The Mishnah teaches that anyone who was stoned must subsequently be hung. This is the view of Rabbi Eliezer. He states that a person is hung after stoning only for two specific transgressions: blasphemy, meaning cursing God, and idolatry. This immediately presents a disagreement. Regarding the manner of hanging, a man is hung facing the people, while a woman is hung facing the tree, which is considered more modest. The Sages, however, contend that a woman is not hung at all.
Rabbi Eliezer challenges the Sages, asking how they can claim women are not hung, given that Shimon ben Shattach once hung eighty women in Ashkelon who were witches. The Sages respond that Shimon ben Shattach's action was an exception. They point out that he hung eighty women in one day, which is contrary to the halakha that prohibits judging more than one capital punishment case in a single day. Therefore, they argue, his actions were extraordinary and not to be taken as a precedent for general halakha.
The Gemara then delves into the scriptural basis for hanging. A verse states, "And he shall be put to death, and you shall hang him." The Gemara initially infers that anyone subject to capital punishment is subsequently hung. However, the verse continues, "because this man cursed God," implying that only the blasphemer, who is punished by stoning, is then hung. The Gemara clarifies that just as the blasphemer's punishment is stoning, so too, anyone whose transgression is punishable by stoning is also hung. To reiterate, not every person who commits a capital crime is hung; only those whose crime is punishable by stoning, like blasphemy, are subject to hanging. The Sages disagree, maintaining that only sins similar to blasphemy, specifically idolatry, are subject to hanging, because both involve denying God.
Thus, the core disagreement is clear: Rabbi Eliezer holds that all those liable for stoning are also liable for hanging. The Sages restrict this to only two sins: blasphemy and idolatry. Rabbi Eliezer's view is more inclusive regarding hanging, while the Sages' view is more limited.
The Gemara seeks the root of this disagreement, explaining it through two methods of scriptural interpretation: "general and specific" (klal u'prat) and "inclusion and exclusion" (ribbui u'mi'ut). Rashi explains that in a "general and specific" interpretation, the specific term explains and limits the general term, meaning the general term only includes what is explicitly mentioned in the specific term, even excluding similar cases. This makes the interpretation very restrictive.
Conversely, in an "inclusion and exclusion" interpretation, the inclusion initially encompasses everything, and the exclusion then minimizes it, but not to a single case. Instead, it minimizes to include only things similar to the excluded item, while everything else is still included. If the inclusion and exclusion are separated by other words, it allows for a broader interpretation, including all cases similar to the excluded item. If they are adjacent, it is more restrictive.
The Gemara applies this to our verse. The Sages interpret it using the "general and specific" method. "And he shall be put to death, and you shall hang him" is the general statement (klal), suggesting everyone is hung. "Because this man cursed God" is the specific statement (prat). Normally, a "general and specific" interpretation would mean only the blasphemer is hung. However, since the general and specific terms are separated by other words in the verse ("do not hang him for a long time"), the Sages interpret this separation as allowing for the inclusion of similar cases. Thus, they include idolatry, which is similar to blasphemy in that it involves denying God. Therefore, according to the Sages, only blasphemy and idolatry warrant hanging.
Rabbi Eliezer, on the other hand, interprets the verse using the "inclusion and exclusion" method. "And he shall be put to death, and you shall hang him" is an inclusion (ribbui), initially encompassing everyone. "Because this man cursed God" is an exclusion (mi'ut), minimizing the scope. If the inclusion and exclusion were adjacent, it would mean only the blasphemer and similar cases are hung. However, because they are separated by other words, Rabbi Eliezer interprets this as including all those liable for stoning, not just similar cases. Therefore, for Rabbi Eliezer, all those liable for stoning are also subject to hanging.
The Gemara then returns to the Mishnah's discussion of hanging men versus women. All agree that men are hung. The Sages maintain that women are not hung at all. Their reasoning is derived from the verse "and you shall hang him," where the Hebrew word "him" (oto) implies a male and excludes a female. Rabbi Eliezer, however, interprets "him" (oto) as referring to the person without their clothes, meaning they are stoned naked. The Sages concede that "him" (oto) could refer to being without clothes, but they still maintain that it excludes women from hanging.
