The Eddie B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli. We begin today’s daf with the discussion of the Mishnah.
The Mishnah teaches that produce from the fourth year has the status of Netah Revai. It is holy like second tithe, and it also has the law of produce whose value is not known. In other words, if the value of the produce cannot be determined, one must assess its worth in order to bring the money to Jerusalem and eat the produce there, or to use the money for the purpose required by its sanctity. The Mishnah therefore says that the assessment must be made by three people.
The Sages taught: What is an example of second-tithe produce whose value is not known? Why would the produce not have a known value? One could simply find out the market price of the produce and make the assessment accordingly.
The answer is that the Mishnah is referring to produce that is spoiled. Such produce is not sold in the ordinary marketplace, and therefore it does not have a standard market price. An assessment is necessary to determine what this particular produce is worth.
The same applies to wine that has begun to turn into vinegar. It is not yet completely undrinkable, but it has started to sour. Since it is no longer ordinary marketable wine, its value cannot simply be determined by looking at the regular market price. It therefore requires an assessment.
The Mishnah also refers to money that has become rusty. For example, a person may already have brought money to Jerusalem, but the coins have become rusty. The question is how much produce those coins can now purchase. That, too, requires an assessment.
We said that such an assessment is made by three businessmen: people who understand business, who know the value of coins and the value of produce. It is not necessary to use three judges who are experts in halachic law. In fact, even if one of the three is a gentile, he may participate, provided that he understands the relevant values. We are seeking an assessment, not a judicial ruling. Therefore, three intelligent people who understand the market are sufficient, even if one of them is not Jewish.
Even the owner himself may be one of the people making the assessment. He knows the value of the item and may therefore participate in determining its worth.
What happens if the three people are partners, meaning that they all share the same financial interests? Can they make a valid assessment, or do we suspect that they will all agree with one another because they are drawing from the same pocket? Perhaps their assessment will not be objective.
The conclusion is that even a man and his two wives, who share the same household and financial resources, may make the assessment. The Gemara attempts to challenge this from the relationship between Rav Pappa and his wife. A husband normally provides his wife with support, while she gives him the income from her labor. However, a wife may say, “Keep the support that you are obligated to provide me, and I will keep the income from my labor.” If that arrangement existed between Rav Pappa and his wife, then they were not actually sharing the same finances. Consequently, the case of a man and his two wives does not necessarily prove that partners who share the same funds may make an assessment. The question therefore remains whether ordinary partners may serve as the assessors.
The Mishnah then teaches that when a person consecrates an item and needs to determine its value in order to redeem it and give the money to the Temple treasury, three people are required.
The Mishnah appears to follow the teaching of the following source. Yaakov taught that even a small object, such as a pipe, that a person consecrated requires ten people for its redemption. In the section of the Torah dealing with consecrated property, the word “priest” appears ten times. From this, one can understand that ten people are required for the redemption of consecrated property.
That section contains three subjects. The valuation of a person is associated with three occurrences of the word “priest.” Movable property is associated with four occurrences, and land is associated with three occurrences. Thus, there are ten occurrences in all: three, four, and three.
According to this approach, the ten occurrences teach that whenever one redeems consecrated property, ten people are required. But where did the Rabbis derive their view that three people are sufficient?
One might suggest that the Rabbis derive three from the section dealing with movable property, where the word “priest” appears three times. Since that section discusses the redemption of movable property, perhaps that is the source for requiring three people.
The difficulty is that the word appears four times in the section dealing with land. According to that logic, four people should be required to redeem land, whereas the Mishnah teaches that ten are required for land.
One might answer that the occurrences in the section dealing with land complete the total of ten. There are three occurrences in the first section, four in the section dealing with movable property, and three in the final section. Since the final section completes the total of ten, land requires ten people.
But this creates another difficulty. The section dealing with movable property is the second section, and its occurrences complete only six, not ten. According to this logic, movable property should require six people. Why, then, does the Rabbis’ ruling require only three?
The Gemara concludes that this derivation does not provide a proof for the requirement of three people. Although the word appears three times in the section dealing with movable property, the same reasoning would lead to requiring four for land and six for movable property. The derivation therefore cannot explain the ruling adequately.
