The **Gemara** continues its discussion from the previous day, which focused on a **Pasuk** stating that an offering "will be accepted as a fire offering to God." This **Pasuk** establishes the halachic requirement that an animal offering must be at least eight days old to be fit. The **Gemara** interpreted the phrase "to God" to teach that this eight-day rule also applies to the goat designated for Azazel. This raised a question: isn't it obvious that the goat designated for Azazel must also be at least eight days old? After all, it's not inferior to a regular offering; when lots are cast between the two goats, one will be designated as an offering to God, implying both must be viable from the outset. The **Gemara** previously offered various scenarios to explain why this teaching was necessary, isolating the unique aspect of the goat designated for Azazel.
Now, the **Gemara** offers another answer. **Rava** stated that the case involves a person who sold a goat designated for Azazel to consecrated property. This individual had a sick person in his house. According to Jewish law, if a person's life is in danger on **Yom Kippur**, one is permitted to transgress even severe prohibitions, such as those related to ritual slaughter, to save a life. This person, therefore, ritually slaughtered the mother of the goat designated for Azazel to feed the sick individual. Halacha prohibits slaughtering a mother and its child on the same day. Consequently, the goat designated for Azazel, being the child, automatically becomes unfit. A new goat must then be brought. The question then arises regarding this replacement goat: one might have thought that a goat less than eight days old would be acceptable in this unique situation. The **Pasuk** teaches that even this replacement must be eight days old. This scenario successfully isolates the goat designated for Azazel, removing the factor of it potentially becoming an offering to God, and thus highlights the need for the eight-day rule specifically for it.
**Abba Ammar** stated that the case of a premature animal, one that is unfit due to lacking sufficient time, is precisely the scenario where the mother was slaughtered. The son is considered premature, not because of its age, but because one must wait until the next day to slaughter it. Thus, even if the animal is two weeks old, it is considered premature in the context of the "mother and its child" law, as it cannot be slaughtered on the same day as its mother. The **Gemara** then questioned whether the goat designated for Azazel is indeed subject to the "mother and its child" law. The Torah states, "you shall not slaughter" the mother and its child on the same day. However, the goat designated for Azazel is pushed off a mountain, not ritually slaughtered in the conventional sense. The **Gemara** responded by quoting a teaching from the Sages in the West: "its pushing off the cliff, that is its slaughter." For the goat designated for Azazel, this act is considered its ritual slaughter, and therefore it is subject to the law of "mother and its child."
An interesting point raised by the commentators is that the **Gemara** chose a scenario where the owner acted permissibly (feeding a sick person). The **Gemara** could have presented a case where the owner slaughtered the mother intentionally and illicitly. However, the **Gemara** prefers to illustrate a case where the action was permissible. The **Yerubki Ve'echa** raised a different question: why not simply present a case where the two goats chosen for the lottery were a mother and son? Once the goat designated for God is slaughtered, the goat designated for Azazel would automatically become prohibited.
The **Tosfot** discussed the extent to which pushing the goat off a mountain is considered ritual slaughter. A properly ritually slaughtered animal does not impart ritual impurity, whereas a carcass (an animal not properly slaughtered) does. **Tosfot** pondered whether this unique "slaughter" for the goat designated for Azazel means it does not impart ritual impurity, similar to a regular ritual slaughter, or if it is only called "slaughter" for certain laws but still imparts ritual impurity. **Tosfot** sought to prove from the case of the **Eglah Arufah**, a calf whose neck is broken, which is also considered a form of "slaughter" and does not impart ritual impurity. Therefore, **Tosfot** suggested, the case of the goat designated for Azazel might be similar.
The **Mishnah** taught that if one of the animals designated for the **Yom Kippur** service dies (for example, the goat designated for God), one must bring a new pair of goats, perform the lottery again, and the new goat designated for God will take the place of the deceased one. The **Mishnah** then states that the "second one" will graze until it becomes blemished. This raises a question: which "second one" is being referred to? Is it the second goat of the *first* pair (the original goat designated for Azazel, which is now without a partner), or the second goat of the *second* pair (the new goat designated for Azazel)?
**Rav** stated that the "second one" refers to the second animal of the *first* pair. This means that if the goat designated for Azazel died, and a new pair is brought, the original goat designated for God (from the first pair) is sacrificed, and the second goat of the *second* pair (the new goat designated for Azazel) is the one that grazes. Conversely, **Rabbi Yohanan** argued that it is the exact opposite: the original second animal (from the first pair) is grazed, and the substitute from the second pair is brought as an offering. This is a fundamental dispute between **Rav** and **Rabbi Yohanan** regarding which animal is used for the offering.
