We begin today's discussion with a ruling from Shmuel, transmitted by Rav Tachlifa bar Avimi. If a person is sleeping naked in a tent-like bed, known as a kila, they may extend their head outside the kila and recite the Keriyat Shema. The rationale is that the kila, in this specific context, is considered akin to clothing, covering the body. Thus, extending the head out is comparable to sticking one's head out of a shirt, allowing for the recitation of Keriyat Shema.
The Gemara raises an objection, citing a teaching that states if a person sleeps naked in a kila, they should not extend their head out to recite Keriyat Shema. This appears to contradict Shmuel's ruling. The Gemara resolves this by distinguishing between different types of kila. The prohibition applies when the kila is ten handbreadths high. At this height, it is considered a distinct domain in itself. In such a case, even if one's head is outside, the majority of the body remains within the private domain of the kila, which is associated with nakedness. Therefore, one cannot recite Keriyat Shema. However, if the kila is less than ten handbreadths high, it is not considered a separate domain but rather like personal clothing. In this scenario, extending the head out is permissible for reciting Keriyat Shema. This ruling also implies that the specific opinion does not require a separation between the upper and lower body for recitation, as long as the head is not in the same domain as the nakedness.
Rashi clarifies that when the kila is less than ten handbreadths high, it is not considered a tent (ohel), and thus we do not say that the head follows the majority of the body. Instead, it is like extending one's head out of a robe, satisfying the requirement that one's nakedness should not be visible. The Gemara supports this distinction by noting that a later part of the braita (a teaching from the Mishnaic period) compares a kila that is ten handbreadths high to a person standing naked in a house. Just as one cannot stick their head out a window of a house to recite Keriyat Shema because the head follows the body within the house, similarly, a tall kila functions as a house. However, the Gemara adds that a house is always considered a permanent structure (ohel), regardless of its height, because of its inherent permanence. This means that even a house less than ten handbreadths high would prevent recitation if one were naked inside and stuck their head out. In contrast, a kila, being a more temporary structure, is only considered a separate domain if it is ten handbreadths high or more. If it is less than ten, it functions merely as clothing, allowing recitation when the head is extended.
The Gemara then presents an alternative version of this discussion, introduced by Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel. This version addresses sleeping in a kila within a Sukkah. Shmuel states that it is permissible to sleep in a bridal canopy (kilat chatanim) within a Sukkah. The reasoning is that this type of canopy lacks a true roof, as its top comes to a point, making it less than a handbreadth thick at its apex. Therefore, even if its overall height exceeds ten handbreadths, it does not interfere with the schach (Sukkah roof covering) and is not considered a separation from the Sukkah. One is still considered to be sitting within the Sukkah.
The Gemara objects, citing a teaching that states one who sleeps in a kila in a Sukkah does not fulfill their obligation. The Gemara resolves this by explaining that this refers to a different type of kila, one that actually has a roof. If a kila has a roof and is ten handbreadths high, it creates a separate domain, posing a problem for fulfilling the Sukkah obligation. Thus, the distinction lies in the presence or absence of a roof: a kilat chatanim, lacking a roof, is permissible even if tall; a kila with a roof is only permissible if less than ten handbreadths high.
The Gemara further challenges this, bringing a teaching about two other types of beds: a naklitin (with two poles) and a kinofet (with four poles). If one spreads a sheet over a kinofet, it is invalid for a Sukkah because it creates a roof. If over a naklitin, it is valid, provided the naklitin is not ten handbreadths higher than the bed itself. This implies that even a naklitin, which lacks a roof, becomes problematic if it is too tall. This contradicts the idea that a roofless canopy is always permissible regardless of height. The Gemara distinguishes: a naklitin is considered permanent (kevi'i), and its permanence causes it to be an ohel (tent) if it is ten handbreadths high. A kilat chatanim, however, is not permanent. Therefore, a kilat chatanim, being both non-permanent and roofless, is permissible even above ten handbreadths. A naklitin, being permanent but roofless, is permissible only if less than ten handbreadths. A kinofet, being permanent and having a roof, is problematic even if less than ten handbreadths.