The Mishnah uses the expression “the valuations of movable property.” This wording appears contradictory. “Valuations” generally refers to a person’s prescribed value, while movable property refers to an object. How can both expressions apply at the same time?
The Gemara offers several answers.
Rav Gidal said in the name of Rav that the Mishnah is referring to a person who says, “The value of this utensil is upon me.” He is not saying that the utensil itself has a Torah valuation. The Torah provides prescribed valuations for people according to their age and gender, but there is no prescribed valuation for a utensil. Rather, the person is accepting upon himself the monetary value of the utensil. If the utensil is worth four dollars, he undertakes to give four dollars to the Temple treasury. This is why the wording combines a valuation with movable property.
The Gemara objects that the terminology is still not entirely precise. The valuation itself is not movable; the object whose value is being transferred is movable. It should therefore have said, “the valuation of movable property,” rather than “the valuations of movable property.”
The Gemara answers that the wording can be understood as a matter of terminology. The Mishnah could be read as referring to “the valuations that arise from movable property.” In other words, it is a valuation connected with movable property, rather than a valuation that itself moves.
A second answer is that the person initially accepted a regular personal valuation upon himself. For example, he said that he owed thirty. He then designated movable property to cover that obligation. The movable property must be assessed to determine whether it is worth the thirty that he owes. This is another way to understand the phrase “the valuations of movable property.”
The wording could then have been reversed: “movable property of valuations,” meaning movable property that resulted from a personal valuation. That would be a clearer expression, because the movable property is the result of the valuation that the person accepted.
A third answer is that the person said, “I am giving my valuation to the Temple treasury.” The Temple representative is now coming to collect the payment. Since the representative is taking movable property as payment, three people are needed to assess it. If the representative is taking land, ten people are needed for the assessment.
These are the possible explanations. In the first answer, the person says, “The value of this utensil is upon me.” He is accepting responsibility for the value of the utensil and will give the monetary value to the Temple treasury. In the second answer, he already owes a personal valuation, such as thirty, and he designates an object to cover that debt. In the third answer, he is simply giving his valuation, and the Temple representative is coming to collect it in the form of property.
The Gemara then compares the different answers. In the first two cases, it is understandable why three people are required. In the first case, the value of the utensil must be assessed so that the Temple treasury receives the proper amount. If the assessors undervalue the utensil, the Temple treasury will lose money. The assessment must therefore be accurate.
In the case of a personal valuation, however, the person has already established the amount that he owes. Suppose he owes thirty. Even if the assessors value the utensil at only twenty, the Temple treasury can collect the remaining ten from him. Why, then, is an assessment necessary? Whatever value the assessors assign to the item, the Temple treasury will ultimately receive the full thirty.
The answer is that the concern may be the opposite. Perhaps the assessors will overvalue the item. If the person owes thirty but the item is actually worth only twenty, and the assessors value it at thirty, the Temple treasury will accept an object worth only twenty as full payment for a thirty-unit obligation. The Temple treasury is then shortchanged by ten.
Therefore, even when the amount of the personal valuation is fixed, three people are needed to ensure that the property being given as payment is assessed properly. The concern is not only that the item might be undervalued; it might also be overvalued.
The third chapter continues with the view of Rabbi Yehudah. Rabbi Yehudah says that one of the three people making the assessment must be a priest. This was also the case in the Mishnah: one of the assessors is a priest.
The Rabbis, however, use three ordinary people. Why would the Torah mention the word “priest” in the section dealing with consecrated property?
When the Torah requires ten people, the explanation is that nine are ordinary Israelites and one is a priest. How do we know that only one of the ten must be a priest? The word “priest” appears ten times in the section dealing with consecrated property. One occurrence is set aside as the priest who must be present, while the remaining occurrences are interpreted through the principle of exclusion followed by exclusion.
An exclusion normally limits the scope of a statement. But when one exclusion follows another exclusion, the second exclusion can reverse the effect of the first and serve to include. According to this interpretation, the first occurrence tells us that one priest is required. The subsequent occurrences, through repeated exclusions, teach that the remaining nine may be Israelites.