The **Gemara** then defined the source of this dispute. **Rav**'s view stems from the principle that living animals are not conclusively rejected. In the case where a goat designated for Azazel died, the goat designated for God from the first pair is temporarily rejected because it lacks a partner. However, this rejection is not permanent. Once a second lottery is performed with a new pair, the first goat designated for God, which is still alive, is reinstated. Therefore, **Rav** holds that it is this original goat that is brought as an offering. This principle applies as long as the animal is alive; if it were already ritually slaughtered and its blood ready to be sprinkled, and then its partner died, the blood would be poured out, as a slaughtered animal cannot be reinstated. This law of reinstatement only applies to living animals.
**Rabbi Yohanan**, on the other hand, holds that living animals *are* conclusively rejected. Once an animal has been rejected, even temporarily, it cannot be reinstated. Therefore, the original goat designated for God from the first pair, having been rejected, can never be used. The only option is to bring the second animal from the second pair.
The **Gemara** then sought the reason for **Rav**'s position that rejection is not conclusive. **Rav** learns this from the case of a premature animal. An animal that is less than eight days old is unfit. However, once it reaches eight days, it becomes fit. **Rav** views this as a form of rejection followed by reinstatement. The **Gemara** challenged this analogy: "Is it analogous?" In the case of a seven-day-old animal, it was never fit at all; it simply transitioned from a state of non-viability to viability. This is different from an animal that was viable, then rejected, and then reinstated. The **Gemara** responded that **Rav**'s true source is from an animal with a temporary blemish. If an animal has a blemish that will heal, it is currently unfit. However, once the blemish heals, it becomes fit again. This is a clear case of an animal being rejected (due to the blemish) and then reinstated (once the blemish passes). How do we know that a blemished animal whose blemish heals becomes viable again? The **Pasuk** states regarding blemishes, "for their destruction is in them." This implies that the animal is considered "destroyed" only while the blemish is present. Once the blemish is gone, it is no longer considered destroyed and becomes viable. Thus, **Rav**'s reasoning is that just as a temporarily blemished animal can be reinstated, so too can an animal that was temporarily rejected.
**Rabbi Yohanan**, however, interprets the **Pasuk** regarding blemished animals differently. The **Pasuk** says, "for their destruction is in *them*," using the word "them" as an exclusionary term. **Rabbi Yohanan** argues that this teaching, that an animal can be reinstated after a blemish passes, is an exception that applies *only* to blemished animals because the Torah specifically limits it to "them." All other cases of rejection remain conclusive. Therefore, in the case of the goats, once an animal is rejected, it stays rejected.
The **Gemara** then asked **Rav**: if the word "them" is exclusionary, what does it exclude according to your view? **Rav** responded that the word "them" teaches that the law of a blemished animal applies when it is by itself. However, if pieces of a regular offering are mixed with pieces of a blemished offering, and one cannot distinguish between them, the law of a blemished animal does not apply. This is a novel teaching: the Torah only prohibits a blemished animal when it is clearly identifiable. If it's in a mixture, the prohibition is only rabbinic. This is learned from a **Mishnah** that discusses limbs of perfect animals mixed with limbs of blemished animals. The **Mishnah** states that if one throws the head of one of these animals onto the **Mizbeach**, all the other heads may also be thrown. The logic is that one can assume the blemished head was the one already offered, making the rest permissible. This leniency is only possible if the prohibition in a mixture is rabbinic. Thus, according to **Rav**, the word "them" teaches that a mixture of blemished and unblemished animals is not biblically prohibited.
The **Gemara** then asked **Rabbi Yohanan**: how do you derive the law of mixtures if you use "them" to teach that only blemished animals are reinstated? **Rabbi Yohanan** responded that the **Pasuk** uses an extra "them" (Bahim) which allows for two distinct teachings: first, that reinstatement applies only to blemished animals, and second, that the prohibition of a blemished animal in a mixture is only rabbinic, as it only applies when the blemished animal is "in its state" (by itself).
The **Ritbah** raised a question regarding **Rabbi Yohanan**'s view that rejection is conclusive. In the law of "mother and its child," if the mother is slaughtered, the child becomes prohibited for that day, but it is permitted the next day. If rejection is conclusive, why would the child become permitted the next day? The **Ritbah** answered that **Rabbi Yohanan**'s principle of conclusive rejection applies only when an active step is required to reinstate the animal (e.g., a new lottery). However, in the case of "mother and its child," or a temporary blemish, where reinstatement is passive (simply waiting for the day to pass or the blemish to heal), even **Rabbi Yohanan** agrees that the animal can be reinstated. This is similar to the case of the blemished animal, where **Rabbi Yohanan** himself agreed that the blemish passing leads to reinstatement.
