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A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Eli Mansour

Daf Yomi

Beitza 2A - 2B (12th Cycle Daf Yomi Shiur)

Lectured by Rabbi Eli Mansour

Published
December 1, 2005
Duration
69:05

This transcript was auto-generated and polished for readability. While we aim for accuracy, errors may occur. If you notice a mistake, please click to submit corrections.

The tractate is traditionally known as Masechet Betza, though some refer to it as Masechet Be'ah, considering the word "Betza" (egg) not to be a clean expression. Others call it Masechet Yom Tov, as it primarily discusses the laws pertaining to festivals. Our Mishnah begins with the case of an egg laid on Yom Tov. Beit Shammai permits eating the egg, while Beit Hillel forbids it. Tosafot clarifies that while the Mishnah uses the terminology of "eating" and "not eating," the fundamental question is whether the egg is considered forbidden to handle. We will await the Gemara's rationale for this. This is an exceptional instance where Beit Hillel adopts the more stringent position, as typically in the Talmud, Beit Hillel is the lenient authority. Here, Beit Hillel rules that an egg laid on Yom Tov is entirely forbidden to handle. To review, items forbidden to handle on Shabbat or Yom Tov come in different forms, and we will explore which category this egg falls into.

The Mishnah then presents a second, unrelated dispute, included solely because it offers another scenario where Beit Hillel is stringent and Beit Shammai is lenient. This case concerns the laws of Pesach. Beit Shammai states that for a leavening agent, the forbidden measure is an olive's measure, while for leavened bread, it is a date's measure. A leavening agent is considered more severe than mere leavened bread because it can cause other dough to rise. Therefore, Beit Shammai applies a stricter, smaller measure for it. Leavened bread, which lacks this leavening power, has a larger forbidden measure, equivalent to a date. Beit Hillel, however, is stringent in both cases, declaring that both a leavening agent and leavened bread are forbidden in the smaller measure of an olive's measure.

A third dispute, again unrelated to the previous two, further illustrates Beit Hillel's stringency and Beit Shammai's leniency. This case involves slaughtering an animal or bird on Yom Tov. Unlike Shabbat, where preparing food is forbidden, the Torah grants dispensation for food preparation on Yom Tov, making slaughter technically permissible. After slaughtering an animal, there is an obligation to cover the blood with dirt. Beit Shammai permits taking a shovel and digging dirt on Yom Tov to fulfill this obligation. Beit Hillel, however, considers digging on Yom Tov problematic due to potential issues like grinding hard dirt. Therefore, Beit Hillel rules that one should only slaughter on Yom Tov if dirt was prepared and designated for this purpose before Yom Tov. If one did not prepare the dirt beforehand, Beit Hillel would initially forbid the slaughter. However, even Beit Hillel agrees that if the animal was slaughtered post-facto, one may cover the blood. The Gemara will explain that this leniency applies if the shovel was already in the dirt before Yom Tov, alleviating some of the associated problems. The simple point is that if the shovel was in the dirt before Yom Tov, and the animal was slaughtered, everyone agrees one may cover the blood.

The final point of the Mishnah, "oven ashes are prepared," is connected to the third case. If one performs slaughter on Yom Tov and needs to cover the blood, the Mishnah informs us that the ashes from an oven are considered prepared and not forbidden to handle. This is because such ashes are considered ready for use, and it is assumed that one had them in mind for such purposes before Yom Tov began. We will await the Gemara's detailed analysis of all these cases.

To summarize, the Mishnah discusses three situations: an egg laid on Yom Tov, the measures for leavened bread and leavening agents, and slaughter on Yom Tov followed by covering the blood. In all these, there is a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, with Beit Hillel consistently taking the stringent position. The Mishnah concludes with the post-facto leniency of Beit Hillel regarding covering the blood and the permissibility of oven ashes.

The Gemara begins its analysis by asking about the specific type of chicken involved in the first case. There are two types: one designated for eating, and one designated for laying eggs. The Gemara first considers a chicken designated for eating. Why would Beit Hillel consider an egg from such a chicken forbidden to handle? It is analogous to a slice of bread cut from a loaf; it is food that has separated from food. Just as the chicken itself is not forbidden to handle, being designated as food, so too should an egg that was part of it be permissible. Rashi and Tosafot both explain that if one could slaughter and eat the entire chicken, including any internal eggs, then an egg that has emerged should also be considered food separated from food and thus not forbidden to handle. Therefore, the Gemara asks, if the chicken is designated for eating, why would Beit Hillel be stringent?

The Gemara then concludes that the Mishnah must be referring to a chicken designated for laying eggs, not for eating. If so, the Gemara asks, what is Beit Shammai's reasoning for being lenient? The chicken itself is not designated for eating, so it is forbidden to handle. How can an egg that emerges from it on Yom Tov be permissible? Such an egg would be considered "newly created," meaning something that came into existence or became available on Shabbat or Yom Tov, and was not anticipated or known to be present beforehand. The Gemara assumes that even Beit Shammai accepts the concept of "newly created" items being forbidden to handle. If the chicken is designated for laying eggs, the owner is not thinking about an egg within its womb before Yom Tov, as eggs are not laid daily. So, when an egg surfaces on Yom Tov, it should be forbidden to handle. Thus, the Gemara questions Beit Shammai's leniency.