Thus, one priest and nine Israelites are required. This is the way Rabbi Yehudah understands the ten occurrences.
How do the Rabbis understand the same verses? If the principle of exclusion followed by exclusion is applied in sequence, the first occurrence excludes and refers to priests. The second occurrence, being an exclusion after an exclusion, includes ordinary Israelites. The third occurrence becomes an exclusion after an inclusion, and therefore again excludes. The fourth becomes an exclusion after an exclusion and includes, and so on.
Following this pattern, one might conclude that five of the ten must be priests and five must be Israelites. The Gemara asks: If five priests and five Israelites are required, what is gained by the repeated wording? The Gemara leaves this difficulty unresolved.
The Gemara then discusses a person who consecrates himself. If a person says, “My value is upon me,” ten people are also required to assess and redeem him. One might understand this from the comparison to land, for which ten people are required.
But the Gemara raises another question. What is the law regarding the hair of a servant whose hair is destined to be cut? Is the hair considered part of the person, in which case it is treated like a person and requires ten people for its assessment? Or is it considered as if it has already been cut, in which case it is treated as movable property and requires only three people?
The issue concerns a servant whose body has been consecrated, including his hair, but whose hair will eventually be cut. If the hair is still regarded as attached to the person, it is considered part of the person and requires ten people. If it is regarded as hair that has already been cut, it is considered movable property and requires three.
A final point is raised regarding the use of a person who has been consecrated. There is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property with regard to a human being. Therefore, even though a person has been consecrated, one may still use him for service. However, one may not use his hair once it is considered consecrated property.
The discussion about the hair of a servant is then compared to another dispute. Rabbi Meir taught that there are things that resemble a carcass but are not treated entirely like a carcass. The Gemara asks whether a similar distinction applies to grapes attached to a vine.
Suppose one person says, “I gave you ten vines laden with grapes,” and the other person says, “You gave me only five.” This appears to be a standard case in which the person who claims that he received only five must take an oath. However, grapes attached to the ground are considered land, and there is no oath concerning land.
The discussion is referring to grapes that are destined to be cut from the vine. One view considers them movable property, and therefore the person who claims to have received only five must take an oath. The other view considers them land, and therefore no oath is administered.
The Gemara suggests that the dispute regarding grapes attached to the vine is parallel to the dispute regarding the hair of a servant. In both cases, the question is whether an item that is presently attached but destined to be detached is considered part of the attached entity or as if it has already been detached.
The Gemara responds that grapes become worse the longer they remain on the vine. Since leaving them attached causes them to deteriorate, they may be considered movable property even before they are cut. Hair, however, improves by remaining attached to the head; it grows and becomes more abundant. Therefore, even if grapes are considered movable property while attached, it does not necessarily follow that hair is treated the same way. The view that considers grapes movable property may still consider the hair of the servant to be part of the person.
The Gemara then returns to the Mishnah concerning an ox that engaged in relations with a person. Both the person and the animal are put to death by a court of twenty-three judges.
The Tanna teaches that the law applies regardless of whether the person who engaged in relations with the animal was male or female, and regardless of whether the animal was male or female. The practical consequence concerns the interpretation of the verses and the requirement of a court of twenty-three in every case.
If the person was female and the animal was involved with her, the punishment is stated explicitly: “The woman and the animal shall be put to death.” But how do we know that the law also applies when a male has relations with the animal?
One might cite the verse, “Whoever lies with an animal shall surely be put to death.” But that verse appears to refer to the person who engages in relations with the animal. We already know from another verse that the person is put to death. Therefore, the verse must be teaching something else.
The Gemara explains that the Torah refers to the passive partner with the language of one who lies with the animal. This teaches that the law governing the passive partner is the same as the law governing the active partner. Just as a person who engages in relations with an animal is put to death, so too the person with whom the animal engages in relations is put to death.
The Torah therefore uses the language of one who lies with the animal in order to equate the passive partner with the active partner. In either case, both are subject to the death penalty, and the matter requires twenty-three judges.