The **Gemara** then returned to **Rav**'s opinion. If **Rav** holds that animals are not conclusively rejected, and both the original goat and the substitute goat are viable, why did **Rav** specifically state that the animal from the *first* group must be used? According to **Rav**, one should have the option to use either. The **Gemara** answered that **Rav** holds like **Rabbi Yosef**, who maintains that it is a commandment to use the first item designated. This is seen in the case of **Shekalim**, where there were three boxes (marked Aleph, Beit, Gimmel) for collecting half-shekel coins. These boxes were emptied three times a year, and the money from the first box (Aleph) was used first to purchase the daily offerings. This shows that **Rabbi Yosef** believes there is a commandment to use the first item that achieved sanctity.
The **Gemara** challenged this proof from **Shekalim**: perhaps the case of **Shekalim** is different. When the first box was filled, the money in the second and third boxes was not yet viable for offerings. Only after the first box was emptied did the next become viable. Thus, the first box had precedence because it became consecrated first. We need a case where both items become viable simultaneously, and yet there is still a commandment to use the first. The **Gemara** responded by citing another teaching of **Rabbi Yosef** regarding a **Korban Pesach**. If a person designated a **Korban Pesach**, then lost it, and then designated another in its stead, and subsequently found the original, both animals now stand before him. If this all occurred before midday on the fourteenth of Nisan, then at midday, both animals become viable as a **Korban Pesach** simultaneously. In such a case, the **Rabbanan** say one may bring whichever animal one wishes. However, **Rabbi Yosef** says it is a commandment to bring the first one, though if the second is superior, one should bring that. This demonstrates that even with simultaneous viability, **Rabbi Yosef** still prioritizes the original designation. Similarly, **Rav** holds that even though both goats are now viable, it is a commandment to take the original one that was designated first.
The **Tosfot** raised a question here: if **Rabbi Yosef** allows choosing the second animal if it is superior, why doesn't **Rav** offer the same option for the goats? The answer is that there must be a distinction between offerings ritually slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, like the **Korban Pesach**, and those slaughtered within the inner sanctum, like the goat designated for God.
The **Gemara** concludes by stating that a **Mishnah** is found to be precise according to **Rav**'s opinion, and a **Braita** is precise according to **Rabbi Yohanan**'s opinion. The **Mishnah** states that if the goat designated for God died, the goat designated for Azazel from the *second* group substitutes it, and "the other one" (referring to the original goat designated for Azazel from the *first* group) will graze. **Rashi** explains that "the other one" refers to the original goat from the first pair, which is reinstated to its original status. This supports **Rav**'s view that animals are not conclusively rejected. The **Braita**, on the other hand, states that the "second one" will stand alive. This refers to the second goat of the *second* pair. **Rashi** explains that "it shall stand alive" refers to a present state of viability, not an animal that was viable, then rejected, and then reinstated. This supports **Rabbi Yohanan**'s view that once rejected, it remains rejected.
The **Gemara** then refers to the end of the **Mishnah**, where **Rabbi Yehuda** states that if the blood of the goat designated for God spilled, the goat designated for Azazel must be put to death. Conversely, if the goat designated for Azazel died, the blood of the goat designated for God must be spilled. The **Gemara** asks: this statement of **Rabbi Yehuda** seems to align with **Rabbi Yohanan**'s view that once rejected, an animal is totally rejected. How can **Rav** reconcile his opinion with **Rabbi Yehuda**? The **Gemara** answers that **Rabbi Yehuda** is arguing with the initial opinion of the **Rabbanan** in the **Mishnah**. The **Rabbanan** must have held that the original animal is reinstated. **Rabbi Yehuda** argues that it is not reinstated, and therefore, it must be put to death. Furthermore, the **Rabbanan** hold that the animal from the second group that is not used should graze until it gets a blemish, because a communal sin-offering is not put to death. **Rabbi Yehuda** argues on this as well, holding that a communal sin-offering *is* put to death, and therefore, the animal should be locked in a room and starved to death. Thus, **Rabbi Yehuda** disputes the **Rabbanan** on two points: whether the first animal is reinstated, and the law regarding a communal sin-offering that is not used.
The **Gemara** concludes that the **Mishnah** is indeed precise according to **Rav**, as **Rabbi Yehuda**'s dispute with the **Rabbanan** in the **Mishnah** aligns with **Rav**'s understanding of reinstatement. **Rav** explains that the **Rabbanan** hold the first animal is reinstated, while **Rabbi Yehuda** holds it is rejected. However, the **Gemara** asks, if the **Mishnah** is precise according to **Rav**, then what are **Rabbi Yohanan** and **Rabbi Yehuda** arguing about? The **Gemara** responds that this was already established: the **Mishnah** is indeed more precisely aligned with **Rav**'s view. The **Braita**, however, is explicitly aligned with **Rabbi Yohanan**'s view, stating that the second animal (from the second group) is brought because it must be "standing alive" in the present, not having been rejected and reinstated. Therefore, we have a **Mishnah** that supports **Rav** and a **Braita** that supports **Rabbi Yohanan**.