The Talmud Bavli, Masechet Sukkah, an audio series, has been dedicated by Celia and Isaac Jemal for the success of their dear children. May they experience much joy from all of them, and may they all grow up and marry at the right time, having children healthily, happily, with blessing and success. May they see descendants and descendants of their descendants until the coming of the righteous redeemer. The tractate has also been dedicated in memory of Sarah bat Adele, by Celia and Isaac Jemal. May they be meritorious in their performance of mitzvot. Today's page, Daf Kaf Gimmel, has been dedicated by Binyamin ben Shoshana for the complete recovery of Shlomo ben Shoshana. Today's page is also dedicated in memory of Avraham ben Esther, and in memory of Mazal bat Frida, who passed away prematurely. Today's page is being studied for the complete recovery of Hacham Ovadia Yosef ben Georgia. May He heal him among the other sick of the Jewish people.
We begin today's discussion with the Mishnah on Kaf Bet Amud Bet, seven lines from the bottom. The Mishnah states: "One who makes his sukkah on top of a wagon or on top of a boat, it is valid, and one may ascend into it on a holiday." The first case describes a sukkah built on a wagon. As depicted in illustration 39 of the Hod v'Hadar, a sukkah is placed on the back of a wagon drawn by horses. The Mishnah declares this sukkah valid. The second case involves a sukkah built on top of a boat, as shown in illustration 40. Both cases are deemed valid by the Mishnah.
Rashi explains that even though the sukkah moves and is not stationary, and even if it's placed on the highest part of a boat where the sea is very high and mountains do not block the wind, allowing the wind to easily dislodge it, it is still valid. This is because a temporary dwelling is sufficient. Rashi clarifies that even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who requires a permanent dwelling, this type of sukkah is considered sufficiently permanent. The key is that when the sukkah moves, its entire floor moves with it, preventing a change in the floor's status. Unlike a bed that was moved in a previous discussion, where moving it changed the floor and made it temporary, here the floor remains integral to the sukkah's movement, thus qualifying as permanent enough for Rabbi Yehuda. So, Rashi is not suggesting it is merely a temporary dwelling that Rabbi Yehuda would invalidate, but rather a type of temporary dwelling that Rabbi Yehuda would consider valid due to its integrated movement. The Mishnah also states that one may ascend into these sukkot on a holiday. This is not a novel ruling, but rather a preface to later cases where ascending a sukkah on a holiday is restricted.
The Mishnah continues with the next case, on the third line: "One who makes his sukkah on top of a tree." This is shown in illustration 41. Rashi clarifies that this means one has constructed a seat at the top of the tree and built four walls and a roof (sechach) there, not merely using the tree as a wall. This is essentially a treehouse. The Mishnah also discusses a sukkah built "on top of a camel," depicted in illustration 42, where a sukkah is placed between the humps of a camel with sechach. In both these cases, the sukkah is valid, but "one may not ascend into it on a holiday." This is due to a rabbinic decree (gezeirah) that prohibits ascending a tree on a holiday, lest one come to break off a branch. Similarly, one cannot ride an animal on a holiday, lest one pull a branch to whip the animal. The novelty of this ruling is that even though these sukkot cannot be used for the full seven days of the holiday (because one cannot enter them on a holiday), they are still valid for the intermediate days (Chol HaMoed) when these restrictions do not apply.
The Mishnah then presents further cases concerning sukkot in trees. "If two of its walls are supported by the tree, and one by human effort." Illustration 43 shows a case where one sidewall extends to the ground and is self-supporting, while the other walls, including a central wall, rest on the tree stump. Rashi explains this as the majority of the sukkah leaning against the tree, with two walls built on the tree's top and one wall built by human effort on the ground, with the middle wall also resting on the tree. The next case is "two by human effort, and one by the tree," as seen in illustration 44. Here, two walls (e.g., a sidewall and a central wall) extend to the ground and are self-supporting, while the third wall rests on the tree stump. In both these scenarios, the Mishnah states the sukkah is valid, but "one may not ascend into it on a holiday."
Rashi explains the reason for this restriction: "Since if the tree were removed, the sukkah's floor would fall, as it cannot stand solely with the two walls supported by the ground, one may not ascend into it on a holiday." The tree is vital for the sukkah's structural integrity. While using a tree for walls is halachically permissible (as walls can be made of anything, unlike sechach which has specific requirements), if the tree is a supporting element, it falls under the rabbinic prohibition of using a tree on a holiday. Therefore, even though the sukkah itself is valid, one cannot enter it on a holiday. The final case of the Mishnah states: "If three walls are supported by human effort, and one by the tree." In illustration 45, three walls rest on the ground, and only a part of the sukkah, perhaps its floor, rests on the tree stump. In this instance, if the tree were removed, the sukkah would still stand. Therefore, it is not considered "using a tree" in a prohibited way. One could use a ladder to ascend, and the sukkah is valid, and "one may ascend into it on a holiday." The general rule for these cases is: "Any sukkah that, if the tree were removed, could stand on its own, is valid, and one may ascend into it on a holiday."