The Gemara then offers an alternative interpretation for the Sages' view, based on the phrase "if a man has a sin" (v'hiyeh b'ish chet). This phrase, they argue, implies that only a man is hung, thus excluding a woman. Rabbi Eliezer, however, would interpret the word "man" (ish) in this verse to exclude a wayward and rebellious son (ben sorer u'moreh) from hanging, even though he is liable for stoning. This is because a wayward and rebellious son is not considered a "man" in the context of this verse, and his punishment is for what he is predicted to do in the future, not for a past sin. However, a Baraita explicitly states that a wayward and rebellious son is indeed hung. Therefore, the Gemara concludes that the word "man" (ish) in the verse must come to include the wayward and rebellious son, meaning he is hung despite the initial exclusions.
Returning to Rabbi Eliezer's challenge regarding Shimon ben Shattach hanging eighty witches, the Gemara reiterates the Sages' point that Shimon ben Shattach acted extraordinarily because he judged eighty capital cases in one day, which is generally forbidden. Rabbi Eliezer then clarifies that the prohibition against judging multiple capital cases in one day applies only when the cases involve different types of capital punishment (e.g., stoning versus burning). The reason for this prohibition is to allow the judges to concentrate on each case and find grounds for acquittal. However, if all cases involve the same type of capital punishment, it would be permissible to judge them on the same day.
The Gemara then asks: if the eighty witches were all liable for the same punishment (strangulation), why would Shimon ben Shattach's actions be considered extraordinary? The Gemara answers that even if the punishment is the same, if the underlying sins are different (e.g., different types of witchcraft, like sorcery versus necromancy), it is still forbidden to judge them on the same day. The Sages explain that the prohibition against judging multiple capital cases on the same day applies even to different sins with the same punishment, to ensure that judges are not preoccupied with multiple distinct legal issues. However, if it is the same sin with the same punishment, it would be permissible.
The Gemara then presents a Baraita which states that one may not judge two cases on the same day, even if they involve the same punishment. This is exemplified by cases like an adulterer and adulteress, where both receive stoning, or a daughter of a priest who commits adultery (liable for burning) and her paramour (liable for strangulation). Another complex example is the case of conspiring witnesses (eidim zomemim) who falsely accuse a priest's daughter and her paramour. If the original witnesses are found to be conspiring, they receive the punishment of the accused. If they accused a priest's daughter and her paramour, the witnesses would be liable for strangulation (the man's punishment). If further witnesses then accuse these conspiring witnesses of themselves being conspiring, the second set of witnesses would also be liable for strangulation, while the priest's daughter would be reinstated as guilty and liable for burning. In such a scenario, where there are two different punishments (strangulation for the conspiring witnesses and burning for the priest's daughter), they cannot be judged on the same day.
The Baraita then quotes Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, who says: "I have heard that a court may administer lashes and even capital punishment, not according to Torah law, but as a temporary measure to make a fence for the Torah." This means that even though Shimon ben Shattach's actions were not strictly according to the letter of the law (judging eighty cases, hanging women), he did so because the times demanded it. Witchcraft was rampant, and he needed to make a strong public statement to deter others. This is why he hung the women, even though normally they are not hung. This is considered a "fence for the Torah," a rabbinic enactment to protect Torah law.
The Gemara provides further examples of such extraordinary measures: during the Greek period, when people were lax about Shabbat, a man who rode a horse on Shabbat (a rabbinic prohibition) was burned by the court. This was not because riding a horse on Shabbat is a capital crime by Torah law, but because the times called for a severe deterrent to strengthen adherence to Shabbat. Similarly, a man who engaged in relations with his wife publicly under a fig tree, though it was his wife, was given lashes by the court. This was not because it was forbidden by Torah law, but because public immodesty was rampant, and the court needed to make a stand. Rashi explains that the public nature of the act, in a place visible to all, necessitated this severe response.
The Mishnah then describes the method of hanging: a pole (kora) is stuck into the ground, with a beam (etz) extending horizontally from its top, resembling a half-sofit letter. The condemned's hands are tied together. Rabbi Yose says that the pole is not stuck into the ground; rather, a beam is leaned diagonally against a wall, and the person is hung in a manner similar to how butchers hang meat. Immediately after hanging, the body is taken down. If it is left overnight, it transgresses a Torah prohibition. The verse states, "for he that is hung is a curse of God," meaning that leaving the body exposed brings dishonor to God. Therefore, the body must be buried immediately. The reason is that people might say, "This is the one who cursed God," and the more they talk, the more it brings shame to God. Therefore, the person should be buried to prevent this public discussion.
