstrates that the animals are dangerous. Had the people not escaped, the animals might have killed them. This is a case in which an animal can become established as dangerous without first killing and without being put to death.
Another possibility is that the animal gored three people critically, but none of them died immediately. The animal therefore remained alive, while the three injured people later died on the same day. In that case, the animal may become established as dangerous before the court puts it to death.
There is also a case in which the animal killed three animals. Once it has killed three animals, it is considered established as dangerous with respect to animals. The Gemara asks whether an animal that is established as dangerous with respect to animals is automatically considered established as dangerous with respect to people.
One might think that a person is more difficult to kill than an animal, because a person has the ability to protect himself. Therefore, an animal that has killed three animals may not necessarily be considered dangerous with respect to people. The Gemara rejects the assumption that the two categories are automatically identical.
Similarly, if an animal has killed three non-Jews, one might say that this does not establish it as dangerous with respect to Jews. Perhaps it is easier for the animal to kill a non-Jew, whereas Jewish people have greater protection. Therefore, killing three non-Jews does not necessarily establish the animal as dangerous with respect to Jews.
The Gemara then considers an animal that killed three people who were already mortally ill and destined to die. Such people are called tereifah. Since they were going to die regardless, one might say that the animal has not demonstrated that it is dangerous with respect to healthy people. Killing three mortally ill people would therefore not necessarily establish the animal as dangerous with respect to ordinary people.
Rav Pappa gives a different answer. The animal killed a person and then escaped to a marsh. It killed a second person and again escaped. It killed a third person and escaped once more. By the time the court was able to seize the animal, it had already killed three people and had become established as dangerous. It remained alive because it had repeatedly escaped before the court could execute it.
Rav Acha bar Rav Ika presents another possibility: the animal’s dangerous status was established through witnesses who were subsequently disqualified as false witnesses, and then those witnesses themselves were shown to have been false witnesses.
The case would be as follows. Witnesses testified that the animal had gored and killed three people. On the basis of their testimony, the animal was about to be considered established as dangerous. Then another group of witnesses came and proved that the first witnesses could not have seen what they claimed to have seen. The first witnesses were therefore declared false witnesses, and the animal was saved.
Afterward, a further group of witnesses came and proved that the second group had also been false witnesses. The first witnesses were then restored to credibility. In a single moment, the animal again had testimony establishing that it had gored three times. Since the animal had remained alive while the matter was being litigated, it had become established as dangerous without having been executed beforehand.
There is another related case. The animal gored twice, but the witnesses who testified about the incidents were disqualified as false witnesses. The animal therefore did not have a valid record establishing that it had gored twice. The animal then gored a third time, and a new group of witnesses testified about the third incident. Before the animal could be executed, the original witnesses were restored to credibility when the witnesses who had disqualified them were themselves shown to be false witnesses. The animal then had three valid incidents attributed to it and became established as dangerous immediately.
The Gemara asks whether the three incidents are needed merely to establish the animal’s status, or whether they are also intended to warn the owner. If the purpose is only to establish the animal’s status, this case presents no difficulty. Once the animal is proven to have gored three times, it is dangerous.
However, if the purpose is to warn the owner, perhaps the owner must receive the warning on three separate days. The owner cannot be told on one day that three separate incidents have now been established and that the animal is suddenly considered dangerous. Originally, the owner may have thought that the witnesses were unreliable, and he may not have taken the first testimony seriously. If all three incidents become established at one time, perhaps he never received the required warning.
The Gemara answers that the testimony itself included the fact that the owner was present each time the animal gored. He therefore cannot claim that he was unaware of the animal’s behavior. Even if the status of the witnesses changed, the owner personally saw the animal gore on each of the three occasions. He knew that the animal was dangerous.
Ravina offers a different answer: the witnesses knew the owner of the ox but did not know which particular ox had done the goring. During the first two incidents, they knew that the animal had come from this owner’s herd, but they could not identify the specific animal. They therefore could not establish any particular ox as dangerous, and the ox could not be put to death.
On the third occasion, they recognized the specific ox. At that point, the testimony established that this particular animal had gored three times. It could therefore become established as dangerous at that moment, even though the owner had not previously been able to identify which animal was responsible. The Gemara asks what could be demanded of the owner in such a case. He could not watch every animal in his herd equally when no one had told him which animal was dangerous.
We have now offered several answers to the question of how an animal could become established as dangerous and still be alive when it reached that status.
The Sages teach that when an animal is put to death, whether it is an animal in its initial status or one already established as dangerous, its flesh may not be eaten. The verse says that the ox shall be stoned and that its flesh may not be eaten.
At first glance, this seems obvious. Once the animal has been stoned, it is an animal that has not been slaughtered properly, and its flesh is forbidden as the flesh of an animal that died without proper slaughter. Why, then, does the Torah need to state explicitly that its flesh may not be eaten?
The verse teaches an additional point. The prohibition begins once the animal has been sentenced, even before the sentence has been carried out. From the moment the court completes its judgment, the animal is forbidden for consumption. The prohibition does not begin only after the animal has actually been stoned.
One might have thought that if the animal were slaughtered properly after the judgment but before the execution, its flesh would become permitted. The verse teaches that this is not so. Even if the animal is slaughtered in a manner that would normally make its flesh permissible, it remains forbidden because the judgment has already been completed.