The Gemara now begins its analysis, asking: "Who is the author of our Mishnah?" Specifically, regarding the ruling that a sukkah on a boat is valid. The Gemara answers: "It is Rabbi Akiva." This follows a Braita (an external teaching) that states: "One who makes his sukkah on top of a boat, Rabban Gamliel invalidates it, and Rabbi Akiva validates it." The Gemara then recounts a story: "It happened that Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Akiva were traveling on a boat during Sukkot. Rabbi Akiva stood up and made a sukkah on top of the boat." The commentators note that Rabbi Akiva would have placed it in a safer location if possible, but due to lack of space, he built it on the exposed deck, unconcerned by the wind. "The next day, a wind blew and dismantled it. Rabban Gamliel said to him, 'Akiva, where is your sukkah?'" This implies Rabban Gamliel's view that a sukkah on a boat is invalid.
Abaye explains the underlying reasons for their disagreement. He states: "Everyone agrees that if the sukkah cannot withstand a normal land wind, it is nothing." Rashi clarifies that such a sukkah is not even considered a temporary dwelling, and is therefore invalid. Conversely, "if it can withstand an unusually strong land wind, everyone agrees it is valid." Rashi notes that an "unusually strong land wind" is comparable to a "normal sea wind," as sea winds are generally stronger. So, if a sukkah can withstand the stronger, normal sea winds, it is universally considered valid. The disagreement arises "when it can withstand a normal land wind but cannot withstand an unusually strong land wind," which is equivalent to a normal sea wind. "Rabban Gamliel holds that a sukkah requires a permanent dwelling, and since it cannot withstand a normal sea wind, it is nothing." However, "Rabbi Akiva holds that a sukkah requires a temporary dwelling, and since it can withstand a normal land wind, it is valid." Even though it's on the sea, its ability to withstand normal land winds is sufficient for it to be considered a temporary dwelling. Rashi reiterates that even for those who require a permanent dwelling, it only needs to withstand normal sea winds, not exceptionally strong ones.
The Gemara moves to the next case: "Or on top of a camel." Our Mishnah states this sukkah is valid. The Gemara asks: "Who is the author of our Mishnah?" It answers: "It is Rabbi Meir." This is based on a Braita: "One who makes his sukkah on top of an animal, Rabbi Meir validates it, and Rabbi Yehuda invalidates it." The Gemara asks: "What is Rabbi Yehuda's reason?" It cites the verse: "The Festival of Sukkot you shall observe for seven days." Rabbi Yehuda interprets this to mean: "A sukkah fit for seven days is called a sukkah; a sukkah not fit for seven days is not called a sukkah." Since the Rabbis decreed that one cannot ride an animal on a holiday, this sukkah cannot be used for seven days. Even though the decree is rabbinic, it renders the sukkah unfit to fulfill the Torah's requirement of a seven-day dwelling. Therefore, it is invalid. "Rabbi Meir, however, holds: From a Torah perspective, this sukkah is fit, and it is only the Rabbis who made a decree concerning it." He argues that a rabbinic decree does not invalidate the sukkah's fundamental Torah-level fitness for seven days. Thus, from a Torah perspective, it remains a seven-day sukkah and is valid. Rashi explains Rabbi Yehuda's view: "Since the Rabbis decreed that one may not ascend into it, it is found to be unfit for the first day."
The Gemara then discusses a case where "one uses an animal as a wall for the sukkah." Illustration 46 shows a live cow used as a sukkah wall. The question is whether a live animal can serve as a wall. The Gemara states: "Rabbi Meir invalidates it, and Rabbi Yehuda validates it." The positions are now reversed. "For Rabbi Meir used to say: Any item that has life, one may not use it for the following: neither as a wall for a sukkah, nor as a lechi for an alleyway." In the context of an alleyway (mavoi) leading to a public domain (reshut harabbim), the Rabbis require a lechi (a vertical pole) at the entrance to permit carrying. Illustration 47 shows an animal used as a lechi, which Rabbi Meir deems invalid. "Nor as posts for wells." In Masechet Eruvin, we learn that for a well in a public domain, the Rabbis were lenient, allowing L-shaped posts (pasaei beirot) to be placed around it to permit carrying. Rabbi Meir holds that an animal cannot be used for one of these posts. Rashi explains that a well (bor) ten handbreadths deep is considered a private domain (reshut hayachid), and one cannot draw water from it (carrying from private to public) unless it is enclosed by walls. For pilgrims' animals needing water, the Rabbis permitted using four L-shaped posts. Rabbi Meir says an animal cannot be one of these posts. "Nor as a golel for a grave." A golel is a cover for a coffin. Rabbi Meir says an animal cannot serve as this cover. Rashi clarifies that if an animal is used as a coffin cover, it is not considered a golel, which has implications for ritual impurity (tumah), as a golel normally transmits impurity upon touch. This animal would not transmit impurity. The Gemara further states, in the name of Rabbi Yossi HaGlili: "One may not even write a bill of divorce (get) for women on it." This refers to writing on the hide of a living animal, then giving the animal to the woman as a conditional get.