Rava bar Rav Huna taught a novel ruling: it is permissible to sleep in a kila (canopy bed) within a Sukkah even if it has a roof and is ten handbreadths high. This seems to contradict previous principles. The Gemara asks, "According to whom is this ruling?" It answers that it follows Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that a temporary tent (ohel arai) does not nullify a permanent tent (ohel keva). The Sukkah is considered a permanent dwelling for the seven days of the holiday. Therefore, a temporary structure like a canopy bed, even with a roof and height, does not override the Sukkah's status. This is supported by a Mishna where Rabbi Yehuda states that they had the custom to sleep under a bed in the Sukkah in front of the Sages, who did not object. The bed, being a temporary structure, did not invalidate the Sukkah.
The Gemara then asks why Rava needed to explicitly state the reason for Rabbi Yehuda's ruling. Why not simply say "it follows Rabbi Yehuda"? The Gemara explains that had he merely said "it follows Rabbi Yehuda," one might have thought that Rabbi Yehuda's leniency only applies to sleeping under a bed, which is an unusual way to use a bed. In such a case, the bed might not be considered an obstruction. However, a kila is designed for sleeping inside. One might have argued that sleeping in a kila in its normal manner would constitute an obstruction. Therefore, Rava explicitly stated Rabbi Yehuda's rationale—that a temporary tent does not nullify a permanent tent—to clarify that this principle applies universally, regardless of whether one is sleeping under a bed or inside a kila.
The Mishna then discusses the laws of schach. If one drapes grapevines, gourds, or ivy (all types of attached plants) over a Sukkah, and these are still attached to the ground, the Sukkah is invalid. This is because schach must be detached. However, if the valid schach outweighs these attached vines, or if the vines are cut, the Sukkah becomes valid. The Mishna provides a general rule: anything that can contract ritual impurity (mekabel tumah) or does not grow from the ground cannot be used as schach. Conversely, anything that does not contract ritual impurity and grows from the ground is valid for schach. This explains why cut vines are acceptable, as they grow from the ground and do not contract impurity. Similarly, bamboo, being a natural growth and not a vessel, is valid.
Rav Yosef, sitting before Rav Huna, states that according to Rav, merely cutting the vines is not enough to validate the schach; one must also shake them. This is based on the principle of "ta'aseh velo min he'asui" (you must actively make it, not merely have it come into being by itself). If one only cuts the vines and they fall onto the Sukkah, no active "making" of schach has occurred. Rav Huna corrects Rav Yosef, saying that this opinion belongs to Shmuel, not Rav. Rav Yosef, offended, clarifies that he never claimed Shmuel didn't say it, only that Rav did. Rav Huna insists that Shmuel said it, but Rav did not, meaning Rav would consider the cutting alone sufficient to fulfill the requirement of "making" the schach.
To prove Rav's position, the Gemara brings an analogy from the laws of tzitzit. The verse states, "And they shall make for themselves tzitzit," implying an active making, similar to the Sukkah. Rav Amram Chasida would prepare tzitzit for his wife (holding that women are obligated in tzitzit, as he believed the obligation was 24 hours a day). He would take a long string, fold it into four, thread it through the garment's hole, make the knots, and only then cut the loops to create the eight required strings. When he asked Rav Chiyya bar Ashi how to validate these tzitzit, Rav Chiyya bar Ashi, quoting Rav, told him simply to cut the strings. This implies that the act of cutting is considered "making" (asiyah) for tzitzit, even after the knots are tied. By extension, Rav would hold that cutting the vines for schach is also considered "making" the schach.
The Gemara then challenges Shmuel's position, asking if he indeed holds that cutting is not "making." It cites a teaching where Shmuel, in the name of Rav Chiyya, states that if one threads a long string through two corners of a garment simultaneously and then cuts the loops, the tzitzit are valid. The Gemara initially assumes this means one ties the knots and then cuts, which would contradict Shmuel's stance. However, it clarifies that Shmuel's statement refers to a case where one first cuts the loops and then ties the knots. In this scenario, the "making" (tying the knots) occurs after the strings are properly separated, thus fulfilling the requirement. The novelty of Shmuel's ruling in this case is to teach that threading through two holes simultaneously is permissible, as the verse "kanaf ptil tekhelet" (corner thread of blue) refers to the act of tying, not threading.