The Mishnah also teaches that an animal that killed a person is judged by twenty-three judges. The source is derived from the verse that says, “The ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death.” The verse is not understood to mean that the owner is automatically put to death when his ox kills someone. Rather, the juxtaposition of the ox and its owner teaches that just as the owner would be judged by twenty-three judges if he were subject to the death penalty, the ox is also judged by twenty-three judges.
The Gemara examines this interpretation. Who says that the verse is coming to teach the number of judges? Perhaps it should simply be read literally: the ox is stoned, and its owner is also put to death. What need is there for an additional comparison between the ox and its owner?
One might answer that if the Torah had merely written that the owner is put to death, we might have thought that he receives the same form of execution as the ox, namely stoning. The Torah therefore needed to use wording that indicates a different penalty. When a person himself kills, his punishment is not stoning but another form of execution. The verse prevents us from mistakenly assigning the animal’s punishment to the owner.
But the Gemara asks whether the additional wording might teach something else. Perhaps the verse is telling us that the owner receives a different and lesser punishment when his animal kills a person. When a person himself kills, he receives the more severe punishment, whereas when his animal kills, the owner receives a lesser form of execution.
The Gemara discusses the relative severity of the various forms of execution. There is a dispute regarding whether strangulation or the sword is more severe. According to the view that strangulation is more severe than the sword, the phrase indicating that the owner is put to death cannot be coming to teach that he receives strangulation, because that would be a more severe punishment rather than a lesser one.
According to the view that strangulation is less severe than the sword, however, one might say that the verse is teaching that the owner receives strangulation rather than the sword. The Gemara must therefore determine why the verse uses the additional wording.
The Torah states that the owner may be liable for payment. This indicates that the entire matter of the owner’s liability is connected with monetary compensation. If a person himself kills, he cannot buy his way out of the death penalty by paying money. But when his animal kills, the owner has the option of either receiving the death penalty or paying a ransom.
The Gemara explains that this is precisely the point of the verse. When the person himself kills, the act is attributed directly to him, and he must suffer the death penalty. When the animal kills, the owner may redeem himself through payment. Since the owner’s liability is fundamentally monetary in that case, the verse is not needed to teach a different form of execution.
We therefore return to the question: How do we know that the animal itself is judged by twenty-three judges? The phrase concerning the owner must be used to establish a comparison between the animal and the owner. Just as the owner would require a court of twenty-three, the ox also requires a court of twenty-three.
The Gemara offers another interpretation. The verse says that the ox shall be stoned and that its owner shall also be put to death. The words can be read as teaching that the owner is killed because of the cry of the victim. The victim’s death is attributed both to the person who killed directly and to the ox that killed him. The comparison therefore establishes the requirement of twenty-three judges for the ox as well.
The Gemara then asks about an ox that was at Mount Sinai. Before the giving of the Torah, the animals were warned not to approach the mountain. The verse says that whether a person or an animal approaches the mountain, he shall not live. If an animal violated that command, would it also require a court of twenty-three judges?
The question is whether a temporary law that applied only at Sinai can be compared with laws that apply for all generations. Perhaps the requirement of twenty-three judges applies to an ox that killed a person in the ordinary circumstances of the Torah, but not to the animals at Sinai, where the law applied only temporarily. Alternatively, perhaps the comparison applies even to that temporary law.
The Gemara answers that the verse explicitly compares the person and the animal: “Whether man or animal, he shall not live.” Just as a person is judged by twenty-three judges, the animal is also judged by twenty-three judges.
The Gemara challenges this comparison by noting that the system of courts for judging people had already been established in the time of Jethro. There were already courts judging people by the relevant standards. The question is whether the law concerning animals at Sinai can be compared to a judicial system that had not yet been established for animals.
The answer is that the verse itself makes the comparison. It says, “Whether man or animal,” and therefore teaches that the two are alike for this purpose. Even though the law concerning the mountain was temporary, the animal required the same judicial process.
The Gemara then returns to the wild animals mentioned in the Mishnah. The first opinion teaches that if one of these animals kills a person, it is judged by twenty-three judges. Rabbi Eliezer says that the animal may be killed immediately, without waiting for a court.