The Gemara asks: "What is Rabbi Meir's reason" for invalidating all these cases? Abaye answers: "Perhaps it will die." The concern is that if the animal dies, it will fall, and the wall of the sukkah, for instance, would no longer be ten handbreadths high. This would invalidate the sukkah. The same applies to the lechi or the posts for wells. The Gemara will later challenge this regarding the golel, asking what difference it makes if it dies. Abaye's reason is a rabbinic decree (gezeirah) that the animal might die on a holiday and fall, leaving the sukkah without a wall, thus invalidating the sukkah. Rabbi Zeira offers a different reason: "Perhaps it will run away." This means a live animal used as a wall might simply walk away, leaving the sukkah without a wall, or the alleyway without a lechi. So there is a major disagreement between Abaye and Rabbi Zeira regarding the reason for the invalidation: is it the fear of death or the fear of escape?
The Gemara explores the practical difference (nafka mina) between these two opinions: "In the case of a tied elephant." If an elephant is tied as a sukkah wall, everyone agrees it is valid. Why? "Because even if it dies, its carcass still has a height of ten handbreadths." An elephant is so large that even if it collapses, its body would still be tall enough to form a valid wall. And "we are not concerned it will run away" because it is tied. Thus, according to both Abaye and Rabbi Zeira, a tied elephant as a sukkah wall is valid. Rashi confirms that since there is no concern about it running away, everyone, including Rabbi Meir (who usually invalidates), would validate this case. (A side note: one would also need to ensure the elephant's presence does not create an unbearable stench, which would also invalidate the sukkah as an unpleasant dwelling.)
The Gemara then refines the point of contention: "Where they disagree is concerning an untied elephant." According to Abaye, who fears death, "we are not concerned it will die" because even if it dies, it retains its height. However, according to Rabbi Zeira, who fears escape, "we are concerned it will run away." Therefore, an untied elephant would be invalid according to Rabbi Zeira, but valid according to Abaye. The Gemara then challenges Abaye: "According to him who says the decree is because it might die, why does he not also suspect it might run away?" Running away seems a more common occurrence than sudden death. The Gemara retracts its previous distinction: "Rather, concerning an untied elephant, everyone agrees it is invalid." This is because even Abaye, who primarily fears death, would certainly also fear escape, which is a more common scenario. So an untied elephant is invalid for everyone due to the concern it might run away.
The Gemara then re-establishes the point of disagreement: "Where they disagree is concerning a tied animal" (not an elephant). "According to him who says the decree is because it might die, we are concerned" because if a regular animal dies, it collapses and would no longer have the required ten handbreadths. "According to him who says the decree is because it might run away, we are not concerned" because it is tied. This is the true practical difference between Abaye and Rabbi Zeira: a tied, regular-sized animal. The Gemara then asks Rabbi Zeira: "According to him who says the decree is because it might run away, why does he not suspect it might die?" Rabbi Zeira answers: "Death is not common; we do not suspect death." He argues that death is an infrequent occurrence, so even Rabbi Meir (the invalidating opinion) would not be concerned about it. Rabbi Meir's concern is only about the animal running away, which is prevented by tying it.
The Gemara raises another issue: "But there is an airspace in between." This refers to the space between the animal's legs and the ground, and between its front and back legs. If this airspace is more than three handbreadths, it invalidates the wall, as a wall must be continuous. So how can it be valid even if tied? The Gemara answers: "One fills it with branches and leaves." This means the space beneath the animal's stomach and between its legs is filled, as seen in illustration 49, to eliminate any invalidating airspace. The Gemara then asks: "But perhaps it will crouch?" Even if it doesn't die, an animal might crouch, which would lower its height below ten handbreadths, invalidating the wall. The Gemara answers: "One ties it with ropes from above." This means the animal is suspended or held up by ropes from the sukkah's top, preventing it from crouching. So, to be valid, the animal must be tied from above to prevent crouching, and the bottom space filled with branches.