The Gemara then raises another objection against Rav from a braita which states that if one threads tzitzit strings without cutting them, they are invalid. This seems to imply permanent invalidity, contradicting Rav's view that cutting them later would validate them. Rav responds that "invalid" means "invalid until they are cut." However, Shmuel and Levi, and Rav Matna in the name of Shmuel, indeed hold that they are permanently invalid if the knots were tied before cutting, as this constitutes "made, but not actively made" (ta'aseh velo min he'asui). Rav Matna even recounts a personal incident where Shmuel ruled this way for his own tzitzit.
Another braita is brought to challenge Rav: if one strings tzitzit and then cuts them, they are invalid. This again contradicts Rav's view that cutting validates them. Furthermore, a braita regarding Sukkah states that if one drapes attached vines over a Sukkah and uses them as schach, it is invalid due to "ta'aseh velo min he'asui." The Gemara reasons that this cannot refer to vines still attached to the ground, as their invalidity would simply be due to being attached. Thus, it must refer to cut vines. Yet, the braita still declares them invalid, implying that cutting is not considered "making." This directly refutes Rav's position that "their cutting is their making."
Rav offers a response: the braita refers to a case where the vines were not cut with a tool but pulled off by hand. In such a case, the act of detachment is not readily apparent (lo minchara asiyah dideihu), making it seem as if they are still attached. Therefore, it is considered invalid, not because cutting isn't "making," but because the "making" was not done in a recognizable way. However, the Gemara still finds the braita regarding tzitzit (where strings were tied then cut, and declared invalid) to be a difficulty against Rav, leaving it as an unresolved question.
The Gemara then suggests that the dispute between Rav and Shmuel regarding whether cutting is considered "making" might parallel a dispute among the Tannaim concerning the hadas (myrtle) used for the Arba Minim (Four Species) on Sukkot. If a hadas has more berries than leaves, it is invalid because it appears "spotted." If one plucks the berries on Yom Tov, Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak says it remains invalid, while the Sages declare it valid. The Gemara initially proposes that this dispute hinges on whether plucking the berries is considered "making" (asiyah) for the hadas, similar to the schach debate. The Sages, who validate it, would hold that plucking is "making," while Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak, who invalidates it, would hold it is not. This would mirror the Rav and Shmuel dispute.
However, the Gemara rejects this interpretation. It offers two alternative explanations for the Tannaim's dispute. The first is that everyone agrees that for Sukkah, cutting is considered "making." The dispute regarding the hadas stems from whether the laws of "ta'aseh velo min he'asui" for Sukkah are applied to the lulav (palm branch, which is tied with the hadas). The Sages, who validate the hadas, would argue that lulav does not derive this law from Sukkah, and thus "ta'aseh velo min he'asui" does not apply. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak, who invalidates it, would argue that lulav does derive this law from Sukkah, making the plucking of berries on Yom Tov problematic as it constitutes "making" on Yom Tov.
The second alternative explanation for the Tannaim's dispute is that everyone agrees that the law of "ta'aseh velo min he'asui" applies to the lulav. The actual dispute is whether the lulav requires to be tied (egged) at all. One opinion holds that it does not require tying, so removing the berries on Yom Tov is not an issue. The other opinion, represented by Rabbi Yehuda, holds that it does require tying. If it requires tying, and the tying was done when the hadas was invalid (due to berries), then removing the berries on Yom Tov would constitute "making" the lulav valid on Yom Tov, which is forbidden. Rabbi Yehuda's source for requiring tying is a gezeira shava (a halachic derivation based on similar wording in different verses) from the "bundle of hyssop" (agudat ezov) used in Egypt, where the verse also uses the term "take" (lekichah) and implies tying. The Sages, however, do not accept this gezeira shava, as such derivations must be transmitted traditionally.
The Gemara then asks which opinion is reflected in the teaching that it is a mitzvah to tie the lulav, but if one does not tie it, it is still valid. This cannot be Rabbi Yehuda, who says it is invalid if not tied. It also doesn't seem to be the Sages, who say tying is not required. The Gemara concludes that it is indeed the Sages' opinion, and the mitzvah to tie comes from the principle of "Zeh Eli Ve'anvehu" (This is my God and I will beautify Him), meaning one should perform mitzvot in a beautiful manner. Tying the Arba Minim together makes them more beautiful, even if not strictly required for validity. Thus, the Gemara concludes that the dispute regarding the hadas and lulav is not about whether cutting is "making," but rather about whether the lulav derives its laws from Sukkah, or whether it requires tying at all.