The Gemara then suggests that perhaps Beit Shammai does not accept the laws of forbidden items at all. However, this is immediately challenged, as the tractate Shabbat extensively discusses these laws, and no opinion rejects them entirely. The Gemara in Shabbat discusses a major dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. While Rabbi Shimon is often lenient regarding forbidden items, he does not reject the concept entirely. He simply holds that in certain cases, items are permissible. The Gemara proposes that Beit Shammai might follow Rabbi Shimon's lenient opinion, extending it even to "newly created" items. For example, in the case of a lamp lit before Shabbat, Rabbi Yehuda considers the residual oil after it extinguishes on Shabbat to be forbidden to handle, as it was forbidden when Shabbat began. Rabbi Shimon, however, permits it, arguing that one anticipates the lamp extinguishing and intends to use the oil afterward. The Gemara assumes that if Rabbi Shimon is lenient in such a case, he would also be lenient regarding "newly created" items. Therefore, Beit Shammai, following Rabbi Shimon, would permit the egg even if it is "newly created."

However, the Gemara then refutes this, stating that even Rabbi Shimon, while lenient in some cases of forbidden items, is stringent regarding "newly created" items. A "newly created" item is considered more severe because it was not even present before Yom Tov. In the oil case, the oil was present; only its status changed. But an egg that emerges on Yom Tov was not there. So, if even Rabbi Shimon forbids "newly created" items, what is Beit Shammai's reason for permitting the egg? Rav Nachman offers a resolution: the Mishnah truly discusses a chicken designated for laying eggs. Rav Nachman asserts that Beit Shammai is indeed lenient even regarding "newly created" items, aligning with Rabbi Shimon's most lenient stance, while Beit Hillel follows Rabbi Yehuda, who considers "newly created" items strictly forbidden. Thus, according to Rav Nachman, Beit Shammai follows Rabbi Shimon, and Beit Hillel follows Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara then challenges Rav Nachman, asking if he truly said that Beit Hillel follows Rabbi Yehuda, making Beit Hillel stringent regarding forbidden items. We have a Mishnah in Tractate Shabbat concerning bones and shells left on a table after a meal. Beit Shammai says one cannot handle them directly, but may shake the table to remove them. Beit Hillel says one may remove them with their hands. On this Mishnah, Rav Nachman commented that the opinions are reversed: Beit Shammai is stringent, forbidding direct handling, while Beit Hillel is lenient, permitting it. This contradicts Rav Nachman's earlier statement that Beit Hillel is stringent regarding forbidden items. According to Tosafot, the bones are considered food for animals, and Rabbi Shimon would be lenient, permitting their direct removal, as one anticipates them becoming animal fodder. Rabbi Yehuda would be stringent, as they were not fit for animals when Shabbat began. Rashi, on the other hand, understands that even if the bones are not fit for animals, Rabbi Shimon would permit their removal because it is disgusting to leave them on the table. In any event, Rav Nachman's reversal of the opinions in Tractate Shabbat presents a contradiction.

Tosafot also raises a question regarding the opinion that permits shaking the table to remove the bones. If the bones are forbidden to handle, the table itself, which holds them, should become a "base" for a forbidden item, and thus also forbidden to move. Tosafot offers several answers: first, a "base" is only created when one intentionally places an item there to remain for the entire Shabbat; here, there is no such intention. Second, the table also holds permissible food, and when permissible items are more valuable than forbidden ones, the table does not become a forbidden base. Therefore, shaking the table is allowed.

The Gemara resolves the contradiction in Rav Nachman's statements by introducing the concept of an "anonymous Mishnah." When Rabbi, the compiler of the Mishnah, presents a law without an opposing opinion, it is considered the established law. In Tractate Shabbat, there is an anonymous Mishnah that states one may give a carcass that died on Shabbat to dogs. This anonymous Mishnah aligns with the lenient opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who permits moving a carcass that became available on Shabbat. Rav Nachman explains that since the law follows Beit Hillel, and the anonymous Mishnah in Shabbat follows Rabbi Shimon, he aligns Beit Hillel with Rabbi Shimon in Shabbat to maintain consistency. Therefore, in the case of bones and shells, Beit Hillel is lenient, allowing their direct removal, following Rabbi Shimon.

However, in Yom Tov, the anonymous Mishnah follows Rabbi Yehuda. This is seen in a Mishnah that states one may not take wood from piles designated for building to use as fuel on Yom Tov. This is because such wood, being valuable building material, is forbidden to handle due to potential monetary loss, a category of forbidden items that even Rabbi Shimon agrees to. The Mishnah then adds that a piece of wood that broke on Yom Tov is also forbidden to handle. This latter ruling aligns with Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that since the wood was forbidden to handle when Yom Tov began (being designated for building), its status does not change even if it breaks and becomes useless for building. Since the anonymous Mishnah in Yom Tov follows Rabbi Yehuda, Rav Nachman aligns Beit Hillel with Rabbi Yehuda in Yom Tov, making Beit Hillel stringent regarding forbidden items in this context. Thus, Rav Nachman consistently aligns Beit Hillel with the anonymous Mishnah of the respective tractate.