The Gemara then challenges Abaye again: "But according to him who says the decree is because it might die, if it is tied with ropes from above, what is the concern?" If the animal is suspended, even if it dies, it won't collapse and lose its height. The Gemara answers: "Sometimes one sets it up with less than three handbreadths near the sechach." This refers to a specific scenario: the wall is exactly ten handbreadths high, with the animal's head, for example, being 2.9 handbreadths from the sechach. In this case, we apply the principle of lavud (joining), where a gap of less than three handbreadths is considered closed, making the wall effectively reach the sechach. However, "when it dies, it crouches a little," as Rashi explains, becoming smaller and shrinking. This slight drop could make the gap exactly three handbreadths or more, nullifying the lavud principle and invalidating the wall. The concern is that "he will not realize it." A person sitting in the sukkah might not notice this subtle change, continuing to sit in an invalid sukkah. This specific scenario, where a minimum sukkah with a tied animal might become invalid upon the animal's death without the owner's awareness, is why Rabbi Meir invalidates, according to Abaye.
The Gemara then questions Abaye's consistency: "Did Abaye indeed say that Rabbi Meir is concerned about death, and Rabbi Yehuda is not concerned?" We have a contradiction. "For we learned in a Mishnah:" "An Israelite woman married to a Kohen." While married to a Kohen, she may eat terumah. "If her husband went overseas," she may continue to eat terumah because "we assume he is alive." However, "we raised a contradiction to this:" "If he says, 'This is your get (bill of divorce) one hour before my death,' she is forbidden to eat terumah immediately." In this case, the husband wants to prevent his wife from falling to yibbum (levirate marriage) if he dies childless. By activating the get one second before his death, she is considered divorced before he dies. But the Mishnah states she cannot eat terumah from that moment on. Why? Because at any moment, he might die, activating the get and making her no longer married to a Kohen. Thus, she is immediately forbidden terumah, implying a concern for death. This contradicts the first case, where we assume he is alive. How can we reconcile these? "And Abaye said: There is no contradiction. One (the first Mishnah) is Rabbi Meir, who is not concerned about death; the other (the second Mishnah) is Rabbi Yehuda, who is concerned about death." But this is the opposite of what Abaye said regarding the sukkah! There, Abaye said Rabbi Meir is concerned about death, and Rabbi Yehuda is not.
Rashi explains the get case: the husband fears sudden death, which would obligate his childless wife to yibbum. By giving a conditional get, he ensures she is divorced just before his death. She is immediately forbidden terumah because at any moment, he might die, and she would then be divorced. This implies death is common and a concern. Abaye resolved this contradiction by attributing the lenient view (not concerned about death) to Rabbi Meir and the stringent view (concerned about death) to Rabbi Yehuda. To support his claim that Rabbi Meir is not concerned about death, Abaye cites another Braita: "One who buys wine from Kutim (Samaritans)." Before later rabbinic decrees, their wine was permissible, but they were not reliable in separating tithes (terumot and ma'asrot). If one buys wine from them on Friday night (Shabbat), when separating tithes is forbidden, one can say: "Two logs that I will separate from the hundred for terumah, behold, they are terumah." This relies on the principle of retroactive selection (bereirah). "Ten for the first tithe, and nine for the second tithe." The second tithe can be redeemed by transferring its sanctity to a coin in one's home. "And he may immediately drink." This is the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Rashi elaborates that one may drink immediately, relying on retroactive selection, and when he returns home, he will physically separate the tithes. However, "Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yossi, and Rabbi Shimon forbid it." Rashi explains their reasoning: "We are concerned that the wineskin might burst, and it will not come to retroactive selection." If the jug breaks, one would have consumed untithed wine (tevel). Rashi concludes: "Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda is concerned about the bursting of the wineskin, and all the more so about the death of a person." If Rabbi Yehuda is concerned about a wineskin bursting, which one can control, he would certainly be concerned about human death, which is beyond control. This Braita, according to Abaye, demonstrates that Rabbi Meir is not concerned about such events (like the wineskin bursting, and by extension, death), while Rabbi Yehuda is. This directly contradicts Abaye's earlier statement in the sukkah discussion.
The Gemara concludes: "Switch them!" The opinions must be reversed in the get case. It must be that Rabbi Meir is concerned about death, and Rabbi Yehuda is not. Rashi clarifies that Abaye's original explanation of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda in the sukkah discussion was correct. The contradiction arose from misinterpreting Abaye's stance in the get case. The Gemara will now proceed to reconcile all opinions, affirming that Rabbi Meir is indeed the one who suspects death, and Rabbi Yehuda is not. Blessed is the Lord forever, Amen and Amen. For the benefit of our listeners to Masechet Sukkah, we refer to several books for illustrations: Hamaor Hamvuar, the picture book on Masechet Sukkah, and a new book called Hahod Vehahadar, as well as Peirush Chai on Masechet Sukkah.