Reish Lakish explains that Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling applies only when the animal actually killed someone. If it merely caused damage, Rabbi Eliezer does not permit it to be killed immediately. This indicates that Rabbi Eliezer holds that such animals can be domesticated. Since they can be trained, they may belong to an owner, and one may not simply kill another person’s animal because it caused damage.
Rabbi Yohanan disagrees. He says that Rabbi Eliezer permits the animal to be killed even if it did not kill a person but merely caused damage. Rabbi Eliezer therefore holds that these animals cannot be domesticated. They are considered ownerless and dangerous, and one may kill them immediately.
The Gemara asks whether these animals can in fact be trained not to cause damage. If they can be trained and have an owner, then even Rabbi Eliezer should not permit them to be killed merely because they caused damage. If, however, an animal killed someone, that itself demonstrates that it was not domesticated and could not be controlled.
According to Rabbi Yohanan, the animals cannot be domesticated. Therefore, even when they merely damage and do not kill, they are considered dangerous and may be killed immediately. According to Reish Lakish, they can be domesticated. Therefore, when they merely damage, one may not kill them, because they may belong to an owner. Only when they kill does their behavior demonstrate that they cannot be domesticated.
The Mishnah says that whoever kills such an animal first acquires it. The Gemara asks what this acquisition means. According to Rabbi Yohanan, who says that even an animal that merely damaged may be killed, the person who kills it acquires its hide. For example, if someone kills a snake, he may keep the valuable skin. The novelty of the Mishnah is that the person who kills the animal acquires its remains.
According to Reish Lakish, however, the Mishnah says that whoever kills the animal first is entitled to it only when the animal has already killed someone. If the animal killed a person, then it is legally obligated to be put to death. Once it has killed, it is as though a final judgment has already been issued against it. The animal must be killed, and the person who kills it is considered to have acquired it.
Normally, when a court has issued a final judgment against an animal and the animal is then killed, one may not benefit from its carcass. What, then, does it mean that the person who kills it acquires it?
The answer is that the acquisition is not necessarily monetary. It means that the person receives the merit of performing the necessary act. By removing a dangerous animal from society, he has done a good deed and protected the public. Thus, according to Reish Lakish, the person who kills an animal that has already killed someone receives the merit of eliminating a dangerous creature, even though he may not benefit from its remains.
With regard to an ox, everyone agrees that twenty-three judges are required. The dispute concerns the other wild animals. According to Reish Lakish, if they kill, they require a court of twenty-three, just like an ox. If they merely cause damage, they may not be killed, because they may be domesticated and owned.
According to Rabbi Yohanan, if these animals cause damage, they may be killed immediately, because they cannot be domesticated and are considered dangerous. The Mishnah’s statement that whoever kills them first acquires them refers, according to Rabbi Yohanan, to the skins or other remains of the animals.
The Gemara then discusses the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Mishnah states that these animals are judged by twenty-three judges, like the first opinion. Rabbi Eliezer had singled out certain wild animals and said that they may be killed immediately. Rabbi Akiva then says that those animals also require twenty-three judges.
At first glance, Rabbi Akiva and the first opinion appear to say the same thing. The first opinion says that all such animals require twenty-three judges, while Rabbi Akiva says that the wild animals mentioned by Rabbi Eliezer require twenty-three judges as well.
The Gemara answers that there is a difference regarding a snake. The first opinion includes a snake with the other animals and requires twenty-three judges if it killed someone. Rabbi Akiva agrees that the other animals require twenty-three judges, but he excludes a snake. A snake is considered dangerous by nature, and one may kill it immediately without a warning or a court.
This creates several possible positions. One view may say that every animal that kills requires a court of twenty-three, including a snake. Rabbi Akiva may agree regarding an ox and the other animals but hold that a snake is different because it is always dangerous and may be killed immediately. Another view may distinguish between the five wild animals and a snake.
The Gemara’s remaining discussion returns to the question of whether these animals can be domesticated. If they can be trained not to cause damage, then an animal that merely bites may still belong to an owner and may not be killed. If an animal kills, however, that may demonstrate that it cannot be domesticated. The distinction between the opinions therefore depends on whether these wild animals are considered capable of being trained and controlled, or whether they are inherently dangerous and ownerless.