The Gemara then asks why Rabbi, the compiler of the Mishnah, adopted a lenient stance regarding forbidden items in Shabbat but a stringent stance in Yom Tov. One might expect the opposite, as Shabbat is generally considered more severe, with punishments like stoning and excision, compared to Yom Tov, which is punishable by lashes. The Gemara explains that this is precisely the reason. Because Shabbat is so severe, people are inherently careful and will not treat its laws lightly. Therefore, one can afford to be lenient in certain aspects of forbidden items without fear that people will further disregard the law. Yom Tov, however, is perceived as less severe, and certain labors are permitted. If the Sages were to be lenient regarding forbidden items on Yom Tov, people might take these leniencies too far. Thus, stringency is necessary on Yom Tov to maintain respect for its laws.

Tosafot raises a question regarding the broken plank case. Rabbi Shimon's leniency regarding forbidden items typically applies when one can anticipate the change in status, such as anticipating a candle extinguishing. However, one does not anticipate a perfectly good plank breaking on Yom Tov. Tosafot answers that the case must refer to a weak beam, where its breaking could be anticipated, thus allowing Rabbi Shimon's lenient opinion to apply.

The Gemara then returns to the initial interpretation of the egg case. If the core dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is about whether "newly created" items are forbidden to handle, why did the Mishnah choose the case of an egg? It could have simply presented the case of the chicken itself, if it was designated for laying eggs. If one does not hold that items are forbidden to handle, the chicken would be permissible; if one does, it would be forbidden. The Gemara explains that the egg case highlights the extreme leniency of Beit Shammai: not only is he lenient regarding the chicken itself, but even regarding an egg, which is a "newly created" item that was not present before Yom Tov. The Gemara counters that the Mishnah could have also shown the extreme stringency of Beit Hillel. It could have stated, "A chicken designated for laying eggs and its egg," thereby encompassing both the chicken and the "newly created" egg, demonstrating both schools' positions without adding many words. Since the Mishnah did not do this, the Gemara rejects this interpretation of the egg case.

The Gemara now proposes a new interpretation: the Mishnah is discussing a chicken designated for eating. The problem with the egg is not about its status as a "newly created" item, but rather due to the principle of "preparation of Rabbah." This principle states that significant meals, such as those for Shabbat or Yom Tov, require verbal designation and preparation on a weekday. Preparation for Yom Tov cannot be done on Shabbat, nor can preparation for Shabbat be done on Yom Tov. The Mishnah's case is specifically a Yom Tov that falls on a Sunday, immediately after Shabbat. An egg laid on Yom Tov is considered to have completed its formation in the mother's womb 24 hours prior, meaning on Shabbat. Since Shabbat cannot prepare for Yom Tov, the egg, though formed by divine action, is forbidden. Rabbah derives this from the verse regarding manna, which states that on Friday (a weekday), the Israelites were to prepare what they would eat on Shabbat. Rashi clarifies that this "preparation" refers to verbal designation, not cooking, as cooking was already commanded. This law of preparation applies only to significant meals of Shabbat and Yom Tov, not to regular weekday meals.

Abaye then challenges Rabbah: if the reason is "preparation of Rabbah," then an egg laid on a regular Yom Tov (e.g., a Tuesday, preceded by a Monday weekday) should be permissible, as it was formed on a weekday. Abaye knew by tradition that all eggs laid on Yom Tov are forbidden. Rabbah responds that the prohibition on a regular Yom Tov is a rabbinic decree, extended from the case of Yom Tov after Shabbat. Similarly, the Gemara asks, an egg laid on a regular Shabbat (preceded by a Friday weekday) should be permissible. The answer is again a rabbinic decree, extended from the case of Shabbat after Yom Tov. Thus, the cases of Yom Tov after Shabbat and Shabbat after Yom Tov are forbidden by Torah law, while a regular Yom Tov and a regular Shabbat are forbidden by rabbinic decree.

The Gemara then poses a final question: if we make such a broad rabbinic decree (forbidding an egg laid on a regular Yom Tov due to the case of Yom Tov after Shabbat), why are eggs found *inside* a chicken slaughtered on Yom Tov permissible? These eggs are considered part of the animal, like any other limb, and are not subject to the laws of "newly created" items or "preparation of Rabbah." Shouldn't we extend the decree to them as well, lest one mistakenly eat an egg that was *laid* on Yom Tov? The Gemara answers that finding a complete egg inside a chicken is an uncommon occurrence. The Sages do not issue rabbinic decrees for uncommon occurrences. Rashi clarifies that the Sages do not forbid something inherently permissible due to a rare chance of transgression.