The Mishnah explains the phrase "curse of God" (kelilat Elohim) by citing the Shekhina (Divine Presence) saying, "My head is heavy, My arm is heavy" (kalani miroshi, kalani mizro'i) when a person is in distress. This indicates that God feels the pain and suffering even when a wicked person is hung. The word "kalani" means "I feel light," but in this context, it is used ironically to mean "I do not feel light; I feel heavy." God suffers even when the wicked are punished.
The Gemara clarifies that the prohibition against leaving a body overnight applies not only to those executed by the court but to any deceased person. It is a positive commandment to bury the dead. However, if a body is left overnight for the purpose of its honor (kavod), such as to arrange a coffin or shrouds, there is no transgression.
Those executed by the court are not buried in the regular family cemetery, as it would be disrespectful to bury a wicked person next to a righteous one. Instead, there is a halakha from Moses at Sinai (halakha l'Moshe mi'Sinai) that establishes two separate cemeteries for those executed by the court: one for those killed by the sword and strangulation, and another for those killed by stoning and burning. After the flesh decays in these special cemeteries, the bones are collected and reburied in the family cemetery. The relatives of the executed person must visit the witnesses and judges to express that they bear no ill will, ensuring no grudges are held against those who carried out the judgment. Mourning rituals are not observed for those executed by the court, as their death serves as atonement. However, they may experience internal grief.
The Gemara presents a Baraita: if the verse had merely said, "If a man has a sin punishable by death, and you shall hang him," one might have thought that the hanging precedes the execution, as is done by some governments. However, the verse explicitly states, "and he shall be put to death, and you shall hang him," indicating that the execution precedes the hanging. The hanging itself is done only just before sunset. The judges issue their verdict of guilt just minutes before sunset. The condemned is immediately stoned, then hung on the tree for a moment, and immediately taken down. One person ties the rope, and another releases it. This is done right before sunset to prevent the body from being left overnight, even though technically it would be permissible to hang him earlier in the day as long as he is taken down before nightfall. The preference is to minimize the time the body is hung.
Regarding the "tree" (etz) on which the person is hung: it can be a tree attached to the ground or a detached piece of wood. Just as the person is buried, the tree (if it was attached to the ground) must also be cut down and buried. Some say that only if it's an attached tree must it be cut and buried. Others say that even a detached piece of wood must be buried. Still others say that a detached piece of wood is simply leaned against a wall, and no burial of the wood is required.
The reason for taking the body down immediately is to avoid desecrating God's name (chillul Hashem). Rabbi Meir offers a parable: two identical twin brothers live in a city. One becomes king, and the other becomes a thief. When the thief is hung, people might mistakenly think the king is being hung, bringing disgrace to the king. Similarly, humanity is created in God's image. When a person is hung, it is as if God's image is being hung, thus bringing shame to God, so the body must be taken down.
Rabbi Meir also connects the phrase "curse of God" to God's suffering, as expressed in "My head is heavy, My arm is heavy." The Gemara asks where the word "heavy" is found in the verse. Abaye explains that "kelilat" (curse) can be interpreted as "kal lit" (I am not light), meaning "I am heavy." The Gemara notes that the Shekhina uses a euphemism ("My head is light") to express "My head is heavy," as one does not speak ill of oneself directly. The Gemara concludes that both interpretations are derived from the verse: the need to take the body down to avoid desecrating God's name, and God's suffering over the death of the wicked.
The Gemara then seeks the source for the general obligation to bury the dead and not leave any body overnight. The double language in the verse "you shall surely bury him" (kavor tikberennu) implies that this law applies not only to those hung on a tree but to anyone who dies. This is a hint (remez) from the Torah for the general burial obligation. Shapur Malka, the king of Persia, once asked Rav Hama for the Torah source for burial. Rav Hama remained silent, for which he was criticized. He could have cited "you shall surely bury him." However, Rav Hama understood that the king would not accept this, as "bury" could mean merely "cover," not necessarily burying in the ground or a cave. The king might also dismiss the burial of righteous individuals in the Torah as mere custom (minhag), not obligation. Even God burying Moses could be seen as God following a custom, not establishing a mandatory law. Rav Hama knew the king would not accept these proofs.
Further proofs are offered: the prophet told Yeravam that only his son Aviyah would be buried, while the rest of his family would not, implying that burial is generally expected. Similarly, God told Yirmiyahu that the people of Anatot would "not be lamented or buried," but would be like refuse on the face of the earth, again implying that burial is the norm. These verses indicate that burial is a common practice or a desired outcome, but they do not explicitly state it as a mandatory Torah commandment. Therefore, Rav Hama's reticence was because he knew the king sought an explicit, undeniable command, which these verses do not provide.