The discussion then asks whether the prohibition is limited to eating or whether one may not derive any benefit from the animal at all. Perhaps one may not eat the flesh, but one could sell it or benefit from its hide.
Another verse says that the owner of the ox is free of liability. Shimon ben Zoma explains that the word “free” can mean completely wiped out. The owner is free not only of financial liability but also of any benefit from the animal itself. Thus, the verse teaches that the owner may not derive benefit from the ox that has been sentenced to death.
The verses can therefore be understood as teaching two separate laws. The command to stone the ox establishes the animal’s execution, and the statement that its flesh may not be eaten establishes the prohibition against eating. The expression that the owner is free teaches that one may not derive benefit from the animal at all.
The Gemara challenges this interpretation. Who says that the phrase concerning the animal’s flesh refers to an animal that was already slaughtered after the court completed its judgment? Perhaps the phrase refers only to an animal that was slaughtered before the judgment was completed, in which case its flesh would otherwise have been permitted.
Perhaps even after the court has completed its judgment, a proper slaughter would make the flesh permissible. The phrase concerning the flesh would then be teaching only that one may not derive benefit from an animal that was stoned, not that one may not benefit from an animal that was properly slaughtered after the judgment.
The Gemara responds that the expression prohibiting the flesh can sometimes include both eating and deriving benefit. In other contexts, expressions such as “you shall not eat” or “you shall not consume” include both the prohibition against eating and the prohibition against benefit, unless the Torah explicitly creates an exception.
For example, with regard to an animal that died without proper slaughter, the Torah explicitly permits giving it to a resident alien or selling it to a non-Jew. The exception is necessary because, without it, the general prohibition would include not only eating but also deriving benefit. Once the Torah explicitly permits the sale, that benefit is allowed in that particular case.
Accordingly, perhaps the prohibition concerning the sentenced ox includes both eating and benefit. The words prohibiting the flesh would then mean that one may not eat it and may not derive benefit from it.
The Gemara answers that in this case the prohibition against eating is learned from the command to stone the animal. Once the Torah says that the ox shall be stoned, that itself establishes the prohibition against eating its flesh. The phrase concerning the flesh is therefore available to teach the prohibition against benefit.
The Gemara objects that if the prohibition against eating is already learned from the command to stone the animal, the Torah should have written an expression meaning that one may not benefit from it. Since the Torah instead says that one may not eat its flesh, perhaps that phrase is not intended to teach a prohibition against benefit.
The Gemara answers that the phrase concerning the flesh can teach both points. It teaches that even if the animal was slaughtered in a manner that would ordinarily make its flesh permissible, it remains forbidden because the animal had already been sentenced. It also teaches that one may not derive benefit from it.
The extra word referring to the flesh indicates that even though the animal has been made similar to ordinary meat through proper slaughter, it remains forbidden. The words concerning the flesh therefore teach that a proper slaughter does not remove the prohibition once the animal has been sentenced.
The Gemara then raises another possibility. Perhaps this applies only when the animal was killed with a stone, because that resembles the prescribed execution by stoning. If, however, the animal was slaughtered with a knife, perhaps the prohibition would not apply, because a knife is not a method of stoning.
The Gemara rejects this distinction. The Torah does not establish different levels of stoning based on the particular object used. Whether the animal is struck with a stone, a reed, or another object, the essential point is that the animal was killed in the manner of an animal sentenced to death. A knife does not create a more lenient status merely because it is a different instrument.
Thus, when the animal is sentenced to death, its flesh is forbidden even if it is subsequently slaughtered with a knife. The prohibition applies to the animal because of its legal status, not merely because of the physical method by which it was killed.
The Gemara then returns to the phrase describing the owner as free. If the prohibition against benefit has already been learned from the prohibition against eating, what does the additional expression that the owner is free add?
It teaches that the prohibition includes the hide as well. One might have thought that the flesh is forbidden but that the hide, which is not normally eaten, remains permitted. The phrase describing the owner as free teaches that one may not even use the hide or derive benefit from any part of the animal.
The Gemara asks why the hide should be treated differently from the flesh. Once the prohibition against benefit has been established, the hide should already be included.
The answer is that the phrase concerning the flesh teaches the prohibition against benefit from the flesh, while the additional expression that the owner is free teaches that the prohibition extends to the hide. Without the additional expression, one might have limited the prohibition to the edible flesh.
There will later be other Sages who interpret the phrase describing the owner as free in a different way. If they use that phrase for another teaching, the question arises: from where will they learn that the hide is also forbidden? They derive it from the extra word connected to the flesh. The word “the” before “flesh” is interpreted as including what is secondary to the flesh, namely the hide.
This is one of the well-known discussions concerning the interpretive significance of the word “the” in the Torah. One Sage, Shevna of Amson, used to interpret every such word in the Torah. When he reached the verse, “You shall fear the Lord your God,” he stopped and asked what the extra word could possibly include. Besides God, whom else could one fear?
His students asked him what would happen to all the other instances in which he had interpreted that word. He answered that just as he had received reward for interpreting the word in all the earlier passages, he would receive reward for refraining from interpreting it in this passage. He considered the restraint itself to be part of the Torah’s proper interpretation.
Later, Rabbi Akiva came and taught that the word in that verse includes Torah scholars. Thus, the method of interpreting the extra word was not accepted in precisely the same way by every Sage. Some interpreted it in one set of passages, while others used it to derive additional laws, including the extension of the prohibition from the flesh to the hide.
That completes this part of the discussion.